Satisfiability vs Elementary equivalence

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Elementary equivalence in logic means that two structures A and B satisfy the same sentences. If structure B satisfies the theory of A, it implies that A and B are elementary equivalent. The confusion arises in understanding how B satisfying a sentence s guarantees that A also satisfies s. The discussion highlights that while B may satisfy additional sentences, the relationship established by the theory ensures that any sentence in the theory is satisfied by both structures. Ultimately, elementary equivalence pertains specifically to first-order theories, as illustrated by the example of non-standard and standard reals.
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Hi, I have stumbled upon PF many times through Google, but this is my first time posting. Hopefully, someone will be able to help me out.

My question is about the concept of elementary equivalence in logic. According to my book, two structures A and B are elementary equivalent if: for every sentence s: A satisfies s if and only if B satisfies s. However, in my book it is also said that if B satisfies the theory of A, then A and B are elementary equivalent.

It is obvious that if this A satisfies s, then B also satisfies s (since s is in the theory of A). But I don't see how to get the other side of the "if and only if". If B satisfies s, I see no reason for s to be also satisfied by A. If B satisfies the theory of A, B could just as well satisfy other sentences too, right?
 
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If B satisfies s, then it doesn't satisfy -s, hence A doesn't satisfy -s, hence A satisfies s.
 
Just a small point: elementary equivalence refers to, in my experience,to the

first-order theory of a structure. So the non-standard reals are EE to the

standard reals, but Archimedean property is not satisfied in non-standard.
 
I'm taking a look at intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). Basically it exclude Double Negation Elimination (DNE) from the set of axiom schemas replacing it with Ex falso quodlibet: ⊥ → p for any proposition p (including both atomic and composite propositions). In IPL, for instance, the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) p ∨ ¬p is no longer a theorem. My question: aside from the logic formal perspective, is IPL supposed to model/address some specific "kind of world" ? Thanks.
I was reading a Bachelor thesis on Peano Arithmetic (PA). PA has the following axioms (not including the induction schema): $$\begin{align} & (A1) ~~~~ \forall x \neg (x + 1 = 0) \nonumber \\ & (A2) ~~~~ \forall xy (x + 1 =y + 1 \to x = y) \nonumber \\ & (A3) ~~~~ \forall x (x + 0 = x) \nonumber \\ & (A4) ~~~~ \forall xy (x + (y +1) = (x + y ) + 1) \nonumber \\ & (A5) ~~~~ \forall x (x \cdot 0 = 0) \nonumber \\ & (A6) ~~~~ \forall xy (x \cdot (y + 1) = (x \cdot y) + x) \nonumber...
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