Is 'Grouping' Intelligence Possible?

[Kherubin]

I recently read a book on the theory of intelligence by Jeff Hawkins aptly titled 'On Intelligence' which I highly recommend. In it, Hawkins posits that the basis of human intelligence lies in the hierarchical structure of the neocortex.

How does the brain work?
The seat of intelligence is the neocortex. Even though it has a great number of abilities and powerful flexibility, the neocortex is surprisingly regular in its structural details. The different parts of the neocortex, whether they are responsible for vision, hearing, touch, or language, all work on the same principles. The key to understanding the neocortex is understanding these common principles and, in particular, its hierarchical structure. We will examine the neocortex in sufficient detail to show how its structure captures the structure of the world. -- On Intelligence

Reading this book started me thinking about whether human intelligence is actually just one among many possible intelligences, or whether that is, in actuality, a contradiction in terms. Is human intelligence, by definition, the only kind that can exist?


Further to this, I would like to generalize the question even more. I think one of the myriad reasons intelligence fascinates us is because it appears that an esoteric, abstract phenomena arises from a, albeit complex, material predicate.

Along these lines, I have been wondering whether intelligence itself belongs to a 'set' (in the mathematical sense) of other potential physical phenomena. I am interested in what form this 'set' would take along with the other 'members' of the grouping. Perhaps intelligence is one of many, seemingly 'abstract' phenomena which can arise from the complex organization of matter.

I would like to hear the thoughts of others on this matter, and apologize if my musings are a little 'out there' for some people.

All the best, and happy philosophizing,
Kherubin

 

[wuliheron]

Intelligence has several definitions and without clarification its difficult to tell what you are asking. The author appears to be talking about higher reasoning which is something the neocortex is famous for, while exactly what you mean is unclear. For example, wikipedia describes intelligence as referring to "...abstract thought, understanding, communication, reasoning, learning, planning, emotional intelligence and problem solving. Thus we might say a computer program has a certain amount of intelligence and mean something very different from when we talk about a person.

 

[Kherubin]

Sorry, but my thoughts on this matter are a bit difficult to articulate, because these concepts are so esoteric in themselves.

Thus we might say a computer program has a certain amount of intelligence and mean something very different from when we talk about a person.

Exactly! By the above definition of intelligence, it could be fair to say that computer programs have a limited form of 'intelligence' and that that form of intelligence is distinct from a human being's.

I suppose the easiest way to rephrase the small-scale, narrower aspect of my question is to resort to the 'alien worlds' tactic used in other philosophical arguments, i.e. if aliens evolved on a planet far removed from ours, would they have the same 'intelligence' we do?

Our intelligence seems to have evolved to be a superior pattern-recognition tool. My question is: is this (pattern-recognition) what intelligence is (as Jeff Hawkins posits in his book)? Or could other potential forms of intelligence exist that are built on different principles? I grasp that this somewhat becomes a question of semantics, depending on how you define intelligence and with a sufficiently generalized definition, everything could come under its remit, but I was simply inquisitive as to other people's thoughts on how unique 'our' intelligence is.



The second part of my question is even more 'fantastical' and is dependent upon people's beliefs on the extent to which the brain is the material predicate of the mind. If, however, you are a materialist, like me, it seems reasonable to ask whether or not intelligence/consciousness is just one seemingly abstract entity among many which can be produced by the complex arrangement of matter. If we arranged matter in other complicated manners, what kind of other 'ethereal' phenomena may arise.

I know that with our current, limited understanding of the universe, the second question is somewhat unreasonable, but I just wanted to give others the opportunity to imagine the possibilities.


Hope this helps,
Kherubin

 

[wuliheron]

Exactly! By the above definition of intelligence, it could be fair to say that computer programs have a limited form of 'intelligence' and that that form of intelligence is distinct from a human being's.

Our intelligence seems to have evolved to be a superior pattern-recognition tool. My question is: is this (pattern-recognition) what intelligence is (as Jeff Hawkins posits in his book)? Or could other potential forms of intelligence exist that are built on different principles? I grasp that this somewhat becomes a question of semantics, depending on how you define intelligence and with a sufficiently generalized definition, everything could come under its remit, but I was simply inquisitive as to other people's thoughts on how unique 'our' intelligence is.

That's as much a psychological question as it is a philosophical one and we just don't have a definitive psychology with which to even begin to debate the issue. In other words, its pretty much anyone's guess at this point.

The second part of my question is even more 'fantastical' and is dependent upon people's beliefs on the extent to which the brain is the material predicate of the mind. If, however, you are a materialist, like me, it seems reasonable to ask whether or not intelligence/consciousness is just one seemingly abstract entity among many which can be produced by the complex arrangement of matter. If we arranged matter in other complicated manners, what kind of other 'ethereal' phenomena may arise.

I know that with our current, limited understanding of the universe, the second question is somewhat unreasonable, but I just wanted to give others the opportunity to imagine the possibilities.


Hope this helps,
Kherubin

This sounds to me more like a metaphysical debate then anything else since we have no real criteria upon which to extrapolate.

 

[Kherubin]

That's as much a psychological question as it is a philosophical one and we just don't have a definitive psychology with which to even begin to debate the issue. In other words, its pretty much anyone's guess at this point.

I wholeheartedly agree, these sorts of questions lie at the very edge of our current knowledgebase, but I would still be interested to hear your and others' opinions on the matter.

