Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

AI Thread Summary
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is facing significant challenges following the earthquake, with reports indicating that reactor pressure has reached dangerous levels, potentially 2.1 times capacity. TEPCO has lost control of pressure at a second unit, raising concerns about safety and management accountability. The reactor is currently off but continues to produce decay heat, necessitating cooling to prevent a meltdown. There are conflicting reports about an explosion, with indications that it may have originated from a buildup of hydrogen around the containment vessel. The situation remains serious, and TEPCO plans to flood the containment vessel with seawater as a cooling measure.
  • #4,601
Samy24 said:
I do understand most of your view, but it is not the total ratio that I feel is wired, it is the fact that at the same measure point the ratio stay the same over time.

The specific sample that was discussed was a liquid sample at the Unit 2 "Sub Drain" If you have the same sample point at a different time please point me to it as I asked in my post. As far as I know that was the only sample at that location so there is no time trend yet.

If you want me to look at ratios at another sample point for which we DO have time trend data, I will look at that for you. I am alert to possible recriticality, but have not yet seen anything convincing, such as confirmed neutron bursts, generation of new short-lived isotopes, and other possible indicators like evidence of corium concrete interaction, new releases of hydrogen, etc.

Assuming that recriticality is possible should prompt TEPCO to be monitoring these sorts of indicators. If they haven't seen it I wouldn't expect them to be reporting things that HAVEN'T gone wrong. I am not saying I can prove no recriticality. I say that recriticality is not needed to explain the measurements we see. But we should all keep looking.

I do hope that someone at TEPCO is monitoring this and other websites around the world. There have been some very good questions, and postulations here. Even one of the other posters who has basically accused me of lying about my experience and expertise has had one idea that I am looking at seriously. Dmytry has stated that having emergency generators and pumps available off site, with airlift capabilities would be a good way to keep some of the emergency backups now stored on site away from a major on-site problem such as earthquakes, site external flooding, or major storms like tornados or hurricanes. TEPCO had inadequate design to handle the 9.0 earthquake and the 14 m tsunami and lost all AC power. Having prepositioned generators and pumps available may have permitted them to be in place before the batteries were depleted. Flooding and hurricanes may prevent access early enough, but having that capability may certainly help in other events that could be imagined. Of course if Fukushima had a 15 m wall we might not even be here.
 
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  • #4,602
jlduh said:
Tsutsuji, the link you provided for simulation of local oceanic currents and radioactive dispersion is great (i repost it: http://sirocco.omp.obs-mip.fr/outils/Symphonie/Produits/Japan/SymphoniePreviJapan.htm ).
[...]
I put also this extract of their explanation to set the limits of this simulation:
We do not know how much radionuclides have been injected, when they have been injected...
This is worrying. This French institute has been asked by the IAEA to do simulations on the plume in the Pacific, but they did not get any other data than what has been published in those endless reams of paper that Tepco publishes on its site.
 
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  • #4,603
NUCENG said:
...

If you want me to look at ratios at another sample point for which we DO have time trend data, I will look at that for you. I am alert to possible recriticality, but have not yet seen anything convincing, such as confirmed neutron bursts, generation of new short-lived isotopes, and other possible indicators like evidence of corium concrete interaction, new releases of hydrogen, etc.

Assuming that recriticality is possible should prompt TEPCO to be monitoring these sorts of indicators. If they haven't seen it I wouldn't expect them to be reporting things that HAVEN'T gone wrong. ...

Technical aspects are somewhat beyond me, but from a PR standpoint (more my field), TEPCO should IMHO very much report on bad things they haven't seen. What better news than "no new neutron bursts or evidence of corium concrete interaction" could there possibly be to quell - reasonable or unreasonable - fears? Personally, I find the lack of reporting of the "bad stuff" they have not found rather disconcerting. For more than one reason I find it difficult to imagine that they are not looking for these things, not at last because the Japanese government might/should require such info to plan further actions regarding the population affected by this accident.
Very opposite to the scientific approach, when it comes to PR, one rule of thumb certainly is that one often learns more from the information not provided than from the information given.
 
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  • #4,604
NUCENG said:
The specific sample that was discussed was a liquid sample at the Unit 2 "Sub Drain" If you have the same sample point at a different time please point me to it as I asked in my post. As far as I know that was the only sample at that location so there is no time trend yet.

If you want me to look at ratios at another sample point for which we DO have time trend data, I will look at that for you. I am alert to possible recriticality, but have not yet seen anything convincing, such as confirmed neutron bursts, generation of new short-lived isotopes, and other possible indicators like evidence of corium concrete interaction, new releases of hydrogen, etc.

Assuming that recriticality is possible should prompt TEPCO to be monitoring these sorts of indicators. If they haven't seen it I wouldn't expect them to be reporting things that HAVEN'T gone wrong. I am not saying I can prove no recriticality. I say that recriticality is not needed to explain the measurements we see. But we should all keep looking.

I do hope that someone at TEPCO is monitoring this and other websites around the world. There have been some very good questions, and postulations here. Even one of the other posters who has basically accused me of lying about my experience and expertise has had one idea that I am looking at seriously. Dmytry has stated that having emergency generators and pumps available off site, with airlift capabilities would be a good way to keep some of the emergency backups now stored on site away from a major on-site problem such as earthquakes, site external flooding, or major storms like tornados or hurricanes. TEPCO had inadequate design to handle the 9.0 earthquake and the 14 m tsunami and lost all AC power. Having prepositioned generators and pumps available may have permitted them to be in place before the batteries were depleted. Flooding and hurricanes may prevent access early enough, but having that capability may certainly help in other events that could be imagined. Of course if Fukushima had a 15 m wall we might not even be here.

Here is the reference I'm talking about:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110421e16.pdf"

On page two is the data of the subdrain below the unit 2 since the last two weeks.
 
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  • #4,605
mscharisma said:
Technical aspects are somewhat beyond me, but from a PR standpoint (more my field), TEPCO should IMHO very much report on bad things they haven't seen. What better news than "no new neutron bursts or evidence of corium concrete interaction" could there possibly be to quell - reasonable or unreasonable - fears? Personally, I find the lack of reporting of the "bad stuff" they have not found rather disconcerting. For more than one reason I find it difficult to imagine that they are not looking for these things, not at last because the Japanese government might/should require such info to plan further actions regarding the population affected by this accident.
Very opposite to the scientific approach, when it comes to PR, one rule of thumb certainly is that one often learns more from the information not provided than from the information given.

