Proof of Reality: Electrical Impulses and The Matrix

[Namloh2000]

as all observations and feelings are merely electrical impulses interpreted by my brain, who's to say any laws of physics really apply? who's to say I'm not a machine made of iron led to believe i am a man with a meat-computer in my head. who's to say I'm not in The Matrix (TM)?

 

[russ_watters]

There is no way from within observed reality to prove that it is objective reality. Its one of the fundamental assumptions.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Namloh2000
as all observations and feelings are merely electrical impulses interpreted by my brain, who's to say any laws of physics really apply?

You assume too much. It might be more accurate to say "the methods and technology we have at our disposal only reveal all observations and feelings are merely electrical impulses interpreted by my brain." You cannot know whether or not we are capable of detecting all that observations and feelings are.

However, if things are as you say, then physics would apply. Electrical impulses are physical.

 

[Shahil]

The topic begs for this line:

"Reality doesn't exist"

HAHA! Kinda a paradox eh?

 

[Chen]

Originally posted by Shahil
The topic begs for this line:

"Reality doesn't exist"

HAHA! Kinda a paradox eh?

Ehh, no.

 

[Canute]

From a 'non-dual' view reality ultimately neither exists nor not-exists and the scientific universe is just appearances. (Which may be what Chen meant). It's worth checking out the 'problem of attributes' to see why science cannot encompass reality.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Shahil
The topic begs for this line:

"Reality doesn't exist"

HAHA! Kinda a paradox eh?

Reality is just an attribute of some of our perceptions. We perceive something, then label it 'real'. Reality itself can't be perceived. If it can't be perceived then it doesn't exist. No paradox. The paradox would be if the object of our real perceptions did not exist. That is just impossible.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by confutatis
Reality is just an attribute of some of our perceptions. We perceive something, then label it 'real'. Reality itself can't be perceived. If it can't be perceived then it doesn't exist. No paradox. The paradox would be if the object of our real perceptions did not exist. That is just impossible. [/B]

I think think this confuses the usual notions of 'ultimate reality' (what lies outside of Plato's cave) with the physical universe (the cave and the shadows on the wall). The physical universe is made out of perceivable attributes. Ultimate reality is what has those perceivable attributes, but which itself has no perceivable attributes.

If 'ultimate reality' (the 'essence' that underlies attributes) does not exist then the physical universe makes no sense, for it means ex nihilo creation. If it does exist then our definition of 'existence' makes no sense, for by a normal defintion of existence something with no attributes cannot exist.

This is the 'problem of attributes, an ancient puzzle in Western philosophy with no solution as yet.

However in Buddhism etc. there is no such problem. 'Essence' or 'ultimate reality' transcends any distinction between existence and non-existence. This thing is fundamental and the physical world is epiphenomenal on it.

Whether this is true is another matter. but this is what they assert.





I'm

 

[Wolf]

Think of it like this,do you see reality therefore you believe it exists or do you know reality exists therefore you see it?

 

[Canute]

Think of it like this,do you see reality therefore you believe it exists or do you know reality exists therefore you see it?

The usual view is that we see and perceive only the relative attributes of things. However from the fact that we do we can infer a reality underlying these perceptions, what it is that has these attributes, or what is from which they arise.

 

[metacristi]

as all observations and feelings are merely electrical impulses interpreted by my brain, who's to say any laws of physics really apply? who's to say I'm not a machine made of iron led to believe i am a man with a meat-computer in my head. who's to say I'm not in The Matrix (TM)?

No one.But we have a clear ladder of rational choices,based on all observed facts+the success of the methods used to make sense of observed facts,not all logical and experimental possibilities are on equal foot.And certainly idealism is not on the first place.

The berkeleyan type of idealism or some variants of the matrix hypothesis are indeed tenable seen from a philosophical and practical standpoint,being fully compatible with all observed facts.Even science has the apriori rejection of all types of idealism as a basic axiom,basically there is no way to disprove it,as of now at least.Some believe wrongly that the matrix hypothesis in general is not tenable because the Wachowsky brothers model presented in 'The Matrix' is not tenable.While this is correct there can easily be proposed much more complex models which make virtually impossible for us to realize we are living in the matrix.So that,after all,Bostrom could be right and we really live in a matrix.

Still science has epistemological privilege [the scientific method is the best method known to explain and understand nature] being intrinsically pragmatic.Since there is no need to postulate additionally that our observed 'outside' reality is an illusion [less fundamental anyway] to make sense of all observed facts,in an intersubjective manner,the burden of proof is always on those who claim that there is something more,acting 'behind the scene' (it is very possible that there is nothing more though we cannot prove that).

 

[Canute]

No one.But we have a clear ladder of rational choices,based on all observed facts+the success of the methods used to make sense of observed facts,not all logical and experimental possibilities are on equal foot.And certainly idealism is not on the first place.

Of course it isn't. Science assumes idealism is false. However the chances of it being true are 50/50 as far as science knows.

The berkeleyan type of idealism or some variants of the matrix hypothesis are indeed tenable seen from a philosophical and practical standpoint,being fully compatible with all observed facts.Even science has the apriori rejection of all types of idealism as a basic axiom,basically there is no way to disprove it,as of now at least.Some believe wrongly that the matrix hypothesis in general is not tenable because the Wachowsky brothers model presented in 'The Matrix' is not tenable.While this is correct there can easily be proposed much more complex models which make virtually impossible for us to realize we are living in the matrix.So that,after all,Bostrom could be right and we really live in a matrix.

The Matrix idea, as presented in the film, makes no sense. It has no metaphysical foundation. It suggests just an infinite regression of matrixes with no final reality. This is why although the Matrix was partly based on Buddhism it is not even close to the Buddhist view.

Still science has epistemological privilege [the scientific method is the best method known to explain and understand nature] being intrinsically pragmatic.

That's an opinion and no more.

Since there is no need to postulate additionally that our observed 'outside' reality is an illusion [less fundamental anyway] to make sense of all observed facts,in an intersubjective manner,the burden of proof is always on those who claim that there is something more,acting 'behind the scene' (it is very possible that there is nothing more though we cannot prove that).

This is not correct. There are sound logical reasons for inferring that there is more to reality than science can observe or describe. (See my last post). This is one reason why so many philosophers have been idealists.

 

[metacristi]

Science assumes both that there exist an external reality independent of mind (in general) and that we can know it at least partially though,certainly,the image of external things is 'filtered' by the brain (meaning also that there is no claim that all attributes we assign to outside things are real).Accepting apriori idealism leads in the extreme case to solipsism (untenable logically) or to the matrix/berkeleyan type of idealism (I do not treat here the case when even our consciousness belongs entirely to our reality).But once we accept the existence of other minds why should we postulate the existence of something extra behind what we observe intersubjectively?Basically there are no sufficient reasons to believe that there is something extra acting behind the scene (the soul in 'God's mind' in the berkeleyan idealism,a consciousness at a higher up level in the matrix hypothesis) or that we cannot percieve the noumenon itself (to use Kant's terminology) at least some features of external things?That's why the simplest way to make sense of the observed realities,given by the scientific method,is to be preferred [the knowledge about the world obtained using the scientific method is preferred as the standard of knowledge,usually labeled 'objective knowledge'].For the moment,no final claim is involved since science is openly fallible.New data (even a better method than the current version of the scientific method) could change things dramatically.But first we must find sufficient empirical reasons,I'm afraid simple logical arguments (inductive in many cases,some deductive but not sound) are never enough...

