Why Explore the Bohmian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics?

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The Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics is primarily motivated by the desire for an objective physical reality that exists independently of measurements, rather than by determinism. The structure of the Schrödinger equation suggests that a deterministic framework aligns naturally with classical mechanics, making determinism a secondary benefit. Critics argue that reality is defined by interactions and observations, questioning the validity of a reality that exists without interaction. The discussion highlights the philosophical complexities of quantum theory, emphasizing that while some seek a definitive explanation of reality, others believe that uncertainty in understanding may indicate a theory's robustness. Overall, the Bohmian interpretation remains a topic of debate, balancing philosophical implications with scientific inquiry.
  • #31
The status of speed of light beeing the upper bound of information propagation is indeed a postulate in Einsteins theories, however my ambition is that the new approaches will/should explain this.

I don't have any proof yet, but a relational information theoretic approach will (IMHO) probably render an upper bound of information transfer as a kind of statistical result. In that case it's also expected that at the Planck scales lorentz invariance breaks down. The intuitive reason for why this can possibly be so is that if dynamics is considered to be a stochastic evolution, then time is simply an internal parametrization of changes and the upper bound follows from information geometry. And this bound is statistical in nature, and thus can be violated at a certain non-zero probability, and the Planck domain probably frequently, effectively breaking down the spacetime structure.

/Fredrik
 
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  • #32
Fra said:
Of course I couldn't care less than to discuss the meaning of the word "scientific" but I take it you mean that there is no benefit in researching stochastic approaches?

No.

I would not draw this conclusion. Thermodynamics is basically a theory partly based on stochastic processes. Is that not scientific?

You misunderstood my position. What I'm saying is that:

1. QM is a very good statistical theory.
2. Being statistical, it fails to predict exactly some experimental results, like the point on the screen where a particle would be detected.
3. It is the duty of science to look for a theory that can account for the above experimental results. Bohmian interpretation might or might not provide a framework for developing such a theory.

Some deny 3. saying that there is no need to assume a cause behind those experimental results. Such view is, IMO, unscientific.

In conclusion, it is good science to work on the theory of thermodynamics. It is not good science to posit that there is no cause behind the motion of a molecule in a gas and there is no reason to look for such a cause because thermodynamics makes good predictions.

In the case of QM, many arguments are put forward to elevate such nonsense to the status of good science (Heisenberg uncertainty, EPR experiments, delayed choice experiments etc.). It is the merit of Bohm to clearly show their failure.
 
  • #33
ueit said:
No.



You misunderstood my position. What I'm saying is that:

1. QM is a very good statistical theory.
2. Being statistical, it fails to predict exactly some experimental results, like the point on the screen where a particle would be detected.
3. It is the duty of science to look for a theory that can account for the above experimental results. Bohmian interpretation might or might not provide a framework for developing such a theory.

Some deny 3. saying that there is no need to assume a cause behind those experimental results. Such view is, IMO, unscientific.

In conclusion, it is good science to work on the theory of thermodynamics. It is not good science to posit that there is no cause behind the motion of a molecule in a gas and there is no reason to look for such a cause because thermodynamics makes good predictions.

In the case of QM, many arguments are put forward to elevate such nonsense to the status of good science (Heisenberg uncertainty, EPR experiments, delayed choice experiments etc.). It is the merit of Bohm to clearly show their failure.

Some points.

I.) A "statistical description" i.e. a probabilistic language is better, not worse than the alternative. We can still indicate certain knowledge of an outcome e.g. [X will occur with 100% probability, Y will occur with 0% probability.] But we can also express those intermediate degrees of knowledge in between. Thus utilizing a statistical language is an expansion of possible physical statements about what we may know about nature rather than a limit.

II.) Science has no duty per se. Science is an epistemological discipline (that of belief based on repeatable empirical test) and it is the duty of the scientist qua scientist to abide by that discipline. The canard about the Moon ceasing to exist when not observed is a total misconception of this principle. The statement about the non-reality of the moon is just as invalid as the statement of its existence. Baring an empirically verified means of prediction the duty-bound scientist would simply state his ignorance of the moon's state of existence between observations.

