Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[AnssiH]

But, your but conclusion is not necessarily a truth statement, for to say that a metaphysical entity has "identity" can be nothing more than saying that "identity" evolves from dialectic union of axioms of "existence" and "consciousness". To put it simply (as put by Ayn Rand):

Existence is Identity
Consciousness is Identification​

To hold that "identity as a concept bears no meaning to reality", is to say you hold that a metaphysical entity can exist apart from its characteristics,

No, I'm rather saying that a "metaphysical entity" is a concept that exists due to the way the brain is structuring reality (by recognizing characteristics). There is no reason to assume metaphysical identity to the brain to say this, but there is a reason to assume the existence of reality in some stable manner. Just that the idea of identity to anything at all can still be just a method for prediction. In a sense, the real nature of reality becomes inherently unintelligible, while reality does exist.

Can we say that existence is identity; subjective experience certainly exists, but to what extent it has got identity? We have our memories certainly, but consider the adult mitosis thought experiment in the previous post.

This is very difficult subject to communicate though, I can't be sure about anyones opinion even when they try to communicate it to me... :( (Wonder what Ayn Rand means specifically...)

-Anssi

 

[mosassam]

This is exactly where we should divorce from the intuitive idea where some thing must be "observing this state of affairs" (or we quickly end up to dualism and/or homunculus argument and/or naive realism).

This, for me, is the point of interest. Let's forget dualism or the 'little man inside', that's just Thought trying to have its way. Genuine creativity occurs in the absence of "the observer" (be it baking, athletics, maths, music, etc.), but what is creating? (this is actually a stupid question but I don't know another way to phrase what I'm trying to say)

This is intuitive idea precisely because the brain builds a worldview by classifying it into "things"; one of these things is "self". By inventing such an object as "self", the "rational" interpretation of the sensory data turns into a form of "self is perceiving". In a purely materialistic stance, this must be enough for a subjective experience to occur, i.e. we assume that reality is such a place where this kind of process causes subjective experience (albeit our understanding of that very process is quite shaky since it is based on us classifying that process into "sensible things", while reality is not quite like that -> our own ontological nature is still shrouded from our thoughts)

I can see how "self" is unlike other 'things' in that it is a conduit through which everything else passes (for me), but the 'thing' that "sees" this must be another aspect of "self", so I don't know where that leaves me.

Let me offer you some material for wrestling that idea of "being no one" properly into your system. Consider a thought experiment where you undergo an adult mitosis. That is, every cell in your body is copied and you split into two; both into the exact same physical state. Which one is the one where the "old you" will go? (Whose "point of view" your current self will assume?) To up the ante, ask yourself if you would agree to undergo an adult mitosis, and have another one of the copies killed, and have the other given a million dollars.

The only thing I can glean from this thought experiment is that Thought is not mine. Thought is like an 'unseen river' that both me and my copy dip our heads in, believing that we have our "own" thoughts because we are physically separated, whereas we actually 'share' Thought, only circumstances, and our physical nature, give the 'illusion' of separate thoughts.

If you find yourself baffled by this thought experiment, it can only be because you have traces of "non-physical self" ideas left in your thinking. In a materialistic stance, the contents of your subjective experience are caused by certain configuration of the brain. With two configurations in the exact same state, there will be two subjective experiences both having the same memories, and both being convinced they are the same self that existed before the split. From this you can derive how there is no metaphysical identity to yourself from one moment to the next either.

They are both the "same self that existed before the split", but to each other they are strangers, due to the physical nature of the separating process of thought.

After many iterations, the nervous systems become able to do just that; to predict reality. For some system to predict some scene, it must model it, by classifying it into "sensible components" to which it assumes certain behaviour, and consequently it can "simulate" how those components behave together (Much like we perform weather simulations by modeling the weather system). In a sense, this is what the brain is; a machine that runs a simulation of reality, so to be able to make rational predictions.

I disagree with this situation completely. I view the nervous system as an interface between the 'internal' and 'external' "realities". Changes in the environment trigger physical changes the neural structure of the nervous system, leading to changes (or affirmations) of mind patterns. Conversely, changes in mind patterns trigger changes in the neural structure of the nervous system, leading to changes (or not) of the environment. I certainly don't view the brain as some isolated entity running programs. (check out Mantura/Verala - (Wiki) Autopoiesis)

Anssi - I have to bail out right now but I will return

 

[AnssiH]

I can see how "self" is unlike other 'things' in that it is a conduit through which everything else passes (for me), but the 'thing' that "sees" this must be another aspect of "self", so I don't know where that leaves me.

Well, think about all those rational reasons that lead you to believe that "the thing that sees is another aspect of self" (like an entity on its own, right?). I.e. think about what other beliefs this belief is based on. To what extent can you trust all the assumptions that must have been made about reality before you can even begin to believe there is some kind of a metaphysical observer somehow connected to the brain?

And to open another line of thought, think about all the functions that this "observer" would have to be capable of metaphysically (without any internal mechanism) Like object recognition (observation is object recognition). If you imagine it does have some internal mechanism to perform this function, well then it's not a metaphysical entity anymore but a system, and it also happens to be just the kind of system that the brain appears to be. An unobservable brain inside the observable brain. Little bit tricky idea.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

I spoke earlier of presenting an unrealistic example for the purpose of illustrating some of the important aspects of treating the ontology as an unknown. The following is the presentation of that "unrealistic" example I had in mind.

I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe. What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements. What these ontological elements actually are is undefined so all we have to work with are references to those elements. In this picture, the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. As I commented earlier, that "past" can be seen as a sequence of changes (I defined "changes" in what is known as "presents") which are themselves part of what is to be explained. To put it simply, what is to be explained is a specific sequence of collections of ontological elements which are known only by specific references to those elements (any definitions are embedded in that structure of those references themselves and, if the specific epistemological construct which explains that sequence is understood, the definitions will be presumed to be understood).