 

[Canute]

Accepting apriori idealism leads in the extreme case to solipsism (untenable logically) or to the matrix/berkeleyan type of idealism (I do not treat here the case when even our consciousness belongs entirely to our reality).

What is logically untenable about idealism?

But once we accept the existence of other minds why should we postulate the existence of something extra behind what we observe intersubjectively?

Because of the problem of essence or attributes. Also to avoid ex nihilo creation.

Basically there are no sufficient reasons to believe that there is something extra acting behind the scene

True, but there's no sufficient reason not to believe it either. (I didn't say 'acting' btw)

or that we cannot percieve the noumenon itself (to use Kant's terminology) at least some features of external things?

Kant said we cannot perceive the noumenal, and this seems to be correct to me.

That's why the simplest way to make sense of the observed realities,given by the scientific method,is to be prefered.

I would argue that science is concerned with the appearances of things, not reality, and that there are simpler ways to make sense of reality than science. I also disgree that science makes sense of things.

For the moment,no final claim is involved since science is openly fallible.New data (even a better method than the current version of the scientific method) could change things dramatically.But first we must find sufficient empirical reasons,I'm afraid simple logical arguments (inductive in many cases,some deductive but not sound) are never enough...

Enough for what? Without sound logical arguments we couldn't reason that the sun was going to rise tomorrow.

 

[Janitor]

I must be the one person who hasn't seen The Matrix.

There is a very old philosophical stance called 'solipsism' which maintains that I am the only thing that exists, and so the various posts in this thread were merely made up by my own mind, and then they were playfully attributed to non-existent entities with names like Namloh2000.

(Actually, it occurs to me that it can't be that old of a stance, since I have to be the one who dreamed it up, right? Ah, why am I asking you guys, since you are figments of my imagination anyway.)

 

[pocebokli]

because *I* am the one making up *your* posts just to trick myself in believing that i am not the only one in the whole creation:-)
muahaha!

 

[metacristi]

Canute

True, but there's no sufficient reason not to believe it either. (I didn't say 'acting' btw)

I'm tired of explaining again and again this simple problem to you all over the internet.The problem is to establish a standard of knowledge (a method of establishing what is real also) working well for all our practical purposes in the simplest possible way,based on all observed facts.This is the main task of epistemology and the actual scientific method has proved to be the best so far.That's why it has epistemological privilege (being the standard of knowledge),still no final claim is involved.Some beliefs might be true still they cannot be considered as belonging to the standard of knowledge (usually labeled 'objective' knowledge) given by science before empirical confirmation using the rules of the scientific method.For example if I see an alien I do not have the right to say that my belief in aliens has epistemological privilege being objective knowledge (amounting to saying that all would be rational persons should believe the same).Thus some personal beliefs,involving facts not amenable to scientific scrutiny for the moment,for which one has a base,especially first hand experiences,are rational (a simple logical possibility is not enough,one has to have a good reason for believing something) but in any case has that person the right to claim that his belief has epistemological privilege.You might believe (rationally or not) whatever you want but this does not automatically mean that your belief,interpretation of observed facts,has automatically privilege over that of science's (the simplest account of all observed facts).For that you should provide empirical evidence,that can be intersubjectively tested,supporting the claim that there is still something extra (for example that we cannot percieve the noumenon in itself).The number of internally consistent interpretations of observed facts,having also power of explanation,could be infinite,the only way to make difference between them is entirely empirical.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

The number of internally consistent interpretations of observed facts,having also power of explanation,could be infinite,the only way to make difference between them is entirely empirical.

No, it isn't. A popular example that I've used on other boards was that wherein the second phenomenological law of thermodynamics was refuted by Brownian motion, it being a perpetuum mobile of the second kind. Unfortunately there was in principle no experiment that could show this, but the kinetic theory nevertheless displaced it for theoretical reasons. The transition from phenomenological to kinetic theory thus came about in spite of there being no empirical difference or result - decisive or otherwise - that disproved the one and suggested the other. In this instance, then, we have a plain counter-example to your assertion above; it fails because it is too simplistic to account for the historical and contemporary practice of science. Other instances are legion, if you only look to the literature.

 

[metacristi]

No, it isn't. A popular example that I've used on other boards was that wherein the second phenomenological law of thermodynamics was refuted by Brownian motion, it being a perpetuum mobile of the second kind. Unfortunately there was in principle no experiment that could show this, but the kinetic theory nevertheless displaced it for theoretical reasons. The transition from phenomenological to kinetic theory thus came about in spite of there being no empirical difference or result - decisive or otherwise - that disproved the one and suggested the other. In this instance, then, we have a plain counter-example to your assertion above; it fails because it is too simplistic to account for the historical and contemporary practice of science. Other instances are legion, if you only look to the literature.

I'd say that the 'replacement' of the classical thermodynamics with the kinetic theory was simply due to the fact that Boltzman kinetic approach used the atomic hypothesis (instead of the pozitivist principles behind classical thermodynamics) which was able to explain/describe a wider range of observed facts (brownian motion included) believed once of being totally separated.Sure full acception of this happened only later when even physicists became convinced of the existence of atoms but this does not change the essence of the problem (for chemists the kinetic theory only strengthened their belief in the existence of atoms).Finally we return at empirical facts,the most supported theory is chosen.I'd say that the term 'replaced' is improper,classical thermodynamics has not been really disproved even now,it has only a lower degree of coherence with the atomic hypothesis;certainly the brownian motion is a puzzle for the classical thermodynamics but in any case a crucial falsification.

But the context in which I used my assertion refers at situations when some claim that hypotheses using in their premises additional theoretical constructs,not indispensable to explain some observed facts (the same in fact),have the same epistemological privilege with those used by science (which provides the simplest account possible,sufficient reasons).It is true now that some theoretical constructs used in the premises of some scientific theories might be not falsifiable themselves (from all we know at a certain moment of time) but they are crucial for the observed empirical success of the predictions of those scientific theories.

No one say that such more complex theories could not be closer to the 'ultimate reality' still the only way to prefer them (as the standard of knowledge for a personal belief or preference of them is sometimes rational,especially when there exist first hand subjective experiences,not amenable to scientific inquiry for the moment,which 'fit' better with the experiences) is either by finding some new empirical evidence (including a greater number of empirical 'confirmations' of their predictions on what we can already observe in general,as shown in the example with the atomic hypothesis) or by providing a method of establishing what is real better than the scientific method (which suggest that something extra exist) proved superior first on observed facts also.

