Is the Real World Deterministic or Indeterministic?

[somy]

Do you know of any theory or evidence that shows the real world is (or is not) deterministic?
By "deterministic" I mean: If we give exactly the same initial conditions to any system in the world, does it evolve to the same state?

 

[kote]

Do you know of any theory or evidence that shows the real world is (or is not) deterministic?
By "deterministic" I mean: If we give exactly the same initial conditions to any system in the world, does it evolve to the same state?

This belongs in the philosophy forum! No such evidence could exist. See the problem of induction for starters.

What we do know from quantum mechanics is that basic elements of a deterministic reality cannot be described in terms of a relativistic space-time framework. It's up to you to make your assumptions though. Standard quantum mechanics assumes that space-time is real and nature is not deterministic. Many disagree. Standard practice historically in science has been to assume determinism, and this assumption may even be required for scientific progress. There are tons of arguments over the issue.

While physics, such as QM, sheds light on the issue and limits the possibilities, determinism in nature can never be proven or disproven. It's a metaphysical issue.

 

[somy]

While physics, such as QM, sheds light on the issue and limits the possibilities, determinism in nature can never be proven or disproven. It's a metaphysical issue.

Could you please explain this more? Is there any work done on this by a physicist? (Actually I do physics and I'm not a philosopher!)

Thanks.

 

[kote]

Could you please explain this more? Is there any work done on this by a physicist? (Actually I do physics and I'm not a philosopher!)

Thanks.

Apparently you are a philosopher . Physics can't answer this question. There are no possible experiments.

For a philosophy primer on the issue, see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/. My apologies for the 35 page encyclopedia entry. Sometimes that's as concise as philosophy can get.

 

[somy]

Well, I would say there IS an imaginary experiment. And that is to prepare two absolutely identical systems which are known to have a random nature and monitor their evolution. The two systems should be the same in an infinite accuracy. I am not sure if it is possible! but it is the simplest plan.

 

[kote]

Well, I would say there IS an imaginary experiment. And that is to prepare two absolutely identical systems which are known to have a random nature and monitor their evolution. The two systems should be the same in an infinite accuracy. I am not sure if it is possible! but it is the simplest plan.

1) How do you know that something has a random nature before you've disproven determinism? If something is deterministic then it is not random.
2) How do you prove your observed correlations apply to all the other systems you didn't test?
3) How do you know the correlation between your systems wasn't due to both systems randomly changing in the same way? What if both systems switched from having a red appearance to having a blue appearance? How could you tell if there were a cause or not?
4) How do you know that one of your systems isn't composed of atoms that decay after exactly 10 years while the other is composed of atoms that do not decay?

These are some of the questions you have to ask. There is a deep history of philosophy regarding this question, with thousands of years thinkers developing the issue in one continuous dialogue. Welcome to the conversation .

 

[skeptic2]

Suppose you have two identical atoms of uranium-238. Will they both emit an alpha particle at the same instant?

Let's do another imaginary experiment. You are driving your car along a busy street. How long would you dare to close your eyes while driving? While you are driving, you are constantly making corrections for thousands of conditions you encounter along your route.

Imagine the probability of the particles and photons aligning themselves out of the chaos 13.7 billion years ago in just the right way to determine all the corrections you make while driving. Now consider that it doesn't just happen for you but for all drivers on Earth over and over again. Rarely do we see a better example of Ockham's razor rejecting a theory.

 

[kote]

Suppose you have two identical atoms of uranium-238. Will they both emit an alpha particle at the same instant?

Hey skeptic, what did you mean with the driving analogy? I think I need an explanation of that one.

As for the quote above... do you want me to assume determinism or not before I answer? It's either, "duh; identical objects behave the same way," or "duh; atomic decay is inherently random." Not sure which you're going for, but either way it doesn't seem very enlightening for deciding determinism!

 

[WaveJumper]

It would be reasonable to suppose that if we are living in a purely deterministic universe(a sort of matrix style simulation), our simulators would have wanted more control over the course of how everything plays out in the simulation. So they would probably leave loopholes in this deterministic universe, like quantum indeterminacy, through which they could impose invisible 'corrections'.

 

[skeptic2]

Hey skeptic, what did you mean with the driving analogy? I think I need an explanation of that one.

Actually kote, in my post when I referred to U238 atoms, I wasn't referring to your post but to somy's post #5. The fact that you also mentioned decaying atoms was just coincidence. somy mentioned an experiment of two identical systems and I was trying to point out even with identical systems the results may not be identical.

I suppose to a deist the creation of a deterministic universe such that even billions of years later matter interacts in such a way as to suggest meaning (e.g. driving to the store to get a loaf of bread) is not incredible, but to me it is. If we live in a deterministic universe, one in such that if we knew the exact positions and momenta of all the particles of the universe we could predict the future to the end of time, then the act of driving a car is pretty incredible. Not only must the driver react to various unrelated evens, he must also obey various non-physical laws. To believe in determinism means believing that all the driver's reactions were somehow encoded in the positions and momenta of the particles 13.7 billion years ago that are only now coming together to create a car and driver seemingly reacting to various phenomena.