Reality itself is the complete set of valid ontological elements (I will call this the set A). Clearly, the set A must be regarded as infinite as, no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists). This is the very definition of the concept "infinite". On the other hand, "the past" which is to be explained must be finite as, if it were infinite, we could not have knowledge of it (we couldn't finish "knowing the information"). Thus it is that the past can be seen as a finite sequence of presents, each of which consist of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. The past, the set C, consists of an ordered collection of sets B_t<a₁,a₂, ... , a_n>. The terms "a_j" are simply references to those individual ontological elements which go to make up this "past" which is to be explained.

In most logical examples, those references mentioned above would be given via English words or phrases; however, this is certainly not a necessary requirement. We can, in fact, use numerical labels to play this role. The great advantage of using numerical labels is the simple fact that there exist an infinite number available to be used as specific labels. The other advantage is that "numerical labels" contain no information in and of themselves: i.e., it is easy to comprehend that the meanings are not carried in the symbols themselves, something very difficult to comprehend when the labels are given in a specified language. People find it very difficult to comprehend the possibility of error in their understanding of English labels.

Under this perspective, what is to be explained is a finite sequence of finite collections of numbers (our references to the known past). Since no flaw free explanation can be expected to explain anything beyond that "known collection", the only expectations which that explanation can be presumed to provide consists of the validity of any specific "present": i.e., the validity of the set of numbers B_t where "t" is an index on that sequence.

Since the number of collections is finite and the number of reference labels in any collection is also finite, the explanation can be put in the form of a table (in some ways analogous to a truth table common to any logical analysis). As I defined "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from "known information", this table fulfills the definition of an explanation. Given any set of numbers, all one need do is look at the table. If the set is in the table, it is a valid set; if not, it isn't a valid set. What you must consider when you think about that issue is the fact that, though what might be considered an explanation under common concepts may be quite different from that table (the method might very well be some logical procedure), the procedure must yield exactly the same result as examining the table just defined. And second, that logical procedure, no matter what it may be, can be seen as manipulation of those numerical labels.

What is important about that last point is that, the explanation (the tabular solution), as given has no capability of yielding expectations outside the actual given past; however, it can be seen as a mathematical table of expectations for specific known "presents" which could be created by some logical manipulation of those numerical labels. That logical manipulation of numerical labels has the capability of yielding expectations outside the known information. So what we are talking about here are methods of interpolation which agree perfectly with the known information.

I'll see if anyone can get their head around that before I go any farther. I am sure your reactions are going to be far from what I expect and am quite curious as to how you will interpret what I have just said.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...subjective experience certainly exists, but to what extent has it got identity?...

Before I can respond I need to understand what you mean by "subjective"--do you mean a mental thought that is unrelated to facts of reality and assigned arbitrary groupings (say into sets of VOEs).

Consider two options:
Option A. subjective experience derives from subjective mind (Kant)

Option B. subjective experience derives from objective reality (Rand)

Which Option is it for you, A, B, or neither ?

 

[Rade]

...I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe...

I thought your philosophy was the one derived from "UNDEFINED ONTOLOGY"--now here you go starting a very long thread with "A DEFINITION" of ontology itself Or, are you now saying, since you want to begin your argument with a "definition of reality", that you no longer hold a philosophy of "undefined ontology" ? Am I the only one having a problem with this ?

 

[Rade]

...What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, ...

NO, this is NOT VERY CLEAR--NOTHING IS CLEAR ABOUT HOW HUMANS "KNOW" ANY"THING". So, let us start with discussion of these options and then all agree that #1 (the one used by Dr.D. to derive his philosophy) is the only one that is "very clear" to all.

1. Humans have "no way of knowing which part...are valid...are mental constructs" [Dr.D. option]
2. Humans have "only one way of knowing which part...are valid..."
3. Humans have "more than one way of knowing which part...are valid..."

Note added in edit: Dr. D., a question for you. Why do you distinguish between parts of ontology that (1) are "valid" vs those that are (2) "mental constructs" ? I see no good reason why ...parts of ontology cannot be both "valid" AND "mental constructs" as a dialectic union...

 

[AnssiH]

I spoke earlier of presenting an unrealistic example for the purpose of illustrating some of the important aspects of treating the ontology as an unknown. The following is the presentation of that "unrealistic" example I had in mind.

I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe. What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements. What these ontological elements actually are is undefined so all we have to work with are references to those elements. In this picture, the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. As I commented earlier, that "past" can be seen as a sequence of changes (I defined "changes" in what is known as "presents") which are themselves part of what is to be explained. To put it simply, what is to be explained is a specific sequence of collections of ontological elements which are known only by specific references to those elements (any definitions are embedded in that structure of those references themselves and, if the specific epistemological construct which explains that sequence is understood, the definitions will be presumed to be understood).

Reality itself is the complete set of valid ontological elements (I will call this the set A). Clearly, the set A must be regarded as infinite as, no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists). This is the very definition of the concept "infinite". On the other hand, "the past" which is to be explained must be finite as, if it were infinite, we could not have knowledge of it (we couldn't finish "knowing the information"). Thus it is that the past can be seen as a finite sequence of presents, each of which consist of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. The past, the set C, consists of an ordered collection of sets B_t<a₁,a₂, ... , a_n>. The terms "a_j" are simply references to those individual ontological elements which go to make up this "past" which is to be explained.

In most logical examples, those references mentioned above would be given via English words or phrases; however, this is certainly not a necessary requirement. We can, in fact, use numerical labels to play this role. The great advantage of using numerical labels is the simple fact that there exist an infinite number available to be used as specific labels. The other advantage is that "numerical labels" contain no information in and of themselves: i.e., it is easy to comprehend that the meanings are not carried in the symbols themselves, something very difficult to comprehend when the labels are given in a specified language. People find it very difficult to comprehend the possibility of error in their understanding of English labels.