The old Boeing approach was: 'If you can't hide it, paint it red'.
A recognition that it is always better to lead with the news than to react to them.
Maybe TEPCO will eventually understand that is a better option.
 
  • #4,606
Please correct me if I'm wrong but I assume that every amount of radioactive iodine means some previously released heat (during a chain reaction), regardless of the type of the chain reaction - core at work or recriticality.

So huge amount of iodine means terrible amount of heat...
 
  • #4,607
AntonL said:
M5.5 earthquake at 00:25AM April 23 is reported with epicenter 37.224°N, 140.981°E , which is 11km south of the Fukushima II Daini NPP and 22km sout of Fuukushima I Daichi NPP

Followed by another at M4.9 nearby:
4.9 2011/04/22 16:27:41 37.137 144.085 40.4 OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
5.5 2011/04/22 15:25:20 37.224 140.981 35.8 EASTERN HONSHU, JAPAN

Times are UTC
Source: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/quakes_all.php
 
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  • #4,608
  • #4,609
mscharisma said:
Technical aspects are somewhat beyond me, but from a PR standpoint (more my field), TEPCO should IMHO very much report on bad things they haven't seen. What better news than "no new neutron bursts or evidence of corium concrete interaction" could there possibly be to quell - reasonable or unreasonable - fears? Personally, I find the lack of reporting of the "bad stuff" they have not found rather disconcerting. For more than one reason I find it difficult to imagine that they are not looking for these things, not at last because the Japanese government might/should require such info to plan further actions regarding the population affected by this accident.
Very opposite to the scientific approach, when it comes to PR, one rule of thumb certainly is that one often learns more from the information not provided than from the information given.

I understand your point. I would make a miserable PR representative, so I agree TEPCO could have made better communications a more successful PR strategy. They didn't and I understand that, too. If wishes was fishes we could feed the world. ;)
 
  • #4,610
mscharisma said:
UPDATE: It's not the article I read yesterday, but here's info on the next step regarding robots:
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110423f1.html

Thanks.

Executive summary:

No specialized Japanese robots and operators are available. Some robots were in various states of development, but the state funding ran out from lack of interest.

Japanese companies wish to be left to experiment with the carcass of Fukushima Dai-ichi so as to develop rad-hardened robot tech locally. This way, everyone can save face by not having to use gai-jin tech when the next disaster happens.

Robots from other countries have so far been shunned for this very reason (with the exception of the iRobots, which are not rad-hardened and can't be used for cleanup work anyway).
 
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  • #4,611
NUCENG said:
The specific sample that was discussed was a liquid sample at the Unit 2 "Sub Drain" If you have the same sample point at a different time please point me to it as I asked in my post. As far as I know that was the only sample at that location so there is no time trend yet.

If you want me to look at ratios at another sample point for which we DO have time trend data, I will look at that for you. I am alert to possible recriticality, but have not yet seen anything convincing, such as confirmed neutron bursts, generation of new short-lived isotopes, and other possible indicators like evidence of corium concrete interaction, new releases of hydrogen, etc.

Assuming that recriticality is possible should prompt TEPCO to be monitoring these sorts of indicators. If they haven't seen it I wouldn't expect them to be reporting things that HAVEN'T gone wrong. I am not saying I can prove no recriticality. I say that recriticality is not needed to explain the measurements we see. But we should all keep looking.

I do hope that someone at TEPCO is monitoring this and other websites around the world. There have been some very good questions, and postulations here. Even one of the other posters who has basically accused me of lying about my experience and expertise has had one idea that I am looking at seriously. Dmytry has stated that having emergency generators and pumps available off site, with airlift capabilities would be a good way to keep some of the emergency backups now stored on site away from a major on-site problem such as earthquakes, site external flooding, or major storms like tornados or hurricanes. TEPCO had inadequate design to handle the 9.0 earthquake and the 14 m tsunami and lost all AC power. Having prepositioned generators and pumps available may have permitted them to be in place before the batteries were depleted. Flooding and hurricanes may prevent access early enough, but having that capability may certainly help in other events that could be imagined. Of course if Fukushima had a 15 m wall we might not even be here.
for flood, helipad on the roof + connectors there. Just as there are connectors for fire trucks on the first floor, right? (German nuclear power plants have that AFAIK). Also there's RCIC that keeps reactor cooled for a bit of time (hours?).

Not accusing you of lying, really. You may well be a nuclear engineer all right, the thing is, I think I misunderstood your attitude about safety especially when it comes to things such as criticality. It appeared as if you have view that it has to be presumed that there is no criticality. Sorry if that is not what you meant and you were simply playing devil's advocate. IMO it has to be presumed that there is criticality if there might be criticality and you don't know. Just like you have to presume there will be criticality if there might be criticality, to avoid criticality accidents, and a lot of criticality accidents look to me like an example of violation of that approach.

You haven't offered some specific explanation of high iodine levels (highest of everything), yet you say it may be caused by something else. Well it might be, but for start one thing it can't be caused by:
CsI role in transport of Caesium : Caesium Iodide has something around 1360 Bq of iodine for 1 Bq of Caesium, so it cannot be that everywhere we have CsI leaking keeping the Cs to I ratio constant, to propose so is to be unaware of mol to Bq conversion.
Ditto for other caesium+iodine chemical compounds. Once again, I may have misunderstood your point on CsI, not sure why CsI was brought up, in the solution there is no CsI anyway, just the ions, so I thought you were explaining the ratio with CsI leaving the fuel.

Furthermore, there has to be a giant disparity between relative rates of transport of caesium and iodine from fuel into the water for the spent fuel pool #4 and for all the reactors. 3 orders of magnitude. While for 3 other reactors it is same order of magnitude (and same order of magnitude ratio as for Chernobyl i think, and TMI, but someone should check the numbers).
Why would it hit the spot where it is same order of magnitude as other reactors a few weeks ago? Luck?

re: TEPCO's actions. They used to check for short living isotopes. They published data with, of all things, Cl-38 . Then they published data with I-134 . Then TEPCO officials declared there is no criticality. Then they retracted the data where they had I-134 and claimed 3 orders of magnitude mistake (overestimating radioactivity). Then government official (Kan?) really harshly criticized them for measurement mistakes, with a lot of hollow words of how it puts worker lives at risk - keep in mind, that was TEPCO erring on the side of caution! edit: even worse, there were also many stupid words how it is unforgivable to release data without review. Then they released new data without I-134 and Cl-38 and the number of isotopes being tested for dropped sharply. It looks almost as if government is urging TEPCO to cover things up. I'm going to find references again tomorrow, it is late here and there's been so much news about the accident.
 
