Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[clancy688]

At least one study of mark 1 containment failure mentions the blowdown that I was just talking about. I wil try to find the study, but in a nutshell this process does not have to involve the torus itself being damaged.

Here you go:

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/5835351-nR29Hq/5835351.pdf

 

[zapperzero]

Does anyone know what is the current status of PCV equipment hatches in Unit 4?

Furthermore, were they supposed to be open, or closed, at the time of the accident?

 

[tsutsuji]

The 7th mid long term meeting was held on 25 June:

3-5 Countermeasures for spent fuels pools
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02bb.pdf Performance of preliminary underwater surveys (2nd and 3rd ones) in spent fuel pool for the purpose of removing debris at unit 3.

Translation:

1/4

2/4

 

[tsutsuji]

Translation:

3/4

4/4

 

[jim hardy]

in this document linked above (thanks again Tsutsuji )
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuc...120625_02y.pdf

there's two red circles on bottom left photo.
800 % is about all the expansion it'll stand, and i don't see what is significant there.
Except that a lot of debris has been cleared.

is there anything I'm missing by my inability to read the captions ?

old jim

 

[SteveElbows]

No you aren't missing anything, debris removal is all its about. In this case they finally dealt with the roof debris that's been dangling down there, having previously cleared away rather large quantities of debris & broken buildings from the area below.

Since I was asking about progress at this reactor the other day, I am very grateful for the translation above which gives us a sense of timescale, as well as these new images.

 

[SteveElbows]

Here you go:

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/5835351-nR29Hq/5835351.pdf

Thanks very much, that's the one, not sure if there are any others.

Anyway I guess we aren't going to learn much more about this for a long time, and there is little else that I can use right now to build on any theories in this regard. I suppose alternative possibilities are core material washing down into S/C or torus room later, or something related to wet venting.

The next thing we might learn about reactor 1 is the state of the TIP room, and updated measurements of previously inspected southern parts of the first floor, as they are due to do the robot thing there on wednesday according to this handout:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120703_01-e.pdf

 

[tsutsuji]

The 7th mid long term meeting was held on 25 June: http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20120625_02.html

3-2 Treatment of accumulated water
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02n.pdf Progress status of ground water bypass study

This document was already translated into English by Tepco in http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf pages 4/17 to 8/17 (only the date is different [25 June instead of 18 June])

The 7th mid long term meeting was held on 25 June: http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20120625_02.html

3-2 Treatment of accumulated water
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02k.pdf Subdrain purification test report

Most of this document was already translated into English by Tepco in http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf pages 12/17 to 17/17:

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02k.pdf 2/7 content similar with http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf 14/17 "Complete the pumping test" was achieved on 15 June for unit 1 and 19 June for unit 2.
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02k.pdf 3/7 translated in http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf 15/17
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02k.pdf 4/7 translated in http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf 13/17
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02k.pdf 5/7 content similar with http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf 14/17
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02k.pdf 6/7 translated in http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf 12/17
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02k.pdf 7/7 translated in http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120618_05-e.pdf 17/17

 

[Azby]

The English-language executive summary of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission was just released a few minutes ago. You can download it from here:

http://naiic.go.jp/en/

 

[SteveElbows]

The English-language executive summary of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission was just released a few minutes ago. You can download it from here:

http://naiic.go.jp/en/

Thanks. Of particular relevance to the discussion of technical matters is the following from page 31:

The government-run investigation committee’s interim report, NISA’s “Technical Findings,” and specifically TEPCO’s interim report, all concluded that the loss of emergency AC power—that definitely impacted the progression of the accident— “was caused by the flooding from the tsunami.” TEPCO’s report says the first wave of the tsunami reached the site at 15:27 and the second at 15:35. However, these are the times when the wave gauge set 1.5km offshore detected the waves, not the times of when the tsunami hit the plant. This suggests that at least the loss of emergency power supply A at Unit 1 might not have been caused by flooding. Based on this, some basic questions need to be logically explained before making a final determination that flooding was the cause of the station blackout.

