How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

[Pythagorean]

I don't agree. You're still accountable. And the other members of your organismal ensemble will make sure of it... in a deterministic matter.

 

[sophiecentaur]

It strikes me that the term 'supervenience', in this context, is just a way of implying a connection that is not necessarily there. Just because 'we make a decision' - which can obviously affect the way that the molecules of the World behave - does not imply anything at all about any 'supremacy' of that decision over the World. That decision can have easily arisen from the random arrangement of some of the atoms in our brains. Assigning any free action of the mind to make this decision and subsequent action is a massive assumption and not justifiable imho. The reason that you think you made a totally thought-out and independent decision need only be because your mind has developed to give you that impression. It is easy to see that some sort of evolutionary advantage could have turned us out in this way.

 

[pftest]

The point is to make the distinction between logical and natural supervenience, and to argue that consciousness supervenes naturally but not logically on physical processes. If something is logically reducible to physical processes, then it is in some sense reducible to or identical to those physical processes. If something is naturally supervenience then they are conceptually distinct entities which seem to coincide in our universe.

I think you may have misunderstood supervenience. Riverbed <> water is not an example of supervenience. H20 <> river is a better example, which would count as logical supervenience.

But the thing is that "logical supervenience" is a mental construct. It has no physical meaning. This is not a useful concept for the actual physical relationship between consciousness and the brain.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi pftest,

But the thing is that "logical supervenience" is a mental construct. It has no physical meaning. This is not a useful concept for the actual physical relationship between consciousness and the brain.

Logical supervenience is a concept like the terms "intrinsic" versus "extrinsic", and like those terms, it attempts to pick out a relationship between properties. In this case, logical supervenience tries to pick out properties that relate. So the argument is, "Do mental states logically supervene on physical states?"

For the record, logical supervenience is nicely defined here:

"Logical" supervenience (loosely, "possibility") is also a stricter variant of supervenience: some systems could exist in another world (are "logically" possible), but do not exist in our world (are "naturally" impossible). Elephants with wings are logically possible, but not naturally possible. Systems that are naturally possible are also logically possible, but not viceversa. For example, any situation that violates the laws of nature is logically possible but not naturally possible. Natural supervenience occurs when two sets of properties are systematically and precisely correlated in the natural world. Logical supervenience implies natural supervenience, but not viceversa. In other words, there may be worlds in which two properties are not related the way they are in our world, and therefore two naturally supervenient systems may not be logically supervenient.

Let's then ask the question as Chalmers did, do mental states logically supervene on physical states? Could we for example, imagine a Turing machine that could consistently pass a Turing test that does not support mental states? That is, is it possible that such a machine could only have physical states? Note that mental and physical states here are defined as Jaegwon Kim defines them.

Clearly, a Turing machine produces responces based on algorithmic manipulations of symbols. Those algorithms can be described mathematically and are deterministic. So for each physical state through which a Turing machine passes, there is a physical reason for why it passes through that state. There is no need to appeal to mental states in this case in order to explain why that Turing machine produced the set of responces it did in order to pass the Turing test. Such a machine therefore does not need to have mental states in order to produce the behavior, it only requires the physical states. If we accept this, we can say those mental states to not logically supervene on the physical states since we clearly have no reason to suggest that subjective experiences (which can't be objectively measured) should supervene on those physical states, though we still might claim that those mental states naturally supervene on the physical states.

In fact, we can't know if there are ANY mental states that supervene on physical states if the mental states have no influence over the physical states. That problem is known as the Knowledge Paradox as described for example by Rosenburg and Shoemaker.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

I don't agree. You're still accountable. And the other members of your organismal ensemble will make sure of it... in a deterministic matter.

Legal systems are based on the assumption that free will does exist and that people, generally, are not operating merely deterministically. People are considered to have genuine choice, not just the illusion of it, and the main reason prosecutions occur in the first place is that the accused are believed to have exercised said free will in a way the law disapproves of. It is the very notion of free will that underpins the concept of responsibility, and so people are accordingly held responsible for the consequences of their free choices (an expression which is tautological - what meaningful sense could be made of the idea of a ‘non-free choice’?)

The basis for mitigation is where it judged that free will has been significantly compromised, perhaps to the extent that it was completely absent – mental illness, intellectual impairment, duress etc. Society considers that responsibility and free will are two inseparable sides of the same coin.

So I really don’t think we can have it both ways on this point: we have to be consistent. If our actions are deterministic, we can no more be responsible for them than can a dog for barking, a brick for falling or a supernova for exploding. The fact that other automata might act as though they believe I can be held responsible is simply a further manifestation of their delusion. If they were to fully adopt the view that my behaviour is deterministic, and therefore a direct product of effects immune to non-deterministic intervention, they would have to conclude that the concept of responsibility is a redundant one. We might like it, but it is not logically justified.

However, even if the automata of society were to acknowledge that I had no real free choice, this would not mean that they should necessarily act differently. The imposition of a legal code on an automaton might have the effect of being another deterministic factor affecting its future behaviour.

If responsibility does exist without free will we’d have to consider the possibility of extending the legal system so that we could prosecute animals. Am I any the less a victim of determinism than a pigeon?

 

[sophiecentaur]

I don't agree. You're still accountable. And the other members of your organismal ensemble will make sure of it... in a deterministic matter.

This is true, of course. Society evolves to encourage appropriate behaviour. Social pressures and laws have a strong influence on our behaviour (unless we are particularly deviant). There is a social 'system' that tells us we are 'accountable' (only a word) and that influences the way we are likely to behave. Evolution has made sure of that - but no more, in essence, than it governs the behaviour of other animals on a much simpler level.

But the fact that we feel we have a free choice in our actions need to be no more than, as I have said before, a way of rationalising what we have just done or 'decided' on. The illusion of free choice is, in fact, very necessary or we'd just lie back and let it all happen - in the belief that it isn't worth trying. The fact is that all life forms 'try' (i.e. behave as if they were trying). It is just the fact that we are so complex that we had to evolve a consciousness in order to handle it all - so we are 'aware' of trying.

 

[madness]

But the thing is that "logical supervenience" is a mental construct. It has no physical meaning. This is not a useful concept for the actual physical relationship between consciousness and the brain.