 

[Canute]

Canute
I'm tired of explaining again and again this simple problem to you all over the internet.

Perhaps I think your explanation is just a sign that you haven't thought about these issues much.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

...certainly the brownian motion is a puzzle for the classical thermodynamics but in any case a crucial falsification.

The point is that there was no such "crucial falsification"; it can happen, as in this case, that two theories predict different consequences but the small variation is beyond the experimental capabilities of any investigation, usually in principle. In such an instance, the choice of one theory over the other is based on criteria other than the crucial result of experimentalist lore. If you want to make reference to additional facts in a wider domain then you are using a criterion of fecundity or similar, not rescuing the situation for experimentalism or the naive empiricism so far discussed.

It is true now that some theoretical constructs used in the premises of some scientific theories might be not falsifiable themselves (from all we know at a certain moment of time) but they are crucial for the observed empirical success of the predictions of those scientific theories.

Why is the epistemological privilege you accord them not arbitrary, though? Their importance notwithstanding, why does that put them on a different footing?

No one say that such more complex theories could not be closer to the 'ultimate reality' still the only way to prefer them [...] is either by finding some new empirical evidence (including a greater number of empirical 'confirmations' of their predictions on what we can already observe in general,as shown in the example with the atomic hypothesis) or by providing a method of establishing what is real better than the scientific method (which suggest that something extra exist) proved superior first on observed facts also.

Are you aware that this is not how the history of science has proceded? Theories are preferred for myriad reasons, some theoretical, some (often) thematic (cf. Holton's account) and very few - if any - in this way. I suggest you look at the way Einstein arrived at his special theory and how he reacted to Kaufman's and Miller's falsifications, along with Eddington's expedition. Your version is still too simplistic, alas.

 

[metacristi]

The point is that there was no such "crucial falsification"; it can happen, as in this case, that two theories predict different consequences but the small variation is beyond the experimental capabilities of any investigation, usually in principle. In such an instance, the choice of one theory over the other is based on criteria other than the crucial result of experimentalist lore. If you want to make reference to additional facts in a wider domain then you are using a criterion of fecundity or similar, not rescuing the situation for experimentalism or the naive empiricism so far discussed.

It's unclear what do you try to achieve...I've never claimed that the progress of science is a straightforward process,the phrase you contest was not intended to address this subject.Anyway because we started this topic,for me your example is a standard confirmation of the lakatosian account of how science works.Clearly we are far from the popperian clear cut logic driving scientific progress,still logic remain the main 'engine' behind it,in the majority of cases,with empirical evidence as the main criterion of rational choice on long run.Around 1860 the kinetic theory was clearly superior to phenomenological thermodynamics,it not only regained the results of classical thermodynamics but it obtained also the value of the speed of sound in different gases,the specific heat and so on which cannot be derived by the classical theory.Many scientists were convinced it was superior and that atoms do exist.With the noticeable difference of many physicists who,heavily influenced by the positivistic ideas of Comte and among scientists Mach,considered that the evidence in favor of atoms was still too weak.But soon they would be forced to change preferences,the kinetic theory continued to be theoretically and empirically progressive.First the success of Boltzmann's statistical approach and afterward the experiements of Thomson,Perrin (1908 about brownian movement) and Rutherford forced even the most conservatory physicist to change preferrences.On short run physicists still preferred the classical theory (inertia is inevitable especially when the evidence is not particulary strong in favor of one or another hypothesis) but on long run it was the empirical evidence which forced the preferences.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

It's unclear what do you try to achieve...I've never claimed that the progress of science is a straightforward process,the phrase you contest was not intended to address this subject.

You were talking of the "crucial falsification" of experimentalist lore, of course, so my purpose was plain.

Anyway because we started this topic,for me your example is a standard confirmation of the lakatosian account of how science works.

What is a "confirmation" of Lakatos' methodology of research programmes supposed to be? Are you aware of the criticism it has faced, particular from a more sophisticated approach like Holton's?

You have failed to answer the other questions i put to you regarding epistemological privilege that were very much on-topic.

 

[metacristi]

Why is the epistemological privilege you accord them not arbitrary, though? Their importance notwithstanding, why does that put them on a different footing?

I made it clear in what context I used that phrase,I do not really understand why do you obstinate to attack a different subject.What do you propose instead in such cases?To consider idealism (in the form of matrix hypothesis) for example as having the same epistemological privilege with the axiomatic system of science?Basically they make exactly the same predictions and cannot be separated from observed facts,science will work exactly in the same way no matter whether we live in the matrix,in God's mind or in an universe created by a transcedental leprechaun...Still,no matter the ultimate truth,we need a standard of knowledge,provided by the simplest account possible based on observed facts only and on the minimum of theoretical constructs.And this is provided by the actual axiomatic system of science,the body of accepted laws and the auxilary assumptions.This is why science has the principle of parsimony 'inbuilt' at its core.Here I totally disagree with your vision on the subject,there are not too many historical occasions when it was used indeed,but without it an infinite number of sligthly different hypotheses would claim epistemological primacy.Finally there is no need to believe in the reality of theoretical constructs indispensable for the empirical success of a scientific theory (as some realists would require) before confirming them experimentally in a sound way.But clearly if the theory using them in premises is the most successful experiemntally it has to be preferred to all others.If there are more the simplest should be chosen,on short run at least,entirely on pragmatic reasons.I am aware this is a difficult problem,defining 'simpler',but clearly if one theory has more not confirmed yet theoretical constructs it will not be preferred.Another criterion for simplicity will be if the hypothesis proceeds from unifying principles,especially if those principles make already part of accepted scientific knowledge (the maximum coherence possible with accepted knowledge).The Copenhagen Interpretation of QM is such an example because it retain full coherence with Special Relativity.Sure not all scientists will adhere to these 'simpler' programmes,even in periods of normal science,some might prefer alternative programmes,even stagnant ones,trying to make them progressive but till they succed the simpler theory makes temporarily,at least,part of the main body of scientific knowledge.I disagree here from there who say that no such theory should be accepted,not even temporarily,before it gains the empirical battle with its rivals.Thus I accept for example that the Copenhange in terpretation of QM+the standard mathematical formalism of QM is part of science for the moment,though I am skeptical that it really reflects the ontology of the quantum level (I am a supporter of hidden variables interpretations due to some personal strange experiences which fit much better with it).

 

[metacristi]

Are you aware that this is not how the history of science has proceded? Theories are preferred for myriad reasons, some theoretical, some (often) thematic (cf. Holton's account) and very few - if any - in this way. I suggest you look at the way Einstein arrived at his special theory and how he reacted to Kaufman's and Miller's falsifications, along with Eddington's expedition. Your version is still too simplistic, alas.

Again have you realized in what context I used that phrase?I really doubt that scientists of the past preferred theories using redundant theoretical constructs.Let's be rational.As regarding the subject you brought about I agree that scientific progress is not only a continuous domination of logic but I cannot agree with the relativism of Kuhn or Feyerabend.