 

[somy]

I suppose to a deist the creation of a deterministic universe such that even billions of years later matter interacts in such a way as to suggest meaning (e.g. driving to the store to get a loaf of bread) is not incredible, but to me it is. If we live in a deterministic universe, one in such that if we knew the exact positions and momenta of all the particles of the universe we could predict the future to the end of time, then the act of driving a car is pretty incredible. Not only must the driver react to various unrelated evens, he must also obey various non-physical laws. To believe in determinism means believing that all the driver's reactions were somehow encoded in the positions and momenta of the particles 13.7 billion years ago that are only now coming together to create a car and driver seemingly reacting to various phenomena.

Good point. Well, our brain is very complex, but in the case of determinism (as you mentioned by knowing the exact initial states of all the matter) our brain would always decide the same.
Also you mentioned a very interesting thing about the spontaneous decay. My quick argument is that: we don't know the complete state of the matter. i.e. we know that the position, momentum, spin, ... would determine the state of the matter. But whether it is a complete one or not is unclear. (You might be familiar with the discovery of new nuclear states).
So, the ambiguity is in 2 facts:
1- We don't know the complete state of the matter.
2- We are unable to construct two exactly similar systems to test their evolution.

 

[flatmaster]

Is the real world deterministic? Probably not.

Interesting, I wonder if you could calculate P(deterministic)

 

[ValenceE]

Hi all !,

seems to me there are two distinct determinisms here... one is cause and effect, the other is global pre-determinism...

Regarding cause and effect, imho, based on the fact that everything must obey F=ma or any synonymous/derived equation, true randomness originating from any/all scales, must be determined since it exists in an evolving environment. So, I believe that true randomness exits but is 'determined' at its root level.

Regarding pre-determinism, imho in any universe/multi-universe situation, any process having its origin other than a 'decisional' source, falls under the cause-effect category and is determined.

All other processes are products of 'sub routines' that are not effected by the F=ma equivalents thus being able to generate outcomes that are not determined but nevertheless imperatively having to return to the on-going, ever evolving deterministic main stream in order to materialise/actuate.


Regards,

VE

Now, it is also my belief that through insight, human intelligence, intellect, and freewill reach far more deeper in the QM well than any equation or description ever formulated or written down by these same human attributes...

 

[ThomasT]

Do you know of any ... evidence that shows the real world is (or is not) deterministic?

Light bulbs, sex, internal combustion engines, radios, cd players, plumbing, the solar system, the space shuttle, the tides, Las Vegas, etc. Our existence and comfort is based on the predictability of various processes and natural phenomena.

The archetypal experimental demonstration of determinism that anybody can do is to drop a small pebble into a smooth pool of water. The disturbance (wavefront) propagates away from its point(s) of origin. This is the fundamental dynamic of any and all disturbances in any and all media. It defines in a general and visualizable way what is meant by determinism.

Here's more evidence of determinism that can be extrapolated to relate to the underlying nature of our world:


Because the world of our experience offers so many examples (so much evidence) of determinism, it therefore makes sense to assume that the deeper reality is also deterministic.

Anyway, what's the alternative?

 

[WaveJumper]

Anyway, what's the alternative?

One hundred million trillion universes, one of which happens to just 'look like' it's deterministic, but is entirely random and is due only to the fact that there are 100 trillion trillion 'irregular', weak and inappropriate universes. In personal plan, this hypothesis doesn't make more sense than seeing Darth Vader make raspberry jam in Nairobi, Kenya, but cannot be excluded completely.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Our existence and comfort is based on the predictability of various processes and natural phenomena.
Anyway, what's the alternative?

An alternative is a fine grained randomness which produces an effectively deterministic coarse grained world. We can measure the changes in the entropy of a system very well with this kind of model.

In terms of our existence and comfort, I would say I'm not at all comfortable with being a programmed automaton with no free will. When scientists talk about strict determinism, there are possible social consequences. The ax murderer should not be punished because his behavior was predetermined and inevitable. Defense lawyers would love to have you as an expert witness. It doesn't take much imagination to see the psycho-social consequences of placing the prestige of science behind what is in fact a metaphysical idea.

A science based on experiment and cause/effect models would also need to re-think its basic philosophy. We do not manipulate experimental variables by choice. We can only realize one possible outcome and the 'choices' are not choices at all. In statistics, we cannot prove causality. We can only establish associations. Under strict determinism, we only have associations with probability 1. The reduces cause/effect to mere correlations and we know mere correlations should not be confused with causality (even with R^2=1). I could given many examples.

EDIT: Also the very important concept of time dependent covariance is invalid since cov(x,y)=corr(x,y)/sd(x)sd(y). It's obvious that if there's no time dependent variation, then the standard deviations both equal are zero.

 

[junglebeast]

Apparently you are a philosopher . Physics can't answer this question. There are no possible experiments.

For a philosophy primer on the issue, see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/. My apologies for the 35 page encyclopedia entry. Sometimes that's as concise as philosophy can get.

Bell's theorem, derived in his seminal 1964 paper titled On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox[3] has been called "the most profound in science".

"Bell's theorem implies that if quantum mechanics is correct, the universe is not locally deterministic."