The external world is a mental construct, the self is a mental construct, I can't think of anything at all that isn't a mental construct.

 

[Pythagorean]

Legal systems are based on the assumption that free will does exist and that people, generally, are not operating merely deterministically.

Er... no. That's exactly wrong. It only works because it's a deterministic system: because we can have a causative effect on people's actions. If there was no causation, people would make decisions independent of whether it caused them suffering. But because the causation chain is not broken, having and enforcing law continues to work.

Just like any other organism, we change our behavior in light of new information as long as that information passes a threshold in our emotional significance detectors (probably mostly in the amygdala and basal ganglia).

The basis for mitigation is where it judged that free will has been significantly compromised, perhaps to the extent that it was completely absent – mental illness, intellectual impairment, duress etc. Society considers that responsibility and free will are two inseparable sides of the same coin.

No, society doesn't care about free will, only responsibility. All society is, is a bunch of individual voices that want safety and security for themselves, so they don't like people engaging in risky behavior around them. It's really quite normal (especially in mammalian organisms) to have some kind of system that eliminates cheaters, for instance.

What we call mental illness, intellectual impairments, duress, etc, are all examples of when executive function is not dominating prediction and decision measures in the brain. When executive function is broken, people do not care about participating in social acceptance. For instance, frontal lobes complete wiring until between age 3-5, when toddler's start caring. The next major finalization comes in the early 20's with myelination, which finalizes the circuit dynamics in the frontal lobes. This gives the organism a long sample-time while the circuits are still plastic to figure out, negotiate, and even create new social rules and paradigms.

When we get frontal lobe damage or deterioration of any sort (whether from traumatic injury, disease, or other morphological or development abnormalities) we care less about what society thinks. The most famous case of this is Phineas Gage, but there have been countless examples since. Rather than seeing them as lacking free will, we can see these people as having broken their detector/predictor mechanisms for social instances.

I think it's best to distinguish between free will, which is a supernatural idea that some force acts independent of cause and effect, and will power, which is the ability for an organism to execute it's needs/wants (determined from biology and environment). Willpower definitely exists and it's how we judge responsibility.

If somebody always wants to kill you, they are responsible. But if somebody has a disease where there arm swings around wildly at random times, we don't consider them responsible. This is independent of whether the system is deterministic or not; it's only a matter of which system is dominating interactions in the organism.

 

[madness]

http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/GreeneCohenPhilTrans-04.pdf

This looks very relevant to the discussion. From the abstract:

"New neuroscience will change the law, not by undermining its current assumptions,
but by transforming people’s moral intuitions about free will and responsibility. This change in moral outlook will result not from the discovery of crucial new facts or clever new arguments, but from a new appreciation of old arguments, bolstered by vivid new illustrations provided by cognitive neuroscience. We foresee, and recommend, a shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favour of a more progressive, consequentialist approach to the criminal law."

 

[sophiecentaur]

Rather than seeing them as lacking free will, we can see these people as having broken their detector/predictor mechanisms for social instances.

I think it's best to distinguish between free will, which is a supernatural idea that some force acts independent of cause and effect, and will power, which is the ability for an organism to execute it's needs/wants (determined from biology and environment). Willpower definitely exists and it's how we judge responsibility.

I can't be sure what you mean by that. I don't actually believe in the supernatural (everything is 'natural' in my view) so are you saying that it 'really is' supernatural or that it's the interpretation that people give for certain experiences they have? If you mean the latter then I agree with your point.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm saying that I think free will is a lot like a soul or a god when it comes to explaining mechanisms (i.e. its not much of an explanation). In science, we expect phenomena to follow rationally from known laws of physics (and it consistently does). Behavior of organisms (even humans) shouldn't violate our rational view, and all our experiments have shown it doesn't; we have a working model of brain function and neuroethology.

There is no need for a supernatural explanation. There's nothing in decision-making that requires explaining free will (though as someone previously said, there is probably plenty of valid interest in studying why we experience the sensation of free will).

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Er... no. That's exactly wrong. It only works because it's a deterministic system: because we can have a causative effect on people's actions

My point wasn’t whether legal systems are effective because they assume free will. They do assume it, and it’s not why they might work. I did actually acknowledge in my last post that their efficacy is based on their potential to have a causal effect on the supposedly deterministic system that is a person.

I must admit to being a bit baffled here. I know of no relevant system within a society that does not make the link between the responsibility of an individual and that individual’s capacity to make free choice – it is almost axiomatic. This assumption may very well be the representation of evolved strategies to minimise danger, but the net result is that people attach blame to wrongdoing because of the belief that alternative courses of action were open to the criminal. There are people who do not buy into this – they conclude that all behaviour is beyond the control of the organism, ‘control’ implying the ability to have done other than what is eventually done. For them, no control exists. Such people would be being true to the deterministic principle.

The burglar receives our disapproval precisely because we assume he didn’t have to enter our houses – he chose to. If we thought he had no real choice available to him, why should we hold him responsible for his behaviour? Only when we allow for mitigating circumstances do we absolve, to a greater or lesser extent, the criminal from his behaviour. Of course, some people won’t allow for any mitigation: the criminal made his bed, he can lie in it. Choice.

I think it's best to distinguish between free will, which is a supernatural idea that some force acts independent of cause and effect, and will power, which is the ability for an organism to execute it's needs/wants (determined from biology and environment). Willpower definitely exists and it's how we judge responsibility.

I don’t see at all how will power justifies the introduction of responsibility. As you describe it, it is a deterministic phenomenon, so the organism can have no real choice but to execute the orders of its will power. The brain of the organism will analyse the information and presumably generate what that brain considers to be the response needed to fulfil the organism’s needs/wants. At no point need this process be elevated above the automatic to explain it. Even if an apparent range of options is available to the executive function of the organism, the one it ‘chooses’ can only be the result of an automatically running programme. There is no choice in will power.

The only way I can see your point is if we mean different things by the word ‘responsibility’. If it is taken to mean that the fox is responsible for the slaughter in the chicken shed because we can attribute the slaughter to the fox’s behaviour, and no more than that, then yes, the fox is responsible. But in the way I mean it (and, I suspect, the way most people use it), responsibility has a moral dimension over and above a simple attribution of effect to cause.