With this in mind the duty-bound scientist should formulate theories in an operational language and avoid expressing opinions about what cannot be observed. This can be most difficult when those opinions are implicitly integrated into the formal language he uses. One such case is the use of the language of classical states when the effect of observing said states is an open question. (Another is the use of implicit absolute time in discussing relativistic phenomena such as traveling twins.)

II.a) Point (I.) then brings up the question as to whether an accurate physical theory, expressed within a probabilistic language, is possible in which all statements about the empirical behavior of a system can be simultaneously predicted with probabilities of the 100% vs 0% variety. Call this classical determinism or classical completeness. It comes to the same thing when one is attempting to extrapolate future phenomena from past experience (the main purpose of science).

If so then Bell's inequality cannot possibly be violated. Bell's inequality begins by asserting that a physical system has a physical state representable by the selection of one point in a set of possible states. Then all true probabilistic statements about the system must form an additive measure on the set of states. This because each outcome results from the measurement applied to the system in some specific state and hence the probability of that outcome is fixed and must add to the probabilities of that outcome given alternative states.

Since empirically we have observed Bell inequality violation then Classical determinism is disproved and QM is still a viable theory. It is not per se a question of locality. Note that by allowing FTL causal effect in QM you also allow future-to-past effects (assuming Einstein's theory is close to correct) which in turn allows any past observation to be changed in the future. You loose classical determinism anyway and also loose any sense of reality as it is.

III.) Quantum mechanics is causally deterministic: When you ask the question: Can any specific outcome be positively determined? The answer is yes in QM. Set up a specific observable and there is a prior measurement which will tell you with certainty which value will be observed. Even in classical mechanics one implicitly assumes a prior measurement must be made before one can know with certainty the outcome of a later observation. This is true for any choice of outcome provided one understands that the choice of prior measurement must depend on the choice of outcome to be predicted. However QM does not assume that intermediate measurements fail to invalidate this predictability e.g. QM recognizes that observation = interaction.

IV.) It is the concept of the classical "state of the system" which implicitly assumes that all possible measurements may be made simultaneously. Quantum Mechanics relaxes this a priori assumption and allows that the non-commutativity of observables be determined empirically instead of dictated by "religious tradition". One must at the same time reject the concept of state based reality as a non-contingent absolute. Our construction of an ontological reality is that of building a model in our heads wherein phenomena there correspond to empirical phenomena. In transcending the classical description we must put aside the use of ontological models and stick to a wholly phenomenological language of observables and events. This is as hard and counter-intuitive as letting go of absolute time in Special Relativity, if not more difficult. But it is necessary to understanding QM whether you agree with it or not.

V.) The indeterminism of quantum mechanics comes from the logical incompatibility of the sequences of assertions in the relevant experiment.
E.g. that a photon is polarized vertically is logically incompatible with it being left-hand circular polarized. One is not quite asserting both A and Not A but one is making two positive assertions which cannot both be absolutely true.
It is the richer language of QM which provides for more possible inconsistent pairs of assertions than simply "A and not A".

It is the very deterministic nature of quantum mechanics which equates (e.g. for a free photon) that an earlier plane polarization measurement is equivalent to a later one and thus an earlier assertion about plane of polarization is incompatible with a deterministic assertion about a later circular polarization measurement. The only way to reconcile the incompatibility in what we assert must happen with what we may observe in some cases, is to expand our logical language to include probabilities.

One is in QM able to make sets of assertions which are partially incompatible and thus the answers are partially unpredictable. We can nonetheless say more using QM, namely,
* Which observations separated over time are compatible,
and also
* How close two observations are to being compatible in the form of the correlation probabilities.

Regards,
James Baugh
 
  • #34
I think I see what you take issue with.

Thermodynamics was just an example of the success of basic ideas of containing probabilistic reasoning and optimal inference. So from now on I'm not talking about thermodynamics.

ueit said:
In conclusion, it is good science to work on the theory of thermodynamics. It is not good science to posit that there is no cause behind the motion of a molecule in a gas and there is no reason to look for such a cause because thermodynamics makes good predictions.