Multiple researchers have performed equivalent experiments using different methods. It appears most of these experiments produce results which agree with the predictions of quantum mechanics,[1] thus refuting the notion that local-hidden-variable theories can account for QM or supporting the notion that QM involves some degree of nonlocality...After all current experimentation it seems these experiments uphold prima facie support for quantum mechanics' predictions of non-locality.[1]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_theorem

 

[kote]

"Bell's theorem implies that if quantum mechanics is correct, the universe is not locally deterministic."

Locally deterministic is entirely different than deterministic. All this means is the world can't be deterministic in one way we thought it might be.

 

[WaveJumper]

In terms of our existence and comfort, I would say I'm not at all comfortable with being a programmed automaton with no free will. When scientists talk about strict determinism, there are possible social consequences. The ax murderer should not be punished because his behavior was predetermined and inevitable.

If determinism is true, God should be put on trial for all evil that has ever happened. Occam's razor however says that it's much more likely that our God would resemble something like a team of simulators sitting in front of a quantum computer. I assume they wouldn't mind being tried by a virtual court, in a virtual world and being handed out virtual sentences. I think we are f***ed as far as real justice goes.

 

[ThomasT]

In terms of our existence and comfort, I would say I'm not at all comfortable with being a programmed automaton with no free will.

Those who believe that their 'wills' are 'free' might miss some important opportunities to engineer their environments so as to maximize the probability that they'll make the choices that will help them progress toward their goals.

When scientists talk about strict determinism, there are possible social consequences. The ax murderer should not be punished because his behavior was predetermined and inevitable. Defense lawyers would love to have you as an expert witness. It doesn't take much imagination to see the psycho-social consequences of placing the prestige of science behind what is in fact a metaphysical idea.

We punish behaviors that we want to minimize or erradicate. It doesn't matter if the behavior was strictly determined or not. If it's deemed a threat to the desired social order, then it's punished. If it's deemed beneficial, then it's rewarded. If our wills are free, then why is operant conditioning so effective?

Believing that Nature is operating at the most fundamental level with some "fine-grained randomness", or that the murderers that we execute could have behaved any differently than they did given the circumstances (including their internal and external histories) won't obviate our efforts to control and direct behavior. Indeed, for those who believe that Nature is fundamentally random, then what's the point ... of anything -- and the defense attorney could then argue that the murderer's actions were the result of unpredictable spontaneous quantum brain farts.

Many of the attitudes codified in our laws haven't caught up with what modern science is teaching us.

 

[ideasrule]

When scientists talk about strict determinism, there are possible social consequences. The ax murderer should not be punished because his behavior was predetermined and inevitable. Defense lawyers would love to have you as an expert witness. It doesn't take much imagination to see the psycho-social consequences of placing the prestige of science behind what is in fact a metaphysical idea.

But human behavior is pretty much deterministic. The ax murderer's actions were caused by his personality and upbringing, which in turn are influenced by genetics, parents, social prejudices and values, education, religion, living conditions (like whether he had to beg or steal), and an infinite number of other factors. He had no control over these factors. A person with the same genes, same experiences, and same upbringing is likely to commit similar crimes.

Because of that, I don't agree with the concept of "getting even" or "an eye for an eye". Punishments should be handed out to correct behavior and make society safer, not to cause pain and suffering for people just because they broke a law.

 

[WaveJumper]

Obviously, courts of law make the assumption that the "I" is not a deterministic process. The fact that we can't understand 'free will' doesn't automatically mean there is no free will. It only means that either:

1. We don't have free will, or
2. We don't understand what it is and how it works(i.e. it is an emergent phenomenon of a particular combination of molecules that does not behave according to the laws of physics as we know them).

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Those who believe that their 'wills' are 'free' might miss some important opportunities to engineer their environments so as to maximize the probability that they'll make the choices that will help them progress toward their goals.

With D, we don't make choices.

We punish behaviors that we want to minimize or erradicate. It doesn't matter if the behavior was strictly determined or not. If it's deemed a threat to the desired social order, then it's punished. If it's deemed beneficial, then it's rewarded. If our wills are free, then why is operant conditioning so effective?

We don't minimize or eradicate anything under D. There is no willful conduct (an important legal concept). Everything that happens is predetermined. Operant conditioning is an experimental activity. Experiments involve choice and control. Choice and human control do not exist under D. Everything is in effect controlled by "destiny and fate". All human actions are passive.

Believing that Nature is operating at the most fundamental level with some "fine-grained randomness", or that the murderers that we execute could have behaved any differently than they did given the circumstances (including their internal and external histories) won't obviate our efforts to control and direct behavior. Indeed, for those who believe that Nature is fundamentally random, then what's the point ... of anything -- and the defense attorney could then argue that the murderer's actions were the result of unpredictable spontaneous quantum brain farts.

Legal defenses based on "diminished capacity" rarely result in acquittals. More likely, they may reduce the penalty. Besides this defense is very specific to the individual. With D, no one can be held responsible for their actions. The future is "set in stone." Without D, we can hope to change the future through positive willful action.

With a classical gas, we can calculate entropy (under constrained conditions) using Boyle's Laws regarding the deterministic relation between pressure, temperature and volume. These laws describe the mass action of particles. However, the position and momenta of individual particles is effectively random. When we measure something repeatedly (assuming no significant time dependency) random error cancels out to give us a well determined result within certain limits. This view of effective determinism and effective randomness is well established in science. I don't see where this "ideological" need for strict D comes from. It can't be proven and conflicts with existing paradigms of QM.