Thanks,
Kherubin

 

[apeiron]

I recently read a book on the theory of intelligence by Jeff Hawkins aptly titled 'On Intelligence' which I highly recommend...Along these lines, I have been wondering whether intelligence itself belongs to a 'set' (in the mathematical sense) of other potential physical phenomena.

The essence of mind does always boil down to forward-modelling for the purpose of controlling reality. And this general need also generally generalises () to a hierarchical or systems view. Top-down contraints in interaction with bottom-up degrees of freedom.

So yes, generalising the notion of intelligence to a metaphysics, and even concrete mathematical models, is a project of many scientists and philosophers.

That is what Peircean semiotics, systems science, hierarchy theory, are all doing in various related ways.

Hawkins was kind of annoying orginally because he came out talking as if he had invented something. But he seems now to have discovered that many others were already thinking these things (and had got a lot further).

 

[Kherubin]

The essence of mind does always boil down to forward-modelling for the purpose of controlling reality.

By this you mean that all minds, and by extension brains, regardless of structure or origin, will take this form (i.e. that is what it is to have a mind at all)? Alien minds, whatever their material basis, will attempt to model reality in an effort to control it?

That would bring me then to my second question, which I concede may be unanswerable, do these 'forward-modeling' minds belong to a group of other seemingly abstract entities with material bases, with the other members of said group allowing for different processes than forward-modeling?

I grasp that my second question is tenuous, at best, but I'm simply interested in the products of others' imaginations since mine is so flimsy.

Thank you again,
Kherubin

 

[apeiron]

I grasp that my second question is tenuous, at best, but I'm simply interested in the products of others' imaginations since mine is so flimsy.

The question seems to hinge on the notion of "ethereal". You appear to mean a property of some material arrangement that does not seem particularly concrete or necessary, but rather epiphenomenal.

I guess people who believe in the singularity (or global brain, groupmind, noosphere) can imagine the internet coming alive and doing its own thing, having some kind of higher level stream of thinking and conversation with itself that is out of our reach. We would be able to sense the buzz of something going on, but that higher level has taken flight and become a realm of its own. Is that the kind of thing you mean?

 

[Frankly]

I think what youre asking is, are different 'flavors' of mind possible.

Is our consciousness uniquely human, or is it sort of a generic form of consciousness that any sufficiently sophisticated brain anywhere would experience, even if it evolved on another planet and its biology was unimaginably different from ours?

Do differently evolved brains produce different sorts of consciousness, or what you could call different subjective realities?

Is this what youre asking, or should I just honk my horn and trundle back to the lame jokes thread on my unicycle?

 

[Kherubin]

The question seems to hinge on the notion of "ethereal". You appear to mean a property of some material arrangement that does not seem particularly concrete or necessary, but rather epiphenomenal.

Is that the kind of thing you mean?

It absolutely depends on the notion of the 'ethereal'. I, as a materialist, consider the mind to be ultimately and entirely, a product of the brain. However, I think that one of the things that fascinates us so about the mind is the fact that it (in the form of consciousness) appears to be an abstract entity entirely divorced from its material predicate, the brain. From a personal point of view, this 'feels' as if the two are distinct.

This disparity 'feels' SO real that it allowed the philosophy of dualism to arise in the first place.

My question comes down to whether or not the mind is the only ethereal entity can arise from the complex organization of matter. I can conceive of lots of other complex forms of matter entirely different from the two pound lumps in our skull, and my question concerns whether any of these give rise to other, entirely diverse, 'ethereal' entities. To my mind , I can see no reason why human minds are special.

I think what you're asking is, are different 'flavors' of mind possible.

Is our consciousness uniquely human, or is it sort of a generic form of consciousness that any sufficiently sophisticated brain anywhere would experience, even if it evolved on another planet and its biology was unimaginably different from ours?

Do differently evolved brains produce different sorts of consciousness, or what you could call different subjective realities?

Is this what you're asking, or should I just honk my horn and trundle back to the lame jokes thread on my unicycle?

Exactly! I could not have put it better myself.

Please don't go back on your unicycle. These are precisely the kinds of questions I'm interested in.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

It absolutely depends on the notion of the 'ethereal'. I, as a materialist, consider the mind to be ultimately and entirely, a product of the brain. However, I think that one of the things that fascinates us so about the mind is the fact that it (in the form of consciousness) appears to be an abstract entity entirely divorced from its material predicate, the brain. From a personal point of view, this 'feels' as if the two are distinct.

This disparity 'feels' SO real that it allowed the philosophy of dualism to arise in the first place.

My question comes down to whether or not the mind is the only ethereal entity can arise from the complex organization of matter. I can conceive of lots of other complex forms of matter entirely different from the two pound lumps in our skull, and my question concerns whether any of these give rise to other, entirely diverse, 'ethereal' entities. To my mind , I can see no reason why human minds are special.

You're looking for the term emergence, ethereal has too many mystical mumbo-jumbo associations. All evidence points to the brain as being the seat of the mind, the emergent property of human brain action is consciousness.

I'd be surprised if human consciousness was the only possible. The novel Blindsight deals with many of these issues. The bottom of the wikipedia page has a link to a free online copy released under creative commons.

 

[Kherubin]

Thank you for the link ryan_m_b.

You're looking for the term emergence, ethereal has too many mystical mumbo-jumbo associations.

I apologize. You're absolutely right, that sounds like a more useful term.

I guess the question I should then be asking is, are there any other 'emergent' properties which may arise from sufficiently complex arrangements of matter?

 

[Giantevilhead]

The problem is that there is no set definition for a lot of psychological concepts like intelligence so having a debate about intelligence is like having a debate about how many pounds a rock weighs when there's no widely accepted definition for "pound."