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  • #4,612
Dmytry said:
re: TEPCO's actions. They used to check for short living isotopes. They published data with, of all things, Cl-38 . Then they published data with I-134 . Then TEPCO officials declared there is no criticality. Then they retracted the data where they had I-134 and claimed 3 orders of magnitude mistake (overestimating radioactivity). Then government official (Kan?) really harshly criticized them for measurement mistakes, with a lot of hollow words of how it puts worker lives at risk - keep in mind, that was TEPCO erring on the side of caution! edit: even worse, there were also many stupid words how it is unforgivable to release data without review. Then they released new data without I-134 and Cl-38 and the number of isotopes being tested for dropped sharply. It looks almost as if government is urging TEPCO to cover things up. I'm going to find references again tomorrow, it is late here and there's been so much news about the accident.
The problem was that they recorded gamma spectra on samples that had been taken 10 hours before. The presence of isotopes with halflives of about an hour was impossible. But their software had extropolated noise backwards in time. In this case, there was no cover-up.

However, in the video of the English-language press conference, the Tepco engineers seemed to get evasive when there were questions about criticality. The only real statement they gave was that there is no criticality at Unit 1 right now. They referred to measurements by neutron detectors.
 
  • #4,613
PietKuip said:
The problem was that they recorded gamma spectra on samples that had been taken 10 hours before. The presence of isotopes with halflives of about an hour was impossible. But their software had extropolated noise backwards in time. In this case, there was no cover-up.
10 times past half life it is 1/1024 . (Most curiously, btw, for SFP4 it is more than 10 times past half life for i-131)
Funky software they must have got, does backward extrapolation but doesn't give confidence value or anything. Also, of all stuff, Cl-38 . Theres lot of possible stuff not normally supposed to be present in the reactor, of all that stuff they found Cl-38 , not something entirely off the mark.

Also WTF 10 hours delay? KHG would have had a measurement van on site and would of done it in minutes.
However, in the video of the English-language press conference, the Tepco engineers seemed to get evasive when there were questions about criticality. The only real statement they gave was that there is no criticality at Unit 1 right now. They referred to measurements by neutron detectors.
Well indeed. And they take pool water sample, and only tell of i-131 and cs-137 . Why even bother taking sample then? To know if it is safe to drink?
 
  • #4,614
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  • #4,615
NHK, Japan's national broadcaster, positioned a TV camera 33 kilometers southwest of the plant, and broadcast the helicopter operation live. At 9:48 a.m. local time a helicopter flying from the west dropped the first load of water almost directly over the No. 3 reactor, though a significant amount spread away from before reaching the target.

http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/energy/nuclear/helicopters-and-cannons-spray-water-on-japans-unstable-nuclear-plant" Field of view is about the same in this video after appox. 30secs as with the #3 explosion video. A good guess for syncing a sound track.
 
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  • #4,616
Samy24 said:
Here is the reference I'm talking about:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110421e16.pdf"

On page two is the data of the subdrain below the unit 2 since the last two weeks.

This is what I was looking for. You are right the ratio of I/Cs is not decreasing as we expect on the Unit 2 sub drain. In fact the ration is increasing the way I take data off those graphs.

Assumption: Samples were measured by the same method and have consistent accuracy.

Observations
1. On 4/7 and 4/14 rhe ratio was abroximately 16 0r 17:1 but both CS and I concentration increased by a factor of 10 during that week.
2. In the week after 4/14 Iodine concentration remained constant at about 160 to 170 Bq/cm3.
3. In the week after 4/14 Cs decreased from 10 Bq/cm3 to about 6 Bq/cm3.

Interpretations:
1. Clearly the sources feeding this sample point saw aditional releases of both Cs and I in the first week,
2. Since the concentration of I-131 did not decrease by one half in the second week it appears there was further release of I-131 during this second week. Since this is a liquid sample an increase in iodine means the liquid has probably remained at a basic pH and reevolution of I2 gas is not significant. One possibility for new I-131 release would be criticality. however this would also likely be releasing additional Cs. That may explain the first week, but does not fit the results of the second week.
3. Cs-137 with its longer half life would not have been expected to decrease measurably in a week. since there was a decrease of about 40% some mechanism of Cs removal was present. Cs plateout or deposition upstream of the sample point is my best guess for the decrease in Cs during the second week.
4. First week and Second week are not directly comparable because there clearly were differnces in source and transport of Cs and I.
5. Data does not rule out recriticality during the first week.
6. Second week shows opposite behavior from expected results. Iodine concentration is not decreasing consistent with half life, and Cs is decreasing which is inconsistent with its half life.

To summarize: the time trend of Cs and I at the unit 2 sub drain sample point changed from the first week to the second week. Behavior appears to diverge from the expected decrease in I/Cs ratio.
 
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  • #4,617
Dmytry said:
Also, of all stuff, Cl-38 . Theres lot of possible stuff not normally supposed to be present in the reactor, of all that stuff they found Cl-38 , not something entirely off the mark.
Chlorine-38 would have been in the database of the software. Salt can get into the cooling water of a nuclear plant (sweat drops, and after all the sea is very close). So the software would look for something, and it found a noise peak.

Also WTF 10 hours delay? KHG would have had a measurement van on site and would of done it in minutes.
It was probably more important to get a measurent from officially certified equipment... Rules and regulations, you know.
 