Determinism dictates that the person who wants to kill me, in executing the will power programme, is powerless to do otherwise. Should there be an element of genuine choice as to whether to execute the will power programme, this would have to be non-deterministic i.e. free will.

Determinists must accept, er, responsibility for their beliefs. They can’t have their cake and eat it.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/GreeneCohenPhilTrans-04.pdf

This looks very relevant to the discussion. From the abstract:

"New neuroscience will change the law, not by undermining its current assumptions,
but by transforming people’s moral intuitions about free will and responsibility. This change in moral outlook will result not from the discovery of crucial new facts or clever new arguments, but from a new appreciation of old arguments, bolstered by vivid new illustrations provided by cognitive neuroscience. We foresee, and recommend, a shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favour of a more progressive, consequentialist approach to the criminal law."

Thanks, good article. It both supports and goes against my argument in parts!

The assignment of responsibility is taken as a pragmatic step, not a moral one - by allowing the law to do this and act accordingly, we get a better society.

Morally, you can't hold the criminal responsible because determinism says he has no free will; pragmatically, you can say you want to hold him responsible because this helps you do things that can affect his future behaviour.

But you don't really believe he is truly, ultimately responsible. Just don't tell him that!

 

[Greg Bernhardt]

Not sure how exactly relevant this link is but I heard this on NPR today

We think we’re thinking our way through life. Well, yes and no. We’re thinking, but our unconscious minds are enormously powerful drivers. We think, but they can decide – often before we’ve even asked the question. For decades, we’ve understood we’re open to “subliminal seduction.” Our unconscious mind can be wooed.

The Subliminal Self
http://audio.wbur.org/storage/2012/04/onpoint_0425_the-subliminal-self.mp3

 

[sophiecentaur]

Determinism dictates that the person who wants to kill me, in executing the will power programme, is powerless to do otherwise. Should there be an element of genuine choice as to whether to execute the will power programme, this would have to be non-deterministic i.e. free will.

Determinists must accept, er, responsibility for their beliefs. They can’t have their cake and eat it.

I'm not sure that follows, strictly. We are observing this 'game' from inside it and could well be interpreting such scenarios in a too - simplistic way. If I want to kill someone but then restrain myself then the outcome could be just as 'determined' as if I did actually kill them. I might feel that I had made a decision but how can I be sure of all the factors that the decision algorithm had used? How can I be sure that I 'made a decision' independently?
'Responsibility' could just be a way for society to impose its influence on us. Our evolution has included what is advantageous to the species as a whole (and, indeed, to other species).

I have concluded that 'god' has been invented (as part of our evolution) in order to get individuals to behave 'better' to other humans. The same could be said about conscience and consciousness. Where that all leaves us is a bit problematical but I must say, it hasn't stopped my enjoyment and appreciation of life. And it certainly is fun to discuss.

 

[Pythagorean]

I don’t see at all how will power justifies the introduction of responsibility. As you describe it, it is a deterministic phenomenon, so the organism can have no real choice but to execute the orders of its will power. The brain of the organism will analyse the information and presumably generate what that brain considers to be the response needed to fulfil the organism’s needs/wants. At no point need this process be elevated above the automatic to explain it. Even if an apparent range of options is available to the executive function of the organism, the one it ‘chooses’ can only be the result of an automatically running programme. There is no choice in will power.

The only way I can see your point is if we mean different things by the word ‘responsibility’. If it is taken to mean that the fox is responsible for the slaughter in the chicken shed because we can attribute the slaughter to the fox’s behaviour, and no more than that, then yes, the fox is responsible. But in the way I mean it (and, I suspect, the way most people use it), responsibility has a moral dimension over and above a simple attribution of effect to cause.

Determinism dictates that the person who wants to kill me, in executing the will power programme, is powerless to do otherwise. Should there be an element of genuine choice as to whether to execute the will power programme, this would have to be non-deterministic i.e. free will.

Determinists must accept, er, responsibility for their beliefs. They can’t have their cake and eat it.

Ok, well first off... let's just get one thing straight. The law are not neuroscientists, so they're not exactly an authority. Neither is society at large. It's really a complicated subject; it will take several iterations of posts clarifying the language and the ideas.

But yes, that's the difference. You've built a notion of free will into your definition of responsibility. So let's skip that semantic argument.

We still hold the burglar accountable. I don't personally care whether he did it deterministically or not. I don't want to punish people for retribution. I just want dangerous people off the streets so they can't be dangerous. It's not a personal thing, I don't want to see them suffer. They're just dangerous (or costly) so their risky behavior shouldn't take place around me or my family. They can perform risky behavior in a place designed for it (a prison). But we know, statistically, that the burglar probably didn't get a good education or have a stable family life growing up. So we launch programs for prevention. This all relies on the system being deterministic.

To you first paragraph posted, this is exactly what the evidence shows. You give people more information, they make better choices (look at the correlation between crime and education and crime and social class). People will always make the choice they perceive as the best choice as long as their executive functions are working properly. If you have more information (education) and money (resource), then you can more easily carry out the best options.

now IF your executive functions aren't working properly, then we don't hold people accountable. We acknowledge that some part of them is broken, so throwing education and money at the problem won't fix it; that's an important distinction so that we don't waste resources (but then again, humanitarians probably won't let you be picky like this).

Of course, everybody has a different genetic concoction underlying this all, so many different biological responses can come from the same environmental stimulus. The developmental period in the womb is important too. Monozygotic twins aren't EXACTLY the same due to some mutations, but also, importantly, due to different nutritional paradigms in the womb (depending on who's closest to mama's nutrition source).

Also, what Sophie said.

 

[Pythagorean]

Actually, what sophie said is grounded in neuroscience (an internal competition between brain regions). That's one of the well-known jobs of the frontal lobes. They have inhibitory projections to the rest of the brain, acting as a break. The "rest of the brain" has a lot of reptilian parts in it that initiate seeking behavior (basil ganglia) or react emotionally to stimuli (amygdala)

The frontal lobes are compromised when you drink alcohol. As I said before, toddlers make a transition from being disobedient little tyrants to listening better around age 3-5, when their frontal lobes go through a wiring paradigm. Then lastly, the frontal lobes myelinate in the early 20's, when kids stop being teenagers (right about when we let them drink alcohol).