I think you are referring to a conflict that IMO doesn't exist.

The fact that there are known relations (for example statistical relations) to a certain confidence, does not in the general case exclude the possibility that there exist other relations at some other confidence or scale of observation. I don't think anyone suggested so either. So I think we can agree on that point. Also relations are not static, they evolve.

For example, thermodynamics does of course not say that there is no cause behind the motion of molecules.

Also a false inference would be that, because today we have a complete theory that within all our confidence levels perfectly describes all of nature suggest that there exists no further structures tomorrow. This is of course not so IMO.

ueit said:
In the case of QM, many arguments are put forward to elevate such nonsense to the status of good science (Heisenberg uncertainty, EPR experiments, delayed choice experiments etc.). It is the merit of Bohm to clearly show their failure.

There are several kinds of uncertainties, some can be said to be due to logical entanglements. Some states of data are simply logically incompatible.

The uncertainty between momentum and position is a logical one. If you ask yourself the questions, what is position and what is momentum at a deeper level, you might find that they are relations in different eventspaces, and there exists a connection between them. Stating a probability distribution in one space, induces a prior chance in the connected space as well. The HUP can IMO best be interpreted as a kind of logical entanglement in informationspaces. There are som fuzzy points to get there though, involving spacetime.

Other things has to do with resolution of data. No object has infinite storage capacity and thus this renders several implications on things. The information is updated all the time, but since objects can't just store it all, it has to update it's state as per some logic.

Simple starting out in a setting where we can have complete information (infinite storage capacity) and that we never have to handle conflicting information, both in dynamics and prior information states is completely unrealistic IMO and idealises away several fundamental blocks of reality.

/Fredrik
 
  • #35
In addition to the comments out there. I can add one point of critics to ordinary QM.

I do not find it realistic that the complete even space is mapped out at the outset of any interactions, and that then time is basically a unitary evolution. That just doesn't make sense to me. It would require complete/"infinite" experience, and complete/"infinite" storage capacity. And I think that is not satisfied by any observer in the universe.

The problem is that this doesn't allow a true event space expansions from first principles, unless you sort of manually put in the concept of the family of possible event space expansions from start, but that's cheating. This is a logical or philosophical problem that are somtimes put forward by those who doesn't like the probabilistic approach, and I share this, but I think there is a solution.

To speak again for my own personal views, what I look for is a new relational information theoretic approach and even the event spaces themselves are dynamical. The dice we play with is evolving as well. The reason for this is that I see not logically consistent way to define a univeral observer invariant dice during realistic conditions. The "dice" is as much part of the dynamical evolution as anything else, leaving it complex, but I see great hope.

/Fredrik
 
  • #36
Then the principles of optimal inference implies that our "dice" is autoadjusting so that while our dice keeps changing, we always have an optimum dice. And optimum here is defined relative to priors and information storage etc. "Human dices" are simply ungraspable for subatomic particles, but they might be said ot have their own dices.

So we make progress with absolute minimal assumptions. The dice notation is just to symbolise that we construct a dice out of the uncertainty and say that at some point we have a range of options and we have no reason to buy one over the other, that defines and forms our dice.

/Fredrik
 
  • #37
There was some confusion about the concept "objective physical reality". Perhaps "classical reality" gives a better intuitive idea of what this terminology was after for? To me complex amplitudes of standard QM and measurements processes themselves could as well be objective physical reality, so it wasn't really my point to try to say that we shouldn't know about reality. Instead my point was, that we should be ready to accept the fact that reality can be confusing (temporarily at least).

Talking about scientifical way, demanding that the nature is of a some specific kind doesn't seem very scientifical either.
 
  • #38
Hmm... I would like to say what I suspect is a common misconception about "probabilistic techniques". To state a probability distribution, is not by far the same thing as to say that there can never be found further mechanisms. This need not be so.

Like jambaugh also touched, instead I think the proper way to think of these approaches, is as higher order extension to basic boolean(true/dalse) logic, bayesian logic, where the support for each statement is quantified. This allows for development of a scientific theory of "revision updates". Where the update is made on basis of current support with minimal ad hoc guesswork included. Data will guide us.