  • #4,618
nukeng: yea yea, it may be criticality there in reactors, it may be weird chemistry, who knows. Except, there you have order of 10 discrepancy, and in SFP #4 you have order of 10 thousands discrepancy, and you've been justifying possibility of explanation of latter with the former. What I don't understand is what difference does it make that there 'might' be other explanation than criticality. The criticality is possible and is a big deal, and they'd better either a: rule it out, or b: confirm it undeniably, and they don't seem to do either.
Is the difference that they might get lucky and it was just some weird chemistry? Well whatever. Counting on luck would be a terrible attitude imo.
PietKuip said:
Chlorine-38 would have been in the database of the software. Salt can get into the cooling water of a nuclear plant (sweat drops, and after all the sea is very close). So the software would look for something, and it found a noise peak.
Well what do you know about how they are doing spectrometry anyway? Is it pure speculation? The thing would detect trace amount of radioactive chlorine when those are from trace amounts of chlorine, but it won't detect larger amounts of radioactive chlorine when those are from pumping seawater, coz it's omg 10 half lifes. Then for omg 10 half lifes approach, you got the spent fuel pool #4 where iodine is well past 10 half lifes.
It was probably more important to get a measurent from officially certified equipment... Rules and regulations, you know.
lol. such rules is how you blow up. also, KHG van is certified for such highly contaminated dirty salt water with a lot of weird stuff in it, whereas whatever thing they use during normal operation is probably only certified for what plant encounters during normal operation.
 
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  • #4,619
Found an article in IEEE Spectrum that says Honeywell's T-Hawk drones took radiation measurements along with hours of (lousy IMO) video. TEPCO has yet to release any of that data.

http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/.../robotic-aerial-vehicle-at-fukushima-reactors

The flow of information is going to get much worse on Monday. That's when the Japanese government takes control of the public information releases and puts the muzzle on TEPCO. Foreign journalists and bloggers have so far been banned from the government press conferences. At the TEPCO affairs the foreign reporters are the only ones asking the tough questions. If they continue to keep the foreign press out of the loop at official government press points then the information flow will be reduced to a trickle.
 
  • #4,620
Dmytry said:
Well what do you know about spectrometry anyway? Is it pure speculation? Sounds like it is.
I gave my name, and a link to my work pages. Teaching gamma spectrometry to physics students is one of the things I do. I know a bit about the errors that can be made.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11042008-e.html confirms what I said about the database. Their software came with a nuclide library. Short-lived Te-129 had not been listed there as a daughter nuclide of the metastable isomer.

In the re-evalution of their spectra, they looked for the main peaks of Cl-38, and did not see any. See http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110420e11.pdf for the reasons for change.
 
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  • #4,621
PietKuip said:
I gave my name, and a link to my work pages. Teaching gamma spectrometry to physics students is one of the things I do. I know a bit about the errors that can be made.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11042008-e.html confirms what I said about the database. Their software came with a nuclide library. Short-lived Te-129 had not been listed there as a daughter nuclide of the metastable isomer.

In the re-evalution of their spectra, they looked for the main peaks of Cl-38, and did not see any. See http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110420e11.pdf for the reasons for change.
well ok then I am rather surprised how badly written is the software in question must have been. I am a software developer. This kinda glitch you'd usually test for.
Don't you have to also print out the error range btw? Or the software is so crap it won't give margin of error? When i was studying we had to propagate errors through calculations.

edit: wait, its weird, the data you linked. Note the La-140 at 3.0E2 . They don't think La-140 was a fluke, even though they re-evaluated it, while they do think that Cl-38 was a fluke. even though with compensation for 10 half lifes, Cl-38 must have been at 1.5 E3 which is 5x more than La-140 . I don't know if for some reason one is entirely different part of spectrum from another though.
edit: nope. According to wolframalpha, Cl-38 decays by 4.9MeV beta, while La-140 decays by 3.76 MeV beta. Why is Cl-38 below threshold and La-140 is not?

Also, speaking of criticality detection. They should of simply checked for cs-136 vs cs-137 ratio in SFP4 water, then we could of known for sure if SFP4 was critical or not.
 
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  • #4,622
Dmytry said:
well ok then I am rather surprised how badly written is the software in question must have been. I am a software developer. This kinda glitch you'd usually test for.
Don't you have to also print out the error range btw?

edit: wait, its weird, the data you linked. Note the La-140 at 3.0E2 . They don't think La-140 was a fluke, while they do think that Cl-38 was a fluke. even though with compensation for 10 half lifes, Cl-38 must have been at 1.5 E3 which is 5x more than La-140 . I don't know if for some reason one is entirely different part of spectrum from another though.

Also, speaking of criticality detection. They should of simply checked for cs-136 vs cs-137 ratio in SFP4 water, then we could of known for sure if SFP4 was critical or not.
I agree that this does not seem to be the most sophisticated software. Anything up to standard should take into account all the peaks, give an error estimate when everything fits with the fingerprint of the nuclide, and ring alarm bells when there are strange discrepancies.

La-140 is likely a daughter of Ba-140 with a halflife of about 13 days.

Yes, it would not be difficult to find unambiguous evidence of criticality (in measurements of fresh samples). Tepco should publish the complete gamma spectra, so that anybody could make their own analysis.
 
  • #4,623
Like Samy24, I also dismissed until now suggestions of recriticality, but ok, if it is something that has to be considered, what would the consequences be? Would it have to be stopped before work could continue? If so, how? If it is on a small-enough scale, could it be worked around somehow?
 
  • #4,624
PietKuip said:
I agree that this does not seem to be the most sophisticated software. Anything up to standard should take into account all the peaks, give an error estimate when everything fits with the fingerprint of the nuclide, and ring alarm bells when there are strange discrepancies.

La-140 is likely a daughter of Ba-140 with a halflife of about 13 days.
Yea, but how come they detect La-140 at 1/5 the concentration of Cl-38 . Very scientific approach, review the least convenient things the most. With all respect to technicians i think they need scientists there.
Yes, it would not be difficult to find unambiguous evidence of criticality (in measurements of fresh samples). Tepco should publish the complete gamma spectra, so that anybody could make their own analysis.
Yes. So far it all looks like either
a: they found criticality, but did not tell anyone,
b: they showed no criticality, but did not tell anyone (but they did about reactor #1)
c: they didn't check for criticality.

Given everything, it could be c. Plus, given how much government has flamed them for erring on the side of caution and for publishing incorrect data without review, it looks like they are under pressure not to tell and maybe even not to look as they may be obligated to publish whatever they find.
Plus, some white collar could be just dismissing the criticality all the way (i recall one time one of their officials said that it is hard to imagine re-criticality in shutdown reactor. When responding to either French or IAEA's suggestion to borate water more.)
 
  • #4,625
Dmytry said:
Yea, but how come they detect La-140 at 1/5 the concentration of Cl-38 .
Because there is no sign of chlorine-38 in the spectra.