 

[sophiecentaur]

This is what annoys me so much about 'those danged Philosophers'. They are just not in a position to go back to square one (because they are inside the system'. They go back to a point that, somehow, satisfies them as being far enough back - then they build whole edifices on that point and reckon they've actually proved something.

Problem is that some of them are extremely clever and they do deserve some recognition but, in the end, they are basing all of their stuff on the dreaded 'faith' word (even the atheists).

I guess I'm just an old fashioned Utilitarian.

 

[sophiecentaur]

Actually, what sophie said is grounded in neuroscience (an internal competition between brain regions). That's one of the well-known jobs of the frontal lobes. They have inhibitory projections to the rest of the brain, acting as a break. The "rest of the brain" has a lot of reptilian parts in it that initiate seeking behavior (basil ganglia) or react emotionally to stimuli (amygdala)

The frontal lobes are compromised when you drink alcohol. As I said before, toddlers make a transition from being disobedient little tyrants to listening better around age 3-5, when their frontal lobes go through a wiring paradigm. Then lastly, the frontal lobes myelinate in the early 20's, when kids stop being teenagers (right about when we let them drink alcohol).

Perhaps the problem that people have with just accepting their machine-like nature is that we also have evolved with a need to feel that we're something special. It wouldn't be favourable if everyone thought of themselves as being without a 'soul'. For a start, people would feel a lot better about killing other people if the general opinion was that they didn't have souls. But I don't believe we do - so what do I do? I have to use my Intellect instead and go with my emotions (an electro/chemical mix). Never felt like killing anyone despite that. Is that really worse than having a religion?

 

[Pythagorean]

I think you are going with the bigger set, in which religion is contained: imagination. That's really our saving grace. I fairly certain no other animals believe in gods or perform arts.

I don't know why people think others would kill without a soul. I would ask them then if a deer had a soul and a bear did not.

 

[sophiecentaur]

I think you are going with the bigger set, in which religion is contained: imagination. That's really our saving grace. I fairly certain no other animals believe in gods or perform arts.

I don't know why people think others would kill without a soul. I would ask them then if a deer had a soul and a bear did not.

A dog's god is often its owner (individual with total authority and completely unpredictable). But, in that case, the god is real and actually comes up with its dinner every day. haha

It's easy for people to anthropomorphise when thinking about other animals. ("I swear he understands every word I say" etc.) That is probably another desirable feature to evolve with - it just spills over from human-human to human-other animal relationships.

 

[madness]

Determinism dictates that the person who wants to kill me, in executing the will power programme, is powerless to do otherwise. Should there be an element of genuine choice as to whether to execute the will power programme, this would have to be non-deterministic i.e. free will.

Determinists must accept, er, responsibility for their beliefs. They can’t have their cake and eat it.

As I said before, I don't think there is any real contradiction between determinism and freewill. In saying that someone is "powerless to do otherwise", you are making the mistake of involving some extra decision-making agent. If you choose to do something, then do you also have to choose what to choose, and choose what to choose what to choose? It doesn't make sense to look at it this way, since you make your decisions freely, but there is no supernatural self or agent who makes these decisions. Your decisions are both determined and free because your self is a part of the natural world and not something separate from it.

Edit: I think this post is probably confusing, but I'm not sure how to word it more clearly...

 

[Goodison_Lad]

I'm not sure that follows, strictly. We are observing this 'game' from inside it and could well be interpreting such scenarios in a too - simplistic way. If I want to kill someone but then restrain myself then the outcome could be just as 'determined' as if I did actually kill them. I might feel that I had made a decision but how can I be sure of all the factors that the decision algorithm had used? How can I be sure that I 'made a decision' independently?
'Responsibility' could just be a way for society to impose its influence on us. Our evolution has included what is advantageous to the species as a whole (and, indeed, to other species).

Yes, I agree with all this. Determinism dictates that you didn’t make an independent decision, despite what you may think. The algorithm is hidden from conscious view. Taking this further, responsibility would be a societal invention that had practical uses but would not be founded scientifically.

Ok, well first off... let's just get one thing straight. The law are not neuroscientists, so they're not exactly an authority. Neither is society at large. It's really a complicated subject; it will take several iterations of posts clarifying the language and the ideas.

I’ll agree that lawyers and society at large aren’t experts, but neither am I sure that neuroscientists are the experts in this philosophical debate.

Yes, it’s probably a good idea to get some things straight, so here’s what I'm trying to argue:

1) what the deterministic view necessarily implies;
2) that people who adopt the deterministic view than fail to apply it to the nth degree are being inconsistent.

Here’s what I’m not trying to argue:

3) that the deterministic view must be false;
4) that the deterministic view must be true.

I introduced the legal argument to highlight the contradiction that appears to be present in the minds of most people’s who say they subscribe to determinism – since human behaviour is no more free of physical law than the sun rising, the belief that we can, in any way and by any mechanism, alter our behaviour from what it is pre-determined to be is contradictory and not rational.

Determinism dictates that I couldn’t do other than commit the crime at the time I did. Determinism also dictates that most other people’s thoughts will form along the lines of condemnation. Inevitably, determinism will result in them believing that I am responsible, and just as inevitably, determinism will dictate what actions they take. These actions may include the formulation of a legal code which itself includes the concept of responsibility and choice. Their actions may, deterministically, alter my brain in such a way that I don’t repeat the offence. No choice at any point in the chain. It’s irrelevant whether we feel we have a choice (more deterministic neuro-stuff again). And it’s also irrelevant how we rationalise it – we have no choice in the matter.

Take the Bohmian interpretation of QM as an example – every last detail of the universe at this instant is an inevitable consequence of the early conditions. That includes what you and I are going to think and write next. And next. If not, where and how did determinism break down?
Most people on this thread indicate that they don’t believe in any non-deterministic agency that could alter the course of events as they unfold. So in the absence of such an agency, which seems to be the majority view, absolutely everything – and I mean everything – is unavoidably as it is. And always will be. That’s all.

Clearly, semantics are not incidental here - they seem to be crucial. As noted, my concept of responsibility necessarily includes a component of free will, and I believe this is the generally accepted use of the word. This is exactly why nobody attributes responsibility to a dog that chews the sofa, nor to a person who chews the sofa under extreme duress. We recognise that they had no choice. But implicit in our speech and behaviour is the belief that somebody who does do something of which we disapprove can be blamed because they could have acted differently. Of course, determinism says quite the opposite.