4. Several TEPCO vendor workers who were working on the fourth floor of the nuclear reactor building at Unit 1 at the time of the earthquake witnessed a water leak on the same floor, which houses two large tanks for the isolation condenser (IC) and the pip- ing for IC. The Commission believes that this was not due to water sloshing out of the spent fuel pool on the fifth floor. However, since we cannot go inside the facility and perform an on-site inspection, the source of the water remains unconfirmed.

5. The isolation condensers (A and B2 systems) of Unit 1 were shut down automatically at 14:52, but the operator of Unit 1 manually stopped both IC systems 11 minutes lat- er. TEPCO has consistently maintained that the explanation for the manual suspen- sion was that “it was judged that the per-hour reactor coolant temperature excursion rate could not be kept within 55 degrees (Celsius), which is the benchmark provided by the operational manual.” The government-led investigation report, as well as the government’s report to IAEA, states the same reason. However, according to several workers involved in the manual suspension of IC who responded to our investiga- tion, they stopped IC to check whether coolant was leaking from IC and other pipes because the reactor pressure was falling rapidly. While the operator’s explanations are reasonable and appropriate, TEPCO’s explanation is irrational.

6. There is no evidence that the safety relief (SR) valve was opened at Unit 1, though this should have taken place in the case of an accident. (Such records are available for Units 2 and 3.) We found that the sound of the SR valve opening for Unit 2 was heard at the Central Control Room and at Unit 2, but no one working at Unit 1 heard the sound of the Unit 1 SR valve opening. It is therefore a possibility that the SR valve might not have worked in Unit 1. In this case, a minor LOCA caused by the seismic motion could have taken place in Unit 1.

 

[tsutsuji]

25 June 2012 government-Tokyo Electric mid and long term response committee, steering committee (7th meeting)

3-1 Cooling by closed loop water injection
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02g.pdf Unit 2 alternative thermometers installation progress status

1) Previous related topics:

1 March 2012 report ( https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3795578&postcount=12465 part 1, https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3796935&postcount=12485 part 2, https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3799356&postcount=12492 part 3)

28 March 2012 government-Tokyo Electric mid and long term response committee, steering committee (4th meeting)

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120328_02f.pdf page 7 is about the revision of priorities for installation of alternative thermometers. The high radiation routes are cancelled. What is left is Jet Pump system B X-40C/D in area B with priority 1, SLC differential pressure sensor X-51 in area C with priority 2, and TIP in area D as priority (1) with a note. The note says: "there is a possibility that the TIP guide tubes are surviving in the outer surroundings of the core (see page 8). →If undamaged TIP guide tubes are left, they can be promoted to priority 1." The figure in the left part of page 8 shows a yellow area where surviving TIP tubes are believed to exist.

23 April 2012 report: https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3939578#post3939578 (insertion and freezing mock-ups)

28 May 2012 government-Tokyo Electric mid and long term response committee, steering committee (6th meeting): https://www.physicsforums.com/showt...ighlight=alternative+thermometers#post3941037 Results of the surveys on location concerning the environment improvement for the purpose of installing alternative thermometers in unit 2's RPV

01 June 2012 videos:

http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2012/201206-e/120601_02e.html "Decontamination around the truck bay door at Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi NPS" (released on 1 June 2012)

http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2012/201206-e/120601_01e.html "Mock-up test to check the insertability of the alternative thermometer at Unit 2" (released on 1 June 2012)

2) Translation:

01/12

02/12

03/12

 

[tsutsuji]

Translation:

04/12

05/12

06/12

 

[tsutsuji]

Translation:

07/12

08/12

09/12

 

[tsutsuji]

Translation:

10/12

11/12

12/12

 

[elektrownik]

Unit 4 top is almost clean now:

 

[SteveElbows]

Your image link isn't working for me but you can see the image here, and click it to see a higher resolution version:

http://enformable.com/2012/07/photo-of-the-week-fukushima-daiichi-reactor-4-building-debris-removal/

The removable concrete cap sections are visible in their storage positions under the yellow containment cap and to the south of it.

Some of the groundwork preparing the foundations for the fuel removal structure are partially visible south of the building.

 

[zapperzero]

http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/07/...y+(Fukushima+Diary)&utm_content=Google+Reader

Can someone confirm this?

 

[a.ua.]