But current QM doesn't explore this full beauty. It has some old classical probability basis that deserves critics. I of course suspect we will see how this change as a consistent QG gravity is developed :wink:

Unlike those people who are more guided by "mathematical beauty" alone, I consider myself pretty philosophically inclined person and I put high emphasis on logical and philosophical consistency of theories and I have come to conclude for myself that this is the best way. I claim that these relational information models are not just "mathematical theories", they are rather IMO more deeply satisfactory on the philosophical level as well and far less speculative, and no ad hoc approach - thus IMO rendering it very scientific. Some of the weirdness is in fact not that weird after all. It's only weird if you try to understand it with a old style realistic mindset.

/Fredrik
 
  • #39
reilly said:
In the past 50 years, Bohm's approach has led to no progress in physics, while the conventional QM approach has led to extraordinary progress in atomic, nuclear, solid state, and particle physics. (Most if not all of this progress involves what might be called a modified Copenhagen interpretation, which boils down to Born's idea that the square of the wave function is a probability density. None involves Bohm's interpretation.)
This is like saying that the undeniable progress in applied nuclear physics, which does not involve the hypothesis that protons and neutrons consist of quarks, while no applied science so far involved quarks, implies that the theory of quarks is a waste of time.
Nobody denies the phenomenological success of the conventional QM. Nevertheless, the Bohmian interpretation is compatible with it. The main goal of the Bohmian interpretation is not to provide an alternative to the conventional QM, but to understand the origin of QM at a deeper, more fundamental level. Just like the main goal of the theory of quarks is not to provide an alternative to conventional nuclear physics, but to understand the origin of nuclear physics at a deeper, more fundamental level.
Even if one day we find evidence that the Bohmian interpretation is correct, one does not expect that it will influence the practical phenomenological use of QM in conventional branches of physics such as atomic, nuclear, and solid state physics. Just as now existing evidence that quarks do exist did not influence the conventional nuclear physics.
 
  • #40
DrChinese said:
And in all fairness to QM, I think that Bohmians should own up to a simple admission of their own: if there are non-local interactions, why is it that c is so fundamental in the propagation of information and all other cause/effect relationships? This has not been "unambiguously" answered (except maybe in their own minds) ...
That is true. The Bohmian interpretation has not unambiguously answered this question. However, the conventional interpretation has not unambiguously answered some other fundamental questions, which the Bohmian interpretation has. An example closely related to your question above is:
If physics is local, why is it that wave function is a nonlocal object that cannot be replaced by a local one?

Both interpretations have some advantages and some disadvantages.
 
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  • #41
Demystifier said:
That is true. The Bohmian interpretation has not unambiguously answered this question. However, the conventional interpretation has not unambiguously answered some other fundamental questions, which the Bohmian interpretation has. Both interpretations have some advantages and some disadvantages.

I think this is very accurate. I don't think we'd have these "feisty" discussions if one of the interpretations answered everything. Each gives us a somewhat uncomformtable piece of baggage to deal with.

Yet we all appreciate the underlying science, regardless of the correct interpretation.
 
  • #42
Some points.

I.) A "statistical description" i.e. a probabilistic language is better, not worse than the alternative. We can still indicate certain knowledge of an outcome e.g. [X will occur with 100% probability, Y will occur with 0% probability.] But we can also express those intermediate degrees of knowledge in between. Thus utilizing a statistical language is an expansion of possible physical statements about what we may know about nature rather than a limit.

OK.

II.) Science has no duty per se.

Sure, I meant something like “in the sphere of science” as opposed to “in the sphere of philosophy”. I’ve seen quite often the argument that asking for a reason why a certain particle was detected in a certain place is not a scientific question, but a philosophical one.

Science is an epistemological discipline (that of belief based on repeatable empirical test) and it is the duty of the scientist qua scientist to abide by that discipline. The canard about the Moon ceasing to exist when not observed is a total misconception of this principle. The statement about the non-reality of the moon is just as invalid as the statement of its existence. Baring an empirically verified means of prediction the duty-bound scientist would simply state his ignorance of the moon's state of existence between observations.

