tommyli said:
Imagine you have a collision between two identical spinless particles. Initially they are non-interacting, and their momenta are different. By measurement of their momentum it is possible to distinguish the two particles.
No, it is never possible to distinguish the particles, they are not distinguishable. However, you can distinguish the momenta of the particles.
What this all boils down to is that when particles don't interact in any way, and have wavefunctions that don't interfere or overlap, then we can get away with imagining that the particles are distinguishable, even though they never are. It doesn't matter, in that case, if they are distinguishable or not, so we replace the indistinguishable particles with distinguishable ones and carry on with our analysis, simply because it simplifies the analysis, and we know we'll get the right answer-- to within whatever small error we make in assuming the particles don't overlap or interact.
Note that in the asymptotic state the wavefunctions are not entangled, they are two separate wavepackets localized in different regions of space.
The wavefunctions are always entangled, there is never two separate wavefunctions for two indistinguishable particles. However, we always treat it as though there were, because it simplifies our lives, and we know we can get away with it. This practice does cause a lot of confusion though, when we forget to mention we are doing it.
After the collision, you perform a measurement of momenta of the two particles, but how do you know which one is which? If the wavefunctions are always separable, it would be possible, but in the interacting region, their wavefunctions are completely entangled since there is no 'trajectory' to follow it is impossible match the final particle to the initial particle.
What you really mean here is that if they collide, we might no longer be able to get away with imagining they are indistinguishable. But even if they don't collide, they are still never distinguishable. It would be pure philosophy to assert that they "keep their same momentum", formal quantum mechanics does not make any such claim expressly because the particles are not distinguishable.
Let me ask you a question. Imagine you have a collision between two particles with opposite spin. If the interaction conserves spin, then it IS possible to distinguish the two particles by measurement of the spin.. you simply collapse the wavefunction to a product of two spin states and since spin remains constant you can match the final particle to the initial particle.
Again that is just a picture that you are choosing to adopt because in many situations it will not lead you to a wrong answer, and is a whole lot simpler. But it isn't a true picture in the axioms of quantum mechanics-- the particles are not distinguishable, and so you can only make statements about the spins you will observe, you can never make statements about which particle you will observe because you cannot empirically demonstrate which particle you observed to be able to check your statement. Formal quantum mechanics is careful not to assert any truths that cannot be checked experimentally, such as which particle had which spin, and even though this often doesn't matter, when it does, it is a good thing that quantum mechanics is built like that. You only measure spins, not "which particle" had it, and formal quantum mechanics is built to respect that fact.
To see this, just write the wave function of two electrons in a triplet state, versus two electrons in a singlet state. Are they not different wave functions, even if nothing is happening that can flip the spin of an electron?
In this sense you have a collision between two NON-IDENTICAL species of particle (spin-up/spin-down). This the same whether the quantum number is spin, weak isospin, electric charge, hypercharge, etc, etc. As long as the interaction does not couple the additional degree of freedom, particles with different quantum numbers are distinguishable.
This brings in a subtle but important issue, which is how we label particles (not how we distinguish them). For example, if we do a two-slit expriment on identically prepared laser photons, we get an interference pattern on the wall. Does this mean we cannot distinguish the photons? Of course we can distinguish the photons, we can distinguish them by where they hit the wall. So we could give all the photons that hit a certain point on the wall a label, after the fact, based on where they hit, and distinguish them that way. But the prediction of where they go requires they be yet undistinguished during the process, the distinguishing happened after the fact.
Now imagine placing polarizers in the slits, at right angles to each other. Now you do not get the interference pattern, and you can also distinguish the photons by their polarization. Does that mean the photons are suddenly not indistinguishable particles, because we can use our apparatus to distinguish them? No, we used our apparatus to distinguish them before, without the polarizers, but the distinguishing happened after the fact, just as with the polarizers. It is not fundamentally different to include polarizers (or an apparatus that can detect isospin, or hypercharge, etc.), those all constitute distinguishing the particles after the fact.
What makes this subtle is that in many situations, you get the same answer if you imagine the particles are distinguishable. When this is commonplace, like with isospin (and we say we can distinguish protons from neutrons, etc.), imagining the particles are distinguishable becomes so automatic that we really completely forget we are strictly applying the same after-the-fact distinguishing we would apply to laser photons in a two-slit apparatus. When the difference becomes moot, we always imagine we can distinguish the particles, even when we actually cannot (we can only distinguish the measurement outcomes, like isospin). This is an especially acute issue when the very label of the particle itself, like proton or neutron, is applied after the fact via that measurement outcome. Surely protons and neutrons are distinguishable particles, they have different labels! But they are not really distinguishable before the fact (during the process, like propagation in a beam), only after the fact of measuring their isospins. We just never need to confront this formal truth of quantum mechanics unless we have to worry about something like neutrons decaying into protons during our experiment! When we do have to worry about that is when we discover that neutrons and protons are not actually distinguishable-- because a neutron that decays into a proton can interfere with the protons already in some beam of both, in a way that requires we cannot distinguish which neutrons decayed into which protons. Thue the neutrons never had a separate identity, or they wouldn't be able to lose it.
E.g. an electron can become a neutrino by emitting a W boson, but if the charge of the electron cannot change in the experiment then electron and neutrino are distinguishable.
Yet what about terms which involve loops with virtual particles? Can the electron not be a neutrino for a short while in that loop diagram? And while it is a neutrino, is it distinguishable from other neutrinos? The formal quantum mechanics says that electrons and neutrinos are not actually different things and are not distinguishable, but the outcomes of measurements are distinguishable, so electrons and neutrinos are distinguishable after the fact of a measurement, just like photons in a two-slit pattern. But the situations you are describing are situations where we can get away with ignoring these formal aspects, and instead treat the particles in the sensible way, imagining that the particles themselves are distinguishable, instead of just the outcomes of the measurements on them. We will always incur some kind of error when doing that, but oftentimes the error is so tiny that it is well worth the simplification of
imagining the particles are distinguishable throughout the process we are modeling. It's not that they are in some sense "really" distinguishable, it is that we are choosing to treat them that way, invoking the standard tradeoffs we always invoke whenever making such choices.