Analyses of core melt and re-melt in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18811248.2011.636537

 

[elektrownik]

Analyses of core melt and re-melt in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18811248.2011.636537

"Re-melting of core materials: 21 March 01:25 21–25 March"
and
"This still from film footage released by Tokyo Electric Power Co. shows black smoke billowing from the crippled Fukushima I nuclear power plant in northeastern Japan, March 22."
from:
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0...What-s-in-the-smoke-emerging-from-Fukushima-I

 

[SteveElbows]

Analyses of core melt and re-melt in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18811248.2011.636537

Thats a rather interesting study.

To look at something other than the later core remelt possibilities for a moment, I am rather interested in the reports suggestion that unlike reactors 1 & 3, the initial core melting at reactor 2 didn't result in a runaway zirconium-steam reaction, due to a lack of steam generation in the core.

This would certainly be an interesting alternative explanation as to why there was no hydrogen explosion at reactor 2. But I haven't quite got my head around the reasons this report thinks such a reaction did not occur. Could someone take a look at the report and attempt to explain this to me?

Many thanks.

 

[elektrownik]

Thats a rather interesting study.

To look at something other than the later core remelt possibilities for a moment, I am rather interested in the reports suggestion that unlike reactors 1 & 3, the initial core melting at reactor 2 didn't result in a runaway zirconium-steam reaction, due to a lack of steam generation in the core.

This would certainly be an interesting alternative explanation as to why there was no hydrogen explosion at reactor 2. But I haven't quite got my head around the reasons this report thinks such a reaction did not occur. Could someone take a look at the report and attempt to explain this to me?

Many thanks.

Look at this part "3.3.1. Core boil-off process and meltdown into lower plenum"

 

[tsutsuji]

Analyses of core melt and re-melt in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18811248.2011.636537

Tanabe's core remelting theories were first mentioned on Physics Forum on https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3443421&postcount=10864 (August 2011)

This was before Tepco revised its flow rate data for unit 3 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110909_06-e.pdf (September 2011). See https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3494451&postcount=11193

I wonder why http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18811248.2011.636537 published in January 2012 is still using the older data in its "Figure 19:Injection water flow rate in comparison with MDHRFR in 1F-3".

 

[elektrownik]

Tanabe's core remelting theories were first mentioned on Physics
I wonder why http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18811248.2011.636537 published in January 2012 is still using the older data in its "Figure 19:Injection water flow rate in comparison with MDHRFR in 1F-3".

But it use also some other data (temp and pressure).

 

[MadderDoc]

Tanabe's core remelting theories were first mentioned on Physics Forum on https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3443421&postcount=10864 (August 2011)

This was before Tepco revised its flow rate data for unit 3 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110909_06-e.pdf (September 2011). See https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3494451&postcount=11193

I wonder why http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18811248.2011.636537 published in January 2012 is still using the older data in its "Figure 19:Injection water flow rate in comparison with MDHRFR in 1F-3".

Perhaps due to the close timing collision between Tepco's publishing of revised flow estimates, and the finalising of this particular article; it was received on 11 August 2011 and the final version was accepted for publication on 16 September 2011.

 

[MadderDoc]

Tsunami photo sequence released June 9th

A photo sequence of the March 11th tsunami hitting Daiichi, recent released at:
http://photo.tepco.co.jp/date/2012/201207-j/120709_01j.html

 

[SteveElbows]

The following is a version of the recent helicopter footage. Can see how far they have progressed with platform to east and south of reactor 3 at a few moments in the footage.



Sorry I couldn't find the original version of this video.

 

[MadderDoc]

The following is a version of the recent helicopter footage. Can see how far they have progressed with platform to east and south of reactor 3 at a few moments in the footage.



Sorry I couldn't find the original version of this video.

