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.Scott said:MWI, as I have heard the term used, suggests many independent worlds that continuously separate from each other and never recombine.
No. In the original development of MWI by Everett, he never assumed anything other than unitary evolution according to Schrodinger's equation. The thing about worlds "splitting off from one another and never recombining" is not an additional assumption; it follows from decoherence. If you have a superposition of two states, \alpha |\phi_1\rangle + \beta |\phi_2 \rangle, the only way to "observe" such a superposition is through interference. To have interference effects, you need to have a "final state" |\psi_{final}\rangle such that both
|\phi_1\rangle \Rightarrow |\psi_{final}\rangle
and
|\phi_2\rangle \Rightarrow |\psi_{final}\rangle
have non-negligible probabilities. But if |\psi_1\rangle and |\psi_2\rangle are macroscopically distinguishable, then there is no such final state |\psi_{final}\rangle reachable from both. If you make a macroscopic change, such as a cat dying, then from then on, the world will be different because that cat died. So effectively, macroscopically distinguishable states never recombine. So you might as well treat them as separate possible worlds. But there is no need for any special, irreversible "splitting" process.
I think an easy contrast between MWI vs. non-MWI is the Schrodinger Cat. An MWI proponent would say that there are independent instances of both a dead cat and live one. I would say that the experiment is impossible. You can't separate the cat or the radioactive decay particle from the rest of the universe.
That's exactly what MWI says. Rather than a superposition of a live cat and a dead cat (which is so unstable as to be practically impossible), the situation evolves into an either/or of (1) a world in which the cat is alive, and (2) a world in which the cat is dead.
A decay decision is imposed on the particle based on its participation in the universe and the result is a cat that is definitely dead or alive - but not both. The interaction between the cat and the particle itself affects the timing of the particle decay. The reason I say this is that the alternative is to say that the result seen when the box is open is the result of a decision made with information that did not exist before the experiment started - that a parameter was added to the universe. In MWI, this parameter is what would differentiate between one world and another. In non-MWI, superpositioning never creates a state with information other than that it started with.
I'm not sure I understand the distinction you are making. The idea behind MWI is just ordinary quantum mechanics, but where you move the boundary of what you consider "the system" to include more and more of the universe. You can either view
- the atom of uranium as "the system", and the cyanide canister is measurement device, or
- the atom + cyanide canister is the system, and the cat is an observer, or
- the atom + cyanide canister + cat is the system, and the person opening the box is the observer, or
- the atom + cynanide canister + cat + person is the system, and a second person is the observer, or
- ...
- the entire universe is the system
I don't know what creates apparent "collapse", but my thought is that some inconsistencies occur as the wave function involves more and more mass. The problem with this "inconsistency" notion, is that it presumes that ultimately only one path will prove out to be free of inconsistencies - but I can't imagine anything that would drive that number to 1 rather than 0 or some large number. Still, something drives events towards apparent collapse. What we observe and remember are fully collapsed events - not a blurred unresolved super-positioned history seen with a blurred unresolved super-positioned mind.
Well, MWI definitely doesn't predict that anyone sees blurred superpositions.