With this in mind the duty-bound scientist should formulate theories in an operational language and avoid expressing opinions about what cannot be observed. This can be most difficult when those opinions are implicitly integrated into the formal language he uses. One such case is the use of the language of classical states when the effect of observing said states is an open question. (Another is the use of implicit absolute time in discussing relativistic phenomena such as traveling twins.)

OK.

II.a) Point (I.) then brings up the question as to whether an accurate physical theory, expressed within a probabilistic language, is possible in which all statements about the empirical behavior of a system can be simultaneously predicted with probabilities of the 100% vs 0% variety. Call this classical determinism or classical completeness. It comes to the same thing when one is attempting to extrapolate future phenomena from past experience (the main purpose of science).

OK

If so then Bell's inequality cannot possibly be violated.

False.

Bell's inequality begins by asserting that a physical system has a physical state representable by the selection of one point in a set of possible states.

Since empirically we have observed Bell inequality violation then Classical determinism is disproved and QM is still a viable theory.

It also begins by asserting that the particle source and the two detectors must be independent of each other. A theory in which the spin of the entangled particles is a function of detector’s state could violate Bell’s inequality while still not denying classical determinism.

It is not per se a question of locality.

I agree. Any mechanism that denies the assumption of statistical independence between the experimental parts of an EPR experiment could violate Bell. The mechanism can be either local (the source extrapolates future detectors’ state from their past state arrived at the speed of light) or non-local (function collapse).

Note that by allowing FTL causal effect in QM you also allow future-to-past effects (assuming Einstein's theory is close to correct) which in turn allows any past observation to be changed in the future. You loose classical determinism anyway and also loose any sense of reality as it is.

I’m not so sure about this. I think it is possible to simulate relativity on an absolute frame of reference and still retain classical determinism. However, I think that the non-locality of QM is rather an illusion produced by an underlying local mechanism, somehow similar with the non-local gravity of Newton being based on the local GR mechanism.

III.) Quantum mechanics is causally deterministic: When you ask the question: Can any specific outcome be positively determined? The answer is yes in QM. Set up a specific observable and there is a prior measurement which will tell you with certainty which value will be observed. Even in classical mechanics one implicitly assumes a prior measurement must be made before one can know with certainty the outcome of a later observation. This is true for any choice of outcome provided one understands that the choice of prior measurement must depend on the choice of outcome to be predicted. However QM does not assume that intermediate measurements fail to invalidate this predictability e.g. QM recognizes that observation = interaction.

I agree.

IV.) It is the concept of the classical "state of the system" which implicitly assumes that all possible measurements may be made simultaneously. Quantum Mechanics relaxes this a priori assumption and allows that the non-commutativity of observables be determined empirically instead of dictated by "religious tradition".

Yes, but this is because QM works with statistical entities that may not exist per se. In thermodynamics we also see such concepts like temperature, pressure specific heat and so on.

One must at the same time reject the concept of state based reality as a non-contingent absolute. Our construction of an ontological reality is that of building a model in our heads wherein phenomena there correspond to empirical phenomena. In transcending the classical description we must put aside the use of ontological models and stick to a wholly phenomenological language of observables and events.

I strongly disagree. “Putting aside the use of ontological models” does not allow one to get pass statistics and relate experimental observations (the spot produced by an electron on a screen) with the prior state without appealing to chance. “it just happens” is not science.

This is as hard and counter-intuitive as letting go of absolute time in Special Relativity, if not more difficult. But it is necessary to understanding QM whether you agree with it or not.

I disagree that such a sacrifice is necessary. See above.


V.) The indeterminism of quantum mechanics comes from the logical incompatibility of the sequences of assertions in the relevant experiment.
E.g. that a photon is polarized vertically is logically incompatible with it being left-hand circular polarized.

It is not necessary to see a logical incompatibility here. It depends on how one understands spin. In BM, for example, spin is not in intrinsic property of a particle. The indeterminism is probably related with incomplete knowledge of the state.

