Is the New Channel Impacting Nebraska's Nuclear Plant Operations?

[zapperzero]

Not according to their reports. Everything is just fine.

I got this off http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110627/ap_on_re_us/us_missouri_river_flooding_nuclear_safety".

 

[Joe Neubarth]

Why would the turbine rooms be below flood level? Or critical electrical rooms. Sounds like Fukushima.

Robinson, that is an insult to American Engineering. It might be valid, but BOY was that a nasty thing to say!

Seepage in saturated ground is expected. The degree of seepage may be in debate but not the actual process.

 

[robinson]

Missouri River floodwater seeped into the turbine building at a nuclear power plant near Omaha on Monday, but plant officials said the seepage was expected and posed no safety risk because the building contains no nuclear material.

Jaczko said the Army Corps of Engineers doesn't expect the river to rise enough to cause additional significant problems at either of the nuclear plants in Nebraska.

"Bottom line, it looks like the levels are going to be at a place where the plant should be able to deal with it," Jaczko said.

Flooding remains a concern all along the Missouri because of massive amounts of water the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has released from upstream reservoirs. The river is expected to rise as much as 5 to 7 feet above flood stage in much of Nebraska and Iowa and as much as 10 feet over flood stage in parts of Missouri.

http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110627/ap_on_re_us/us_missouri_river_flooding_nuclear_safety

Clearly critical areas are low enough to be effected long before it reaches the level they claim the plant was designed for.

 

[nikkkom]

Robinson, that is an insult to American Engineering. It might be valid, but BOY was that a nasty thing to say!

Sure, American Engineering is way superior to Japanese. (Pay no attention to the fact that Japanese said about the same thing about them and Russian engineering - before 2011-03-11)

A story about American Engineering prowess:

http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/7006951239/fission-stories-46-powerless-nuclear-power-plants

Fission Stories #46: Powerless Nuclear Power Plants

Did the station blackout event at Vogtle described in Fission Stories #45 shock the nuclear industry into taking actions to prevent recurrence? Hardly. Almost exactly one year later, on March 7, 1991, the boom of a mobile crane neared, but did not touch, a 500,000 volt overhead power line connecting the main transformer at Diablo Canyon Unit 1in California to the offsite electrical power grid. Plant procedures required mobile cranes to be kept at least 27 feet away from overhead power lines. The boom of the mobile crane in question ventured to within 2 or 3 feet of the 500,000 volt power lines. Electrical arcing (i.e., nuclear-sized sparks) between the boom and the transmission lines caused an electrical fluctuation that tripped the main transformer. Since the backup transformer was out of service for maintenance at the time, Unit 1 lost all offsite power. The three emergency diesel generators automatical1y started and supplied power to essential equipment. Power to the rest of Unit 1’s electrical equipment was restored about five hours later by cross-tying connections to a Unit 2 transformer (i.e., putting all the eggs in one basket).

Okay, some snoozed through the Vogtle wakeup call. But surely the Diablo Canyon event triggered actions to prevent power plants from becoming powerless. Guess again.

On March 13, 1991, six days after the Diablo Canyon miscue, the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable.

Turkey Point Unit 4 along with Unit 3 (Units 1 and 2 are fossil-fired generators), had been shut down the previous November for a lengthy outage to fix safety problems. All the irradiated fuel had been transferred from the reactor core to the spent fue1 pools. As long as one irradiated fuel assembly resides in the reactor core, at least one emergency diesel generator (EDG) must be available. But when that last irradiated fuel assembly is relocated to the spent fuel pool (which now contains ALL the irradiated fuel assemblies), none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools.

When the event began, the startup transformer was connected to the offsite electrical grid. It was supplying power from the grid to equipment throughout the plant. Due to an electrical disturbance, the startup transformer was automatically disconnected from the grid and prevented from reconnecting.

Workers inspected the startup transformer and associated circuit breakers and found no electrical fault indications. About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.

Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning that the Vogtle and Diablo Canyon events failed to send? Maybe, but apparently not to folks in Arizona. On November 15, 1991, workers at Palo Verde Unit 3 were replacing the “A” phase bushing on the main transformer.

(read the rest by following the URL)

Do you still think American engineering is immune to Fukushimosis?