Thank you, Steve. I think I've found the progenitor of that version, it is a published snippet of a video taken by a Kyodo News helicopter on July 5th 2012:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-FgXPX5iYC4&feature=plcp

 

[tsutsuji]

A photo sequence of the March 11th tsunami hitting Daiichi, recent released at:
http://photo.tepco.co.jp/date/2012/201207-j/120709_01j.html

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120710/index.html Tepco released 33 new pictures of the tsunami in response to the Diet investigation commission pointing out the existence of unreleased pictures. The picture were taken by a contractor company employee who was within the plant premises. Among the pictures taken before the tsunami arrival, one can see the white spray of the rising wave while it approaches, and a tanker seeking refuge by getting out of the port. The pictures taken after the tsunami arrival show the violent muddy stream, a large container being carried away by the stream and these pictures let one know again about the violence of the tsunami. Then, we see employees who had taken refuge on a roof who are worryingly looking at the stream. Tepco had released 17 Fukushima Daiichi tsunami pictures in May 2011, but the present pictures had not been released until the Diet investigation commission pointed them out. Tepco said:"Among the taken pictures, we selected for public release those that are the easiest for understanding how the tsunami came. We would like to apologize for the insufficient points in provision of information".

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120706/index.html The Diet's investigation commission report contains up to now unreleased transcripts of plant manager Yoshida's testimony where he says "the line of command was a mess" and contains his criticism of the interference by the Prime Minister's Office. Yoshida said: "If the Main Office had said "stop" [injecting seawater], that would be debatable, but there was no such instruction at all. A phone call came from supporting role Prime Minister's Office: what is this stop thing? As it is on phone, it is difficult to discuss. The line of command was a mess. I thought that in the end I would decide by my own judgement". [Also quoted by http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120706003982.htm (English) and http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20120706p2a00m0na010000c.html (English)]

 

[SteveElbows]

Reactor 3 torus room survey robot, which had sound monitoring equipment to listen for running water, got stuck and hasnt been retrieved. 360 mSv/h measured at side of the northern torus access hatch, 230 mSv/h in location where robot is stuck:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120712_03-e.pdf

Some photos of upper levels of reactor 3, but quality is poor. Some of the images have some signs of interlacing lines, which suggests to me that its from a video, but no video has been released.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120711_03-e.pdf

http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2012/201207-e/120711_02e.html

Images released as part of the announcement of completion of reactor 4 upper level debris removal, but they are all taken from unhelpful angles. Helicopter footage we've already seen was better than this stuff.

http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2012/201207-e/120711_01e.html

 

[LabratSR]

TEPCO to release footage of video conferences

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20120712_15.html

 

[tsutsuji]

Reactor 3 torus room survey robot, which had sound monitoring equipment to listen for running water, got stuck and hasnt been retrieved. 360 mSv/h measured at side of the northern torus access hatch, 230 mSv/h in location where robot is stuck:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120712_03-e.pdf

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120713/index.html No conspicuous damage was observed except the fact that the south-western door is broken.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120713/0400_4gk.html The NISA approved the plan to retrieve 2 fresh fuel assemblies from unit 4 pool. The assemblies will be pulled with 4 wires. The operation will be controlled with the help of an underwater camera, and radiation measurement tools. The NISA said these safety measures are "appropriate". As a security measure concerning radioactive substances, Tepco will not announce the date beforehand.

http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2012/07/20120712003/20120712003.html NISA approval for unit 4 fresh fuel assembly removal
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2012/07/20120712003/20120712003-3.pdf Figure 2 at the bottom of the page shows the rafter crane on the platform above the reactor well with two hooks. Figure 4 is the tool that will be used for inspecting the fuel at the common pool. This inspection is scheduled during the last ten days of August. Normally the radiation on the surface of the fresh fuel is 25 microsievert/hour.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120712_05-e.pdf Unit 2 RPV Alternative Thermometer: SLC Pipe Soundness Confirmation.

Why isn't the pipe already filled with water from the RPV ? Is there a check valve or something preventing water from flowing downwards ?

At 10:35, "no more water could be injected from that point". Why not ? What is preventing the water from pouring into the RPV ?

Does this result (soundness of SLC instrumentation pipe is confirmed) mean that the core is not as badly melted as could be thought ? It sounds like at least that pipe did not melt.

 

[Joffan]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120712_05-e.pdf Unit 2 RPV Alternative Thermometer: SLC Pipe Soundness Confirmation.

Why isn't the pipe already filled with water from the RPV ? Is there a check valve or something preventing water from flowing downwards ?

At 10:35, "no more water could be injected from that point". Why not ? What is preventing the water from pouring into the RPV ?

Does this result (soundness of SLC instrumentation pipe is confirmed) mean that the core is not as badly melted as could be thought ? It sounds like at least that pipe did not melt.