 

[apeiron]

The problem is that there is no set definition for a lot of psychological concepts like intelligence so having a debate about intelligence is like having a debate about how many pounds a rock weighs when there's no widely accepted definition for "pound."

So you don't agree on a definition based on the capacity to forward model reality - to anticipate the consequences of courses of action?

 

[Giantevilhead]

So you don't agree on a definition based on the capacity to forward model reality - to anticipate the consequences of courses of action?

It doesn't really matter whether or not I agree with a definition. What matters is that there has to be a standardized definition so that the word can be useful in conveying and analyzing information.

For example, I may think that the green spectrum of light should be between 550 to 480 nm but because the standardized definition of green is between 560 and 490 nm, I know that when someone says that the light is green, that the light is between 560 and 490 nm even if I don't subjectively view the light as being green.

It's the same thing with intelligence. It doesn't matter how good you think a definition is, what matters is that other people have to also use that definition. Without a standardized definition, what you call "intelligent" may be a completely different set of abilities and behaviors than what I call "intelligent," and that limits the usefulness of the word in conveying information.

 

[apeiron]

It doesn't really matter whether or not I agree with a definition. What matters is that there has to be a standardized definition so that the word can be useful in conveying and analyzing information.

Your point seems strained because clearly there is a difference between the complaint that our definitions of intelligence seem rather vague, and hence insufficiently crisp, and the separate complaint you make that "a definition does not even exist".

You may also be confounding measures of individual difference in intelligence (ie: IQ tests) with the generic idea of intelligence (as an ethereal or emergent property of a complex system) that was in fact the OP.

So we are talking about "intelligence" in the indeed rather vague and generic sense of a knowing, sentient, being.

For example, I may think that the green spectrum of light should be between 550 to 480 nm but because the standardized definition of green is between 560 and 490 nm, I know that when someone says that the light is green, that the light is between 560 and 490 nm even if I don't subjectively view the light as being green.

Where's the difficulty in allowing a 10 nm wiggle room here? If you agree that your response has to be defined in terms of a "standard" response, then where is the problem in using a population average to define that standard? The fact that you are probably also not of exact average height or weight does not make the whole concept of height or weight invalid.

It's the same thing with intelligence. It doesn't matter how good you think a definition is, what matters is that other people have to also use definition. Without a standardized definition, what you call "intelligent" may be a completely different set of abilities and behaviors than what I call "intelligent," and that limits the usefulness of the word in conveying information.

Which comes back to the argument I made. I suggested a single general definition of intelligence (which is backed up by a lot of psychology and neuroscience that I could cite). So this in turn can act as a constraint on the speculation being asked for here.

OK, let's talk about other intelligences. You might say I can imagine an entirely different set of mental functions because intelligence just seems like a loosely bundled collection of cognitive components. And I reply no, in fact there may be a single generic process that must characterise any imaginable form of life. So for that reason, alien intelligence would have to be like ours in that fashion.

So now you can go on to say, well there are these obvious flaws in your generic definition, and here is the literature to back up my comments.

You can't just state there are no generic definitions of intelligence as I have already put one on the table.

 

[Giantevilhead]

Your point seems strained because clearly there is a difference between the complaint that our definitions of intelligence seem rather vague, and hence insufficiently crisp, and the separate complaint you make that "a definition does not even exist".

You may also be confounding measures of individual difference in intelligence (ie: IQ tests) with the generic idea of intelligence (as an ethereal or emergent property of a complex system) that was in fact the OP.

So we are talking about "intelligence" in the indeed rather vague and generic sense of a knowing, sentient, being.

I didn't say that a definition does not even exist. I said that there is no set definition, as in there are no standardized definitions. Psychologists and neurologists in different fields have their own definitions but there isn't a consensus in the way that all physicists and chemists have set definitions for the terms they use in measuring and describing the universe.

Where's the difficulty in allowing a 10 nm wiggle room here? If you agree that your response has to be defined in terms of a "standard" response, then where is the problem in using a population average to define that standard? The fact that you are probably also not of exact average height or weight does not make the whole concept of height or weight invalid.

I never said that having "wiggle room" for definitions makes them useless. It simply makes them less useful for conveying information. For example, if you define green as between a different spectrum of light than the way I define it then when I tell you that the light is green, there is a chance that there could be a misunderstanding since you might consider the light I'm talking about to be blue. That kind of misunderstanding can be greatly reduced if a standardized system is used.

Which comes back to the argument I made. I suggested a single general definition of intelligence (which is backed up by a lot of psychology and neuroscience that I could cite). So this in turn can act as a constraint on the speculation being asked for here.

OK, let's talk about other intelligences. You might say I can imagine an entirely different set of mental functions because intelligence just seems like a loosely bundled collection of cognitive components. And I reply no, in fact there may be a single generic process that must characterise any imaginable form of life. So for that reason, alien intelligence would have to be like ours in that fashion.

So now you can go on to say, well there are these obvious flaws in your generic definition, and here is the literature to back up my comments.

You can't just state there are no generic definitions of intelligence as I have already put one on the table.

You define intelligence as "the capacity to forward model reality - to anticipate the consequences of courses of action." Is "intelligence" independent of that capacity or is "intelligence" a label for that capacity? Does someone have that capacity because they have "intelligence" or is "intelligence" just a word that you use to describe that capacity?