 

[BobG]

From the link above:
"Fort Calhoun was designed for floods up to 1014 feet above sea level, and the current flood stands at 1006 feet."

If it was designed for floods up to 1014 feet, why is it already flooding at 1006 feet?
Is this an example of failure within design basis?

It's flooding outside the buildings, not inside. The floodgates keep the water from entering the buildings, not from entering the general area.

In fact, that was just one of the problems the NRC noted when looking at Ft Calhoun's initial plan for increasing flood protection by 5 feet. Besides stacking sandbags on top of floodgates, there were also some modifications that would have required some welding. The NRC didn't believe crews could actually maneuver around in the rising flood waters well enough to accomplish the welding and stacking.

While the failed AcquaDam isn't essential to protect the critical parts of the plant, it certainly did fulfill a very useful function in keeping the area surrounding the buildings free enough of water that work could be done outside the buildings.

I wouldn't say the exterior water was an example of design failure, but it isn't an example of a great plan, either.

Pumping water out of a basement isn't anything special, either. One of the best ways to prevent leaky basements in houses is to let the water accumulating outside the basement pass from outside drain tiles to inside drain tiles (underneath the basement floor) where it's pumped into your normal waste water lines. In fact, when I worked with a masonry crew for a couple years, we used to punch holes in every few bottom blocks of the basement and run small plastic PVC pipes to the interior drain tiles just in case water seeped into the blocks higher up. (We built some rather exotic houses, including one in which the basement was built in the natural creek bed with the creek diverted around the house - cool looking as could be when it was finished and never leaked - the first year anyway - I didn't work with them long enough to know if the creek eventually reverted back to its natural path.)

 

[Drakkith]

I don't know... I can see some overeager young'uns loading them on a pylon. I don't see how they got them out of their bunker in the first place and I don't see how come the pilots did not have any indication of what they were carrying.

Plus, Minot AFB was certainly qualified and equipped to offload weapons. Plus, they were supposed to be shipping just shapes that day, not weapons. Lots of things wrong with the story, such as it got out. Enough to give one pause.

I don't want to derail the thread, so if you want to know why send me a message.

 

[Joe Neubarth]

Sure, American Engineering is way superior to Japanese. (Pay no attention to the fact that Japanese said about the same thing about them and Russian engineering - before 2011-03-11)

A story about American Engineering prowess:

http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/7006951239/fission-stories-46-powerless-nuclear-power-plants

Fission Stories #46: Powerless Nuclear Power Plants

Did the station blackout event at Vogtle described in Fission Stories #45 shock the nuclear industry into taking actions to prevent recurrence? Hardly. Almost exactly one year later, on March 7, 1991, the boom of a mobile crane neared, but did not touch, a 500,000 volt overhead power line connecting the main transformer at Diablo Canyon Unit 1in California to the offsite electrical power grid. Plant procedures required mobile cranes to be kept at least 27 feet away from overhead power lines. The boom of the mobile crane in question ventured to within 2 or 3 feet of the 500,000 volt power lines. Electrical arcing (i.e., nuclear-sized sparks) between the boom and the transmission lines caused an electrical fluctuation that tripped the main transformer. Since the backup transformer was out of service for maintenance at the time, Unit 1 lost all offsite power. The three emergency diesel generators automatical1y started and supplied power to essential equipment. Power to the rest of Unit 1’s electrical equipment was restored about five hours later by cross-tying connections to a Unit 2 transformer (i.e., putting all the eggs in one basket).

Okay, some snoozed through the Vogtle wakeup call. But surely the Diablo Canyon event triggered actions to prevent power plants from becoming powerless. Guess again.

On March 13, 1991, six days after the Diablo Canyon miscue, the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable.

Turkey Point Unit 4 along with Unit 3 (Units 1 and 2 are fossil-fired generators), had been shut down the previous November for a lengthy outage to fix safety problems. All the irradiated fuel had been transferred from the reactor core to the spent fue1 pools. As long as one irradiated fuel assembly resides in the reactor core, at least one emergency diesel generator (EDG) must be available. But when that last irradiated fuel assembly is relocated to the spent fuel pool (which now contains ALL the irradiated fuel assemblies), none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools.

When the event began, the startup transformer was connected to the offsite electrical grid. It was supplying power from the grid to equipment throughout the plant. Due to an electrical disturbance, the startup transformer was automatically disconnected from the grid and prevented from reconnecting.