Under this perspective, what is to be explained is a finite sequence of finite collections of numbers (our references to the known past). Since no flaw free explanation can be expected to explain anything beyond that "known collection", the only expectations which that explanation can be presumed to provide consists of the validity of any specific "present": i.e., the validity of the set of numbers B_t where "t" is an index on that sequence.

Since the number of collections is finite and the number of reference labels in any collection is also finite, the explanation can be put in the form of a table (in some ways analogous to a truth table common to any logical analysis). As I defined "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from "known information", this table fulfills the definition of an explanation. Given any set of numbers, all one need do is look at the table. If the set is in the table, it is a valid set; if not, it isn't a valid set. What you must consider when you think about that issue is the fact that, though what might be considered an explanation under common concepts may be quite different from that table (the method might very well be some logical procedure), the procedure must yield exactly the same result as examining the table just defined. And second, that logical procedure, no matter what it may be, can be seen as manipulation of those numerical labels.

What is important about that last point is that, the explanation (the tabular solution), as given has no capability of yielding expectations outside the actual given past; however, it can be seen as a mathematical table of expectations for specific known "presents" which could be created by some logical manipulation of those numerical labels. That logical manipulation of numerical labels has the capability of yielding expectations outside the known information. So what we are talking about here are methods of interpolation which agree perfectly with the known information.

I'll see if anyone can get their head around that before I go any farther. I am sure your reactions are going to be far from what I expect and am quite curious as to how you will interpret what I have just said.

Well, it certainly is little bit tricky to interpret unambiguously.

I picked up that you presented a hypothetical example where you don't yet tackle the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't know which elements of an ontology are "valid" and which are mental constructs?

Then you propose marking down all the elements (which are all valid in this example) onto a table, but how that is useful I didn't yet get...

Hmm, also, perhaps you can clarify another thing which I've wondered before. You have chosen to handle ontology as a set of "presents" (set of moments?), this I reckon is like defining "what exists at each moment"? This is one of the most difficult things to remember when reading your text, since we are (or at least I am) so used to handle ontological elements as a set of "stable functions", i.e. instead of defining everything that ever existed in each moment, I would rather attempt to define how reality behaves.

Would this approach be incompatible to what you are presenting (I'm not quite sure where you presentation is heading), and/or do you feel it would be presupposing too much to think it's valid to define ontology as a set of stable functions(behaviours)?

I hope you can understand what I'm asking because it is pretty hard to even think of meaningful questions... :I

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Before I can respond I need to understand what you mean by "subjective"--do you mean a mental thought that is unrelated to facts of reality and assigned arbitrary groupings (say into sets of VOEs).

When I said "subjective experience certainly exists", I was referring to that all-familiar experience that we are having. That which consists of all sorts of "things" that we recognize around us, whatever their underlying nature (causes) might be.

But it is not a naive realistic experience; the aspects it consists of don't exist in reality the way we experience them, but according to our best physical models the particular subjective experience is caused by a specific way our brain/sensory systems recognizes wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation (colour) or air pressure fluctuations => differences in air molecule density (sound) etc... I.e. the subjective experience is not "like" objective reality exists, but it is rather just a particular way to "handle" that reality.

Consider two options:
Option A. subjective experience derives from subjective mind (Kant)

Option B. subjective experience derives from objective reality (Rand)

Which Option is it for you, A, B, or neither ?

I could agree with both, depending on how you mean them. I would say that which could be called "objectve reality" exists, and by "subjective mind" I would refer to the specific high-level process (portion of that reality) that is causing the subjective experience.

Even reading the wikipedia page about Rand and her view she calls Objectivism, I could still agree with both depending on how I should interpret these views.

I am not proposing that reality does not exist, but I am proposing that when we point our finger at some particular stable pattern of it and call it by name, it doesn't mean an entity like that actually exists in ontological sense (that reality is made of such entities).

You could choose to understand the word "identity" as just a reference to certain stable property or characteristic of something, and in that sense point your finger at a wave on a pond and say it has got identity, while also those water molecules that are just going up and down are also having an identity of their own.

With a different definition to "identity" you could say that wave does not have identity but the molecules do, or at least the elementary particles that the molecules are composed of have got identity to themselves (i.e. if the water molecules were swapping those elemantary particles with each others all the time, they would not have a persisting identity).

This is probably the most common definition people assume to "identity", and in this view you would not say that the hole of a doughnut has got identity to itself (while it stably exists), but the doughnut itself does (since its made of elementary particles that are usually thought to possesses identity).

Note that with this definition already, when joined with materialism, the identity of "self" disappears. You are a learning machine and your knowledge and memories (and consequently the way you react to stimulus) exists only in the specific configuration of neurons that keeps changing all the time. You think there is a self with identity, but that is only because your experience and your memories persist, and it would persist even if all the material particles of your brain were switched to different particles; as long as that specific configuration remained that holds/is your memories.

But let's push it little bit further still. Why suppose those elementary particles have got identity to themselves; perhaps they are just a specific configuration of energy in constant flux (after all, matter can be turned into energy and vice versa). Checking out Milo Wolff's model where everything is made of spherical standing waves of space is a good excercise here, regardless of what you might think of the validity of that model.

Next we need to also question the identity of "energy". And we run into trouble, much like we ran into trouble with the identity of space when Newtonian relativity was introduced (there was no longer reason to assume space has got metaphysical "locations" (rest frame) in it, and yet objects are moving "through it". Instead space should be seen either as a relativistic spacetime construction, or as something that matter gives rise to... our conception of "space" turn out to be rather full of questions)

So we can see that it is an extra assumption to assume identity to any elementary particles that exist in any model, be it photons, electrons or quarks. While all these things "exist" in the same sense that that hole in the doughnut exists.