Many of the attitudes codified in our laws haven't caught up with what modern science is teaching us.

So far science hasn't established D. The existing paradigm is still local indeterminism. It is a mistake to place the prestige of science behind a view that neither is proven nor the de facto existing paradigm based on QM and Bell's Theorem. When you day "everyone" believes in D, I question whether this is true.

Why don't you address my point that with D, we lose the concept of causality and only can speak of correlations such that R^2 always equals unity or zero? Suppose, given that over a certain total dose (X) of cigarettes (packs per day x days), lung cancer always occurs. Also yellow fingers always occur. Both yellow fingers and dose X are fully correlated with lung cancer, but only dose X causes ling cancer. With D, both conditions are simply state attributes that are always followed by lung cancer. Without D, in theory we can perform experiments which involve control of exposure. We can differentiate between cause and correlated consequents. Under D, human control of any situation does not exist.

 

[JoeDawg]

With D, we don't make choices.

D just means your choices are determined by your history.
I don't see this as anything more than obvious within the context of modern genetics and psychology, not to mention physics.

Everything that happens is predetermined.

'Pre-determined' implies some sort of conscious agency setting the agenda, determinism does not.

Everything is in effect controlled by "destiny and fate".

Destiny and fate are very different concepts. One can fail to fulfill one's destiny, its more like a goal, you've been told you are supposed to attain.

Fate is not about determinism, fate describes a complete lack of causality. With fate, no matter what you do in life, the end is set, like a curse. Determinism is about one thing following from another logically.

Without D, we can hope to change the future through positive willful action.

Without determinism there would be no causality, so every action you take would have a random result. You could no more will an action than you could will yourself to win the lottery.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism" is the standard, if not completely satisfying answer to the nature of determinism and free will.

 

[kote]

Ah, I see free will has been brought up as an argument for or against determinism. I can suggest some links for a primer on this topic:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

I'm for determinism as a requirement for identity and responsibility and for emergent qualia as an explanation for the appearance of consciousness.

Without determinism there are no causes. How can someone be held responsible for an action they can't be said to have caused? Without determinism "you" can't even be rational. You can't act with cause, by definition.

Denying determinism is saying that events do not have causes and cannot be explained. As much as physicists have tried to deny it lately, any hope for progress in physics requires an assumption of determinism. A theory of everything requires determinism. A realist account of any physical theory requires determinism. Where would physics be if physicists didn't implicitly believe that the results of experiments could be explained by natural laws?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

JoeDawg: D just means your choices are determined by your history.
I don't see this as anything more than obvious within the context of modern genetics and psychology, not to mention physics.

The idea of choice means selecting from among two or more possibilities. With D there is only one possibility: the selection you were predetermined to make.

'Pre-determined' implies some sort of conscious agency setting the agenda, determinism does not.

If there's D, then all events are predetermined. I don't see where this requires any kind of consciousness or external agent. It's simply a consequence of D.

Destiny and fate are very different concepts. One can fail to fulfill one's destiny, its more like a goal, you've been told you are supposed to attain. Fate is not about determinism, fate describes a complete lack of causality. With fate, no matter what you do in life, the end is set, like a curse. Determinism is about one thing following from another logically.

Fate/destiny are common words regarding a predetermined future. You're really making my case. With fate, there is no causality. See my argument in my prior post. Under D we have only have correlations of unit or zero value.

I'm saying we have effective determinism and effective randomness and I describe the relationship between the two in my previous post. Complete D or complete R at all scales are absolutes which are outside the bounds of current science.

 

[kote]

Fate/destiny are common words regarding a predetermined future. ... With fate, there is no causality.

Fate = Determinism = No Causality?

I don't agree. Determinism means every event has a cause. Determinism = Causality. Without determinism things happen without any reason/cause/explanation. If every event has a reason/cause/explanation, then you have determinism.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Fate = Determinism = No Causality?

I don't agree. Determinism means every event has a cause. Determinism = Causality. Without determinism things happen without any reason/cause/explanation. If every event has a reason/cause/explanation, then you have determinism.

See my post #23. (last paragraph)

 

[kote]

Okay then .

Without D, in theory we can perform experiments which involve control of exposure. We can differentiate between cause and correlated consequents. Under D, human control of any situation does not exist.

Without the assumption that events have definite causes, experiments are worthless. What good is an experiment that doesn't help you reveal some immutable deterministic law? Without determinism there is no such thing as control. How do you control a system that is inherently random?

For your point about cause vs correlation... scientifically how can we ever tell the two apart? You still have to answer Hume and the problem of induction here. I think this is more of an empirical / epistemological question than one related to determinism. For there to be any cause or necessary correlation you have to assume determinism anyways. I don't know if you can talk about causes without assuming determinism.

 

[kote]

I posted the identity links above because I think they are very relevant to this question. You say that if things are predetermined then we can't have free will. What about identity? Do you think that there is something that makes you you?