Workers inspected the startup transformer and associated circuit breakers and found no electrical fault indications. About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.

Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning that the Vogtle and Diablo Canyon events failed to send? Maybe, but apparently not to folks in Arizona. On November 15, 1991, workers at Palo Verde Unit 3 were replacing the “A” phase bushing on the main transformer.

(read the rest by following the URL)

Do you still think American engineering is immune to Fukushimosis?

The initial statement was tongue in cheek, but so obvious that I did not put a smiling face at the end of the text.

Now, on a more serious point, your examples of loss of American reported power incidents at times when systems are down and there is less concern for total continuity of power are in no way comparable to the outright insanity that is Fukushima.

Fukushima was and is an engineering disaster from beginning to end. It should never have been allowed to start up with the site engineering so totally Fuk'd up as it was. It amazes me that nobody caught those outrageous engineering gaffs in the past 40 years.

 

[jim hardy]

Nikkom, That "All Things Nuclear" article is another example of how to lie with facts.
It lies about the incident at Turkey Point.
"Lie" means 'to deceive by intent' and that's what that article does.

I was working at that plant then and don't even remember the day it happened so had to find the NRC report on it..
The report is here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1991/in91068.html

First lie: "..the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable."
Wow, you'd think we were in same shape as Fukushima and that's what the author wants you to think..
In fact,
we had years earlier installed an emergency feed from the adjoining fossil unit's blackstart diesels for just such a situation where our emergency diesels were unavailable due to maintenance work or disaster. The blackstarts were same type, twenty cylinder GM locomotive engines.
So the author infers the falsehood that no diesel power was available; and that's deceit by intent and that's lying.
Here's from the NRC report:
""An alternate source of power supply to the CCW, ICW, and spent fuel pool cooling pumps was available from four, non-safety-related (black start) diesel generators. ""
Indeed we could have got power from them if we'd needed it, they did start and stand by but weren't needed.
Again from NRC report: "The licensee manually started, but did not load, two of the black start diesel generators."
That's why we put that feed from the blackstarts there, as backup for our emergency diesels.

Furthermore we had other backup in- house power sources from other transformers,
from NRC report : "Other backup sources of power to the pumps included interconnection with the Unit 3 startup transformer and transfer to another Unit 4 transformer (after defeating circuit breaker interlocks)."

Furthermore we had a THIRD backup to both those other backups, again from NRC report:
" An alternate method of spent fuel pool cooling, which was available, involved the use of a trailer-mounted diesel generator and a diesel powered fire pump or a non-safety grade screen wash pump. Detailed procedures for use of the alternative cooling methods were available."

So the author's intentionally deceitful allegation that the fuel was left without a means of cooling is at least three lies(count 'em we had 3 backups in place) but i'll only count it as one.

Second lie: "..a lengthy outage to fix safety problems." Sounds as if the place was falling apart, eh?
In fact the outage was to install more diesel generators. I remember THAT fact very well.
Here's from NRC report:
""In November 1990, the licensee for the Turkey Point Plant began an 11-month dual unit outage to conduct a major electrical system upgrade including installing two additional emergency diesel generators (EDGs)."
Author lied by asserting a falsehood as to reason for outage. We put in two more emergency diesels.
We had executives who understood the seriousness of a station blackout and were willing to spend the money to "do it right".

Third lie :"...none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools." suggests there's something wrong with that idea.
WELL DUHHHH , meathead, that's why we defuel BEFORE we take out both diesels, because there's tons of heat capacity in the fuel pool and you could get along fine with NO cooling for many days.. and OF COURSE we get multiple backups in place before we do that! Wouldn't you ?
So his suggestion of wrong-doing is deceit by intent.

Fourth lie: Now this statement is true: "About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.."
...
Having baited his hook with that little bit of truth he tries to set it with:
..."Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning..."" inferring it was a near miss
Don't take the bait it's a bald faced lie.. Again from NRC report: "The temperature of the spent fuel pool had increased from 84(degrees)F to 87(degrees)F during the 2-hour duration of the event."

Now i can't speak to the other reactors he wrote about.
Mine was put into the safest possible configuration, work was in progress to improve electrical system reliability, multiple layers of backup were in place and operable, and the event was a yawn.