Let me still tell you that it can be quite illuminating to look at the quantum mechanics while keeping in mind that these little particles that move in such an odd manner, probably do not have an identity to themselves. It doesn't resolve the mystery, but it certainly seems to be few steps forward as long as you remember all the measuring devices are similarly "stable things without identity", and that we indeed do tend to find the particles from locations that would hold a highest "energy density" at any given moment. (The timewise evolution of quantum systems is seriously shrouded in mystery still, but then, time is also a semantical concept we hold in our minds... :I)

Oh, and some people at this point cannot find much sense to the idea that nothing would have an identity... ...this would be the case already due to the way our brain appears to be modeling a reality (building a worldview). To model something, you have got to describe it in terms of certain objects and their associated behaviour, regardless of how it really exists. To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects".

I am not sure if Rand or Kant would disagree, and if so, at which points.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

When I said "subjective experience certainly exists", I was referring to that all-familiar experience that we are having. That which consists of all sorts of "things" that we recognize around us, whatever their underlying nature (causes) might be.

Thank you for the clarity of your response.

Following this quote from your post:
"I am not proposing that reality does not exist"--that is, you propose that reality does exist, therefore as a Premise #1 let us agree:

Reality Exists​

[Note: here you will find agreement with Rand, although she states it as]:

"Existence Exists"​

And then your quote:
"To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects"."

Now, suppose a "sensible object" {X} that is real before you and you point your finger at it. Would you then agree that ?:

your experience of {X}= dialectic union of your subjective mind + objective reality of {X}​

If so, can we not conclude that the terms "subjective experience" and "objective experience" of {X} are of no value, but offer a false dichotomy--that is, when we refer to the term "experience of {X}" we mean a dialectic union of the subjective (the classifier = you) + objective (that which is classified = {X}) ?

Next your comments about "identity"...

This is probably the most common definition people assume to "identity", and in this view you would not say that the hole of a doughnut has got identity to itself (while it stably exists), but the doughnut itself does (since its made of elementary particles that are usually thought to possesses identity).

Here I would say the the hole of a doughnut is an attribute of the doughnut and as such the hole as attribute has identity (that is, the hole is what the hole is), however, the hole as existent does not have "identity", for while it is possible to have a doughnut without a hole, it is not possible in this example to have a hole without a doughnut.

So we can see that it is an extra assumption to assume identity to any elementary particles that exist in any model, be it photons, electrons or quarks. While all these things "exist" in the same sense that that hole in the doughnut exists.

Here I would not agree--to attach same level of existence to "hole of doughnut" as to "photons, electrons, quarks" is a form of concept stealing, what has been called a Reification of the Zero. Physicists can cause photons to hit other photons, or electrons, or quarks and observe cause-effect events. But it is nonsense to even consider that we remove hole from donut and use it (the hole) to cause an effect on some other thing with identity. Now, concerning energy--it comes in many different forms so I see no good reason why different forms of potential energy and kinetic energy cannot have their specific identity(see http://www.need.org/needpdf/FormsofEnergy.pdf)--not sure I am grasping your concern about energy having identity ? Finally, I find no problem with quantum mechanics and identity--so, it goes for me... existence exists and what exists must exist as some metaphysical entity with identity and the nature (dynamics) of that identity is explained by quantum mechanics. I do not know if Rand would agree or not with this (I think she would), but Kant most surely would not.

 

[AnssiH]

Thank you for the clarity of your response.

Following this quote from your post:
"I am not proposing that reality does not exist"--that is, you propose that reality does exist, therefore as a Premise #1 let us agree:

Reality Exists​

[Note: here you will find agreement with Rand, although she states it as]:

"Existence Exists"​

And then your quote:
"To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects"."

Now, suppose a "sensible object" {X} that is real before you and you point your finger at it. Would you then agree that ?:

your experience of {X}= dialectic union of your subjective mind + objective reality of {X}​

Yes you could say that, unless it implied to someone that subjective mind & objective reality are ontologically separated things. That is why I tend to just say "subjective experience" rather than refer to a "mind".

And also to say that you must have first assumed there are fundamental "real" building blocks to reality in ontological sense also, as oppose to only in our ways of thinking about that reality.

If so, can we not conclude that the terms "subjective experience" and "objective experience" of {X} are of no value, but offer a false dichotomy--that is, when we refer to the term "experience of {X}" we mean a dialectic union of the subjective (the classifier = you) + objective (that which is classified = {X}) ?

Well sure. I mean, I tend to see "experience" as something that could only refer to a subjective experience (since "objective experience" would be an oxymoron), although I still use the phrase "subjective experience" just to clarify what I am talking about. In any case the proper way to understand this would be that objective reality is the underlying cause of that subjective experience. "We are in reality and reality is in us"

Next your comments about "identity"...

Here I would say the the hole of a doughnut is an attribute of the doughnut and as such the hole as attribute has identity (that is, the hole is what the hole is), however, the hole as existent does not have "identity"

Yeah, the hole is identified by a certain pattern, that is caused by the doughnut. Now most people tack that doughnut with "real identity", that is, assume that the doughnut is ontologically the "same entity" from one moment to the next. Another option, which I suggest you try out for a fit, is that the doughnut is a "stable energy concentration". I cannot make any ontologically accurate assertions here (you should not take these as a claims as to how reality IS), but I can refer to different sorts of paradigms for matter to loosen some contraints that exist in almost everyones worldviews.

For example, in that spherical standing wave idea that was mentioned, fundamental particle (electron) is seen as a standing wave, much like standing waves form in, say, acoustics.

For example, look at the first three pictures:
http://www.glafreniere.com/sa_spherical.htm

The third is what happens when the first two interfere. Note how differently you assume identity to waves in each picture. In the last one you would be inclined to say there is a real persistent entity in the middle and bouncing waves around it that don't move in space. The underlying reality of such a perception could be very much different.

Here I would not agree--to attach same level of existence to "hole of doughnut" as to "photons, electrons, quarks" is a form of concept stealing, what has been called a Reification of the Zero. Physicists can cause photons to hit other photons, or electrons, or quarks and observe cause-effect events. But it is nonsense to even consider that we remove hole from donut and use it (the hole) to cause an effect on some other thing with identity.