Kaufmann's experiment seemed to falsify SR because a theory is not tested in isolation but also with some specific auxiliary hypotheses.As Planck proved it was the interpretation of data which seemed to falsify SR but finally things have been settled in SR's favor.Anyway the intial conclusions of Kaufmann were so tight (though Abraham's model fared slightly better) that Einstein considered those results results as a confirmation of his theory long before Planck settled the problem.

 

[metacristi]

What is a "confirmation" of Lakatos' methodology of research programmes supposed to be? Are you aware of the criticism it has faced, particular from a more sophisticated approach like Holton's?

You have failed to answer the other questions i put to you regarding epistemological privilege that were very much on-topic.

There is a clear difference between confirmation and verification.I haven't claimed it was verified.Still on that particular case you brought about the lakatosian view is vindicated,confirmed,by the scientific practice.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

What do you propose instead in such cases?

I do not need to provide an alternative to critique your ideas, of course.

Still,no matter the ultimate truth,we need a standard of knowledge,provided by the simplest account possible based on observed facts only and on the minimum of theoretical constructs.

Why? It is decidedly unclear why any of these presuppositions should be accepted or thought plausible. Why do theoretical constructs need to be minimised, for example, particularly if you then go on to declare an instrumentalist account satisfactory? Likewise, such an account is, ceteris paribus, not likely to be the simplest; and moreover, there are always antecedent assumptions that are unargued, unverifiable and unfalsifiable but involved in the formation of scientific theories. Why should your methodological advice get us what we require?

This is why science has the principle of parsimony 'inbuilt' at its core.

No, it doesn't. Are you aware of the writings of physicists like Bohr on the subject? We can only judge something like parsimony a posteriori because the consequences of additional postulates, hypotheses, theoretical entities or assumptions only become clear (if at all) after the fact, by which time the matter has been decided by other factors - or so said Bohr.

If we study the motivations of scientists in the past, we very often find that they were guided by something like an aesthetic sense, trying to find the most "beautiful" theory. Sometimes it happened that this was also the simplest, mutatis mutandis, if - like Copernicus - they were commited to some mathematical regularity, say, but sometimes it was not.

without it an infinite number of sligthly different hypotheses would claim epistemological primacy.

That is neither a good nor satisfactory reason to claim primacy, since i could just as well use your argument to claim likewise for any epistemology. The under-determination of theories by evidence, say, surely must imply that only leprechauns can provide the answers we seek, right?

Finally there is no need to believe in the reality of theoretical constructs indispensable for the empirical success of a scientific theory (as some realists would require) before confirming them experimentally in a sound way.

Well, that is another argument; i'll be glad to oppose you on it another time, perhaps.

But clearly if the theory using them in premises is the most successful experiemntally it has to be preferred to all others.

Calling such things "clear" does not make it so. How do you propose to measure success? If we followed this methodological advice in the past, many theories we now take to be accurate (or maybe true or truthlike) would have fallen at the first fence - like the special theory when confronted with Kaufman's experiments, for example. Your suggestion fails to account for the actual practice of scientists.

I am aware this is a difficult problem,defining 'simpler',but clearly if one theory has more not confirmed yet theoretical constructs it will not be preferred.

Why is this any clearer than before? In an instrumentalist account, it will make no difference in any case.

Sure not all scientists will adhere to these 'simpler' programmes,even in periods of normal science...

Do you believe in the existence of so-called "normal science"? If so, i suggest you look at the criticisms the idea received back when Kuhn first suggested it, particularly in the volume Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Musgrave and Lakatos. More to the point here, why should anyone else so believe?

...some might prefer alternative programmes,even stagnant ones,trying to make them progressive but till they succed the simpler theory makes temporarily,at least,part of the main body of scientific knowledge.

As we already discussed, if we are aiming for instrumentalist theories then simplicity is like fine weather: it is nice to have sometimes but the day will go on just as before regardless. Even in the Lakatosian methodology, the currently employed research programme need not be the simplest. It is unclear that you are saying anything here.

till on that particular case you brought about the lakatosian view is vindicated,confirmed,by the scientific practice.

On a very narrow reading, perhaps, but not likely. Have you tried to answer the critique aimed at Lakatos? How does this instance "confirm" Lakatos' ideas? I could equally claim that Einstein vindicates the ignoring of falsifications.

I really doubt that scientists of the past preferred theories using redundant theoretical constructs.Let's be rational.

Thank you for telling me how to behave, but i think i'll continue to be irrational for a little longer. Since i did not say that "scientists of the past preferred theories using redundant theoretical constructs", it would be helpful if you did not imply that i did.

Anyway the intial conclusion of Kaufmann were so tight (though Abraham's model fared slightly better) that Einstein considered those results results as a confirmation of his theory long before Planck showed settled the problem.

I suggest you go back and read what Kaufman had to say about his work and also the reasons Einstein gave for holding to his theory in spite of it. The latter's view on confirmations - or "verification of little effects", as he called them - significantly differs from that you are attributing to him.

 

[metacristi]

I will not address now all your points,maybe in the future.Still what you talk here [interesting though I profoundly disagree with many of your conclusions,for example I do not find reasonable your attack at the terminology used by me,the usual meaning of 'confirmation' is exactly how I presented it] is totally different from what I intended to say.I stress again your criticism totally missed the point.By the way what makes you believe that your point of view has to be accepted?Unfortunately there is no satisfactory account of how scientific progress occurs;simply stating that there is no method is not a solution either.I'd say that the most successful is the lakatosian account in spite of the fact that scientific practice recorded situations when instant refutations occured.

Science,beginning from its basic assumptions,continuing with the body of accepted scientific knowledge and auxiliary assumptions can be seen as huge research programme giving the best account of the observed facts in the most simple manner in spite of the fact that some theoretical constructs might be used sometimes (but this is not at all necessary to happen).The problem I was dealing is not how scientific hypotheses are accepted as belonging to the main body of science,this is a tenuous process indeed.The claim was that other programmes having the same body of already accepted scientific theories and auxiliary hypotheses+the vast majority of the basic axioms of science,assumptions of science (less the assumptions of naturalism and/or the apriori rejection of idealism) which introduce some new axioms,not indispensable for the success of the programme,is on the same foot with that given by the actual version of the scientific programm,the simplest possible.If you think that it's so,your choice,but of course this does not mean that your position is the most rational.


Probably I have to define also what do I mean by 'real' because you talked of instrumentalism.I'm afraid the logical structure of the hypothetico-deductive method let's the door wide open for inexistent theoretical constructs (in reality,but we are not aware of that at a certain moment) to still lead to very successful scientific theories...I will have to repeat partially what I've already said on this thread but I think this will make things clearer.

There is no philosophical/scientific arguments (at least currently) which to provide sufficient reasons to consider the Matrix hypothesis or the berkeleyan type of idealism as disproved.That's why science has among its basic assumptions the apriori rejection of all types of idealism,postulating also that there exist an external,objective,fundamental,world which we can measure,describe and understand.Sure we do not have now sufficient reasons to claim that we do not live in a matrix or in the mind of God but since the base of rationality is represented by observed facts there is no good reason to believe that we do.The burden of proof is on those who claim that there is something more.Besides even if we really live in the matrix the actual findings of science will not be nullified by the discovery that we live there,at least on the 'domain of definition' given by the matrix world.