 

[apeiron]

I didn't say that a definition does not even exist. I said that there is no set definition, as in there are no standardized definitions. Psychologists and neurologists in different fields have their own definitions but there isn't a consensus in the way that all physicists and chemists have set definitions for the terms they use in measuring and describing the universe.

I don't get the impression here that you know enough about what they do say to judge. Prove me wrong by citing some references if you like...

You define intelligence as "the capacity to forward model reality - to anticipate the consequences of courses of action." Is "intelligence" independent of that capacity or is "intelligence" a label for that capacity? Does someone have that capacity because they have "intelligence" or is "intelligence" just a word that you use to describe that capacity?

Clearly, I defined intelligence as that capacity. It evolves to do that thing. To claim it arises to do other things that are clearly unrelated would be to dispute my definition.

 

[Giantevilhead]

I don't get the impression here that you know enough about what they do say to judge. Prove me wrong by citing some references if you like...

Just look at all the "theories" concerning intelligence, Thrustone's primary mental abilities, Gardner's multiple intelligences, Sternberg's triarchic theory, etc. They don't all conform to the APA's definition of intelligence.

Clearly, I defined intelligence as that capacity. It evolves to do that thing. To claim it arises to do other things that are clearly unrelated would be to dispute my definition.

If intelligence is defined as that capacity then intelligence is not a thing, it's simply a definition. What is important then is not "intelligence," but the capacity that intelligence describes. For example, if a child is good a chess, gets good grades, and has good memory, then that child is described as intelligent. However, intelligence is simply a label for someone with those abilities. Saying that the child is good a chess, gets good grades, and has good memory because he's intelligent doesn't really explain anything. What we need to ask is what specific events led to the development of those abilities.

 

[apeiron]

Just look at all the "theories" concerning intelligence, Thrustone's primary mental abilities, Gardner's multiple intelligences, Sternberg's triarchic theory, etc. They don't all conform to the APA's definition of intelligence.

I agree that if you focus on precisely those psychologists who try to define intelligence by ennumerating its sub-components, then you will be disappointed with the result.

Like a Swiss army knife, the idea seems superficially attractive but is a pretty useless implement in practice.

So that is why I go with those taking a generic approach to intelligence - one with a central purpose guiding its design.

So for example the current Bayesian brain approach - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_brain

If intelligence is defined as that capacity then intelligence is not a thing, it's simply a definition. What is important then is not "intelligence," but the capacity that intelligence describes. For example, if a child is good a chess, gets good grades, and has good memory, then that child is described as intelligent. However, intelligence is simply a label for someone with those abilities. Saying that the child is good a chess, gets good grades, and has good memory because he's intelligent doesn't really explain anything. What we need to ask is what specific events led to the development of those abilities.

Intelligence is not a thing but a process. It is a capacity to do something rather than the capacity to be something.

As to your child, a generic definition of intelligence as an evolutionary capacity for smart forward modelling would already tell you that chess, grades and even "good memory" (for what? facts, faces, skills?) are too culturally specific as tasks to really be what we are talking about.

That is why Gardner et al can make a career correcting for a too culture-centric initial definition of intelligence. Oh, but little Johnny's also good at music, empathy, woodwork, etc. Everyone's a genius in their own way.

So yes, it is very important to separate theories about biologically evolved generic capacities from particular culture-laden judgements about what impresses most.

Now if you have a specific argument against "future-modelling" being what brains are about, and also why consciousness feels like what it feels like, then let's hear it.

 

[Giantevilhead]

But the word is already so burdened by cultural context. It's already been appropriated to describe certain culturally relevant traits. Children who excel academically are often called intelligent while children who are excel at sport are instead called athletic or coordinated but not intelligent. A physicist is considered to be intelligent while an great actor is considered to be expressive or passionate but not intelligent.

Does it really serve us to try to redefine the word to be as culturally neutral as possible or would it be better to just use another word or invent a new word?

 

[apeiron]

But the word is already so burdened by cultural context. It's already been appropriated to describe certain culturally relevant traits. Children who excel academically are often called intelligent while children who are excel at sport are instead called athletic or coordinated but not intelligent. A physicist is considered to be intelligent while an great actor is considered to be expressive or passionate but not intelligent.

Does it really serve us to try to redefine the word to be as culturally neutral as possible or would it be better to just use another word or invent a new word?

Take it up with the OP. I didn't insist on the word here and would pretty much never use it myself. I would instead talk directly about anticipation, or modelling, or whatever.

On the other hand, I see no real difficulty in using it how the OP intended - as a generic question about sentience. I mean, have you even read the OP yet? Certainly you have said nothing that addresses it, just gone off on a tangent about a word you don't feel is properly definable.

 

[Kherubin]

I understand that the notion of 'intelligence' is tenuous at best, and individuals will have their own understandings of its meaning, however, I was hoping that my questions were sufficiently generalized as to avoid that problem.

If you are worried about definitions, or dismayed by the semantics of psychology, maybe its best to avoid the labels entirely. Please don't be restricted by my terminology. If in doubt, use your own.

In truth, a label is not required. In this context, I used 'Intelligence' to mean the whole gamut of the spectrum of human sentience. Do you think this is the only form of 'sentience' that can exist at this level of complexity? Do you think other 'emergent' properties are possible?

There's going to be a problem with 'sentience' isn't there?

 

[cosmographer]

Sentience is a problem too =) I think. Think of a reptile: the sensations it can avail of to move towards the world differently in the next round of encounter are conditioned by the kinds of sensations a reptile body-brain-mind coupling can make available to the reptile consciousness (or whatever else we want to term the highest operatory level of psychophysiological organisation in reptiles). One might be able to group intelligences by bodies, different worlds being made sensible, but then again you run into the problem that real bodies never are regular and that no body shares the mind, circumstance, biography and equipment of another.

