- #1
nomadreid
Gold Member
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(Disclaimer: this is a mathematics question, not a social science question)
It is not clear to me, given Arrow's impossibility theorem, why the most common forms of cumulative voting -- range, rank, and approval voting -- are advantageous over choice voting systems, such as elimination run-offs till a majority is reached, or even plurality-wins. As I understand it, cumulative voting systems are supposed to reduce the probability of vote dispersal (similar candidates splitting the bloc vote), but I do not see why. I am looking at it from a strictly mathematical viewpoint, so any answer should not bring in extraneous social considerations. Thanks.
It is not clear to me, given Arrow's impossibility theorem, why the most common forms of cumulative voting -- range, rank, and approval voting -- are advantageous over choice voting systems, such as elimination run-offs till a majority is reached, or even plurality-wins. As I understand it, cumulative voting systems are supposed to reduce the probability of vote dispersal (similar candidates splitting the bloc vote), but I do not see why. I am looking at it from a strictly mathematical viewpoint, so any answer should not bring in extraneous social considerations. Thanks.