Note that I am not saying that either free will or responsibility actually exists. I am saying that free will and responsibility come as a package. And I’d bet good money that the overwhelming majority of people, scientists included, operate according to this notion in everyday life. If people profess to adhere to the deterministic world view then the only consistent thing to do is to abandon the notion of responsibility (as I have used it) along with free will. That the laws of physics lead us to hold the burglar to account doesn’t make belief in this accountability any more real than belief in the free will these same laws of physics tell us is illusory. I very much doubt that scientists have freed themselves from this, no matter what they do in their day jobs.

So I accept everything you say about how the brain works – you’re providing information about what goes on under the hood. Since it is assumed that neuroscience is ultimately grounded in physics and therefore subject to determinism to exactly the same degree, I asked myself whether neuroscience could offer any mechanism that would allow for anything that is unfolding in the human world to be any different than what it actually is? And, of course, the answer is no.

As I said before, I don't think there is any real contradiction between determinism and freewill. In saying that someone is "powerless to do otherwise", you are making the mistake of involving some extra decision-making agent. If you choose to do something, then do you also have to choose what to choose, and choose what to choose what to choose?

I’m not arguing for a supernatural agent, just that I think the concepts of pure determinism and free will are mutually exclusive. Since the word ‘choice’ implies (to me at least) freedom of selection between different courses of action, I think the idea that an organism has choice is incompatible with determinism. It might both look and feel that it has choice, but it has none at all.

Sorry to all for the long post - I'm a slow typer, and the posts kept on coming!

 

[Pythagorean]

I think that's a rather selective definition of responsibility. We may have a situation where two people worked together to make decisions for an event that failed catastrophically. Then we want to look for which of them is responsible for it by analyzing how they contributed to the plan and what parts of the plan failed.

None of this requires talking about free will. We just want to know which organism is partaking in risky behavior. Was it an honest mistake? Was the organism interested in safety, or was the organism interested in fame and glory and being negligent. None of these questions require free will. We, as a society, are just gentler on honest mistakes than we are on intended misconduct. Somebody who intentionally attacks you IS different than somebody who accidentally drops something on your toe, even if they are both operating deterministically. You want to put the person with intention in prison because they will always fix their mistakes such that they won't get caught in the future, whereas the good-intentioned will fix their behavior such that they perform more congruently with societies minimal demands (safety of property and person).

(of course, people can change too, but it's actually quite a small chance a violent criminal will rehabilitate, so it's more risk-taking to forgive ill-intentioned people even when they say they'll be good next time; other non-violent "criminals" like drug-users almost certainly shouldn't be in prison, imo, they should be in rehab.)

 

[Pythagorean]

In any case, I agree that how you define responsibility, free will and responsibility are a package deal.

 

[sophiecentaur]

In any case, I agree that how you define responsibility, free will and responsibility are a package deal.

Yes; it's definitely a package..
I see it this way: responsibility is the influence of the group on the individual. It is a normalising influence which may not immediately appeal to the individual. We have 'free will' in as far as we are not totally aware of all the influences on us (looking from inside the game) and, when we come to a decision, it is based (to a varying extent) on what we perceive as our 'responsibility' which is, in fact, an urge to a particular preferred action, which we learned from society.

 

[pftest]

Hi pftest,

Logical supervenience is a concept like the terms "intrinsic" versus "extrinsic", and like those terms, it attempts to pick out a relationship between properties. In this case, logical supervenience tries to pick out properties that relate. So the argument is, "Do mental states logically supervene on physical states?"

For the record, logical supervenience is nicely defined here:

Let's then ask the question as Chalmers did, do mental states logically supervene on physical states? Could we for example, imagine a Turing machine that could consistently pass a Turing test that does not support mental states? That is, is it possible that such a machine could only have physical states? Note that mental and physical states here are defined as Jaegwon Kim defines them.

Clearly, a Turing machine produces responces based on algorithmic manipulations of symbols. Those algorithms can be described mathematically and are deterministic. So for each physical state through which a Turing machine passes, there is a physical reason for why it passes through that state. There is no need to appeal to mental states in this case in order to explain why that Turing machine produced the set of responces it did in order to pass the Turing test. Such a machine therefore does not need to have mental states in order to produce the behavior, it only requires the physical states. If we accept this, we can say those mental states to not logically supervene on the physical states since we clearly have no reason to suggest that subjective experiences (which can't be objectively measured) should supervene on those physical states, though we still might claim that those mental states naturally supervene on the physical states.

In fact, we can't know if there are ANY mental states that supervene on physical states if the mental states have no influence over the physical states. That problem is known as the Knowledge Paradox as described for example by Rosenburg and Shoemaker.

I think we have talked about supervenience before, but i don't remember the outcome. My impression of supervenience is that a supervenience relationship is always conceptual. So when someone says that your mind supervenes on your brain, it actually translates to "some other mind conceptualises that your mind supervenes on your brain". So a supervenience relationship doesn't describe any kind of physical activity and this means that supervenience isn't a physicalist view of the mind body problem.

 

[pftest]

The external world is a mental construct, the self is a mental construct, I can't think of anything at all that isn't a mental construct.

Idealists think that is true yes, but physicalists think that physical things exist independently of minds.

 

[sophiecentaur]

Idealists think that is true yes, but physicalists think that physical things exist independently of minds.

So idealists say that the constructs of the mind are, somehow 'greater' than the physical processes that are, in fact, going on in the brain? That implies that they believe a part of us is outside the physical Universe. Apart from the fact that it could make one feel good to think that way, there is no evidence for this, is there?

 

[pftest]

So idealists say that the constructs of the mind are, somehow 'greater' than the physical processes that are, in fact, going on in the brain? That implies that they believe a part of us is outside the physical Universe. Apart from the fact that it could make one feel good to think that way, there is no evidence for this, is there?

Idealism is the idea that everything is mental. Like physicalism (which holds that everything is physical), it is a metaphysical position and no evidence exists to tell us that either of those positions is right or wrong.

 

[sophiecentaur]

Yeah, well, when I drop a hammer on my foot, the result isn't just 'mental'.