It is my identity, it is who I am, that determines the choices I make by my own free will. Will I, by my own free will, always make the same choice given the same set of circumstances? Yes, I believe I will. That's what makes me who I am. To not make the same choices given the same set of circumstances, I would have to be a different person (and yes, people can change with time/experience/mood etc, but that's beyond the scope here).

Given this concept of identity, there is nothing inconsistent about free will resulting in determined outcomes. Perhaps the "who I am" reduces to the motion of particles in my body. The argument still holds. This is how free will can be reconciled with determinism.

I still hold that determinism, the idea that all events/actions have reasons/causes/explanations, is required for any notion of choice or control to begin with.

Who I am determines the choices I make. Why did I make the choice I did? Because I believe... I was raised to... I have a genetic predisposition to... I woke up on the wrong side of the bed... There's always a reason - and that is the definition of determinism.

 

[WaveJumper]

D just means your choices are determined by your history.
I don't see this as anything more than obvious within the context of modern genetics and psychology, not to mention physics.

What about mutations? If they aren't random, but just random-looking, and still produce a highly sophisticated structure like the human body, I think you must be alluding to something that your ex-president was referring to as the "Almighty".

'Pre-determined' implies some sort of conscious agency setting the agenda, determinism does not.

What do you mean by this? Are you saying that the chain of events break at the Big Bang without an explanation as to why the particular configuration of energy that led to your appearance on this forum 14 billion years later was what it was? Is my laptop a deterministic phenomenon that was pre-determined at the BB 'randomly'(for no reason)?
Do you believe there are much more than 100 trillion trillion universes?

 

[apeiron]

Without determinism there are no causes. How can someone be held responsible for an action they can't be said to have caused? Without determinism "you" can't even be rational. You can't act with cause, by definition.

Denying determinism is saying that events do not have causes and cannot be explained. As much as physicists have tried to deny it lately, any hope for progress in physics requires an assumption of determinism. A theory of everything requires determinism. A realist account of any physical theory requires determinism. Where would physics be if physicists didn't implicitly believe that the results of experiments could be explained by natural laws?

Determinism is only required as an axiom of particular models of causality. There are other models which do not require it (at a fundamental level as opposed to an emergent level).

So as I keep mentioning, a logic of vagueness does not require determinism at at the deep ToE level.

And then when we move from the realm of simple systems (like cosmology) to complex adaptive systems (like conscious brains), simple dichotomies like determined/random are too ontically simple to really be much help in describing the situation.

Human freewill is a complicated story and you need to be able to discuss both its neurology and sociology. Collapsing it to the level of a physics discussion is always the wrong thing to do. Instead, you need to escalate to an anticipatory systems level of discussion. That is where the "science" lies.

 

[WaveJumper]

Are emergent properties a deterministic process? Does everyone think that the emergence of life was determined at the Big Bang?

 

[kote]

Collapsing it to the level of a physics discussion is always the wrong thing to do.

apeiron, you drive me crazy. Doesn't consistency demand reducibility? When we're talking about what's basic or "real," we must ignore macroscopic approximations. Any macroscopic theory that is not an approximation must be reducible to physics, if we let physics represent whatever our fundamental microscopic reality is. Either the metaphysical is consistent with the physical realm, or one of your theories is wrong.

I'm not sure how a "logic of vagueness" is useful. Are you arguing that we should genuinely adopt mutually inconsistent views? Why bother when regular old logic works perfectly well and we can explain phenomena through emergence?

 

[kote]

Are emergent properties a deterministic process? Does everyone think that the emergence of life was determined at the Big Bang?

WaveJumper, I'm not sure I understand your use of "emergence" here. Emergent properties are not something that happen deterministically. Take the color red as an example of an emergent property. There is no intrinsic property of "red" in matter. But when you combine an apple, the proper lighting, my eyes and my brain, voila, the entire system taken as a whole gives you the emergent property of red. Red is a property of the system as a whole, though it is not a property of any of the individual parts by themselves. There is nothing extra needed besides individual atoms, though. No extra substance is needed to support "red." It is all right there in the configuration of the basic atomic system.

This is my take on emergent qualia in the philosophical sense. But yes, determinism would say that if at any point in time you knew the exact state of the universe, you could predict the future and know the past with absolute certainty.

 

[WaveJumper]

WaveJumper, I'm not sure I understand your use of "emergence" here. Emergent properties are not something that happen deterministically. Take the color red as an example of an emergent property. There is no intrinsic property of "red" in matter. But when you combine an apple, the proper lighting, my eyes and my brain, voila, the entire system taken as a whole gives you the emergent property of red. Red is a property of the system as a whole, though it is not a property of any of the individual parts by themselves. There is nothing extra needed besides individual atoms, though. No extra substance is needed to support "red." It is all right there in the configuration of the basic atomic system.

This is my take on emergent qualia in the philosophical sense. But yes, determinism would say that if at any point in time you knew the exact state of the universe, you could predict the future and know the past with absolute certainty.

No, i think your example was bad(i don't think anyone knows how/why we interpret certain wave frequences as 'red'). I referred to emergent properties as properties that were not there until a precise particular combination of molecules were accomplished(e.g. Life). And 'BAM', you have a system that behaves in ways that cannot be explained by the proprties of its constituents parts.