Well, on a stable platform with a hole in the middle, the hole does have an observable effect; things fall through it. Incidentally, there are views where some particles exist as holes in space (and when we see two particles colliding and disappearing, it is in fact a case of a particle falling into that hole, filling it) I cannot remember the details, and I hope I had references but I cannot find them now. In any case, this would be just a way to handle the same system in semantically different way in ones own mind.

As of the identity of photons and electrons and quarks, no one has ever seen a photon, electron or quark per se. We measure certain behaviour, and explain that with a model where photons, electrons and quarks exist (and everyone imagine these little bit differently). With these experiments we have found many different sorts of quarks; some require higher energy levels to exist in stable manner. Andrew Pickering and many others have suggested, quite succesfully in my opinion, that quarks are not real things but artificial abstractions. One of the main motivations for this is that quarks cannot exist alone according to the models that suggest their existence. It rather looks like quarks are descriptions of certain characteristics of higher order "stable things", if you know what I mean. (Like describing a top half and the bottom half of a wave as separate entities)

This could be revealing:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0226667995/?tag=pfamazon01-20

What must not be forgotten about matter is that in experiments in particle accelerators, we can form sufficiently high energy densities to form matter, and likewise we can turn matter into energy. I think this is a good indications towards the idea that matter is a case of stable energy configuration...

...which leads us straight into what I mentioned about the identity of energy. Again, we always think of "things" with assumed identity, and likewise when you think about energy, you think about something that flows from one place to the next, much like a naive realistic fluid (i.e. if you drew dots onto the energy, you could see those dots moving). A good next step is to ask yourself, what constraints you to assume this kind of nature to energy?

http://www.need.org/needpdf/FormsofEnergy.pdf)--not[/URL] sure I am grasping your concern about energy having identity ? Finally, I find no problem with quantum mechanics and identity--so, it goes for me... existence exists and what exists must exist as some metaphysical entity with identity and the nature (dynamics) of that identity is explained by quantum mechanics.

Here you are faced with that difficult question that was one motivator for dropping identity from things in the first place. What is the identity that quantum mechanics "explain"? What does QM behaviour suggest here in your opinion? (And which interpretation is your choice, if any)

btw, I found this quote from Wikipedia entry about "Dialectic Materialism" to still be quite fitting to the present situation of quantum mechanics:

[With quantum mechanics, matter seems to disapper] 'Matter disappears' means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter disappears and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are disappearing that formerly seemed absolute, immutable and primary, and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter.

One of those properties of matter that seem to be disappearing, is its identity. At least, dropping it as a real property explains a whole lot. Not everything, but a lot.

-Anssi

 

[verdigris]

What is an illusion?What is time?
First we need to define both accurately and see if they are the same.

 

[Doctordick]

I picked up that you presented a hypothetical example where you don't yet tackle the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't know which elements of an ontology are "valid" and which are mental constructs?

You are right on the money.

Then you propose marking down all the elements (which are all valid in this example) onto a table, but how that is useful I didn't yet get...

It is useful because it allowed me to define something which fulfilled the definition of an explanation without actually defining any of the ontological elements. That turns out to be an extremely powerful construct.

Hmm, also, perhaps you can clarify another thing which I've wondered before. You have chosen to handle ontology as a set of "presents" (set of moments?), this I reckon is like defining "what exists at each moment"?

Yes, that is exactly what it "is like". Basically it says, "what is", is "what is"[/color] and nothing further is necessary to solve the problem: i.e., I have been able to construct "an explanation" which says no more than that. I am quite impressed that you managed to pick up on the underlying nature of the issue; I don't think anyone else has. There are a number of issues which I do not delineate explicitly though they are quite important. However, with regard to that very issue, you must comprehend that it provides not the first clew as to what should be expected of the future; it provides only "an explanation" for the known past. I should also point out that, from a "usefulness" perspective it is a rather worthless explanation as, being no more than a table of what to expect, it is actually far too complex and unwieldy to be useful; however, from the perspective of logical analysis, it is quite simple.

What I was trying to point out was the fact that "any explanation" is bound by exactly the same constraint: i.e., you can only prove it works for the known past; that it is to be depended upon for the future is an inductive hypothesis the analysis of which needs to be postponed until we get all our ducks in a row (so to speak). For the moment, the "explanation" I have provided has absolutely nothing to say about future events.

This is one of the most difficult things to remember when reading your text, since we are (or at least I am) so used to handle ontological elements as a set of "stable functions", i.e. instead of defining everything that ever existed in each moment, I would rather attempt to define how reality behaves.

So would we all and that is the very essence of of acceptable explanations; however, in deciding that an explanation is acceptable, we must make assumptions and it is these assumption which generally close our eyes to alternated possibilities. What I want to do is keep those alternate possibilities explicitly open. No doors are to be closed without proof that they are indeed impossible.

Would this approach be incompatible to what you are presenting (I'm not quite sure where you presentation is heading), and/or do you feel it would be presupposing too much to think it's valid to define ontology as a set of stable functions (behaviors)?

At the moment, yes; it is exactly "presupposing" too much. But what I want you to understand is that it is exactly those suppositions which can be seen as included in the view that the valid ontology consists of "what exists at each moment".

What the view you are promulgating requires is that one identify a particular ontological element at a specific "moment" (a member of an identified "present") with an ontological element at a different specific "moment" (a member of a second identified "present"). What that identification requires is that the "reference label" attached to those two (possibly different ontological elements -- different in time anyway) must be the same. What I am getting at is the fact that handling ontological elements as a set of "stable functions" is essentially exactly the same as handling everything that ever existed in each moment as different; the only difference between these two seemingly very different perspectives actually amounts to no more than establishing a specific set of numerical labels.

That is to say, any explanation of the past under examination can be mapped into the table I have specified; it just requires that the numerical labels be established (or defined). That is exactly why I make so much noise about the fact that the information defining those ontological elements must be embedded in the epistemology itself (these all important definitions arise from correlations in the set of specific labels use to express that epistemological solution).