The acceptance that there exist an 'objective reality' implies the existence of an external fundamental reality outside our wishes and desires which we can observe;possible in this objective reality exist an infinity of 'entities'.Before going further must be settled another important aspect.Can we really observe at least some of the noumenal (to use the Kantian term) features of reality or ontological reality is incognoscible (what we observe,the order we see,everything,being imposed by our own minds)?Again we cannot prove that what we observe is the 'naked' reality (at least some of the attributes assigned) but again the burden of proof is upon those who make the positive claim that it is otherwise.There is absolutely no good reason to think that we cannot know the reality at least partially though some attributes we assign to observed entities might not be primary ones (of course our theories are simple models there is no claim of exhaustivity).

The epistemological problem which arise next is to establish what entities or processes should we consider as belonging to this objective ontological reality,that is which entities should be considered real and which can be understood as being physical processes among real entities (based on all observed facts)?A method of investigation is needed for that,including a mean of verification.What methodology is the best?Can we rely only on our senses?Can we rely only on reason+intuition or on reason+intuition+senses?Empiricism has proved to be the most successful of establishing the truth about natural facts having at base both the correspondence and coherence philosophical theories of truth.The scientific method is the best empirical method known so far giving us the best model currently of the 'phenomena',natural facts as we observe them,time has proved that the scientific method is the most successful,the most rational,based on a careful observation of facts done with the best instruments available,without hasty generalizations.This is why science has epistemological privilege over the so called 'common truths' being the standard of objective knowledge giving us what should be considered as being real.Sure some personal,subjective,experiences (not amenable at scientific inquiry now) can be something absolutely real in spite of the lack of intersubjective,scientific,support (seeing some extraterrestrials for example) but we must be very careful with this type of experiences (many are not reliable).Thus they should not be considered as representing 'objective knowledge' (since science has epistemological privilege) but they give sufficient reasons to the experiencer to believe that what he saw is real,as a strictly personal belief of course.

From here on things are depending on the philosophy held and the facts observed.Personally I am a supporter of the brand of realism (hermeneutical realism which engulf also some anti-realist conceptions) which consider that science come closer and closer to the ontological,ultimate,nature of things though some of our theoretical attributes and constructs in very successful scientific theories might not be real.The reality of something must be established entirely by experiments,indirect confirmations are accepted,not confirmed empirically yet 'entities',though predictions of very successful otherwise theories,must not be considered real.Scientists have however the right to use them in further hypothesis making processes but entirely as theoretical constructs.Sure the existence of theoretical support from more,different,disciplines (as was the case with the atomic hypothesis before Thomson and Rutherford experimental confirmations) entitle scientists to believe that some theoretical constructs are real but this does not yet represent the sufficient arguments science always seek.Also the observed facts that can be explained in terms of processes among real entities are not considered as being real.Only the processes are real but the emergent phenomenon ('information') they create is not.For example no matter that all people will see a 'fata morgana' in the desert this do not entitle us to claim that fata morgana is real,indeed science show us with arguments beyond all reasonable doubt that this phenomenon is only an optical illusion and fata morgana does not exist in the objective reality other than some sort of information.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I stress again your criticism totally missed the point.

So you say, but i rather think you have failed to understand the Quinean criticism I've presented. *shrug* Handbags at dawn, i suggest.

By the way what makes you believe that your point of view has to be accepted?

I missed the part where i said that it does, i guess. I don't care in the least if you accept my criticisms or offer up a sacrifice to Mach instead.

Unfortunately there is no satisfactory account of how scientific progress occurs;simply stating that there is no method is not a solution either.

Well, if conflate the two in this way then a solution may be even further off than otherwise. I agree that there is "no satisfactory account" but i'll be glad to disagree in principle if you bring it up again. Perhaps you have misunderstood the approach of those like Galison, Cartwright and others who have shown the complexity of methodologies? The lack of a definitive method is not offered as a solution to anything.

The claim was ...

I know what the claim was. How do you answer Quine's remarks that this difference in footing is one of degree, not kind?

If you think that it's so,your choice,but of course this does not mean that your position is the most rational.

Luckily I'm not concerned to be more rational than you or anyone else. *shrug*

Empiricism has proved to be the most successful of establishing the truth about natural facts having at base both the correspondence and coherence philosophical theories of truth.

It has? What does "successful" mean in your account? What is the "truth about natural facts"? I think you could be a little more careful with these terms, especially if you are intending to make such claims.

...time has proved that the scientific method is the most successful,the most rational,based on a careful observation of facts done with the best instruments available,without hasty generalizations.This is why science has epistemological privilege over the so called 'common truths' being the standard of objective knowledge giving us what should be considered as being real.

Once again, it's not clear what "successful" is supposed to mean or why anyone should accept this assertion. If someone uses a different methodology that is successful within a certain domain according to their requirements, why are they not similarly justified in giving it epistemological priviledge? Examples are legion, of course.

Scientists have however the right to use them in further hypothesis making processes but entirely as theoretical constructs.

Why do you want to proscribe scientific practice in this way?

 

[metacristi]

Look,pal,you are confusing me with a logical positivist.Unfortunately for you neither do I support the view that meaningful propositions are only those which are analytical nor that all non analytical propositions (which are enunciations about natural facts) are meaningless if they cannot be 'verified' (in Ayer's 'weaker',probabilistic,sense).As a matter of fact my stance is that metaphysical assumptions have a place inside science itself (nonwithstanding Popper's prescriptions) though they might seem nonfalsifiable at a certain moment but only as much as they prove indispensable for the empirical success (I do not find your criticism as being substantial regarding this problem) of the theory (theories) using them in their premises and so cannot be discarded.Of course this does not mean that redundant assumptions are meaningless.Since science is openly fallible if sufficient reasons will be found they will become part of science later,at least a successful theory where they are indispensable constructs or,even better,direct or indirect evidence for them..Thus my whole argument still stands and I ask again do you have a better approach?As for the existence of slight variations from the standard scientific method what is really important is that the principle of intersubjectivity is always present.Even Chalmers' first person approach proposal can be seen,at limit,as a slight variation of the third person usual approach.Finally there is no proof that this method is the best possible,maybe intuition is better,I certainly do not claim this,only that we must prove it first as being superior...on observed facts.By the way you give a lot of advices but you haven't been able to produce a coherent stance so far...

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Look,pal,you are confusing me with a logical positivist.

Thank you for telling me what I'm doing.

Thus my whole argument still stands and I ask again do you have a better approach?

Unfortunately saying so does not make it so, and nor does avoiding questions. What's more, i don't have to provide a better approach to critique yours.

By the way you give a lot of advices but you haven't been able to produce a coherent stance so far...