With equipment we can make the jump to humans: where is intelligence located when a person thinks with a sheet of paper and a pencil? Where is intelligence located when one requires a habituation to mathematical thought to perform well in that domain? I'd argue that a focus on real world domains, equipment and cultural and biographical enskillment would blow the whole question wide open. And I mean that in the full biological sense. Giantvilehead does imo have apoint in focusing on events. Of course we all have biological bodies, but the building of our persons is quite plastic, totally open to the event, in a normal sense of biographical experience and in the sense of developmental systems evolution.

I think we have in these matters a habit to jump into styles of thought that will statistsize out the contingent specificities we encounter in our lives, in others, and not least in the self-conscious knowing of our own minds. try to think yourself back along any intellectual trajectory. can't you almost pinpoint the events where you acquired the possibilities of thought that you now wield so effortlessly?

My 0.02 Cents: "Intelligences" are much more contingent, personal and "eventful" than scientific approaches will have you think. This is not to say that I think it's wrong to try and average out some features of minds with instruments of scientific measurement, only that the complexity of the picture might be ridiculously underestimated in most approaches.

And a quick addition to apeirons focus on the future-modelling capacities of mind. I agree, that must surely be kind of lowest common denominator for human minds. A thought: are there other realities found in nature that can make pasts, presents and futures part of any present? What I mean to say: is what we call intelligence not perhaps better describable as the making available of pasts and extrapolated futures to make decidable present situations? But surely this can't be a deterministic exercise, we can even play out fantasy scenarios to make decidable a real situation..

 

[Giantevilhead]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=erhmslcHvaw&feature=related

 

[apeiron]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=erhmslcHvaw&feature=related

Thanks for reminding us how woefully impoverished operant psychology was as a theory of mental functioning. But did you have some point to make relevant to the OP?

 

[Giantevilhead]

Thanks for reminding us how woefully impoverished operant psychology was as a theory of mental functioning. But did you have some point to make relevant to the OP?

Really? I would say that the lack of behaviorist driven research is the reason why psychology has so many problems.

If simpler organisms like pigeons can be taught behaviors that we normally associate with more "intelligent" creatures like self awareness and problem solving behavior then what does that say about our definition of "intelligence?"

 

[apeiron]

Really? I would say that the lack of behaviorist driven research is the reason why psychology has so many problems.

If simpler organisms like pigeons can be taught behaviors that we normally associate with more "intelligent" creatures like self awareness and problem solving behavior then what does that say about our definition of "intelligence?"

The intellectual poverty of behaviourism is a different thread - unless you can say how a behaviourist would have answered the OP.

 

[Giantevilhead]

The intellectual poverty of behaviourism is a different thread - unless you can say how a behaviourist would have answered the OP.

The behaviorists would focus on the specific abilities and behaviors that we attribute to "intelligence" rather than worry about the label of intelligence.

Behaviorists recognize how people often conflate the label or description of a phenomenon with its cause. For example, when a child is able to identify itself in a mirror, the child is said to have self awareness. Self awareness is simply a label for the child's ability to identify itself in a mirror. However, many psychologists are treating self awareness like it's the cause of the behavior. They say that the child is able to identify itself in the mirror because it has self awareness, which is like saying that the child is able to identify itself in the mirror because it has the ability to identify itself in a mirror. Similarly, when a child is good at math, people say that it's because the child is intelligent or that good math skills is a sign of intelligence. However, that doesn't actually explain why the child is good at math.

 

[apeiron]

The behaviorists would focus on the specific abilities and behaviors that we attribute to "intelligence" rather than worry about the label of intelligence.

Thanks for proving my point about the impoverished project that was behaviourism.

The OP concerns the general constraints that would shape a universal notion of intelligence.

I supplied a specific suggestion (future modelling) based on the systems approach taken by psychologists, neuroscientists and neural net simulations.

You are stating that behaviourism would be unable to offer any sensible constraints here because as a discourse it simply does not have them to give. The answer must be "well intelligence could be anything I guess".

Skinnerianism wants to model reality solely in terms of efficient cause. It fails to address material, formal or final cause and so in the wider view is pretty much useless for anything.

Or perhaps you can name one really exciting paper on operant conditioning that has appeared in Nature or Science recently.

 

[Giantevilhead]

Thanks for proving my point about the impoverished project that was behaviourism.

The OP concerns the general constraints that would shape a universal notion of intelligence.

I supplied a specific suggestion (future modelling) based on the systems approach taken by psychologists, neuroscientists and neural net simulations.

You are stating that behaviourism would be unable to offer any sensible constraints here because as a discourse it simply does not have them to give. The answer must be "well intelligence could be anything I guess".

Skinnerianism wants to model reality solely in terms of efficient cause. It fails to address material, formal or final cause and so in the wider view is pretty much useless for anything.

Or perhaps you can name one really exciting paper on operant conditioning that has appeared in Nature or Science recently.

Except that's not what I stated at all.

Behaviorists recognize the malleability of a word's meaning. They are unwilling to deal with notions about intelligence precisely because there is no standardized definition since that's like having a physics without standardized definition of measurement. It does not mean they do not believe that a standardized definition cannot be given. That's why Skinner made up his own words with mand, tact, intraverbal, etc., when he wrote his book on verbal behavior.

