Adonis1 said:
This is exactly what I was looking for! Thank you for this very clear explanation. I do have one question regarding this explanation however. This is certainly good enough for my purposes though, and my question is off-topic, i.e. not related to this problem. Anyway, you say that I can proceed "under the assumption" that I've selected an arbitrary set that satisfies the property of induction, and then show that it must be true that it also satisfies the properly of being the whole set of natural numbers, using the WOP. Well that's fine, but how do I know I have actually selected an arbitrary such set? Yes, we "stipulate" it when we carry out the proof, i.e., we say "I've selected an arbitrary such set that I name A", that's what's meant by your phrase "under the assumption that..." but how do I actually know that such an assumption is legitimate in the first place? How do I know I am not subject to confirmation bias? Perhaps more directly, how do I know such an arbitrary A even exists in the first place? If such an assumption could be shown, then there is no problem, the proof strikes me as perfect. But can I ever legitimate that assumption?
But maybe I'm stretching things into epistemology here?
This is going to seem way off, but I promise it'll come around.
Pretend for a second that we have
very precise definitions of "zombie apocalypse", "prepared for", and "survive". We could presumably prove that every member of the set of humans who is prepared for the zombie apocalypse is also in the set of humans who will survive the zombie apocalypse. If we couldn't then we might need to adjust our definitions. It might turn out that, just as a side result of our definitions, that other statements using the terms "zombie apocalypse", "prepared for", and "survive" are also provable. Perhaps some of them would be obvious, others not so obvious. But they would all be logical consequences in a universe where those who are prepared survive.
We don't really care if our definitions are reasonable or achievable. Maybe "prepared" is far too strict. Maybe "survive" means "survives for 10 seconds", maybe it means "survives for 10 years". We don't really care as long as preparedness implies survival. We also don't care if zombie apocalypse is an event that can happen (at least for the purpose of this analogy). Maybe it can, maybe it can't. We don't know. But what we do know is that, in our construct,
if there is a zombie apocalypse and
if you are prepared, then you will survive.
This is precisely the type of argument that we've made here. We've defined the natural numbers to satisfy certain axioms (probably Peano). We've also defined things like "set", "subset", etc. (probably Zermelo–Fraenkel). Are sets real? Do numbers exist? We'd like to think so, but that's really question for the philosophers. As mathematicians, we move forward and prove other statements as if they are real and do exist ... somewhere. We
are concerned with having precise definitions (so that there is no ambiguity) and an appropriate logical framework in which to work.
And in that logical framework,
if WOP is true and
if a set has the "property of induction" (notice how we've defined
in this post what it means for a set to have the property of induction

that's our term), then that set must be all natural numbers. It doesn't matter to us one bit if there really are sets, natural numbers, or whether or not it's possible for a set to possesses the property of induction.