*yawn* I don't have to "produce a stance" to point out the faults in your own. You are more than welcome to cease telling me what I've done and should do and begin answering criticisms.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The problem is to establish a standard of knowledge (a method of establishing what is real also) working well for all our practical purposes in the simplest possible way,based on all observed facts.This is the main task of epistemology and the actual scientific method has proved to be the best so far.

That's why it has epistemological privilege (being the standard of knowledge),still no final claim is involved.Some beliefs might be true still they cannot be considered as belonging to the standard of knowledge (usually labeled 'objective' knowledge) given by science before empirical confirmation using the rules of the scientific method.

. . . .The number of internally consistent interpretations of observed facts,having also power of explanation,could be infinite,the only way to make difference between them is entirely empirical.

Your English is just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning. It seemed you were careful to use the words "observed facts" and "objective knowledge." Is your assertion that the empirical method is deserving of "epistemological privilege" limited to knowledge of "externals" and sense data?
Beyond that, one might say empirical confirmation deserves epistemological privilege in terms of serving to convince others of what one claims to have experienced.

What I would object to, and I don't know if this is what you are implying, is the belief of some thinkers (a high percentage here at PF I'd say) that there is no other reliable method of acquiring knowledge. I wouldn't agree the "epistemological privilege" of empiricism should be extended to, for example, self knowledge or what might be discovered through self knowledge. If fact, I would say empiricism has absolutely no relevance to the deepest aspect of self knowledge.

 

[Dayle Record]

...time has proved that the scientific method is the most successful,the most rational,based on a careful observation of facts done with the best instruments available,without hasty generalizations.


Reality is currently demonstrating that the above mentioned stuff, is lethal.

By design, we perceive deterrent pain, hunger, and lust; in that order. To suit some need of the cosmos, we now have abundant organic software with which, to destroy our planetary web of life. I don't want to believe that our evolution, by plan, would result in so much destruction. But seriously, who gave that monkey the gun?

Regarding reality, it is all real, what we perceive, what we feel, what we know, what we don't know, what we can perceive, what we can sense and feel, and what we can't sense and feel. We don't have enough measuring sticks to measure the whole thing. We ourselves don't measure up to the measure of the situation. So existence can be anything, as long as we keep the legislation of our mutual delusions to a minimum, we will be able to operate more smoothly in this uncertain venue.

This is really comical, in the sense, that I am looking at a viewscreen, whose basic operation, I don't really understand. The viewscreen was given to me, and then appearing on it is a question regarding the nature of existence posed in black letters, that diminish the light of the screen, so I can see them, in contrast. The letters want to know if they are a meat puppet, or a bit actor in a mystical movie, or if we are all in a movie. This is existence of a sort. Then I answer, by pressing on plastic finger rests, instead of calculating taxes that my very real government wants.

 

[Dayle Record]

Your English is just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning.



It may not be a problem with the transmitter, maybe it is a reception problem.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It may not be a problem with the transmitter, maybe it is a reception problem.

When I said metacristi's English was "just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning," it was not meant as put down. I simply wanted to make sure I understood what he means before I critique what he says.

However, if you believe something is wrong with my reception, I would appreciate hearing what you think that might be.

 

[metacristi]

Thank you for telling me what I'm doing.

I do not understand what you are talking about here.You are talking from books but without really managing to build a coherent view from those chunks you mention so often.If we shift the accent from the problem of meaning toward the demarcation between science and pseudoscience by allowing even metaphysics inside science,where valuable as I've argued,my stance is absolutely viable.Ayer's principle was meant to eliminate metaphysics,which he failed to do,but the idea that only fruitful theoretical constructs are allowed within science is still viable and in fact all scientists use it widely.I do not think Quine supported the introduction of redundant constructs in science or preference for programmes which use redundant constructs.Why do you believe for example that the sentence 'God (a certain model) has created our universe' is not a part of science?Because for the moment is a redundant construct.No one says that a research programme having God as an extra axiom (the rest of assumptions being almost unchanged) is not viable,it is,but it cannot have primacy.The principle of sufficient reason is the base of rationality,also at the heart of the whole science.Otherwise even in our usual scientific quest we would be always entitled to introduce inside science constructs which have no role for the predictions the theory makes.For example if by using the usual inductive methods of agreement and so on we establish that the sufficient observed causes for a phenomenon Z are A,B,C there is no good reason to claim also that D is another cause which always appears in conjunction with A,B,C but we cannot observe it for the moment.When sufficient reasons will be produced then D will become also part of science,for the moment its introduction inside science is redundant.Likewise if from a set of assumptions let's say a,b,c,d,e,f ('a' being for example metaphysical,seemingly nontestable itself:strings for example it's hard to believe that we will ever be able to 'probe' at Planck's level) we deduce some predictions potentially testable g,h,i,j,k,l (some of them confirmed experimentally) but we observe that if we renounce at premise 'f' the predictions are the same then we are fully entitled to discard it till new evidence (be it in the form of a theory where it cannot be discarded) will force us to allow it inside science.Why do you insist to a different approach when dealing with the whole scientific programme vs alternative ones (containing redundant constructs)?Even creationists realized that they must prove that God hypothesis is fruitful within scientific theories in order to be entitled to claim epistemological primacy.

I said that 'a' could be metaphysical,it is part of science but there is no obligation for all scientists or would be rational people to believe in it's existence until we will have indirect or direct experimental confirmation.For example if I had lived around 1870 I would have certainly believed in the atomic hypothesis which even made predictions (it was able to accomomdate many observed phenomena in a wide area,previously thought as totally separated) but I would have not condemned physicists as Mach,Herz,Planck for not believing in the existence of atoms.The mistake was that the atomic hypothesis was marginalized when in fact it was theoretically and empirically progressive,even at that time more superior experimentally to the continuous hypothesis.

 

[metacristi]

By the way because we talked of 'verification' versus 'confirmation'.It is a common practice to say that a theory was confirmed when a valid experiment support one of its predictions.This does not imply that the theory is true,verified or the best possible,not even that the theory was made more probable if you wish.Personally I think that the bayesian interpretation of probabilities,widely used in scientific practice,is a very solid base for those who try to justify induction,we do not need to justify induction within logic.Sure we can never prove a theory but we are fully entitled to have a high degree of confidence in the (approximative) truth of scientific statements (even some theories) for which we have a relevant sample of previous succes.We cannot rely on such scientific laws,in spite of the relevant sample of previous successes,on long run indeed but there is absolutely no good reason to not rely on them at our next use of them.Indeed otherwise we would have no science and technology either,why attempt to design a car if we cannot rely on the fact that tomorrow,when we plan to start building it,is uncertain that the laws of physics will still hold?

 

[metacristi]

Your English is just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning. It seemed you were careful to use the words "observed facts" and "objective knowledge." Is your assertion that the empirical method is deserving of "epistemological privilege" limited to knowledge of "externals" and sense data?
.

