Whose book is online? Now this is indeed an intriguing possibility. I was being a bit derisive of them, they clearly aren't mere nonsense, but I would say that you yourself are making light of the statement that physics uses numbers; the fact that physics uses real numbers and complex numbers is quite profound in its own right, perhaps more so than the state space being measurable. My point is that no-go theorems which are about theories instead of about physical phenomena aren't actually theorems belonging to physics, but instead theorems belonging to logic, mathematics and philosophy; see e.g. Gleason's theorem for another such extra-physical theorem pretending to be physics proper. There is no precedent whatsoever within the practice of physics for such kind of theorems which is why it isn't clear at all that the statistical utility of such theorems for non-empirical theory selection is actually a valid methodology, and there is a good reason for that; how would the sensitivity and specificity w.r.t. the viability of theories be accounted for if the empirically discriminatory test is a non-empirical theorem? It is unclear whether such a non-empirical tool is epistemologically - i.e. scientifically - coherently capable of doing anything else except demonstrating consistency with unmodified QM/QFT. If this is all the theorems are capable of, sure they aren't useless, but they aren't nearly as interesting if QM is in fact in need of modification, just like all known theories in physics so far were also in need of modification. Physics is not mathematics, philosophy or logic; it is an empirical science, which means that all of this would have to be answered before advising or encouraging theorists to practically use such theorems in order to select the likelihood of a theory beyond QM in such a statistical manner. To put it bluntly, scientifically these theorems might just end up proving to be 'not even wrong'. I'll get back to this. If some necessary particular mathematical ingredients such as geometric or topological aspects are removed, physical content may be removed as well; what randomly ends up getting left may just turn out to be irrelevant fluff, physically speaking. Partially yes, especially given the lack of precedent for using theorems (which might belong more to mathematics or to philosophy instead of to physics) in such a non-empirical statistical selection procedure. There seems to be at least one link with BM, namely that Manasson's model seems to be fully consistent with Nelson's fully Bohmian program of stochastic electrodynamics.