It is the very deterministic nature of quantum mechanics which equates (e.g. for a free photon) that an earlier plane polarization measurement is equivalent to a later one and thus an earlier assertion about plane of polarization is incompatible with a deterministic assertion about a later circular polarization measurement. The only way to reconcile the incompatibility in what we assert must happen with what we may observe in some cases, is to expand our logical language to include probabilities.

I think that logic works just fine as it is.

Regards,
Andrei Bocan
 
  • #43
ueit said:
OK.
It also begins by asserting that the particle source and the two detectors must be independent of each other. A theory in which the spin of the entangled particles is a function of detector’s state could violate Bell’s inequality while still not denying classical determinism.

I hope you didn't mean "theory" but rather circumstance. If such dependence is necessary "in theory" for all such cases then you again violate classical determinism. The initial preparation of the detectors is forced to depend causally on the later interaction of the particles with the detector. They thus cannot be considered to have been in an "initial state".

Once you assert than you can establish the independence of the source and detectors then any Bell inequality violation in this circumstance denies classical determinism. This is the experiment which has been performed.

If you construct a combined state manifold for all the equipment involved then you again get Bell's inequality on any distributions of outcomes. Classical determinism dictates that probabilities of outcomes form measures on the state manifold of the large system in question. Bell's inequality is just a convoluted way to say that the probabilities form a measure on sets of states. Given a measure you have a metric on set differences and this satisfies the triangle inequality aka Bell's inequality.
 
  • #44
ueit said:
OK.
I strongly disagree. “Putting aside the use of ontological models” does not allow one to get pass statistics and relate experimental observations (the spot produced by an electron on a screen) with the prior state without appealing to chance. “it just happens” is not science.

Not "it just happens" but "if this happens" then "that is likely to happen with probability p". That is all science can ever say and it doesn't need an ontological model to say it. It does take models to say it succinctly but those models need not be fundamentally ontological. We can use nouns to describe electrons as long as we understand that at the foundational level:
"and electron is a process of quantized charge and mass transport" or some other phenomenological description.

What's more ontological models are the most natural conceptually, we evolved using them. In doing chemistry we don't need to get into philosophical debates about the "reality of the proton" it is contingently real and objective. This contingency is on our staying in the domain of chemistry.

Where I see the issue as important is in the attempts to build a fundamental theory of everything by starting with an ontological construct e.g. strings. One should begin elsewhere... out of time... more later.
Regards,
JB
 
  • #45
ueit said:
OK.
I think that logic works just fine as it is.
But one must be careful not to commit category errors and confuse the logic of statements about a physical system (which presupposes an act of measurement) and logical statements about what we know about a system (e.g. statements about what measurements have been or will be made.)

We can assert that we have both determined the z-component of spin of an electron and (later) determined the z'-component of spin. This is a statement about what we have done in a lab. But the statements about an electron; that the z component is +1/2 and that the z'-component is +1/2, are incompatible (in QM) as both cannot be asserted simultaneously (said simultaneity implicit in the objective language).

This incompatibility is apparent at the previously used higher level of abstraction. In a physical theory it is implied by a statement about the system that the determination of that statement has also been made, (or at list can be made). Since both determinations cannot be made simultaneously or in such a way that each doesn't preclude the other then the two statements themselves are incompatible since the meta-statement that both statements have been tested is "anti-tautological" or always false.

The logic is fine when used correctly. But for example parsing the EPR experiment without playing close attention to the levels of abstraction and the use of counterfactual assumptions leads one to headaches and insanity.

The specific confusion in this case is the improper identification of the two statements:
"We can predetermine the outcome of any measurement of one half of an EPR pair" (by making the corresponding measurement of the other half)
with
"We can predetermine the outcome of every measurement of one half of an EPR pair".

Once you choose to make one such measurement then any assumption which is inconsistent with having made that choice, is either meaningless or must presuppose we have jumped into a different instance of the system and thereby making the original assumption invalid.

Regards,
J. Baugh
 
  • #46
jambaugh said:
I hope you didn't mean "theory" but rather circumstance. If such dependence is necessary "in theory" for all such cases then you again violate classical determinism. The initial preparation of the detectors is forced to depend causally on the later interaction of the particles with the detector. They thus cannot be considered to have been in an "initial state".