That 'intellectual' ATN author is exercising his first amendment right to be incredibly asinine.
I'd wager he repeats the performance. old jim

 

[jim hardy]

BTW when i try to access NRC READING ROOM via Google i get a security warning that a site named "akamaihd.net" may be attempting monkey business.

I went straight in through NRC.gov and it worked okay.

I don't know it there's internet hijinks afoot or maybe i have a virus. Be careful.

Am going to bed now, will let virus scan chew on it overnight.

Over and out for day

old jim

 

[zapperzero]

BTW when i try to access NRC READING ROOM via Google i get a security warning that a site named "akamaihd.net" may be attempting monkey business.
old jim

You get a redirect to akamai - which is a caching service. Dunno why that would happen. Maybe your ISP is being clever.

 

[minerva]

There's so much "omg, that's just lies, it's all a coverup, Big Nuclear Industry Conspiracy!" ******** out there around the internet about Fort Calhoun, it's absolutely driving me nuts.

 

[URob]

Is there any news on this? I saw a clip saying that there is a 10 mile evacuation zone around the plant. Any weather forecasts? Is the water level still rising?

 

[NUCENG]

Is there any news on this? I saw a clip saying that there is a 10 mile evacuation zone around the plant. Any weather forecasts? Is the water level still rising?

Saw the same thing on a conspiracy blog 24 hours ago. It was bogus then and is still most probably bogus today, Unless you believe (conspiracy on) President Obama can impose a total news blackout (conspiracy off) AND MAKE IT WORK! The fact that we can reach this forrum is pretty good evidence he hasn't.

 

[URob]

In that case any word on the plant and the water levels? The clip I saw showed water around all of the buildings.
Pretty good bogus clip. I'm from New Zealand so not familiar with the U.S. news networks, does ABC 8 News not exist?
I assume flood water is lapping at the front door of the power plant as shown unless someone has got a massive budget for CGI...

 

[URob]

http://www.klkntv.com/story/15007832/fort-calhoun-correction-evacuations
ABC 8 retraction of their evacuation story.
Still love to know what the predictions are for water levels.

 

[NUCENG]

http://www.klkntv.com/story/15007832/fort-calhoun-correction-evacuations
ABC 8 retraction of their evacuation story.
Still love to know what the predictions are for water levels.

lOOK AT THE VARIOUS STATIONS ALONG THE mISSOURI HERE:
http://water.weather.gov/ahps2/forecasts.php?wfo=oax

 

[robinson]

http://www.examiner.com/human-right...looding-event-above-cooper-nuclear-site-video

This is one story I really hope in a few months we will not be discussing.

 

[zapperzero]

lOOK AT THE VARIOUS STATIONS ALONG THE mISSOURI HERE

caps lock accident?

 

[Joe Neubarth]

I do not know much about our river systems. I know my geography, but my understanding of flooding techniques and blasting levees to prevent flooding downstream is just not my shtick.

So, with that in mind, when I heard that a busted levee raised the river level several inches, I scratched my head and totally ignored the story.

Because of my primitive knowledge, I thought that levees were used to hold the river back from flooding the surrounding countryside. Now, with that thought in mind, something tells me that if a levy broke, the river level should go down not up.

I have since found out that it was flooded farmland that had a water level higher than the river. Amazing that in a crisis an individual or several individuals could decided they don't give a damn and raise the level of the river. If that is enough to flood Omaha or other cities downstream, it makes me wonder if the farmers could be subject to a class action suit for partial responsibility to the communities downstream

 

[NUCENG]

I do not know much about our river systems. I know my geography, but my understanding of flooding techniques and blasting levees to prevent flooding downstream is just not my shtick.

So, with that in mind, when I heard that a busted levee raised the river level several inches, I scratched my head and totally ignored the story.

Because of my primitive knowledge, I thought that levees were used to hold the river back from flooding the surrounding countryside. Now, with that thought in mind, something tells me that if a levy broke, the river level should go down not up.

Could somebody please explain how the reverse could happen?

There was an initial levee failure further north that flooded some agricultural land. This water was then behind the levees along the river and water started to pool. The owners of a private levee then blew their levee to let this pool back into the river. Apparently the river bed at the point of the levee had dropped at that point so that the water level behind the levee was higher than the river level. Thus failing the levee allowed flow back into the river and the level rose.

