.Scott said:
In order to be conscious of something, the information describing that something has to be in one state - not divided into discrete symbols. Classical information processing doesn't provide a mechanism for that.
Hi Scott, Just to clarify, when I said, "... there’s no reason to accept that local interactions are insufficient to produce all of the phenomena produced." I mean that classical mechanics (ie: local interactions which are separable as defined in philosophy of science)
between neurons is sufficient (to produce oscillations, etc...). I don't mean that classical mechanics is up to the task of explaining p-consciousness. Let's accept that neuron interactions don't utilize any of the special features of quantum mechanics and move on from there. I would disagree that's a dead end.
The argument that 'classical' information can't provide a mechanism for p-consciousness has been written about by a few authors. I think I'd listed a few earlier. Below are two more. There are others. Pythagorean has eluded to
field theories which attempt to introduce quantum mechanical interactions across the entire brain such as by Pocket and McFadden. However, there's a complicated line of logic that's needed to support the contention that classical mechanics can't provide a basis for p-consciousness and I don't see any papers that have provided that logic in a way that everyone can accept.
Note the two authors below would agree that there's no quantum mechanical interactions between neurons. Edwards suggests single cells are the fundamental units of consciousness without providing much in the way of a logical argument. Sevush jumps right to the conclusion and provides even less of an argument why than Edwards. I personally believe there's a great argument out there having to do with separability but there are as many other arguments that suggest otherwise.
The bottom line is that this forum isn't set up for and doesn't support philosophical discussions around this topic, primarily because people tend to 'shoot from the hip' with their own pet theories without referencing the published literature and without knowing much about what's already been written.
Edwards, J. C. (2005). Is consciousness only a property of individual cells?.
Journal of Consciousness Studies,
12(4-5), 4-5.
Sevush, S. (2006). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.
Journal of theoretical biology,
238(3), 704-725.