 

[apeiron]

Behaviorists recognize the malleability of a word's meaning. They are unwilling to deal with notions about intelligence precisely because there is no standardized definition since that's like having a physics without standardized definition of measurement. It does not mean they do not believe that a standardized definition cannot be given. That's why Skinner made up his own words with mand, tact, intraverbal, etc., when he wrote his book on verbal behavior.

So demonstrate the value of the Skinnerian perspective by finally applying it to the OP!

And as has already been explained a few times now, intelligence here actually denotes sentience - smartness + subjectivity. Which is even more off-limits for behaviourists.

 

[loseyourname]

Well, I don't know that this defines intelligence, but intelligence functionally is just a means of manipulating one's environment to set more favorable conditions without relying upon structural adaptations to the body itself, since those take hundreds of generations to take on. It allows 1) the ability of an individual itself to adapt over the course of a lifetime and to change his own environment and 2) to pass on developed skills and technologies without the need for genetic transmission. Humans happen to use adaptive reasoning and language to do this, but I suppose it's conceivable that some other animal or lifeform could use other means, like telekinesis and genetic memory or perhaps something like an independent carrier of personality that latches onto one body at a time but does not die, like reincarnation without the spiritualism, basically the premise of movies about alien parasites that take over our brains.

Again, though, I'm not sure this is really a definition of intelligence so much as a description of its purpose. Intelligence as we commonly use the word probably just means the use of reasoning and language to do these things.

 

[Giantevilhead]

So demonstrate the value of the Skinnerian perspective by finally applying it to the OP!

And as has already been explained a few times now, intelligence here actually denotes sentience - smartness + subjectivity. Which is even more off-limits for behaviourists.

I was not aware the OP had already defined intelligence. In fact, the OP didn't seem to know what intelligence was and was asking what intelligence was.

 

[apeiron]

I was not aware the OP had already defined intelligence. In fact, the OP didn't seem to know what intelligence was and was asking what intelligence was.

OK, breath deep and focus. The OP referenced Hawkins' definition of intelligence.

Here is a good Wiki summary:

Hawkins' basic idea is that the brain is a mechanism to predict the future, specifically, hierarchical regions of the brain predict their future input sequences. Perhaps not always far in the future, but far enough to be of real use to an organism. As such, the brain is a feed forward hierarchical state machine with special properties that enable it to learn.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Intelligence

I said yeah, hardly original. But yes, future-modelling is how we would explain the brain/mind as a generic process. And as Hawkins says, the hierarchical spatiotemporal organisation is key to its ability to model futures. So this is more than a statement about function - what we want the thing to be able to do. It is an assertion about architecture. Hey, this is what a complex adaptive system must look like to do that job.

Now if you saying that both Hawkins and I are failing to define intelligence/sentience in some crucial way, then let's hear it. But a definition was set up to legitimate the thread. And if the OP's questions were not crisply articulated, the gist of what was being asked did not seem hard to understand.

So you can reply "I'm a Skinnerian, I'm outta here". Or you can discuss the OP using the definitions supplied.

 

[Giantevilhead]

The OP also said this:

Further to this, I would like to generalize the question even more. I think one of the myriad reasons intelligence fascinates us is because it appears that an esoteric, abstract phenomena arises from a, albeit complex, material predicate.

Along these lines, I have been wondering whether intelligence itself belongs to a 'set' (in the mathematical sense) of other potential physical phenomena. I am interested in what form this 'set' would take along with the other 'members' of the grouping. Perhaps intelligence is one of many, seemingly 'abstract' phenomena which can arise from the complex organization of matter.

As for the definition of intelligence, a behaviorist would pretty much be fine with any definition so long as it describes observable and measurable phenomenons, provided of course the definition is standardized. Otherwise, they really don't care what behaviors and abilities you put under the label of intelligence, "a rose by any other name" and all that.

 

[Kherubin]

I was really using Hawkin's opinions as a springboard for a a far wider discussion.

In his book Hawkin's espoused his view on the material basis of 'Intelligence', to use his terminology. I am interested in whether others think that this is the only form that said, 'emergent' property can take.

Further to this, I wonder if others have examples, opinions or baseless musings on 'emergent' properties beyond this one.

I think what youre asking is, are different 'flavors' of mind possible.

Is our consciousness uniquely human, or is it sort of a generic form of consciousness that any sufficiently sophisticated brain anywhere would experience, even if it evolved on another planet and its biology was unimaginably different from ours?

Do differently evolved brains produce different sorts of consciousness, or what you could call different subjective realities?

Humans happen to use adaptive reasoning and language to do this, but I suppose it's conceivable that some other animal or lifeform could use other means, like telekinesis and genetic memory or perhaps something like an independent carrier of personality that latches onto one body at a time but does not die, like reincarnation without the spiritualism, basically the premise of movies about alien parasites that take over our brains.

These are the sort of questions/possibilities I was considering.

Thanks,
Kherubin

 

[apeiron]

Different flavours is a good way of putting it. It is pretty obvious that the sonar-based perceptual world of the dolphin or bat is going to be a rather different kind of mind. And so the inner experience of a chimpanzee compared to the language-structured mind of a human. Or the collective group mind of an ant colony compared to clever invertebrate like an octopus. There is plenty of variety around us.

What this should tell you is that the notion of consciousness/intelligence as some emergent property that pops out is very misleading. Different flavours of experience would be due to different neurobiological detail, different sensory modalities, different structuring social worlds. So it is in fact very easy for the "ethereal" aspects of mindfulness to come in different flavours. They would vary along with the structures involved. Intelligence/consciousness is not an emergent property like liquidity or tensegrity which is always essentially the same despite being composed of very different kinds of substance. It will be as varied as the structures involved.