By "theory" I mean a hypothetical local hidden variable theory of the type you claim it has been proven impossible to exist.

I claim that it is possible that the source (a calcium atom in a PDC) generates a pair of entangled photons with the spin being a function of the future detector orientation, which is extrapolated from the data available at the present moment (this is possible in principle if the detectors are deterministic systems)

Let me give you an example. If NASA wants to launch a ship to Mars it will not launch towards the present position of Mars but towards its extrapolated position at the time the ship is expected to arrive there. In this case would you say that this space mission violates classical determinism because "the initial preparation" of the rocket "depends causally on the later" encounter with the planet?

Once you assert than you can establish the independence of the source and detectors then any Bell inequality violation in this circumstance denies classical determinism.

I wouldn't assert such a thing in a fully deterministic system. It is an assumption that may or may not be true. I tend to think it is not true.

This is the experiment which has been performed.

I disagree.
 
  • #47
So far, we have been discussing arguments for the Bohm deterministic interpretation within the nonrelativistic QM. These can be viewed as traditional arguments. However, in the case of relativistic QM, there is an even stronger reason to introduce a deterministic interpretation. This is because the conventional probabilistic interpretation in the case relativistic QM is simply inconsistent. See e.g. Secs. 7. and 8. of
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0609163
as well as
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0307179
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0406173
For a "non-philosophical" formal derivation of the field/string Bohmian equation of motion from the requirement of relativistic covariance see also
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0407228
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0601027
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0512186
 
  • #48
It is interesting that, whenever I use a non-philosophical argument supporting the Bohmian interpretation as in my last post above, the opponents of the Bohmian interpretation suddenly get silent.
 
  • #49
Perhaps not everyone knows all the math, but i also think it takes more effort to read x number of papers and then response in detail :)

That's why I didn't read and reply.

Actually parts of the bohmian formalism, and deal with amplitude and phase separately has appealed to me as well. I fiddled with that some time ago. I am reevaluating the formalism myself, and I am not sure that the final ultuimate formalism will be the complex amplitude approach. Maybe there are others that have merits.

The complex phase i actually interesting, although I may not like the bohmian notion and his philosophy. For the same reason I choose not to spend very much time analysing alternatives, givne limited time. but of course if the predictions are the same, it no more right or wrong than anything else. But I tihnk for bohmian notion to get more attention the approache needs to take things further and solve things the ortodox approach doesn't.

I've realized the same thing for myself, I'm not going to convince anyone with fuzzy arguments, the remaining choice is to try and work out a proof that solves problems not yet solved. That alone takes a decent amount of time.

/Fredrik
 
  • #50
In my humble opinion, Fra, you are ascribing reality to mathematical ideas. There's no complex phase, no wave function, no phase space. They do not have any objective reality so analysing them in detail will take you further from reality, not closer.
 
  • #51
Fra said:
But I tihnk for bohmian notion to get more attention the approache needs to take things further and solve things the ortodox approach doesn't.
This is exactly what in
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0406173
is done.
 
  • #52
Hmmm... I wonder about these philosophical discussions, I suspect nonone gets any wiser at any side LOL :bugeye: Mentz I don't follow your conclusion. "Objective reality" is barley in my dictionary. I am not a bohmist, and not even close, but I was showing some sympathy to Demystifier for the lack of feedback. OTOH, You're certainly free to make your customer interpretations of my statements :) but your feedback on my feedback sort of doesn't add up in my head :)

/Fredrik
 
  • #53
Fra, re-reading your post #49, I admit my response was off-target. As you say, you're not guilty of ascribing 'object reality' to anything.
 
  • #54
Mentz114 said:
In my humble opinion, Fra, you are ascribing reality to mathematical ideas. There's no complex phase, no wave function, no phase space. They do not have any objective reality so analysing them in detail will take you further from reality, not closer.

I can't be sure, but I think I might beg to differ with this :rolleyes:

So much of observable QM phenomona can only be understood in mathematical terms, i.e. wave-particle duality, that I'm on the way to believing that the reality might be the mathematics (which mathematics is debatable).