 

[kote]

No, i referred to emergent properties as properties that were not there until a precise particular combination of molecules were accomplished. And 'BAM', you have a system that behaves in ways that cannot be explained by the proprties of its constituents parts.

Causally I would say that irreducibility is not a necessary feature of emergence. You can always explain the system in terms of the atoms. Sometimes the system just throws off some extra 2nd order properties out of the chaos (like qualia/the color red).

I don't claim to know of any mechanism for why red is red either. I just know that it is , and that it corresponds to states in basic physics. There is no explaining emergent qualia from outside the system. I literally can't know what you're thinking without being you - without having the atoms of my body configured exactly the same as yours. But I do know that with the configuration of atoms my body currently has, I'm having the thoughts that I'm having.

If I were physically an exact clone of you, I believe I would be having the exact same thoughts that you are having. That's what it means to believe that qualia are reducible to physical systems. If you have the same physical system, you have the same qualia.

Getting back to the OP's topic, it all works out nicely and consistently in a deterministic world containing consciousness and free will.

 

[WaveJumper]

Causally I would say that irreducibility is not a necessary feature of emergence. You can always explain the system in terms of the atoms. Sometimes the system just throws off some extra 2nd order properties out of the chaos (like qualia/the color red).

I wish this system you speak of, would stop throwing off qualia and would just as easily throw off some dollars my way, as a 2nd order property out of the chaos. Or at least some credit cards or bonds.

 

[apeiron]

apeiron, you drive me crazy. Doesn't consistency demand reducibility? When we're talking about what's basic or "real," we must ignore macroscopic approximations. Any macroscopic theory that is not an approximation must be reducible to physics, if we let physics represent whatever our fundamental microscopic reality is. Either the metaphysical is consistent with the physical realm, or one of your theories is wrong.

Reducibility is part of all modelling I would agree. We generalise to shed the particulars. We discard information (calling it noise) to increase the meaningfulness of what we chose to retain (which we call the signal).

But - the big but - you are assuming that all reality will reduce in the one direction - from the large to the small. From the global to the local. From the macro to the micro.

Yet you have studied philosophy and would agree that reduction is not really about shrinking the scale of analysis but increasing the generality of the statements. And generalisation is a dichotomous reduction. You have to move towards two complementary extremes - in this case, of scale.

So the macro and the micro are equally fundamental in this view. The macro level describes the boundary constraints, the downward causality, the micro level describes the initial conditions, the bottom-up constructive causality.

Even physics actually reduces in these two directions - laws and measurements. Boundary constraints and initial conditions. Forms and substances.

For branding purposes, physics goes around saying we reduce everything to the fundamentally small. And that is indeed half its job. Seeking reality's atoms. But the other half is reducing reality to its global forms, its prevailing laws, its most general principles.

Do QM and GR emerge from the identity of a quark, or does a quark emerge from the principles of QM and GR?

I'm not sure how a "logic of vagueness" is useful. Are you arguing that we should genuinely adopt mutually inconsistent views? Why bother when regular old logic works perfectly well and we can explain phenomena through emergence?

Vagueness is based on the premise that anything is possible, but only the mutually consistent can emerge (or rather develop - emergence is a tarred word these days).

And regular old logic is nested within a larger systems logic. Again, it is all about dividing in opposing directions. You end up with two things that appear completely opposed (as they must be as a result of their journey) yet give you the two extremes that are what is possible.

So if you say all reality is reducible to local substances, micro-properties, then implicit in this is the antithesis, all reality must also be reducible to global forms, macro-organisational principles. And you have no real argument for privileging one over the other.

Though this is what happens in the Western technocratic tradition. Local substance gets called the "real", global forms become the emergent, the platonic, the laws in the mind of god or whatever - the "unreal".

Regular old logic always dichotomises. This is why it is founded on the law of the excluded middle. But old logic did not then demand that you had to chuck one half of the dichotomy away as an emergent macro approximation. That is a more recent metaphysical position.

Regular old logic gave us the choices of chance and necessity, random and determined. And it also gave us even deeper dichotomies - the vague and the crisp, becoming and being, potential and actual. The axis of ontic development that allows things like random and determined events to be the result of global developmental processes rather than having to have some prior local existence.

 

[ThomasT]

With D, we don't make choices.

We engage in behavior that we call "choosing" or "choice making". If you're a determinist, then you believe that the range of choices available to you and the choices you make are determined by antecedent conditions. If you do any sort of arranging or engineering, including reflective thinking, to facilitate certain desired outcomes, then you're a practicing determinist. The idea that the world is fundamentally indeterministic and that it could be different given the same history is contradictory. If you want to maintain that the world is fundamentally indeterministic but that the apparent deterministic evolution is an emergent property related to how we must view the world, then you can pray to a god who plays dice, but you'll still be a practicing determinist.

We don't minimize or eradicate anything under D.

We certainly do act to minimize and/or eradicate wrt various contexts. The assumption of determinism doesn't disallow any behavior that we engage in. Indeed, it's partly through observing individual and collective human behavior and various social conventions and institutions that the assumption of a fundamental determinism becomes such a compelling choice.

There is no willful conduct (an important legal concept). Everything that happens is predetermined. Operant conditioning is an experimental activity. Experiments involve choice and control. Choice and human control do not exist under D. Everything is in effect controlled by "destiny and fate". All human actions are passive.