Thanks for for continuing reporting efforts tsutsuji.

As Tepco says, the amount of water injected into the pipe and the retention of pressure point to a blocked pipe. The 15L injected was way less than the (as-designed) volume of the pipe, 33L. So there is potentially crud in the pipe, perhaps corrosion products, and these are blocking the pipe. It's also possible that the pipe has distorted (by heat or mechanical impact) which could block and reduce volume, or that the RPV internal section of the pipe has been penetrated and blocked by corium; or a combination.

The "result" is that the SLC pipe is not currently usable as a thermometer insertion route. Exactly why is not yet determined.

 

[tsutsuji]

Thanks Joffan. I was perplexed by this "soundess is confirmed" conclusion in the Tepco handout.

http://genpatsu-watch.blogspot.fr/2012/07/20127131800.html [transcript of July 13's press conference] Junichi Matsumoto:

"Normally, it is thought that the injected volume obtained from the pipe's length and diameter is 33 litres. Of course, in the hypothesis where the pipe is open up to the RPV, we presumed that water would go on entering even after filling 33 litres of water, but the situation in yesterday's soundness check is that injection becomes impossible at around 15 litres, and after the water filling was stopped, we observed the pressure decline status.

Today, when we checked at around 10:00, it was about 100 kPa as shown above. Well, as it was not the water head value of 68 kPa or 56 kPa measured by the water elevation when the extremity is open, we are suspecting that the pipe is somehow clogged.

Therefore, about anything special that we could say about this pressure, well, we understood that probably it is clogged, and we want to check the status of this clogging.

Also, checking methods are currently under study, but as we had been carrying out the preparations for alternative thermometer insertion, at present we are checking if we could not look inside the pipe using an industrial endoscope with that method".

 

[Joffan]

Thanks Joffan. I was perplexed by this "soundness is confirmed" conclusion in the Tepco handout.

Me too, but I can speculate that, as the pipe did hold a very considerable pressure for a long time, in one sense it is "sound" in that it is probably not leaking to the PCV. Or perhaps - you would know better than me - it's a mistranslation of the idea that the the soundness has been confirmed... bad.

 

[tsutsuji]

Or perhaps - you would know better than me - it's a mistranslation of the idea that the the soundness has been confirmed... bad.

That's right. It was a mistranslation.

計装配管の健全性を確認　should have been translated as "checking instrumentation pipe soundess" or "we shall check instrumentation pipe soundness".

There is a second handout on the same topic dated July 13: www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120713_04-e.pdf

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120718/index.html Tepco removed one of the 204 fresh fuel assemblies in unit 4 pool on 18 July, starting at around 9:00 AM. They plan to remove a second one soon.

http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1670136/Workers-remove-nuke-fuel-from-Japan-plant "Television crews used helicopters to film the operation, defying requests from TEPCO"

Asahi News

Fuji News

http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xs8r32_yyyyyyyyy-yyyyyyyy_news JNN

 

[Andres Arce]

Does anybody know what that underwater tarpac is for ?
(at 01.22)
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xs8r32_yyyyyyyyy-yyyyyyyy_news

 

[MadderDoc]

Does anybody know what that underwater tarpac is for ?
(at 01.22)
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xs8r32_yyyyyyyyy-yyyyyyyy_news

Hello there Andres Arce. I believe this particular sequence of that video is from the May 26th tour to the top floor of unit 4. The camera appears to be looking into the cutaway in the southwest corner of the general floating plastic construction which composed the covering of the pool at that time. The cutaway gives access to the water surface of the pool. I think this cutaway is where water is circulated in and out of the pool and perhaps where e.g temperature sensors are interfaced. I am not sure what exactly we are seeing underwater, but since the general covering is there to protect from something falling into the pool, it would make sense to me that a similar protection has been put underwater in the cutaway in order to catch objects that might fall into the pool during operations there.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20120719/index.html On 19 July at around 06:00 AM, Tepco took the second fresh fuel assembly out of unit 4 pool and put it into a special transportation container. There was not any trouble so far.