What is really important here is that your understanding of any given specific epistemological solution consists of a finite number of specific labels (symbols for supposed valid ontological elements of the past) together with underlying presumed ontological elements not actually contained in that specific finite set (these are the presumptions in your understanding itself). The basis of your understanding is in the correlations you see in some finite set of specific labels. What I want to do is carefully examine the possibilities without closing out any alternate possibilities.

I hope you understand that I am slowly defining things that are characteristics of that numerical table which represents that generalized explanation of the past ("what is", is "what is" and nothing further[/color]). Normally I would put off the following definition until later but, at the moment, it seems you might understand the rational for such a thing right now. I define "an object" to be any collection of ontological elements held by a specific epistemological solution, to be referring to the same thing. An "acceptable" explanation of "reality" will provide expected behavior of these objects. The point of my attack is that we must carefully examine the foundation of those "acceptable" explanations before presuming existence of those objects; we need to examine the characteristics of that table which expresses the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation.

I hope you can understand what I'm asking because it is pretty hard to even think of meaningful questions... :I

As soon as you begin to understand what I am saying well enough to ask "meaningful questions", you will understand it well enough to answer those questions yourself. (I am sure you have heard that old adage, "the trick to discovering good answers is asking the right question".) Actually, we are at this moment not very far from seeing the big picture. There are only a few more subtle things you need to be aware off.

Before we can really go on, you need to be able to see your own world view as a, "what is", is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation consisting of valid ontological elements together with presumed ontological elements (which go to make up your personal past: i.e., what you know or think you know) and not concern yourself with entries to that table which are not actually specific examples of that known past. Though there is utterly no way to tell the difference between a valid ontological element and a presumed ontological element (so long as that world view is a flaw free epistemological construct) there are, nonetheless, vast differences between the two. The "valid ontological elements" must be explained by every flaw free epistemological construct, whereas the presumed ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological constructs themselves and are fundamentally free variables open to be anything you wish (so long as they are perfectly consistent with that flaw free epistemological construct).

Though you can not tell the difference, in the logical analysis of that "what is", is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation, they must be handled in a very different way. It is a common flaw in philosophical analysis to assume that, if you cannot tell the difference between two things, they cannot be handled differently. That idea is embedded in analysis of epistemological constructs and, so long as we concern ourselves with any specific epistemological construct, it is an utterly valid constraint; however, it is not true of the logical analysis of that, "what is", is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation itself.

I hope what I said doesn't confuse you too much. Tell me what you find confusing and I will try and straighten it out for you.

To the rest of you, I think you are wasting your time building epistemological constructs which can not be defended (what Kant referred to as "mock battles") so I apologize for ignoring you.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

["what is", is "what is"] is the same as saying [A] = [A], which has been known since Aristotle first defined the term as the "Law of Identity". Thus, any philosophy of ontology that begins from the premise of "what is, is what is" correctly recognizes the fundamental importance of the Law of Identity to any valid explanation of epistemology.

But, very important to realize--[A] = [A] is not the starting point of a valid explanation of ontology, what must be priori is what can be called the "Primacy of Existence"--that is, first the [A] as an ontological element must exist, but its existence does not need to be "explained" or "defined". Thus we see that while the [A] as an ontological element is outside explanation, any "set" of [A]s most clearly does need to be defined and explained. Note, as mentioned by AnssiH, the individual quark as an ontological element, a type of [A], cannot be defined or explained or even measured--only after a dialectic union of two opposite quarks, one matter and another antimatter (such as meson), can we offer a definition or explanation or measurement of the entity called "quark" (eg., that it has asymptotic freedom, always found as matter + antimatter, etc.)

About "explanation"--what does it mean ? Suppose you are asked to "explain" to a child how to put together a 10 piece puzzle. Where do you start ? You start with existence--you point to 10 ontological elements on the table but you have no need at all to "define" or "explain" any of them--they are, what they are, elements of the puzzle that exist. The child understands this. What you define is the "set of elements" and the "state" they are in--call it "disorder" on the table. The child understands this also--for does anyone know disorder better than a child ? Next you show how any 2 of the 10 elements can be joined together--that is, you show how to remove disorder from the system. Most children will understand this. You then have the child at it, you tell them to keep removing disorder until a final state of complete order is reached (all 10 elements are together). Not all children will reach the final state--but note that reaching the final state of order is also outside the explanation. Thus a priori to any "explanation" is "existence" of valid elements in disorder, and a posteriori to any explanation is existence again, but now either as elements continued in some degree of disorder or in complete order.

So I say, to "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how to obtain order from disorder.​

 

[Rade]

...What must not be forgotten about matter is that in experiments in particle accelerators, we can form sufficiently high energy densities to form matter, and likewise we can turn matter into energy. I think this is a good indications towards the idea that matter is a case of stable energy configuration...which leads us straight into what I mentioned about the identity of energy. Again, we always think of "things" with assumed identity, and likewise when you think about energy, you think about something that flows from one place to the next, much like a naive realistic fluid (i.e. if you drew dots onto the energy, you could see those dots moving). A good next step is to ask yourself, what constraints you to assume this kind of nature to energy?

I find the thoughts here to be of interest to the question on the relation of matter and energy:

There is no energy in matter other than that received from the environment." — Nikola Tesla

...Here you are faced with that difficult question that was one motivator for dropping identity from things in the first place. What is the identity that quantum mechanics "explain"? What does QM behavior suggest here in your opinion? (And which interpretation is your choice, if any)...

imo, it is not a concern for philosophic discussion what is the "identity" of reality--that is up to the physicists to determine. It is, what it is--as we have been informed by good Dr.D., eg, reality has identity, A = A. The reason I now hold to QM is because it meshes well with my view that whatever the identity of reality is, it will be found to be a simple yet beautiful dialectic union on opposites--and here then I find union with the principle of complementarity of Bohr where he suggested that existence can be understood only in terms of "concepts" that come in complementary pairs of opposites that are inextricably connected by a Heisenberg-like uncertainty principle--which leads to the QM view of the superposition--this is for me what "QM suggests" about identity of reality--the reality of the Dialectic.