Determinism doesn't preclude willful conduct. The predestination or fate implied by determinism doesn't render human actions passive. We're still actors in this reality drama, and our actions have consequences which, to some extent, determine our choices and future actions. It's all just too complicated for us to project exactly how the 'big picture' is going to unfold.
Our legal systems are based on the notion and application of deterministic control, even if we don't want to call it that.

With D, no one can be held responsible for their actions.

Of course they can, and are. It's just a matter of contingencies, eg., if you steal cars, etc., and get caught, then you will face prosecution and possible confinement. Responsibility refers to accountability which refers to contingent consequences.

Without D, we can hope to change the future through positive willful action.

Without D, there is no future -- at least no intelligable one. Just a roll of the dice, a flip of the coin. Without D there's no fundamental dynamical principle(s) to search for.

With a classical gas, we can calculate entropy (under constrained conditions) using Boyle's Laws regarding the deterministic relation between pressure, temperature and volume. These laws describe the mass action of particles. However, the position and momenta of individual particles is effectively random. When we measure something repeatedly (assuming no significant time dependency) random error cancels out to give us a well determined result within certain limits. This view of effective determinism and effective randomness is well established in science. I don't see where this "ideological" need for strict D comes from. It can't be proven and conflicts with existing paradigms of QM.

The idea of a fundamental determinism accompanies the search for fundamental dynamical principles. The fact that physics (quantum and classical) involves probabilistic treatments doesn't obviate the search for fundamental dynamics.

So far science hasn't established D. The existing paradigm is still local indeterminism. It is a mistake to place the prestige of science behind a view that neither is proven nor the de facto existing paradigm based on QM and Bell's Theorem. When you say "everyone" believes in D, I question whether this is true.

Physics involves probabilistic treatments where necessary -- and determinism remains the de facto foundational assumption underlying the collection of methods we call physical science.
I didn't say that everyone believes in D. I said that everyone should believe in D.

Why don't you address my point that with D, we lose the concept of causality and only can speak of correlations such that LaTeX Code: R^2 always equals unity or zero?

This doesn't make any sense to me. Anyway, the fact that we mostly just speak of correlations doesn't negate the belief in and search for fundamental pervading and unifying dynamical principles.

Suppose, given that over a certain total dose (X) of cigarettes (packs per day x days), lung cancer always occurs. Also yellow fingers always occur. Both yellow fingers and dose X are fully correlated with lung cancer, but only dose X causes lung cancer. With D, both conditions are simply state attributes that are always followed by lung cancer. Without D, in theory we can perform experiments which involve control of exposure. We can differentiate between cause and correlated consequents. Under D, human control of any situation does not exist.

I don't know what to make of this either.

 

[ThomasT]

Reducibility is part of all modelling I would agree. We generalise to shed the particulars. We discard information (calling it noise) to increase the meaningfulness of what we chose to retain (which we call the signal).

But - the big but - you are assuming that all reality will reduce in the one direction - from the large to the small. From the global to the local. From the macro to the micro.

From the complex to the simple. The way I see it, the search is for a fundamental wave dynamic(s), which, through countless iterations, like some sort of cellular automaton, has given rise to the vast hierarchy of extant media.

If there really is some such dynamic(s) pervading physical reality wrt any and all scales, then we don't have to keep smashing things together at higher and higher energies to get to the bottom of things. It's already right in front of us -- part of our everyday experience. The problem is adjusting our way of looking at things so that we can see it.

 

[JoeDawg]

The idea of choice means selecting from among two or more possibilities. With D there is only one possibility: the selection you were predetermined to make.

Using words like 'predetermined' is just confusing the issue. Either something is determined or not. Predetermined means determined before it happens, not when it happens. In order for something to be predetermined you need a concsious agent rigging the system, think: mind-control.

Unless you believe we are puppets of some god, then there is no 'predetermined', no fate, no destiny, no intention to events. What you have is a series, or rather a conflux of events that logically follow from initial conditions. One of the problems people get into when talking about determinism is that they confuse logical progression with purpose or intent.

Nothing is determined, until it happens, via cause and effect. Prediction and prophesy are what 'pre' is about.

If there's D, then all events are predetermined. I don't see where this requires any kind of consciousness or external agent. It's simply a consequence of D.

The 'pre' part. You're talking about future, about prediction, not events that have actually happened.

Fate/destiny are common words regarding a predetermined future.

Well, yeah, that's why its really inappropriate to use 'pre' when talking about causality

With fate, there is no causality.

Agreed

Under D we have only have correlations of unit or zero value.

Causality and prediction are different things.

I'm saying we have effective determinism and effective randomness

If you like, but that's not saying much of anything, in my book.

Complete D or complete R at all scales are absolutes which are outside the bounds of current science.

Absolutes are outside the bounds of science, period. Science is about obsevation and prediction, not perfect knowledge.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Nothing is determined, until it happens, via cause and effect. Prediction and prophesy are what 'pre' is about. The 'pre' part. You're talking about future, about prediction, not events that have actually happened.

This where we part company. I maintain that with D (not just effective D), the future is assumed to already exist in every detail. All future outcomes are strictly determined by past events such that there are no alternatives. I don't believe you or ThomasT really understand how profound an idea D is, but I guess we'll have to agree to disagree.