Yeah I still have to sharpen my english skills,but I think my points of view were enough clear.The science has epistemological privilege being the standard of knowledge on all those aspects of nature where it has managed to obtain suffients reasons for its assertions forcing so all would be rational people to think the same.All rational people will believe that the Earth is round we have sufficient reason for that.Moreover since there is no other viable alternative method which to match the actual version of the scientic method even there where the scientific quest has not obtained yet those sufficient reasons it still has epistemological privilege,though there is no obligation for all would be rational people to believe in its proposals.For example I do not think that science has managed to find sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness so that some rational people are entitled to doubt that AI or the materialistic approach is correct,for example.Still doubting does not equate that some one is entitled automatically to believe that science cannot one day find those sufficient reasons and in any case that all would be rational people should believe that consciousness,at least subjective experiences,will never be understood by the actual approach.Let's allow time and human geinus to settle things.If there is something extra,possible to detect,we will know sometimes.If not we could have 'hints' that something more is implied,though,certainly,we will never gain sufficient resons.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I do not understand what you are talking about here.

That much is plain.

You are talking from books but without really managing to build a coherent view from those chunks you mention so often.

On the contrary, you are talking from books, failing to answer questions and unable to appreciate that a critic need not offer an alternative to point out the shortcomings of your ideas.

If you want to claim an epistemological priviledge, you need to explain why scientific theories have an epistemological standing that differs in kind - not degree - from others. You are more than welcome to attempt this in a non-circular fashion instead of asserting that you've already done so, but if you are just going to waste my time again then please just say so.

 

[metacristi]

Provide first a credible alternative proposal at what I've said above and I will find worth of continuing this discussion.Till then I waste my time either,I do not find your criticism as being substantiated.First I fail to see how your criticism is entitled,why research programmes which contain redundant assumptions are on the same level of rationality with the actual reasearch programme of science,i'm afraid the logic and even scientific practice does not support this view;anyway there is no claim of 'eternal truth',even the current axioms of science are open to rejection if sufficient reasons against are produced.If you could propose an alternative research programme where the God's of Homer are indispensable constructs,though we have to change some other assumptions hold by the actual research programme of science,which explain facts equally well,then yes there is no base to claim primacy for the actual version of the scientific research programme.Unfortunately there is no such proposal.I repeat I don't think Quine referred at successful prgrammes which have redundant assumptions as being on the same level of with programmes where the redundant assumptions have been eliminated.Secondly I fail to see why am I a logical positivist and thus falling under Quine's criticism (as I've explained above there is no supposition that each statement in the premises, taken in isolation from other assumptions,must be potentially testable).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

*sigh* I have already explained - many times - that i need not provide an alternative to note errors in your ideas. You are welcome to offer an argument as to why i am plainly mistaken in so thinking, but ignoring the point is not convincing. Nor, i might add, is mischaracterising my criticisms as supposing you are a logical positivist when i have already disclaimed that idea.

If i am merely taking arguments from books and you have me all figured out then you might be better advised to turn to the actual book i am using and address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological privilege is possible. This, of course, is the matter that you continue to avoid: why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example? I have asked you this time and again, but i am yet to see a non-circular answer (or, indeed, any answer at all). Kindly cease mischaracterising me and offer an answer, or throw your toys at someone else.

 

[Canute]

Metacristi - It would also help me if you explained what you mean by science having 'epistemilogical priviledge'. I've never known what you meant.

 

[metacristi]

*sigh* I have already explained - many times - that i need not provide an alternative to note errors in your ideas. You are welcome to offer an argument as to why i am plainly mistaken in so thinking, but ignoring the point is not convincing. Nor, i might add, is mischaracterising my criticisms as supposing you are a logical positivist when i have already disclaimed that idea.

If i am merely taking arguments from books and you have me all figured out then you might be better advised to turn to the actual book i am using and address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological privilege is possible. This, of course, is the matter that you continue to avoid: why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example? I have asked you this time and again, but i am yet to see a non-circular answer (or, indeed, any answer at all). Kindly cease mischaracterising me and offer an answer, or throw your toys at someone else.

Nothing is set in stone.This is why I do not rely too much on other sources,they good informally but cannot constitute a sort of Bible,especially in this controversial field.The majority of what I write comes from my own thought,facts and logic counts,I do not have to read all books existent to provide a logically defendable stance.


Why is there a difference?Simply because quarks are fruitful theoretical constructs indispensable for the success of the theories using them,at least to accommodate,having power of explanation,the observed facts.This does not mean they exist in reality,as a matter of fact since they are not ddirectly involved in the new predictions made by the theories using them many scientists doubt that they should make part of science itself as of now.However,though 'quark hypothesis' seems an ad hoc hypothesis,it is accepted within the Standard Model,indeed there are different degrees of ad hocness,some have a so high degree of coherence with existing knowledge that fully deserve to become part of science itself,not all are all out crackpots (in the same position was once the neutrino hypothesis now widely supported empirically).

There is no such proposal for the Homer's God research program.I do not say it's impossible to construct one (I still expect your proposal) but it will be tremendously difficult to build one free from internal contradictions able also to keep pace with the standard research program of science.For example you cannot interpret lightning as due to Zeus and in the same time to explain the functioning of capacitors using the electromagnetic theory.

Secondly,assuming that an internally coherent program will ever be provided,the proponent will have first to deal with the following problems,on medium and long run at least:

1.Does the program accommodate all known empirical facts,already explained by the scientific program,with the exitence of Homer's God assumption playing an active role in comjunction with other premises?

2.Are there new testable predictions,apart from accomomdating all known facts,resulting from the combination of the initial assumption (that Homer God's exist) with some other premises?

3.Is the program falsifiable?If yes has the program the potential to be empirically and theoretically progressive,on long run,able to remain at the same level of empirical success with the standard program of science whilst keeping 'active' (in the process of new predictions making) the assumption that Homer's Gods exist without resorting to the ad hoc assumption that 'Homer Gods did it')?Is the program able also to accommodate also neutral facts previously ('fit' them within the program)?

If the answer is again yes but only with the expense of changing large parts of its premises in a very short amount of time then we have a problem.I'm afraid exactly this would have happened if for example we would have accepted let's say 100 years ago that Homer's Gods rsearch program was on the same level of priority with the usual scientific program.What reasons would we have to accept a program that changes almost on a daily basis?This would be a clear sign of the strong adhocness of one of the premises that never changes,I do not know which,but clearly the program as a whole is inferior,with experiments playing a key role.Basically is meaningless to say that we deal with one and the same research program.Why not change the assumption that Homer Gods exist itself?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Yeah I still have to sharpen my english skills,but I think my points of view were enough clear.

Just so you know . . . I wasn't being critical of your English skills or suggesting you need to sharpen them. I was just letting you know if I question what you believe you've already explained, it's because I'm having a little trouble with how you put words together.

The science has epistemological privilege being the standard of knowledge on all those aspects of nature where it has managed to obtain suffients reasons for its assertions forcing so all would be rational people to think the same.

I agree.

Moreover since there is no other viable alternative method which to match the actual version of the scientic method even there where the scientific quest has not obtained yet those sufficient reasons it still has epistemological privilege,though there is no obligation for all would be rational people to believe in its proposals.

