I Quantum Immortality without MWI?

[votingmachine]

No, they don't. The fact that results occur for all 6 pairs of settings does not mean all of those results were predetermined.

OK. I was seeing Tegmark's argument as requiring predetermined conditions and a deterministic path ... I see the difference now. It's an infinite number of multiverse's with every path taken for everything from each and every initial starting condition. I thought that each multiverse was being called determinist. All 6 of my parallel multiverses had indeteminate potential.

So there is no contradiction.

 

[PeterDonis]

The adoption of the idea where we do not need experimental evidence for these claims, I suggest, is allowing metaphysical wool to be pulled over our eyes.

As @Jarvis323 points out, this argument would apply to any interpretation of QM, not just the MWI. None of them are experimentally testable as compared with other interpretations, because they all make the same predictions for all experimental results (since they all use the same underlying mathematical machinery to make those predictions).

One of the reasons we spun off this subforum is to allow discussion of QM interpretations in spite of the above fact. We can't stop people from wanting to discuss the topic, but we also can't resolve discussions of it the way we can resolve discussions of things that are experimentally testable--i.e., the way we resolve disagreements in other forums here at PF.

So while your statement is true, it is (rather ironically) off topic in this particular subforum, because it's already understood that no claims that anyone makes about QM interpretations are experimentally testable.

Further, as I've already pointed out in this thread, discussion of the MWI is off topic because the thread is specifically supposed to be about what the possibilities are for quantum immortality without the MWI.

 

[onqm]

Yes, I know the concept. Boltzmann Brains are usually dismissed saying that if you were one, it would be more probable to don't observe a coherent world. Mallah makes a similar objection to QI: if it was true and you could be live indefinitely, since there are more "survival" observer moments, it would be more probable to you being experiencing one of these than one of the few "normal".

A doubt I have is if the important thing here is the number of observers or observer-moments, I mean, if there are 100 versions of you, 99 drinking water and 1 drinking coke, since the 99 observer are same observer-moment, what are the chances? 99-1 or 1-1?

Hello. I'm Jacques Mallah, and was invited to join this conversation. (I'm not sure which member here emailed me.)

The 'doubt' raised in the above quote is important to the topic. If the effective odds of drinking the water were 1-1 instead of 99-1, then all types of conscious observations (among those that do actually exist somewhere in the wavefunction) would have equal effective probability. Our observations would then be very atypical, for reasons that should be obvious (such as seeing a lot of regularities around us). So we can dismiss that and conclude that the observers that are more physically numerous (or in the MWI, have more amplitude) are in fact more "probable" and not equally "probable".

So by the same reasoning, observations within a lifespan than does not require rare events to continue would be more "probable" than those outside of that. Thus, FAPP, no immortality or unusual longevity.

 

[Physicuser]

Hello. I'm Jacques Mallah, and was invited to join this conversation. (I'm not sure which member here emailed me.)

The 'doubt' raised in the above quote is important to the topic. If the effective odds of drinking the water were 1-1 instead of 99-1, then all types of conscious observations (among those that do actually exist somewhere in the wavefunction) would have equal effective probability. Our observations would then be very atypical, for reasons that should be obvious (such as seeing a lot of regularities around us). So we can dismiss that and conclude that the observers that are more physically numerous (or in the MWI, have more amplitude) are in fact more "probable" and not equally "probable".

So by the same reasoning, observations within a lifespan than does not require rare events to continue would be more "probable" than those outside of that. Thus, FAPP, no immortality or unusual longevity.

Hello.
I misunderstood your paper, then, I thought you were arguing the opposite.

 

[onqm]

Physicsuser,

I would like my writings to be clear, so would appreciate it if you could explain what was not clear in there.

In the post I quoted, you correctly noted that I was making an objection to "QI", and that I was saying that if it were true than our actual observations would be of low "probability" as one argument against it. So I actually thought that you had understood what I was saying.

To be clear, in the language used in this thread, I argue that "identity of indiscernibles" (plus MWI or sufficiently many similar planets of the appropriate sort in a large universe) would have commonly observable consequences that already show it to be false with high Bayesian probability. The paper also includes other arguments against "QI".

 

[Anixx]

However, could this work even if MWI is not true?

I had a e-mail conversation with Max Tegmark on this issue. He agreed that not only MWI, but other interpretations also imply quantum immortality.

 

[Anixx]

all of those branches will have the same classical dynamics

Wrong. There are branches which are highly improbable.

 

[PeroK]

I had a e-mail conversation with Max Tegmark on this issue. He agreed that not only MWI, but other interpretations also imply quantum immortality.

I guess that's the case closed then.

 

[PeterDonis]

There are branches which are highly improbable.

Highly improbable in the sense of very finely tuned initial conditions, yes. But the dynamics from the initial conditions, whatever they are, is the same in every branch.

 

[PeterDonis]

I guess that's case closed then.

No, the fact that Tegmark makes the claim doesn't necessarily mean it's correct. I would like to see an actual paper laying out the argument.

 

[PeroK]

No, the fact that Tegmark makes the claim doesn't necessarily mean it's correct. I would like to see an actual paper laying out the argument.

If the man says he has an email, how can you argue with that?

 

[PeterDonis]

If the man says he has an email, how can you argue with that?

An email isn't a textbook or peer-reviewed paper.

 

[Anixx]

Highly improbable in the sense of very finely tuned initial conditions, yes. But the dynamics from the initial conditions, whatever they are, is the same in every branch.

No. There are branches with improbable dynamics as well. There are branches with all possible dynamics.

 

[Anixx]

If the man says he has an email, how can you argue with that?

Of course, he just expressed his opinion.

 

[PeterDonis]

There are branches with improbable dynamics as well.

Why? The laws of physics are the same in all the branches.

 

[Anixx]

Why? The laws of physics are the same in all the branches.

Not probabilistic laws though. A "weight" of a branch is proportional to its probability, but even for the least-probable outcomes there are branches.

 

[PeterDonis]

Not probabilistic laws though.

Please read the thread. These issues have already been discussed.

 

[akvadrako]

I had a e-mail conversation with Max Tegmark on this issue. He agreed that not only MWI, but other interpretations also imply quantum immortality.

This is not what he has said publically and without seeing his exact words it's hard to reconcile with his quotes on the wikipedia page, where he says QI is not real even given MWI.

But it doesn't matter much since neither is a rigorous argument but more of a casual opinion.