This doesn't preclude an objective reality, though, just one that has a function oriented substructure.
 
  • #55
So much of observable QM phenomona can only be understood in mathematical terms, i.e. wave-particle duality, that I'm on the way to believing that the reality might be the mathematics (which mathematics is debatable).
I'm sure you'll never fall into that trap. Look what happens to forces when we go from Newtonian dynamics to GR. GR is a fine theory which makes many correct predictions, but it is not a complete description of reality.. ditto QM.

Maybe when/if there is a complete theory, the mathematics will be the reality. Than again, maybe pigs can fly.
 
  • #56
Demystifier said:
This is exactly what in
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0406173
is done.

I agree that some of QM contains a lot of logical issues that is ignored and motivated by "it still works", and I do not believe the fundamental formulation of QM ends with plugging the p -> -i\hbar\frac{\partial}{\partial q} into the equations of classical mechanics.

Are there some bohmian programs to grand unification? I think that's what we need.

I've dropped the semiclassical manipulations for myself, and I decided to start from scratch.

I think we need a mechanism that links the apparent non-unitary evolution as a dynamic driver of expansion/modification of configuration space. Static event spaces is too restrictive. Also assuming a crapload of unobservable dimensions that we need to hide when not needed is also very ad hoc and also unnecessarily complex. I think the solution is that the missing part is a dynamics of hte eventspaces themselves.

Non-unitary observations doesn't mean the world collapses, rather in any general learning model non-unitary behaviour is natural. The question is, what is the dynamic model response to non-unitary evidence? I think zero probability does not mean it will never happen, it means it never _happened_. But what about when it happens for the first time? I expect a model that can handle that and let data take charge. I am not suggesting a model that allows everything arbitrary, but I an suggesting a model that should be very careful to forbid things. It should however provide probabilities for things, but the probabilities are only inferences based on a relative, and in practice always incomplete data.

/Fredrik
 
  • #57
Fra said:
Are there some bohmian programs to grand unification?
Not really. Although, some results indicate that consistency of the Bohmian interpretation with particle creation and destruction requires particles to be extended objects, that is - strings. Other independent results indicate that if we assume strings, then Bohmian mechanics emerges rather naturally, more naturally than in the case of pointlike particles.
 
Last edited:
  • #58
Demystifier said:
Not really. Although, some results indicate that consistency of the Bohmian interpretation with particle creation and destruction requires particles to be extended objects, that is - strings. Other independent results indicate that if we assume strings, then Bohmian mechanics emerges rather naturally, more naturally than in the case of pointlike particles.

I've always considered string theory to smell a lot like a hidden variable approach, so while I don't know the details of your conjecture, or have any specific opinion on it, it would not surprise me.

As for extended objects, I can see that logic emerging out of non-unitary observations but I'd expect think the non-unitary observations should infere the nature of these extension, not the other way around. From my past thinking of this I think the particle -> string -> branes, has some similarities to a constrainted generic quantization procedure. If you consider the probability of a particle, you get a field defined over the configuration space. A space field can maybe be thought of as an (infinitely, or at least covering the event space) extended n-brane (n-beeing configuration space dimension), and an evolving field might be an evolving n-brane. But IMO I would interpret such a "n-brane" as representing information rather than physical matter, which OTOH doesn't bother me one bit, because what the heck is the difference :) I think information doesn't just refer to human brains, even a particle has to inform itself about the world. So for most practical purposes I'd equal information structure with physical structure, with the difference that the former notion renders some things that lack sensible interpretation in a mechanistic interpretation. But I guess that's where we disagree. But of course, the future may show what approach is more efficient.

I do not rule out string (or more likely membrane like) structures appearing, but if they do they will evolve into such in response to data, there should not need to put them in manually.

Until I have an answer myself I leave anyone the benefit of doubt, and even though I have my own preferences there are elements of other approaches I can appreciate too.

/Fredrik
 
  • #59
Fra said:
I've always considered string theory to smell a lot like a hidden variable approach
I am glad that you also think so. Unfortunately, I cannot convince the traditional string theorists that it is so. :biggrin:
 

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