...One of those properties of matter that seem to be disappearing, is its identity. At least, dropping it as a real property explains a whole lot. Not everything, but a lot...

But if we do decide to drop identity from matter and move philosophy forward, we end with a philosophy where [A] does NOT = [A], where "what is, is NOT what is", where what exists does NOT exist as a some"thing" but only as a no"thing", and then poor Dr.D. left with no philosophy at all for then there be no"thing" to explain.

 

[Doctordick]

You apparently don't wish to work with my definition! That's fine with me; I just wonder why you are bothering to read my posts.

So I say, to "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how to obtain order from disorder.​

If that is your position, then why don't you go ahead and use it to show the world what interesting consequences can be deduced from that definition?

Oh, I'm sorry; that's right, you're not interested in deducing anything, you are exactly the person Kant was talking about:

... as seen by Kant ... "for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and, what is the worst, in groping among mere concepts."

You just want to build a mock battle for the fun of it don't you. It would be nice if you would rather think about things a little.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...If that is your position, then why don't you go ahead and use it to show the world what interesting consequences can be deduced from that definition? ...

But Dear Dr., I just did, and what a very interesting and entertaining consequence it was indeed.

 

[Rade]

Let me use comments from Dr. D post #354 to show how Dr. D. philosophy of "explanation" is falsified from what I will call Allegory of Puzzle--see my post # 364.

1. We start with premise that the problem to be solved is understanding how to explain to a child how to put together a 10 piece puzzle (post #364).

2. From Dr. D. (post #354) we are informed...the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements (VOE)...so clearly the 10 puzzle pieces represent the finite set of VOEs that he talks about.

3. But next we read from Dr. D. what I will call logical error #1 that...I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements... But, then, clearly, what Dr. D. is considering (that is, all text in post # 354 after this statement) is null and void of any meaning for the simple reason that the problem to be solved here (eg., understanding how to explain to a child the process of putting together a 10 piece puzzle) is neither "unrealistic" nor "hypothetical". What this informs, is that, whatever philosophy Dr.D. has put together, it cannot be applied to what is both realistic and non-hypothetical such as the simplistic puzzle problem discussed here.

4. Next from Dr. D. we are informed...no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists)...So, here we find logical error of Dr. D. #2 for clearly there is 0.0 % possibility that there exists an VOE puzzle piece of which we are ignorant in the problem here to be solved.

In conclusion, I find that the philosophy of Dr. D. is thus falsified by the fact that it cannot be applied to solve the realistic and non-hypothetical problem of understanding how to explain to a child the process of putting together a 10 piece puzzle.

 

[Rade]

Originally Posted by Rade:
So I say, to "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how to obtain order from disorder.

But I now find that what I say above is incomplete, for it does not apply to the situation (using the 10 piece puzzle example) of dissociation of the whole puzzle into the 10 pieces. So, let me revise and now say:

To "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how a passing-away of a "this" is a coming-to-be of a "that" (something other than a "this"), AND a coming-to-be of a "this" is a passing-away of a "that".

All laws of physics are a solution to this definition of explanation itself.

 

[AnssiH]

So would we all and that is the very essence of of acceptable explanations; however, in deciding that an explanation is acceptable, we must make assumptions and it is these assumption which generally close our eyes to alternated possibilities. What I want to do is keep those alternate possibilities explicitly open. No doors are to be closed without proof that they are indeed impossible.

Okay. Will we find it possible to close any doors at all?

At the moment, yes; it is exactly "presupposing" too much. But what I want you to understand is that it is exactly those suppositions which can be seen as included in the view that the valid ontology consists of "what exists at each moment".

What the view you are promulgating requires is that one identify a particular ontological element at a specific "moment" (a member of an identified "present") with an ontological element at a different specific "moment" (a member of a second identified "present"). What that identification requires is that the "reference label" attached to those two (possibly different ontological elements -- different in time anyway) must be the same. What I am getting at is the fact that handling ontological elements as a set of "stable functions" is essentially exactly the same as handling everything that ever existed in each moment as different; the only difference between these two seemingly very different perspectives actually amounts to no more than establishing a specific set of numerical labels.

Okay, yeah, this actually reminds me a lot about what I've said about the fallacy of identity, about how it is inherent to our worldviews to handle things by identifying some "patterns" as the "same thing" through time. That is to say, I can easily imagine one might simply choose to view reality in terms of each moment being defined separately, if that seems to be useful for whatever purpose (like for the purpose of the analysis you are describing :)

That is to say, any explanation of the past under examination can be mapped into the table I have specified; it just requires that the numerical labels be established (or defined). That is exactly why I make so much noise about the fact that the information defining those ontological elements must be embedded in the epistemology itself (these all important definitions arise from correlations in the set of specific labels use to express that epistemological solution).

What is really important here is that your understanding of any given specific epistemological solution consists of a finite number of specific labels (symbols for supposed valid ontological elements of the past) together with underlying presumed ontological elements not actually contained in that specific finite set (these are the presumptions in your understanding itself). The basis of your understanding is in the correlations you see in some finite set of specific labels. What I want to do is carefully examine the possibilities without closing out any alternate possibilities.

I hope you understand that I am slowly defining things that are characteristics of that numerical table which represents that generalized explanation of the past ("what is", is "what is" and nothing further[/color]). Normally I would put off the following definition until later but, at the moment, it seems you might understand the rational for such a thing right now. I define "an object" to be any collection of ontological elements held by a specific epistemological solution, to be referring to the same thing. An "acceptable" explanation of "reality" will provide expected behavior of these objects. The point of my attack is that we must carefully examine the foundation of those "acceptable" explanations before presuming existence of those objects;

Again we are in luck; I can indeed understand the rationale behind this view, since it happens to correspond closely to how I tend to see all that business regaring what our worldviews are like and what their consequent limitations are.