There could not be. Even if Cl-38 (half-life 38 minutes) had been produced by neutron activation in the brine at moderate levels, it should have fallen below detectable concentrations by the time they measured the spectrum ten hours later.
 
  • #4,626
PietKuip:
ahh, sorry was confused about half life, between I134 and Cl-38 . So it was almost 16 half lifes and thus it'd be 1/65000 of original concentration.
But aren't you stretching "bad software" theory a little too far? Suppose I take a soil sample here, measure it, entering 10 hours as time, would this software give me insane amounts of every short living isotope? How would anyone ship software which fails so much that when you do a test run with stale banana as radiation source, it'd find a lot of short living isotopes?
edit: Though TBH reading about software glitches in critical military systems and such, I've been under impression that a lot of 'certified' software developed using 'formal' development process is very bad in general even though every module is bug-less and meets the specifications.

ahh, here. IAEA says there may be criticality,
TEPCO responds
'The reactors are stopped, so it's hard to imagine re- criticality,' occurring, Tsuyoshi Makigami, a spokesman for the utility, told a news conference today.
http://news.businessweek.com/article.asp?documentKey=1377-aEYAMDQ_BVlo-5TVRB3CR70DGQ7S5OIP73UK3P7

In spent fuel pool(s) especially, I don't understand why one would just dismiss criticality or be highly sceptical of it. There's boral plates between fuel assemblies, to prevent criticality.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/196.html
Those boral plates (the lowest melting point of all the things involved) fail, and it will go critical when covered by water. Yet the people here go on with theories that involve failure of a notable percentage of fuel rods and ill-defined 'weird chemistry' keeping out 99.9% of expected caesium, just to avoid highly inconvenient conclusion that the spent fuel pool gone critical.
Some sort of misplaced 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence' while the claims are extraordinarily inconvenient, but not at all scientifically extraordinary.
 
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  • #4,627
razzz said:
NHK, Japan's national broadcaster, positioned a TV camera 33 kilometers southwest of the plant, and broadcast the helicopter operation live. At 9:48 a.m. local time a helicopter flying from the west dropped the first load of water almost directly over the No. 3 reactor, though a significant amount spread away from before reaching the target.
http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/energy/nuclear/helicopters-and-cannons-spray-water-on-japans-unstable-nuclear-plant" Field of view is about the same in this video after appox. 30secs as with the #3 explosion video. A good guess for syncing a sound track.

the videos for the helicopter sprinkling are most likely taken from this location http://watchizu.gsi.go.jp/watchizu.html?b=371307&l=1405230 at an elevation of 750-830 metres and 27 km distant from the NPP and this is not the same location as the videos from the explosions. Using google Earth and maps I cannot find a good location at 33 km distance - possibly the reporters just stated this distance to comply with the 30kM exclusion zone.[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/inr320.JPGThe videos of the explosion, in my opinion, were taken from this point http://watchizu.gsi.go.jp/watchizu.html?b=372016&l=1405540 which is 13km and at an elevation of 582metres. This point also seems to be TV or radio station as a mast and a building is visible on google earth.

Using Google Earth one can draw site lines and check features like the high voltage line towers (vertical lines in the middle of the foreground)
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/inr1us.JPG
 
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  • #4,628
PietKuip said:
Teaching gamma spectrometry to physics students is one of the things I do. I know a bit about the errors that can be made.
That's exactly the point. How do you become an expert in gamma spectrometry? Easy! You buy a gamma spectrometer with a fancy software that does the analysis for you. That's the Tepco way. You get away with this approach as long as nothing extraordinary happens. It seems that Tepco's knowledge is limited to normal operation and now they are lost because they are facing a situation that is not described in the manuals. It is not just bad PR we saw from Tepco.
 
  • #4,629
Dmytry said:
PietKuip:
ahh, sorry was confused about half life, between I134 and Cl-38 . So it was almost 16 half lifes and thus it'd be 1/65000 of original concentration.
But aren't you stretching "bad software" theory a little too far? Suppose I take a soil sample here, measure it, entering 10 hours as time, would this software give me insane amounts of every short living isotope? How would anyone ship software which fails so much that when you do a test run with stale banana as radiation source, it'd find a lot of short living isotopes?
edit: Though TBH reading about software glitches in critical military systems and such, I've been under impression that a lot of 'certified' software developed using 'formal' development process is very bad in general even though every module is bug-less and meets the specifications.
The software would not do so for all nuclides, as it would give insane results for stuff with millesecond half-lives. That is why their nuclide library includes some parent-daughter relations. But the database did not include this for Te-129, according to the link I gave above.

Before the accident, I would assume that the routine was to measure the gamma spectra on site, within hours. Decay corrections would have been small. But since they lost power, they are sending the samples to a different place. Which takes time, and suddenly corrections for decay become enormous.

And I still think there is an error in the intensities of the re-evaluation: for each Ba-140 decay there is a La-140 decay about 2 hours later; the activity of these two isotopes should be the same, and Tepco's differences are a factor of two or larger.
 
  • #4,630
PietKuip said:
The software would not do so for all nuclides, as it would give insane results for stuff with millesecond half-lives. That is why their nuclide library includes some parent-daughter relations. But the database did not include this for Te-129, according to the link I gave above.

Before the accident, I would assume that the routine was to measure the gamma spectra on site, within hours. Decay corrections would have been small. But since they lost power, they are sending the samples to a different place. Which takes time, and suddenly corrections for decay become enormous.

And I still think there is an error in the intensities of the re-evaluation: for each Ba-140 decay there is a La-140 decay about 2 hours later; the activity of these two isotopes should be the same, and Tepco's differences are a factor of two or larger.
well, it was long after the quake... surely they had some generators to have lights, communication, etc?
This is why one has to have something like KHG.
Also, some officials were going from Tokyo to site, and i bet it was not 10 hours either way. Why are those suits that have no clue what so ever and only get in the way are transported around faster than stuff that matters? Doesn't Tokyo have a several dozen labs that can analyse such stuff?
It really is just inexcusable imo if they don't even know if there is criticality or not. I'm kind of inclined to think they themselves don't know and don't want to look.
 