[I'm unsure if the fuel assemblies are still on the 5th floor or if they have already taken them away to the common pool]

 

[westfield]

Does anybody know what that underwater tarpac is for ?
(at 01.22)
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xs8r32_yyyyyyyyy-yyyyyyyy_news

It's a reflection, not underwater.

 

[zapperzero]

There was not any trouble so far.

Apparently the rods were slightly contaminated, but nothing dramatic.

 

[tsutsuji]

Apparently the rods were slightly contaminated, but nothing dramatic.

Do you know that from a news source or how did you guess it ?

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1206689_1870.html "The transportation to common pool building was completed at 4:47 PM on July 19"

 

[LabratSR]

Fukushima contractor covers up worker exposure

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20120721_23.html

 

[tsutsuji]

http://icanps.go.jp/post-2.html Cabinet investigation committee final report (Japanese)

http://icanps.go.jp/eng/SaishyuRecommendation.pdf Final report recommendations (English)

 

[zapperzero]

Fukushima contractor covers up worker exposure

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20120721_23.html

Asahi also covers it:

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207210069

Disgraceful, to say the least. Lack of oversight.

 

[zapperzero]

Reactor 2 is still the worst polluter, Asahi reports:

The most radiation is being emitted from the No. 2 reactor, which is releasing 8 million becquerels an hour.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207240087

 

[Ms Music]

Hi, long time since I have posted here... (thankfully)

What is the process for removing fuel from the storage pools? Just curious since they have only removed two new assemblies so far. I understand the used fuel is hotter, so what is the process (even if so far unknown) and how long can the used assemblies be out of water? How long does it take to inspect the assemblies?

Just curious why a/ it has taken so long to remove the two new ones (is it low priority?), and b/ why do they expect it to take so long to remove the rest? I have read this thread long enough now you can throw some meat at me, and I should understand.

Thanks in advance, back to being a lurker.

 

[Astronuc]

Hi, long time since I have posted here... (thankfully)

What is the process for removing fuel from the storage pools? Just curious since they have only removed two new assemblies so far. I understand the used fuel is hotter, so what is the process (even if so far unknown) and how long can the used assemblies be out of water? How long does it take to inspect the assemblies?

Just curious why a/ it has taken so long to remove the two new ones (is it low priority?), and b/ why do they expect it to take so long to remove the rest? I have read this thread long enough now you can throw some meat at me, and I should understand.

Thanks in advance, back to being a lurker.

The reactor service floor and spent fuel pools were covered with debris, and the areas were heavily contaminated. The new (fresh) fuel could be more easily removed, except that is has been contaminated on the outer surface by activated corrosion products and any fission products that escaped from the operating or spent fuel.

The normal course is the use the fuel handling machine (the green bridge structure) to install and remove fuel assemblies. The fuel racks have a little clearance with each fuel assembly, so usually the fuel handling machine is indexed to the spent fuel pool racks.

The fuel assemblies sit under several meters of water which provides shield from the radiation to the workers operating on the machine. They will move the assemblies underwater to a cask. Once loaded, the cask lid is installed and the cask is then drained - really the water inside is displaced by an inert gas - helium. The cask environment is dried and finally sealed. There is an outer shield and protective container in which the cask sits. The whole set is then lifted and moved to a transporter - trailer or truck. The cask may be transferred to another pool (interim storage), or it may be sent to a dry storage facility onsight. If the fuel is sufficiently cool, it may be sent to a reprocessor, if the utility is part of a program to reprocess its fuel.

The overhead crane is used to lift the heavy cask and its contents. The overhead cranes were destroyed in the explosions and fires.

 

[Ms Music]

The FHM is functioning on #4? I thought they would have to use an external (outside of the building) crane to remove the assemblies, and other methods of getting them into a cask. Well, at least 3 and 4. 1 and 2 still have a roof...

I am just surprised it has been a year and a half before they removed two fresh fuel assemblies out of 4.

Thanks again.

 

[LabratSR]

The FHM is functioning on #4? I thought they would have to use an external (outside of the building) crane to remove the assemblies, and other methods of getting them into a cask. Well, at least 3 and 4. 1 and 2 still have a roof...

I am just surprised it has been a year and a half before they removed two fresh fuel assemblies out of 4.

Thanks again.

Video shot from news helicopters of the operation.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_kDf2JB8-Q&feature=related