DarMM
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Of course, as I have said, the theorems have assumptions, that's a given.Auto-Didact said:Can't work given certain assumptions
That depends on the particular theorem. Bell's theorem for example does not rely on the full validity of QM, similar for many others. This implies to me that you haven't actually looked at the framework and are criticising it from a very abstract position of your own personal philosophy of science and your impression of what it must be.Auto-Didact said:including the full validity of axioms of QM beyond what has been experimentally demonstrated
It's not a proposal that the real space of states only has the property of supporting integration and nothing else. Remember how it is being used here. It is saying "If your model involves a state space that at least supports integration..."Auto-Didact said:If the only relevant property is that 'it supports integration', then you have removed all the physics and are left with just mathematics. 'It supports integration' is equally empty as the statement 'numbers are used in physics'.
So it constrains models where this (and four other assumptions) are true. It's not a proposal that nature involves only a set that involves integration and nothing else. The fact that you can prove theorems constraining such models shows it isn't as empty as "physics has numbers", to be honest that is just a kneejerk sneer at an entire field. Do you think if the framework was as useful as just saying "physics has numbers" that it would be accepted into major journals?
I think you are still treating the ontological models framework as an actual proposal for what nature is like, i.e. objecting to only looking at a state space that involves integration. Rather it is a presentation of general properties common to many models that attempt to move beyond QM and then demonstrating that from those properties alone one gets constraints.
i.e. Many models that attempt to replicate QM do have a state space that supports integration and that with four other properties is all you need to prove some theorems about them. Again all the actual models are richer and more physical than this, but some of their less pleasant to some properties follow from very general features like the integrability of the state space.
An analogue would be proving features of various metric theories of gravity. In such proofs you only state something like "the action possesses extrema", not because you're saying the action has that feature and nothing more, but because it's all you need to derive certain general features of such theories.
I don't understand your use of epistemic I have to say. You seem to use it to mean abstract, but I don't see how a manifold is epistemic. "Stripped of physical content" maybe, but I don't know of any major literature calling this epistemic.Auto-Didact said:it would transform the manifold into exactly an epistemological object
Well then coming back to where this originated, what makes it invalid as a definition of ##\psi##-ontic?Auto-Didact said:I'm not saying ##\mathcal{H}## shouldn't be involved