This is why an intelligent definition of what we are talking about will invoke a structure. Some functional or process description that would be emboddied as a general architecture.

You must have been persuaded by Hawkins to have cited him. Otherwise that was a pretty random and misleading way of starting a thread. But anyway, that is why a good generic description of intelligence/mind looks like "future-modelling", and that in turn is generally emboddied as "spatiotemporal hierarchy". You need a system where global ideas and memories are the context that frame local impressions or current experience. A constraints-based approach to processing the world.

 

[Giantevilhead]

But that means you can boil "intelligence" down to simply an ability to perceive and react to differences or relationships between stimuli or situations. Everything else can be built on top of that.

 

[apeiron]

But that means you can boil "intelligence" down to simply an ability to perceive and react to differences or relationships between stimuli or situations. Everything else can be built on top of that.

Be my guest, demonstrate that you can do this.

Do you not see the difference between atoms and systems?

You can boil a human down to a collection of constituent elements in a test-tube - so much carbon, so much nitrogen, etc. But this exact isomerism does not give you a model of the phenomenon you seek to model.

Behaviourism was an impoverished discourse of this nature. It was an exercise in scientism rather than science. Conditioning is a good way of thinking about reflexes, yes, but a bad way of thinking about something more complex like intelligence or sentience.

 

[Giantevilhead]

It's a matter of the refinement of those perceptions and reactions. For example, compare the difference between a novice basketball player and a professional basketball player. The novice has trouble perceiving the relationship between the movements he makes when he throws the basketball and the trajectory of the ball. The professional on the other hand, is much more aware of how minute movements can affect the ball's trajectory. The professional basketball player can then be said to be more "athletically intelligent" or "kinesthetically intelligent" than the novice.

As for behaviorism, this isn't the 50's anymore. Skinner is not Watson. Operant conditioning is the selection of behaviors based on their consequences.

 

[apeiron]

It's a matter of the refinement of those perceptions and reactions. For example, compare the difference between a novice basketball player and a professional basketball player. The novice has trouble perceiving the relationship between the movements he makes when he throws the basketball and the trajectory of the ball. The professional on the other hand, is much more aware of how minute movements can affect the ball's trajectory. The professional basketball player can then be said to be more "athletically intelligent" or "kinesthetically intelligent" than the novice.

Actually, the key difference between novice and expert athletes is anticipation. The studies on this are a major piece of evidence I usually cite in support of the view that the brain is an anticipation machine.

Experts are better at reading their opponent's body language or flight of the ball - see it coming earlier, more accurately, on less information.

Yes, there is a genetic variability in motor integration, etc. Many elements make up the package which means some people have better co-ordination, or more will to win, or suitable body shape, etc.

But the key thing that individuals learn to become actually good at is reading the game.

So I see your argument. We can reduce smart things to collections of dumb things. For instance, jocks are just good in doing dumb, reflexive, sensorimotor integration. They have a quicker eye, a faster hand.

But actually get jocks into the lab and it turns out that their intelligence is again an example of that generic explanation - brains are shaped by the purpose of future-modelling.

As for behaviorism, this isn't the 50's anymore. Skinner is not Watson. Operant conditioning is the selection of behaviors based on their consequences.

Jeez, its not the 1970s anymore either. I was there when operant conditioning was going out of fashion, and cogsci was the shiny new hope. Then came evopsych. Anglo-saxon psychology keeps striking out because it cannot break from the mental constipation of psychic atomism.

I accept that there is operant conditioning as a branch of theory perhaps useful for some kinds of therapy. There are a few tools which can be picked up in about a term, max. But as a philosophy of science - which is what we are talking about here - it is a relic. A holy one to some, but nevertheless...

 

[Giantevilhead]

Actually, the key difference between novice and expert athletes is anticipation. The studies on this are a major piece of evidence I usually cite in support of the view that the brain is an anticipation machine.

Experts are better at reading their opponent's body language or flight of the ball - see it coming earlier, more accurately, on less information.

Yes, there is a genetic variability in motor integration, etc. Many elements make up the package which means some people have better co-ordination, or more will to win, or suitable body shape, etc.

But the key thing that individuals learn to become actually good at is reading the game.

So I see your argument. We can reduce smart things to collections of dumb things. For instance, jocks are just good in doing dumb, reflexive, sensorimotor integration. They have a quicker eye, a faster hand.

But actually get jocks into the lab and it turns out that their intelligence is again an example of that generic explanation - brains are shaped by the purpose of future-modelling.

But the brain's ability to model the future is based on what has happened in the past. If behaving in a certain way in the presence of a specific stimulus has always produced some kind of reinforcement in the past then the probability of behaving the same way in the presence of that stimulus in the future will be high.

Few experts are born with the ability to read their opponent's body language or the trajectory of the ball.