  • #4,631
Until now, surveys were conducted outside the 20 km radius, but here's something new :

The science ministry has announced the results of radiation monitoring in areas between one and 21 kilometers from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110422004001.htm

unfortunately, I can't find the data on http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1303726.htm

But there is a map here attached to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/20110423-OYT1T00199.htm (red squares show locations above 19 μSv/h).

They poured 200 tons of water into SFP4 on April 22nd and plan for another 140 tons on April 23rd, being careful not to spill water, because extra weight would harm the weak building : http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20110423/t10015504561000.html http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_12.html

Water is "about half way up the bulb of the dry well" in Reactor No. 1 : http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_05.html
 
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  • #4,632
tsutsuji said:
They poured 200 tons of water into SFP4 on April 22nd and plan for another 140 tons on April 23rd, being careful not to spill water, because extra weight would harm the weak building : http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20110423/t10015504561000.html http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_12.html

To any physicist or engineer it is obvious that SFP4 with an estimated heat load of 2 to 2.4MW is boiling at a rate of about 60-80 tonnes a day - why the bleep tepco cannot say the same, instead they measure the temperature in the furthest corner as close as possible to the wall to show it is 91 degrees and prove that it is not boiling and to state water is lost to evaporation due to the high temperature. I can only think that a boiling radioactive soup is bad PR as it is obvious the amount of contamination carried into the atmosphere is very high. If Tepco really did their job properly then the minimum amount of water would be injected into the pool and have one headache less of what to do with the many tonnes of water spilled every day that needs to stored and decontaminated at high cost. It has been boiling since March the 13th. (https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3244793&highlight=boil#post3244793") instead in the NHK
To loose 140 to 200 tonnes of water per day either means that heat load is higher than estimated or the pool has a leaking.
 
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  • #4,633
What is not clear is where Friday's 200 tons have gone. "From Saturday, the utility started (...) using a device to monitor (...) the level of cooling water in the pool" ( http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_12.html ) seems to mean that the "device" was not ready on Friday.

Perhaps some amount of the 200 tons were spilled and they found out that they had to do it all over again (with more care and more "devices") on Saturday.
 
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  • #4,634
AntonL said:
To any physicist or engineer it is obvious that SFP4 with an estimated heat load of 2 to 2.4MW is boiling at a rate of about 60-80 tonnes a day - why the bleep tepco cannot say the same, instead they measure the temperature in the furthest corner as close as possible to the wall to show it is 91 degrees and prove that it is not boiling and to state water is lost to evaporation due to the high temperature. I can only think that a boiling radioactive soup is bad PR as it is obvious the amount of contamination carried into the atmosphere is very high. If Tepco really did their job properly then the minimum amount of water would be injected into the pool and have one headache less of what to do with the many tonnes of water spilled every day that needs to stored and decontaminated at high cost. It has been boiling since March the 13th. (https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3244793&highlight=boil#post3244793") instead in the NHK
To loose 140 to 200 tonnes of water per day either means that heat load is higher than estimated or the pool has a leaking.
I think it 'probably' gone critical. There was fuel damage, and boal plates would get damaged as well. If boral was damaged, spent fuel can go critical unless water is borated. If it is leaking they can't keep water borated. Leak does not in the slightest exclude criticality, quite to the contrary, if the thing is leaking it means they wouldn't be able to easily do anything about criticality.

I really don't understand this scepticism about criticality, as if it was some sort of extraordinary claim. Extraordinarily bad, yes, but totally ordinary in the scientific sense. Good or bad, criticality is the only theory that had been proposed which explains the facts ("there might be weird chemistry" doesn't count for theory). A very simple theory, very plausible, and best yet easily falsifiable if it is false. Scepticism is good, but not when how sceptical you are is proportional to how inconvenient is the theory. And not when you're unduly sceptical of danger.

I am instead sceptical of the claims that it would not go critical in the event of re-flooding after overheating / fuel damage / temperatures high enough for hydrogen production, which is higher than melting point of aluminium. The claim that it did not go critical is so far is unsubstantiated. It is not shown that boral had not failed, it had not been shown that there's still any shutdown margin. In safety you have to be particularly sceptical of claim that you are safe and everything is good, and default to worst case.
 
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  • #4,635
The following article http://mainichi.jp/select/today/news/20110424k0000m040046000c.html (in Japanese, written on March 23rd at 7:30 p.m. JST ) has a slightly different story :

On March 21st the water level in SFP4 was 2 metres above the top of the fuel, with a temperature of 91 °C.

Then on March 22nd and March 23rd they poured 140 tons + 140 tons = 280 tons of water. Then the water level rose to 4 metres above the top of the fuel. And the temperature went down to 66 °C.

Until then, they used to pour an average of 70 tons of water into SFP4 every day.

A 30 cm x 30 cm x 5 cm, 900 mSv/h highly radioactive concrete debris was found and removed near Reactor No. 3 on March 21st : http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0423/TKY201104230396.html

They are considering clearing a nearby forest to make space for the water waste tanks : same http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0423/TKY201104230396.html
 
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  • #4,636
tsutsuji: what are the dimensions of spent fuel pool? We could easily check those numbers. What would be interesting, is how much water they pour daily, averaged, not some special days when they pour a lot more or a lot less than usual. Also, what would be interesting - was the fuel uncovered? If the official theory is that building 4 was destroyed by hydrogen explosion of hydrogen originating in spent fuel pool, then fuel had to run dry and overheat to make more hydrogen than usual, and that would damage boral plates. Either way, they should imo presume that it gone critical, and then falsify that hypothesis with direct measurement if it didn't.
 
  • #4,637
AntonL said:
To loose 140 to 200 tonnes of water per day either means that heat load is higher than estimated or the pool has a leaking.

FWIW. There seem to be water in the reactor building and turbine building of reactor 4.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/20110423-OYT1T00357.htm?from=main1 (in Japanese)
http://translate.google.com/translate?js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&sl=ja&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.yomiuri.co.jp%2Fscience%2Fnews%2F20110423-OYT1T00357.htm%3Ffrom%3Dmain1&act=url (google translation)

Translation according to a Japanese blogger:
Contaminated water with radioactive materials in TEPCO's Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant Reactor 4 turbine building has risen 20 centimeters in 10 days. There's also 5-meter deep water in the reactor building, estimated to be 4,000 tons, as has been already disclosed by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency; this is in addition to the amount of contaminated water from other reactors.