 

[Caniche]

Unless you believe (conspiracy on) President Obama can impose a total news blackout (conspiracy off) AND MAKE IT WORK! The fact that we can reach this forrum is pretty good evidence he hasn't.

It don't work like thatBut if you're happy with what you are presented with and swallow it then who am I to disabuse you

 

[URob]

I know nothing about a total news blackout, however finding news articles on this issue in mainstream media is almost impossible. This IS one of the very few sites that has any real information. The moderators of this site are conservative. This is not being critical, it's the reason I any many others come back here. It provides balance to the conspiracy sites that release information regardless. Mainstream media in New Zealand has made no mention of the fact that there several nuclear power stations threatened by flood waters and the public is completely unaware of the situation. Quickly scanning Google over the last week for information was fruitless and only leads to dead ends, old info, conspiracy or if your very lucky a link to here.

 

[NUCENG]

It don't work like thatBut if you're happy with what you are presented with and swallow it then who am I to disabuse you

The biggest problem with most conspiracy theories is that in America secrets don't remain secret. Between wikileaks, and Kitty Kelly, the tell all-books and the revisionists, there are always people who want to spill, and there is a ready market for secrets.

My reply stated that there was no evacuation. The original source TV station retracted their story due to misunderstanding that there ARE plans for evacuations but that is true for every nuclear plant. No evacuations have been ordered.

If you want to expand to discussions of conspiracy theories in general, that is off topic and against forum rules.

 

[URob]

Thanks for the link Nuceng, looks like the water levels are beginning to recede. Be nice to get a daily photo of the plant, no webcams there I guess? Here is hoping the rains and the melt have done their worst. They say these buildings are waterproof though I wouldn't like to see water levels go much above ground level. Rivers in flood pack a hell of a wallop (think floating debris, trees etc not to mention boats or barges which may have slipped moorings) once you actually get some water moving past the buildings structural integrity is going to be severely tested.

 

[NUCENG]

Latest Update to the PNO for Ft Calhoun. NRC relaxing on site coverage.

http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/idmws/DocContent.dll?library=PU_ADAMS^pbntad01&LogonID=d69a84b8d0ce76fc0df1b8d48974347a&id=112080157

 

[NUCENG]

Latest Update to the PNO for Ft Calhoun. NRC relaxing on site coverage.

http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/idmws/DocContent.dll?library=PU_ADAMS^pbntad01&LogonID=d69a84b8d0ce76fc0df1b8d48974347a&id=112080157

Latest Update: Flood Water level dropping, Site access improved and is allowing more workers back on site.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/15/us-nebraska-nuclear-plant-idUSTRE77E4EX20110815

 

[NUCENG]

NOUE cancelledat Ft Calhoun

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/en.html

http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/08/29/3321225/nebraska-nuclear-plant-ends-flood.html

 

[tasp77]

Aqua berm at plant is being disassembled, and the catwalks over the waters are being dismantled. River is just a few feet above official flood stage now.

One complication, apparently unaddressed at this point; there are some concerns the main channel of the Missouri River is shifting eastward through some cornfields, and connecting with the channel cut off back in the 50s for the wild life refuge, and then rejoining the existing main channel south (downstream) of the plant. Presumably, even in the 'worst case', there would still be a substantial flow past the Ft. Calhoun facility, but knowing now what the final flow rates in each channel would be when the flooding is over would be a big guess.

 

[NUCENG]

NRC ends 7day coverage at Ft Calhoun

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1124/ML112420866.pdf

 

[tasp77]

Water levels have dropped some more, and the main channel of the river, so far, seems to be stable in it's location near the plant.

A lucky break for everyone, the capricious nature of the 'Mighty Mo' could have given us quite a headache.

(a channel shift farther south of the plant seems less likely now too)


Just speculating here, but the apparent maximum discharge rate for the 1st dam upstream of the Ft, Calhoun facility, Gavins Point, is around 500,000 CFS. (the recent flooding topped out at ~160,000) Perhaps a levee or flood wall designed around that rate needs to be considered for construction. (A flow rate of 500,000 CFS, btw, could empty the reservoir in around 10 hours, assuming no incoming flows)