 

[JoeDawg]

I maintain that with D (not just effective D), the future is assumed to already exist in every detail.

If the future already exists, one could question the entire idea of causality. Time, in that situation, would simply be a spectrum of events. For it to be determinism, and I don't see any need to qualify it, effect must follow from cause, they don't exist at the same time.

All future outcomes are strictly determined by past events such that there are no alternatives.

There are no alternatives in the sense that one thing leads to another, but defining freewill as the ability to choose what you didn't choose is simply self-contradicting. Its not a problem with freewill, its a problem of poorly defined freewill.

I don't believe you or ThomasT really understand how profound an idea D is.

That's ok, I rarely feel profound.

 

[ThomasT]

I don't believe ... ThomasT really understand(s) how profound an idea D is ...

Well, it wouldn't be the first time that I've gotten in over my head.

 

[petm1]

Well, it wouldn't be the first time that I've gotten in over my head.

This is the feeling I get when I picture my world as if all of the accelerometers are right. Thinking of riding this matter wave we call earth, this deterministic wave dilating into every time and in all possible directions through space, nine point eight meters every second.

 

[z3hr]

I don't think you'll find any proof of anything, it all really depends on religious preferences. In a physical world determinism seems logical because every action has a specific reaction. No one action can have multiple outcomes. One could also say that the "human" or "God" element of choice defies these laws and allows us to change the world in the way that we want to. Then again one could argue that humans are also governed by these same physical laws and their choices are as well.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I don't think you'll find any proof of anything, it all really depends on religious preferences. In a physical world determinism seems logical because every action has a specific reaction. No one action can have multiple outcomes. One could also say that the "human" or "God" element of choice defies these laws and allows us to change the world in the way that we want to. Then again one could argue that humans are also governed by these same physical laws and their choices are as well.

I agree that issues of determinism and free will are philosophical and tend to merge into theological arguments. I have no problem with deterministic scientific theories. The testing of physical theories are almost always in terms of measurements and measurements are subject to uncertainty. My problem is statements which fail to distinguish between theories and physical reality. The fact is that, given our present state of knowledge, experimentally observed quantum outcomes are probabilistic. QM is deterministic only in terms of predicting probabilities. If scientists want to believe physical reality is strictly determined at all scales in every detail, fine. But don't posture that physical reality IS (non-probabilistically)deterministic. I've encountered this in a thread on Chaos Theory in the Classical Physics forum. No one knows that. If it's true, then there is no free will.

Free will would not seem to be substantially random either. By definition, it is purposeful, directed behavior; an emergent phenomenon arising out of the interactions of the organism with its environment over time. To that extent, it may have a small but important probabilistic component insofar as our current best theory (QM) is probabilistic. If there is a substratum, how do we know that it will be fully deterministic?

 

[Descartz2000]

I think it comes down to rejecting the illusion of a 'first cause'. For free-will to occur, there must be a first cause of action, or it is not free, it is caused by a previous condition. It seems ludicrous to think in my brain there is a mind that is based on either phyics, biology, genetics, history, evolution; or based on a first cause being the wholistic mind already in tact. If true, and my mind is the first cause, then this seems to require a supernatural phenomena behind the process (or actually lack of process, as it is free of previous conditions or physical states due to being the first cause). It seems most logical to assume the mind is a product not separate from the brain or the laws of science. 'free' from what? Our biology? our experiences? our genes? The first cause makes little sense as a general concept. It creates the idea of a creator (my mind) without being created (there is no process of coming into being, as it is required to be a first cause, and any process leading up to is the cause). Therefore, accepting a history-dependent and physical basis for mind and consciousness allows us to hang on to science. Without a physcal basis, why even try? Our instruments are not adequate. I predict true 'free-will' will be debunked in the future and will be tallied up to be nothing more than supernatural and pseudo science bordering on atrology and religion. Hey wait, isn't there a religious affiliation of Free Will Baptists? Seems they are similar.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I think it comes down to rejecting the illusion of a 'first cause'. For free-will to occur, there must be a first cause of action, or it is not free, it is caused by a previous condition.

I'll bite. That free will implies a first cause would be true if you assume strict determinism. Current established science is based on probabilistic QM. If don't like it, fine. That's a matter of taste. But that's all it is. Strict determinism is not current science. Unless and until a fully tested, fully deterministic TOE exists, your connection between a first cause and free will is a matter of taste.

There's a bit conceit and hubris about assuming that we can fully comprehend nature. Why should that be possible? Our species has only existed for some 200,000 years (if that). Moreover, 'supernatural' is loaded unscientific term. What we are really talking about is the nature we don't understand given our current level of evolution and the limitations of our collective mind.

This doesn't mean we shouldn't stop trying; but there is one deep question. If there is no first cause, what is the alternative; an infinite regress?

EDIT: I'm not arguing for any particular point of view here, other than respecting the limitations of our species but nevertheless persisting in our quest to understand nature. What you and I said about free will actually leads to a paradox. If there's a first cause, then there can be free will, but only if there is deterministic connection between free will and the first cause. But strict determinism is an argument against free will, whereas a universe with no first cause might allow free will.