TEPCO has been transporting the contaminated water with high radioactive materials from Reactor 2 [turbine building] to the central waste disposal facility. But the amount that the facility can store safely is likely to be half of what was planned, and there is no clear plan to deal with the contaminated water from other reactors.

According to TEPCO, the water in the Reactor 4 turbine building basement was 0.9 meter (2.95 feet) deep on April 13, and 1.1 meters (3.61 feet) deep as of 6:00PM on April 22. It rose 20 centimeters in about 10 days. In the adjacent Reactor 3, water is being injected at 6.8 tons/hour to cool the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). TEPCO suspects that the water leaked from the RPV is leaking through the cracks in the wall that separates the Reactor 3 turbine building and the Reactor 4 turbine building.
source: http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2011/04/fukushima-i-nuke-plant-contaminated.html
 
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  • #4,638
tsutsuji said:
On March 21st the water level in SFP4 was 2 metres above the top of the fuel, with a temperature of 91 °C.

Then on March 22nd and March 23rd they poured 140 tons + 140 tons = 280 tons of water. Then the water level rose to 4 metres above the top of the fuel. And the temperature went down to 66 °C.

Until then, they used to pour an average of 70 tons of water into SFP4 every day.

70 tonnes of water per day is roughly the right amount to replace boiled off water and confirms https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3244793&highlight=boil#post3244793"

Dmytry said:
.. what are the dimensions of spent fuel pool?

Capacity = 1425 m3 http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110406-1-1.pdf"

The pool is about 11 metres deep,
so 1 metre level change is 1425/11= 129.5m3 of water
 
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  • #4,639
Contaminated water with radioactive materials in TEPCO's Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant Reactor 4 turbine building has risen 20 centimeters in 10 days. There's also 5-meter deep water in the reactor building, estimated to be 4,000 tons, as has been already disclosed by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency; this is in addition to the amount of contaminated water from other reactors.
It is from tsunami ? I don't think so, reactor building should be water sealed... If the water is not from tsunami then it must be from SFP, but in they injecting 70t/day then 4000:70= 57 days... So is this mean that SFP is leaking ?
 
  • #4,640
tsutsuji said:
What about rain ?

But how so much rain could get into reactor building ?
 
  • #4,642
elektrownik said:
It is from tsunami ? I don't think so, reactor building should be water sealed... If the water is not from tsunami then it must be from SFP, but in they injecting 70t/day then 4000:70= 57 days... So is this mean that SFP is leaking ?

Some or all of the water in the RB likely came from early helicopter water drops and then later from the fire/concrete trucks spraying water over the pool area. For sure some of this water missed the pool and ran down into the lower floors. No idea how much.

The pool may also be leaking - especially when they keep saying they want to get in and shore up the bottom of the pool. The integrity of the pool must be questionable.
 
  • #4,643
I've updated my plots of #Fukushima reactor variables, up to #NISA release 110 (23/apr 15:00).
http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/EXPORT/projects/fukushima/plots/cur/Main.html

No big news. They are pumping a little bit less water, and reporting fresh water flow measurements with every release (instead of repeating week-old numbers, as they used to).

Pressure in #1 RPV still rising; temp was decreasing but now rose a bit (109 C).

The two radiation measurements in #2 torus are hugely divergent (0.51 Sv/h falling, 136 Sv/h rising).

Reactor #3 RPV is sucking, really (50 kPa abs). Drywell pressure 1 bar, torus 2 bar. Does that mean the drywell (!) is flooded, up to ~2m above the bottom of the RPV?
 
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  • #4,644
RealWing said:
Some or all of the water in the RB likely came from early helicopter water drops and then later from the fire/concrete trucks spraying water over the pool area. For sure some of this water missed the pool and ran down into the lower floors. No idea how much.

The helicopter dumps may have been 5 tons per trip. IIRC all the truck spraying amounted to a few hundred tons. It seems we are one order of magnitude off.

Tsunami water may have entered trough the fuel loading door at ground level.

Presumably the reactor vessel and cooling loop tanks were still full of water when the earthquake struck. If the explosion damaged the wrong pipes/valves, could that water have drained out to the basement?

Water may have come from other buildings through the cable trenches or other underground routes. I wish TEPCO or NISA measured not only the water being pumped into the reactors but also the amount of water flowing out of the return pipes. "What did you say, 'there are no return pipes'??"
 
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  • #4,645
I withdraw my earlier comments concerning the meaning of O.P. in altitude measurements.

O.P. means Onahama Port Standard Construction Level and it is related to T.M.S.L. (Tokyo Bay Mean Sea Level) with the relation O.P. + 0 m = T.M.S.L - 0.727 m.

Onahama Port is located 55 km south of the Fukushima Daichi plant.

Source : the following attachment : section view of the turbine building and sea water circuits on page 10 of http://www.pref.fukushima.jp/nuclear/pdf_files/onhaisui-h19houkokusyo.pdf available from http://www.pref.fukushima.jp/nuclear/anzen/onhaisui.html
 

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  • #4,646
Jorge Stolfi said:
Reactor #3 RPV is sucking, really (50 kPa abs). Drywell pressure 1 bar, torus 2 bar. Does that mean the drywell (!) is flooded, up to ~2m above the bottom of the RPV?

Has anyone heard an official explanation for the <1 atm pressures ?

The only ones besides the sensors being broke that I can think of is that nothing is getting in ,
and the temperature is so high in there that it pushes all gasses out of containment.
Or that the sensors are encased by condensed salt deposits.
 
  • #4,647
Dmytry said:
...

for flood, helipad on the roof + connectors there. Just as there are connectors for fire trucks on the first floor, right? (German nuclear power plants have that AFAIK). Also there's RCIC that keeps reactor cooled for a bit of time (hours?).
US plants where I have been DO have ground level connections for external fire pumps to fill spent fuel pools and inject water into the reactor. Right now they also have diesel driven pumps available on site to perform that function or spray down the building. I can see a benefit in having some resources pre-positioned off site where they can’t be damaged in a site specific event. I am not certain the best delivery site is the roof, simply because that may be inaccessible due to damage, fire, or radiation. Perhaps it requires more than one landing site. Every plant already has a helicopter landing area, usually in a parking lot or cleared area. When plants moved employee parking away from buildings post 9/11 it left large paved open areas available for landing equipment.