 

[pftest]

Yeah, well, when I drop a hammer on my foot, the result isn't just 'mental'.

How do you know about your foot, or the hammer? How do we know about anything physical? The entire bunch of sciences, including physics, depends on empiricism, which means "to experience", aka consciousness. So mind really is the starting point of all our knowledge. From the consistency of your observations you may start believing that a physical world actually exists out there, but this is an assumption, not a fact. Of course the idealist view is also an assumption.

 

[Maui]

How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?


Is this somehow supposed to be different or more significant than the questions:

How metallurgists handle the idea of Free Will?
How masseurs handle the idea of Free Will?
How miners handle the idea of Free Will?


If so, why should physicists be more concerned than the above? Why is free will more related to physics than to agriculture or irrigation?

 

[Maui]

Yeah, well, when I drop a hammer on my foot, the result isn't just 'mental'.

If i can hear your scream, i'd agree with you. Otherwise, it'd be subjective/non-existent as far as i am concerned.

 

[sophiecentaur]

Yes, I was being very trivial there.
Problem with that view is that you and everyone else would need to be just figments of my imagination. That would have to imply that I know more than you and all the others (who are all my dream buddies). It would mean that I taught myself Maths and Physics from scratch... ?
Perhaps, if I were a 'philosopher' my ego could cope with that.

 

[pftest]

Yes, I was being very trivial there.
Problem with that view is that you and everyone else would need to be just figments of my imagination. That would have to imply that I know more than you and all the others (who are all my dream buddies). It would mean that I taught myself Maths and Physics from scratch... ?
Perhaps, if I were a 'philosopher' my ego could cope with that.

That would be solipsism (only your mind exists). Solipsism is a form of idealism, but idealism doesn't have to be solipsism, it doesn't specifify how many minds or who they are.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?


Is this somehow supposed to be different or more significant than the questions:

How metallurgists handle the idea of Free Will?
How masseurs handle the idea of Free Will?
How miners handle the idea of Free Will?


If so, why should physicists be more concerned than the above? Why is free will more related to physics than to agriculture or irrigation?

You left out brick layers. We brick layers have a very comprehensive theory purporting to explain the universe, if anybody's interested.

 

[sophiecentaur]

That would be solipsism (only your mind exists). Solipsism is a form of idealism, but idealism doesn't have to be solipsism, it doesn't specifify how many minds or who they are.

That implies 'souls' that can communicate with each other. Difficult.
If I had to, I'd rather be a solipsist. But all that stuff fits in so well with the explanation of it all being generated by our minds and that is a relatively simple idea.

 

[madness]

Idealists think that is true yes, but physicalists think that physical things exist independently of minds.

I think I would have to define myself as an idealist in the Kantian sense. We can only know the external world through our senses, and therefore the external world is an unobservable hypothesis. This doesn't mean that the physical world doesn't exist independently of our minds though. It just means that we can never know the external world directly (and that we can't be sure it exists).

The fact that we deal with an internal representation of the external world rather than the world itself is widely accepted in Neuroscience. For example: http://philosophyandpsychology.com/?p=1013 .

"Here we can see the intellectual foundations for modern neuroscience’s claim that the objects we experience are illusionary constructions generated from the brain making hypotheses and guesses about how the world is based on ambiguous sensory input. The key idea here is construction. An internal mental construction implies a disconnection from the objects themselves. When grasping a coffee mug, my vision is not directed towards the cup itself, but rather, towards an internal construction the brain generates. According to Kantian neuroscience, the mug I experience is not real; it is a simulation. Neuroscience is thus an intellectual descendant of Kantian anti-realism. Indeed, 20th century positivism collapsed into representational phenomenalism despite its claim to be “anti-metaphysical” and modern neuroscience has subsequently followed suit with little critical discussion."

 

[madness]

So idealists say that the constructs of the mind are, somehow 'greater' than the physical processes that are, in fact, going on in the brain? That implies that they believe a part of us is outside the physical Universe. Apart from the fact that it could make one feel good to think that way, there is no evidence for this, is there?'.

It's more that materialists believe in an unobservable external world which exists outside of anything we can ever directly experience. This is what there is no evidence for. There is plenty of evidence for the existence of mental processes and conscious experience, in fact this comprises everything we ever know as individuals. What you describe in this quote is dualism, which accepts the existence of separate physical and mental entities.

Yeah, well, when I drop a hammer on my foot, the result isn't just 'mental'.

Why not?

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi pftest,

I think we have talked about supervenience before, but I don't remember the outcome. My impression of supervenience is that a supervenience relationship is always conceptual. So when someone says that your mind supervenes on your brain, it actually translates to "some other mind conceptualises that your mind supervenes on your brain". So a supervenience relationship doesn't describe any kind of physical activity and this means that supervenience isn't a physicalist view of the mind body problem.

You jogged my memory... I remember talking about this now. I think what you're saying is that the supervenience relationship is conceptual in the sense that it depends on the individual who conceives of the relationship. Different individuals will have a different conceptual relationship so the supervenience relationship isn't consistent between individuals. Is that right?

Supervenience can be broken down into logical versus natural supervenience, but supervenience alone means the following:

Supervenience is a concept with broad applicability throughout philosophy that has particular importance to physicalism. …

Supervenience can be seen as the relationship between a higher level and lower level of existence where the higher level is dependent on the lower level. One level supervenes on another when there can only be a change at the higher level if there is also a change at the lower level. (e.g., a set of properties A supervenes upon a set of properties B when there cannot be an A difference without a B difference). …

Supervenience establishes such a relationship between the mental and the physical, that any change in the mental is caused by a change in the physical. Just as a shadow is dependent upon the position of the object causing it, is the mental dependent upon the physical. Physicalism thus implies (through modal realism) that:

No two worlds could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some other respect.​

The corresponding conclusion about the mental would be as follows:

No two beings, or things could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some mental respect.​

Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Supervenience

For example, the pressure of a gas in a container supervenes on the temperature, number of molecules that make up the gas, and the volume of the container. The ideal gas law is used for illustration only; PV=nRT. So we can say the pressure supervenes on the physical state of the gas molecules. Without a change to the physical state of the gas molecules, we can’t get a change in the pressure. If we change one of the gas's properties, such as temperature, the pressure will also change. In this case, the pressure of the gas "naturally supervenes" on the physical state of the gas molecules. This relationship is given by the ideal gas law, PV=nRT. We might however, conceive of a world where the constant R is different and therefore, a mole of gas at a given temperature and in a given volume would have a pressure DIFFERENT than the pressure we know to exist. So the particular pressure of the gas we measure in our world “naturally supervenes” on the physical state according to our equation but it does not “logically supervene” since the value for R could conceivably be different in a different world.
(See Chalmers, “The Conscious Mind” pg 36)

For philosophy of mind, a physicalist would contend that the mind supervenes on the brain in some way. For the sake of illustration, we might consider a physicalist who would argue that the mind is a higher level phenomena created by the interaction of neurons in the brain. Therefore, the mind supervenes on both these interactions and on the neurons themselves. This is a supervenience relationship, and the physicalist would certainly argue this supervenicience relationship holds true.

Even if we accept however, that the mind naturally supervenes on the brain, we can't say it logically supervenes on the brain. Logical supervenience is a much more stringent requirement, and clearly p-zombies for example, are conceivable. Therefore, we don't generally suggest that the mind is logically supervenient on the brain. Natural supervenience is a subset of logical supervenience.

 

[pftest]

Hi pftest,

You jogged my memory... I remember talking about this now. I think what you're saying is that the supervenience relationship is conceptual in the sense that it depends on the individual who conceives of the relationship. Different individuals will have a different conceptual relationship so the supervenience relationship isn't consistent between individuals. Is that right?

Supervenience can be broken down into logical versus natural supervenience, but supervenience alone means the following:

Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Supervenience

For example, the pressure of a gas in a container supervenes on the temperature, number of molecules that make up the gas, and the volume of the container. The ideal gas law is used for illustration only; PV=nRT. So we can say the pressure supervenes on the physical state of the gas molecules. Without a change to the physical state of the gas molecules, we can’t get a change in the pressure. If we change one of the gas's properties, such as temperature, the pressure will also change. In this case, the pressure of the gas "naturally supervenes" on the physical state of the gas molecules. This relationship is given by the ideal gas law, PV=nRT. We might however, conceive of a world where the constant R is different and therefore, a mole of gas at a given temperature and in a given volume would have a pressure DIFFERENT than the pressure we know to exist. So the particular pressure of the gas we measure in our world “naturally supervenes” on the physical state according to our equation but it does not “logically supervene” since the value for R could conceivably be different in a different world.
(See Chalmers, “The Conscious Mind” pg 36)

For philosophy of mind, a physicalist would contend that the mind supervenes on the brain in some way. For the sake of illustration, we might consider a physicalist who would argue that the mind is a higher level phenomena created by the interaction of neurons in the brain. Therefore, the mind supervenes on both these interactions and on the neurons themselves. This is a supervenience relationship, and the physicalist would certainly argue this supervenicience relationship holds true.

Even if we accept however, that the mind naturally supervenes on the brain, we can't say it logically supervenes on the brain. Logical supervenience is a much more stringent requirement, and clearly p-zombies for example, are conceivable. Therefore, we don't generally suggest that the mind is logically supervenient on the brain. Natural supervenience is a subset of logical supervenience.

What i mean when i say supervenience is conceptual, is basically that it isn't known to occur anywhere in the physical world, so it is a purely hypothetical relationship. Perhaps it is like the metaphor of the hardware/software distinction: such a distinction doesn't actually physically exist, but the metaphor is popular in debates about consciousness. Im glad you picked the gas example because i think it illustrates what i mean.

The higher and lower levels of existence, as mentioned in the wikipedia quote, are actually higher and lower level descriptions. Physically speaking, pressure is reducible to its molecular ingredients (which in turn are reducible to eventually elementary particles and forces). So we humans may describe the system at a higher level and speak of pressure, but physically there is only one level that actually exists. A higher level description merely exists as a mental model in our minds. Physically speaking, the supervenience relationship between pressure and molecule is a "consists of" or better, an " = " relationship. Pressure = its molecules, a rock = its molecules, etc.

So when someone says that mind supervenes on brain, it actually still means mind = brain.

 

[Ferris_bg]

Just a quick example clarifying supervenience:

We have 2 different brains - B1 and B2.

If the mind is identical with the brain these will always produce different mentality (M1 != M2 where B1 = M1 and B2 = M2). // reductive physicalism

If the mind supervene on the brain these can sometimes produce identical mentality (M1 = M2 where B1 -> M1 and B2 -> M2). //non-reductive physicalism

So what do we know from introspection - our qualia changes over time, but we are still able to experience the same qualia sometimes. Let's say the brain state of 5 year old is B1 and this same person's brain state at 40 years is B2. Clearly these 35 years have changed massively the structure of his brain, but this person would be still able to experience and feel the same way as when he was at 5. This is a strong argument supporting supervenience and the multiple realizability. The mind-brain identity supporters can then say that we are mistaken and our memory is deceiving us, so we always experience different mental state, but with very tiny changes, which we can't "catch".

 

[madness]

Just a quick example clarifying supervenience:

We have 2 different brains - B1 and B2.

If the mind is identical with the brain these will always produce different mentality (M1 != M2 where B1 = M1 and B2 = M2). // reductive physicalism

If the mind supervene on the brain these can sometimes produce identical mentality (M1 = M2 where B1 -> M1 and B2 -> M2). //non-reductive physicalism

So what do we know from introspection - our qualia changes over time, but we are still able to experience the same qualia sometimes. Let's say the brain state of 5 year old is B1 and this same person's brain state at 40 years is B2. Clearly these 35 years have changed massively the structure of his brain, but this person would be still able to experience and feel the same way as when he was at 5. This is a strong argument supporting supervenience and the multiple realizability. The mind-brain identity supporters can then say that we are mistaken and our memory is deceiving us, so we always experience different mental state, but with very tiny changes, which we can't "catch".

You have completely misunderstood supervenience (sorry). The mind supervenes on the brain if two identical brains will produce identical minds. Nothing stops different brains from producing the same mind under supervenience, but it is not part of the definition. No one in their right mind would claim that a 5 year old and 40 year old have the same conscious experience. They may have the same experience of redness, but no two individuals have the same overall experience as a whole.