There's a procedure called errorless discrimination training in conditioning. Basically, the goal is to have the subject respond in a certain way, like pressing a button or a lever, to a very specific stimulus, say a 400nm wavelength light. You start by showing the 400nm light and then reinforce the subject for responding to the light. Then you introduce another stimulus, say a 500nm wavelength light and you do not reinforce the subject for responding to it. Then you present the two stimuli in random order, you reinforce for responding to the right stimulus and do not reward for responding to the wrong stimulus. After a while, the subject will only respond to the correct stimulus. When that happens, you move the second stimulus closer and closer to the stimulus you want the subject to respond to. So you go from 500nm to say 490nm, then to 480nm, 470nm, and you continue the procedure until you get extremely close, to the minimum difference the subject can discriminate between. A person who goes through this kind of training can discriminate between minute differences in color. Can you see how this kind of procedure or similar procedures can be generalized to explain other behaviors? You can use a similar procedure to teach people to read body language. You reinforce them for responding to a specific facial expression and do not reinforce them for responding to a different facial expression and you gradually make the second facial expression to be more and more like the first facial expression. You can also impose a time limit to teach the subject to make faster discriminations.

 

[apeiron]

Can you see how this kind of procedure or similar procedures can be generalized to explain other behaviors? You can use a similar procedure to teach people to read body language. You reinforce them for responding to a specific facial expression and do not reinforce them for responding to a different facial expression and you gradually make the second facial expression to be more and more like the first facial expression. You can also impose a time limit to teach the subject to make faster discriminations.

If you go speak to sports psychologists, you will hear about the importance of ecological validity and holistic learning in acquiring anticipatory skill. That is unless they are only interested in your cash and want to flog you gimmicky training aids.

You automatically think an atomistic approach is what would work. The real world has found the opposite.

 

[Giantevilhead]

If you go speak to sports psychologists, you will hear about the importance of ecological validity and holistic learning in acquiring anticipatory skill. That is unless they are only interested in your cash and want to flog you gimmicky training aids.

You automatically think an atomistic approach is what would work. The real world has found the opposite.

But the behaviorist approach is not atomistic, it's mechanistic.

Behaviorists use an atomistic approach when trying to condition very specific behaviors with specific stimuli. When behaviorism is applied in education or therapy, they deal more with stimulus and response classes.

 

[apeiron]

But the behaviorist approach is not atomistic, it's mechanistic.

Sigh. Same thing. It is all about a reduction to efficient causes. Newton, inspired by the recent rediscovery of Atomist texts atomised dynamics to create his mechanics. Reductionism is atomism, mechanicalism, locality, determinism, monadism - the whole package.

 

[Kherubin]

Different flavours is a good way of putting it. It is pretty obvious that the sonar-based perceptual world of the dolphin or bat is going to be a rather different kind of mind. And so the inner experience of a chimpanzee compared to the language-structured mind of a human. Or the collective group mind of an ant colony compared to clever invertebrate like an octopus. There is plenty of variety around us.

This is a very fair point. It's clear that the particular kind of 'intelligence/sentience' perceived will depend on the underlying structure of the brain and the available sensory modalities. I suppose my question was, however, more generalised than this. I was asking how far we can 'cast the net'. As a consequence, it is a little more tenuous and relies more on imagination than experience.

This is why an intelligent definition of what we are talking about will invoke a structure.

You must have been persuaded by Hawkins to have cited him. Otherwise that was a pretty random and misleading way of starting a thread.

I was very persuaded by Hawkins. Indeed, I think his view and the similar views of other offer a very potent basis for the future generation of general A.I.

Actually, I asked him a similar question to the OP and he was kind enough to reply, here is his response:

As to your second question, I define intelligence as the ability to build a model of the underlying causes in sensory data and from that do inference and make predictions. We believe we understand in detail how neurons do this. I believe the basics of these algorithms are essential, there are no others. However, they can be implemented on different substrates.

I then suggested that our intelligence may be like our biochemistry, in as much as, on a universal scale, we lie at the peak of the Bell Curve; we probably have the most common variety of biochemistry (and 'Intelligence'), but other 'flavors' are possible.

Unfortunately, I think he is a very busy man and didn't want to enter into a long, drawn-out conversation with someone whose ideas are as 'out there' as mine, so I received no reply. That's why I came to you!

Thanks,
Kherubin

 

[Giantevilhead]

Sigh. Same thing. It is all about a reduction to efficient causes. Newton, inspired by the recent rediscovery of Atomist texts atomised dynamics to create his mechanics. Reductionism is atomism, mechanicalism, locality, determinism, monadism - the whole package.

Well, it works well when used to teach developmentally challenged children.

I can understand why people would think that behaviorism is too simplistic but I doubt that they've ever gotten a chance to see how applied behavior analysis can help developmentally challenged children learn complex behaviors and improve their overall functioning.

http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/120/5/1162.full I'd say that it's reasonable to apply behaviorist theories to the concept of "intelligence."

 

[-Job-]

I instinctively associate intelligence with understanding. Naturally intelligence may be used in different contexts, but "kinesthetic intelligence" is really stretching the usage of the term, in my opinion.

I would add also that the brain is an anticipation machine as much as a computer is a machine for carrying out arithmetic operations. In a sense, it may have been built with that purpose in mind, but it's much more than that.

 

[kings7]

Somebody mentioned that intelligence is so murky a concept that psychologists don't even have a concrete theory to start from, which is not true. (See below)

http://www.iapsych.com/CHCPP/CHCPP.html


Also, one has to realize that the brain is a parallel processor; it is more akin to a quantum computer than a standard "on/off" computer. This makes intelligence very difficult to define because it can't be distilled down to a set of axioms that are either fulfilled or unfulfilled. In other words, there is no real "starting point" that we can use.


Finally... intelligence is not an object. It is a concept. Furthermore, it is a concept defined only when it exists in tandem with a particular context. A characteristic (not definition) of intelligence that many people forget is this: Intelligence is contextually based upon environment, genetics, situational circumstances, people, and culture.