Not accusing you of lying, really. You may well be a nuclear engineer all right,

"There was also NUCENG who from earlier discussion of role of CsI in the transport of Cs-137 along with I-131, I have assumed was some sort of bystander with no clue how to relate Becquerel to number of atoms and half life (even if it is 10X the Iodine to Caesium in Bq, it is 1/136 or so the Iodine to Caesium in number of atoms coz I-131 has half life 8 days and Cs-137 has half life 30 years). Which would of been totally fine if he was. I don't mind explaining Bq to people outside nuclear industry and how it relates to half life and number of atoms. I don't think everyone has to know how decay works. Then it turns out he's in fact (or claims to be) a nuclear engineer with many years of experience, involved in uprating, and goes on with his ultra arrogant attitude that he knows enough and has nothing to learn. Right, precisely the kind of person I'd trust with uprating.
Really, this forum is such an eye opener."

Those are your words Dmytry. Have I disrespected you, your opinions, or even your arguments? I think most of the posters here would read that and at least think you have a low regard for my input on these forums.

the thing is, I think I misunderstood your attitude about safety especially when it comes to things such as criticality. It appeared as if you have view that it has to be presumed that there is no criticality. Sorry if that is not what you meant and you were simply playing devil's advocate. IMO it has to be presumed that there is criticality if there might be criticality and you don't know. Just like you have to presume there will be criticality if there might be criticality, to avoid criticality accidents, and a lot of criticality accidents look to me like an example of violation of that approach.

There is the problem. You are absolutely wrong about my attitude. I absolutely believe TEPCO and the people on this forum should be looking for evidence of recriticality. But it should not blind us into ignoring other possibilities. Science, Engineering, and Forensic Investigations should be looking for truth, proof of what did happen, not speculation or opinions of what might have happened. That is what I am trying to do here. I have training, information, and experience related to these threads that I will share. I am pro-nuclear. But I respect your right to take the opposite view. Can’t you try to give others on this thread the same respect?

You haven't offered some specific explanation of high iodine levels (highest of everything), yet you say it may be caused by something else. Well it might be, but for start one thing it can't be caused by:
CsI role in transport of Caesium : Caesium Iodide has something around 1360 Bq of iodine for 1 Bq of Caesium, so it cannot be that everywhere we have CsI leaking keeping the Cs to I ratio constant, to propose so is to be unaware of mol to Bq conversion.
Ditto for other caesium+iodine chemical compounds. Once again, I may have misunderstood your point on CsI, not sure why CsI was brought up, in the solution there is no CsI anyway, just the ions, so I thought you were explaining the ratio with CsI leaving the fuel.

Furthermore, there has to be a giant disparity between relative rates of transport of caesium and iodine from fuel into the water for the spent fuel pool #4 and for all the reactors. 3 orders of magnitude. While for 3 other reactors it is same order of magnitude (and same order of magnitude ratio as for Chernobyl i think, and TMI, but someone should check the numbers).
Why would it hit the spot where it is same order of magnitude as other reactors a few weeks ago? Luck?

I have provided an estimate of the total amounts of I-131 and Cs-137 that were available for release. At the time of shutdown on March 11, the core in unit 2 or unit 3 21 different isotopes of I and 20 isotopes of Cs. There was a total of 17.6 kg of I and 230 kg of Cs. In terms of activity that initial source term consisted of 2.8E18 Bq of I and 1,7E14 Bq of Cs.
I provided you with references that describe the chemical makeup of the released I and Cs. 95% of the I released from damaged fuel is released as CsI. I brought that up because that is the predominant chemical form for transport of Iodine. Other forms include Iodine gas, HI and possibly some organic compounds.

If released into air CsI is agglomerative. It forms clumps with other CsI molecules. It can be filtered from air easily. It tends to deposit readily. It is hygroscopic. It likes to jump into the nearest pool. Once there it is in Cs+ and I- ions. If the pool becomes acidic Iodine gas will re-evolve and be released to the atmosphere. In other words it is not likely to go very far.

Even with 95% of Iodine hooking up with Cs, there is still a lot of excess Cs being released. Cs is a reactive metal. Cs readily reacts with many chemicals including water where it forms a strong base CsOH and releases hydrogen gas. It is non-volatile and will not boil off. It will plate out or deposit. As you say, it will have very different transport characteristics from Iodine particulates (CsI) or gasses. If you get that point you will understand why a single measurement at a sample point is very difficult to interpret the I/Cs ratio because Iodine and Cs are not transported the same ways.

I am not sure I understand your reference to 1360 Bq of Iodine per Bq of Cs. If a molecule of CsI is composed of Cs-137 and I-131 the I is more likely to decay first because its half life is about 1688 times shorter. But a CsI molecule may form in any combination of isotopes of I and CS including stable ones. It isn’t luck it is physics and chemistry.

Dmytry, I have provided this information as factually as I can and have explained or posted references where I obtained this information. Check out my post #4632. In this case I cannot provide a definitive counter to passible criticality. I am not convinced, but us devils advocates can be pretty stubborn.

This forum is interesting and informative. If we can all keep the rhetoric down and respect each other we will have a much better chance of making this forum useful. We’ve already seen one thread shutdown, we all lose when that happens. You seem to see things so clearly, but you lose any chance of persuasion when you belittle others or call them stupid, or liars. Come on in, the water is fine, even if it glows in the dark. Peace?
 
  • #4,648
rowmag said:
Like Samy24, I also dismissed until now suggestions of recriticality, but ok, if it is something that has to be considered, what would the consequences be? Would it have to be stopped before work could continue? If so, how? If it is on a small-enough scale, could it be worked around somehow?

Does anyone know the feasability of using a fully enclosed dredging machine that is custom built to withstand high temps and can be remotely operated? The goal is to move the fuel into a controlled environment like a tank of heavy borated water, right?
 
  • #4,649
(NHK) TEPCO: Highly radioactive concrete fragment found

The operator of the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant says that concrete debris emitting a high level of radiation has been found near the Number 3 reactor.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/24_01.html
 
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  • #4,650
AntonL said:
70 tonnes of water per day is roughly the right amount to replace boiled off water and confirms https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3244793&highlight=boil#post3244793"



Capacity = 1425 m3 http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110406-1-1.pdf"

The pool is about 11 metres deep,
so 1 metre level change is 1425/11= 129.5m3 of water
Don´t forget the open Gate to the Reactor. There also a lot of Water.
 
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