Here is where I might have a problem. It depends on if you mean a "viable alternative method" for studying externals, or if you mean for studying anything, including the interior of consciousness. I will explain more below.

For example I do not think that science has managed to find sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness so that some rational people are entitled to doubt that AI or the materialistic approach is correct,for example.Still doubting does not equate that some one is entitled automatically to believe that science cannot one day find those sufficient reasons and in any case that all would be rational people should believe that consciousness,at least subjective experiences,will never be understood by the actual approach.

I agree one isn't logically justified in "automatically" assuming science cannot find the answer to consciousnes. But they would be justified if they have a sound reason to doubt. A crucial aspect of the empirical method is that what has been hypothesized to be true must be experienced (observed). So I would say it is experience which most establishes "epistemological privilege." As William James put it, “Nothing shall be admitted as fact except what can be experienced at some definite time.”

Yet James also said, " . . . everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real." I think that is relevant because not everyone finds sense experience the most valuable of human experiences. As far back as Socrates we hear of individuals recommending "know thy self" (and many of these people are thought of as "wise" human beings). If one were to develop the ability to experience the most inward nature of consciousness, and after repeated experiences one becomes certain that the senses, and therefore empiricism, can never get at it, then one would then be justified in believing science is not the right approach to learning about the nature of consciousness.

Further, with the added choice of acquiring that "inner" knowledge, one wouldn't necessarily agree that empiricism deserves "epistemological privilege."
One might very well decide that self knowledge is one's first priority, and understanding the external aspects of reality is below that in priority.

Let's allow time and human geinus to settle things.If there is something extra,possible to detect,we will know sometimes.If not we could have 'hints' that something more is implied,though,certainly,we will never gain sufficient resons.

This relates to the point I was trying to make in another thread. If what I said above is possible, there will be no way to externalize the experience of consciousness. Therefore, only "hints" we will acquire are if each individual learns to experience the inner aspect of consciousness for oneself. I cannot see your experience, you cannot see mine. You can only experience your own, I can only experience mine.

 

[metacristi]

Hugo Holbling

Our disagreement begins from the assumption of Feyerabend that experiments cannot constitute the base of making the difference.Contrary to what you seems to believe I maintain my view that empirical data is crucial,on the long run at least.While it is true that Copernicus and even Galieo's views were somehow against the 'natural' interpretation of facts,at that time very few preferred them based only on some aesthetic reasons.It was Tycho Brahe's observations and especially the tremendous success of Newtonian mechanics which made all scientists of the time to prefer their views.Thus scientific practice vindicate the appeal to experience on long run in spite of some counter examples along history.In my opinion history is full of examples when the lakatosian view was the closest to what happened,this is why I prefer it.Those who think it is no longer tenable have first to prove their case as being superior in experimental practice (though possible their view was at its turn disproved by some other counter examples).Anyway what counts even on the short run is that thefirst task of science is to work for all our practical purposes in the simplest way and that the principle of sufficient reason is the base of rationality.Since science is openly fallible if other alternative programmes will prove superior the majority of scientists will consider it the standard of knowledge (though possible working to make progressing some empirically degenerating alternative programmes).If you have other proposals (better I hope backed by sufficient reasons) please go ahead.I'm listening.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Why is there a difference?Simply because quarks are fruitful theoretical constructs indispensable for the success of the theories using them,at least to accommodate,having power of explanation,the observed facts.

Fair enough, but the same held for the Homeric gods at the time - that's the point. For these reasons, the Greek gods were as real to people as quarks are to us.

For example you cannot interpret lightning as due to Zeus and in the same time to explain the functioning of capacitors using the electromagnetic theory.

Sure, but the conclusion you want to make doesn't follow: why then eliminate Zeus and not the latter explanation? You may use an epistemological privilege but why shouldn't i grant it to Zeus? Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this privilege in a non-circular way.

 

[Les Sleeth]

. . . address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological privilege is possible. . . . why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example?

I would enjoy debating Quine's point if I wasn't busy for the next couple of days. But as a quick answer to why I think epistemological privilege is possible, I'll let my pragmatist leanings show and say epistemological privilege is established by what "works."

When it comes to understanding physcial reality, empiricism has earned the right to claim epistemological priviledge. When what is claimed to be known is applied in a process, laser technology for instance, then we "know" something about the nature of light has been understood (i.e., because we can make it "work" or operate according to predicted principles). While quarks might be unknowable, there is plenty science has proven it knows. Homer's gods however produces no hypotheses we can apply and then prove it is an epistimological model that reveals reality.

Of course, I also believe epistemological privilege is not absolute, but is determined by what one wants to know. So as I argued in my last post to metacristi, I would not agree that empiricism has epistemological privilege in the case of certain subjective experiences.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this privilege in a non-circular way.

Well, you responded to my point, though not to me, while I wrote it.

But I still believe utility proves itself. On a very basic level, it is what humanity, and for that matter all of life, does relentlessly. Ultimately, when we make things "work," we survive. Philosophers get to sit around and demonstrate the argument is circular, but only if they keep it a rationalization exercise and don't reference experience. In life they behave exactly like everyone else who depends on utility to survive.

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological privilege in every area of human investigation.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

But I still believe utility proves itself. On a very basic level, it is what humanity, and for that matter all of life, does relentlessly. Ultimately, when we make things "work," we survive. Philosophers get to sit around and demonstrate the argument is circular, but only if they keep it a rationalization exercise and don't reference experience. In life they behave exactly like everyone else who depends on utility to survive.

I quite agree, but this is making my point for me: the Homeric gods "worked" in this way, just as myriad other worldviews and methodologies "work" for other groups, cultures and so on. Why should i assign an epistemic privilege to one or the other?

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological privilege in every area of human investigation.

Well, i applaud your caution.

Homer's gods however produces no hypotheses we can apply and then prove it is an epistimological model that reveals reality.

The Homeric gods were used to make sense of the world just as we use quarks (in both cases, along with many other ideas). Without meaning to sound dismissive, i suggest you read (or re-read, perhaps) the classic works of that period if you think no hypotheses were produced or applied.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The Homeric gods were used to make sense of the world just as we use quarks (in both cases, along with many other ideas). Without meaning to sound dismissive, i suggest you read (or re-read, perhaps) the classic works of that period if you think no hypotheses were produced or applied.

Well heck, just when it's getting interesting I have to leave. However, I didn't say the classic works of that period produced no hypotheses or applications.

I am assuming we are all talking about epistimology, and in this case getting proof about the nature of reality. Just because the Greeks made sense of the world through myth doesn't mean they knew anything about reality. But this method of linking experience to what is hypothesized has produced an incredible amount of knowledge. As I've already said, I don't think sense experience is the only sort of experience which brings knowledge. But the qualitative difference in acquiring knowledge between people seeking to know by making up stories, or guessing, or divining, or purely rationalizing versus those who seek confirmation through experience is huge. That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.