 

[Ferris_bg]

Nothing stops different brains from producing the same mind under supervenience, but it is not part of the definition.

Yes, you are right it's not, but its part of what non-reductive physicalism is.

[Mind-body supervenience] The mental supervenes on the physical in that any two things (objects, events, organisms, persons, etc.) exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ in respect of mental properties. That is, physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscernibility.

What you mean by "overall experience as a whole"? Take for example the feeling of surprise. How it feels to be surprised at 5 and at 40? Do you think its different?

 

[madness]

Yes, you are right it's not, but its part of what non-reductive physicalism is.

[Mind-body supervenience] The mental supervenes on the physical in that any two things (objects, events, organisms, persons, etc.) exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ in respect of mental properties. That is, physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscernibility.

Yes but psychological indiscernibility does not entail physical indiscernibility. This means that different brains do not necessarily produce different mental states according to physicalism.

What you mean by "overall experience as a whole"? Take for example the feeling of surprise. How it feels to be surprised at 5 and at 40? Do you think its different?

I mean the total contents of your mental/conscious state at that time. You have qualia such as the experience of redness or the smell of roses which may be largely the same between individuals, but the overall mental state is different. I don't think it is really possible to feel surprised in the same way twice or between two individuals due to the myriad associated mental states which are unique to an individual at that time. One of the most important properties of conscious states is the level of integration, meaning that each component cannot be analysed separately http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_Information_Theory.

 

[Ferris_bg]

We don't know if there are any mental states, which are the same for different individuals. We can only guess. That's why I gave the example with the same person at different ages. What I know from introspection is that the same chemicals can cause me different qualia, but I am also able to experience some things the same way, as when I was a kid. That's why the reductive physicalism has serious problems, because according to it, different brain state always produces different mental state.

And IIT is interesting, but we don't know if the mental reduces to information.

 

[Pythagorean]

We don't know if there are any mental states, which are the same for different individuals. We can only guess. That's why I gave the example with the same person at different ages. What I know from introspection is that the same chemicals can cause me different qualia, but I am also able to experience some things the same way, as when I was a kid. That's why the reductive physicalism has serious problems, because according to it, different brain state always produces different mental state.

And IIT is interesting, but we don't know if the mental reduces to information.

That doesn't really appear to be an argument of merit to me. Firstly, you can't say whether you experience things the same way as when you were a kid. Even if you could, it wouldn't be particularly surprising. There are several hierarchies in the brain. One particular sensory experience memory may be contained in a small region of somatic cortex. It's functional organization can be preserved. It (the chunk of somatic cortex) may even have several different physical states over the course of the person's lifetime, yet still produce the same result. Degeneracy and redundancy are fairly common in biological systems (and it makes sense, of course, for such complex machines to keep running in a chaotic environment requires fail-safes, which is what degeneracy brings you).

On the other side of the hierarchy, the representation of self is widely distributed throughout the brain. You can take half of somebody's brain out and they could still feel mostly like themselves (and even mostly recover given enough time). Of course, they're not going to be the same person in totality. Older people, who have reduced plasticity, might never recover (i.e. they will suffer some form of retardation because their brain has already committed regions to particular tasks). Whereas a child who still has a lot of plasticity is likely to fully recover. Because it has plasticity, the system is able to reorganize into a complete set (but now with half the computing power, you might say).

 

[madness]

That's why the reductive physicalism has serious problems, because according to it, different brain state always produces different mental state.

This not true at all. I don't even agree with physicalism but physicalists do not believe what you say here.

 

[Ferris_bg]

Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind-brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory, in philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain. For example, one type of mental event like "mental pains" will, presumably, turn out to be describing one type of physical event (like C-fiber firings). [wikipedia]

Putnam’s argument can be paraphrased as follows: (1) according to the Mind-Brain Type Identity theorist (at least post-Armstrong), for every mental state there is a unique physical-chemical state of the brain such that a life-form can be in that mental state if and only if it is in that physical state. (2) It seems quite plausible to hold, as an empirical hypothesis, that physically possible life-forms can be in the same mental state without having brains in the same unique physical-chemical state. (3) Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Mind-Brain Type Identity theorist is correct.

Type physicalism says that pain is C-fiber excitation. But that implies that unless an organism has C-fibers or a brain of an appropriate biological structure, it cannot have pain. But aren't there pain-capable organisms, like reptiles and mollusks, with brains very different from the human
brain? Perhaps in these species the neurons that work as nociceptive neurons--pain-sensitive neurons--aren't like human C-fibers at all. Can the type physicalist reply that it should be possible to come up with a more abstract and general physiological description of a brain state common to all organisms, across all species, that are in pain state? This is highly unlikely, but how about inorganic systems? Could there not be intelligent extraterrestrial creatures with a complex and rich mental life, one that is very much like ours, but whose biology is not carbon-based? And isn't it conceivable--in fact, at least nomologically if not practically possible--to build intelligent electromechanical systems (that is, robots) to which we would be willing to attribute various mental states? Moreover, the neural substrates of certain mental functions can differ from person to person and may change over time even in a single individual through maturation, learning, and injuries to the brain. We should keep in mind that if pain is identical with physical state C, then pain is identical with state C not only in actual organisms and systems but in all possible organisms and systems.

These considerations are usually taken to show that any given mental state is "multiply realizable" in a large variety of physical/biological structures, with the consequence that it is not possible to identify a mental state with a physical state. If pain is identical with a physical state, it must be identical with some particular physical state; but there are indefinitely many physical states that can "realize" (or "instantiate," "implement," etc.) pain in all sorts of pain-capable organisms and systems. So pain, as a type of mental state, cannot be a neural-state type or any other physical-state type.

This, in brief, is the influential "multiple realization" argument against type physicalism Hilary Putnam advanced in the late 1960s (we will recur to multiple realization in the next chapter). It had a critical impact on the way philosophy of mind has developed since then: It effectively retired type physicalism as the reigning doctrine on the mind-body problem, throwing the very term "reductionism" into disrepute and ushering in the era of "nonreductive physicalism." Further, it inspired a new conception of mentality, "functionalism," which has been highly influential since the 1970s and which is arguably still the most widely accepted view on the nature of mind.