One thing though, just to be sure, when you say "...collection of ontological elements referring to the same thing...", you refer to the way we understand "objects" or "entities" according to a set of (its) properties (functions/characteristics/behaviour). Be it a "ball" or "space"?

Before we can really go on, you need to be able to see your own world view as a, "what is", is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation consisting of valid ontological elements together with presumed ontological elements (which go to make up your personal past: i.e., what you know or think you know) and not concern yourself with entries to that table which are not actually specific examples of that known past. Though there is utterly no way to tell the difference between a valid ontological element and a presumed ontological element (so long as that world view is a flaw free epistemological construct) there are, nonetheless, vast differences between the two. The "valid ontological elements" must be explained by every flaw free epistemological construct, whereas the presumed ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological constructs themselves and are fundamentally free variables open to be anything you wish (so long as they are perfectly consistent with that flaw free epistemological construct).

Yes this sounds very reasonable again.

Though you can not tell the difference, in the logical analysis of that "what is", is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation, they must be handled in a very different way. It is a common flaw in philosophical analysis to assume that, if you cannot tell the difference between two things, they cannot be handled differently. That idea is embedded in analysis of epistemological constructs and, so long as we concern ourselves with any specific epistemological construct, it is an utterly valid constraint; however, it is not true of the logical analysis of that, "what is", is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation itself.

Hmmm, ok, is this leading to a way to analyze a number of different flawless solutions together to come up with further conclusions than any single one could produce alone?

I hope what I said doesn't confuse you too much. Tell me what you find confusing and I will try and straighten it out for you.

Well obviously there are few things that I cannot be quite sure about, but I think we can proceed further and things will get straighten out.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

I find the thoughts here to be of interest to the question on the relation of matter and energy:

There is no energy in matter other than that received from the environment." — Nikola Tesla

I am not familiar with the quote and don't know what Nikola had in mind when he said that. Nevertheless sounds like a reasonable assertion :)

imo, it is not a concern for philosophic discussion what is the "identity" of reality--that is up to the physicists to determine. It is, what it is--as we have been informed by good Dr.D., eg, reality has identity, A = A. The reason I now hold to QM is because it meshes well with my view that whatever the identity of reality is, it will be found to be a simple yet beautiful dialectic union on opposites--and here then I find union with the principle of complementarity of Bohr where he suggested that existence can be understood only in terms of "concepts" that come in complementary pairs of opposites that are inextricably connected by a Heisenberg-like uncertainty principle--which leads to the QM view of the superposition--this is for me what "QM suggests" about identity of reality--the reality of the Dialectic.

Well, one thing that seems to follow from the fact that our worldview begins with assumptions is that we must invent concepts in juxtapositions with each others before they can make any sense. A single concept cannot make sense alone, but its meaning is wholly defined by other concepts and vice versa. That is to say, when you form a concept about "solid things", that also entails you form a conception of things that are not solid. You cannot know what some conception means without also knowing what it doesn't mean; you cannot know what something is without also knowing what it isn't.

I've wondered before whether this has got a connections to our inability to understand QM in an explicit sense, but it doesn't seem so. For example, the concepts used in Copenhagen interpretation are fairly standard concepts that most everyone understands; just they are arranged in a very surprising way. It can be quite revealing to realize that we must always use "everyday concepts" in any explanation about quantum realm. We don't really have any other concepts; new concepts like "superposition", are concepts that are synthesized from everyday concepts (of position and time)

At any rate, I have two serious objections to what you said.

1. You are referring to just one very specific interpretation of QM when you talk about superpositions and complementary. There are other interpretations, and Copenhagen is receiving way too much attention in my opinion, just because it was the first proper interpretation (and because Bohr pushed it so strongly that it became an intimate part of QM culture)

2. You don't necessarily even need to say that Bohr's views point at the "reality of a dialectic". To me they seem to point at epistemology rather than to ontology. You must at least accept it is wholly possible it is only the limitation of our "intelligence" that things come in complementary pairs, not an actual limitation of reality.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi AnssiH, I only have time for a quick and dirty response as my wife and I are leaving for the East Coast this afternoon. My brother in law died (old age – congestive heart failure) this last weekend and I need to attend the funeral. Beginning to feel a bit mortal.

I am actually quite astonished as too how well you have picked up on my presentation. Looking back over some of my older posts (all my posts have to do with exactly the same issue) I think I may have learned a little about how to present these ideas; however, to date you seem to understand what I am saying a lot better than anyone else.

Okay. Will we find it possible to close any doors at all?

Oh yes, we are going to close a whole slew of them not far down the line.

One thing though, just to be sure, when you say "...collection of ontological elements referring to the same thing...", you refer to the way we understand "objects" or "entities" according to a set of (its) properties (functions/characteristics/behaviour). Be it a "ball" or "space"?

The "collection of ontological elements" consists of whatever those ontological elements happen to be. If the epistemological construct is built upon ontological elements which you would prefer to label "conventional objects" that is fine. If you want to include "properties" as a fundamental ontological concept then my definition of an object would include that. I define an object to be any collection of ontological elements which are going to be considered to exist at different times. That is a pure outcome of a defined epistemological construct.

Hmmm, ok, is this leading to a way to analyze a number of different flawless solutions together to come up with further conclusions than any single one could produce alone?

I want you to consider the set of all possible flawless epistemological solutions to your known past: the set of all possible world views consistent with what you know. What is important here is that every one of those solutions must also be consistent with the "what is" is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation I have already discussed. Just as you cannot prove the "brain in a vat" explanation of reality is wrong, you cannot prove the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] is the wrong explanation. It should be clear to you that every conceivable explanation of reality can be seen as no more than a specific example of that, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation together with a collection of mental fabrications necessary to create the rules that allows that particular explanation to explain your experiences[/color] (essentially fulfilling the need for cause).

But there is one great advantage to that "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation. That advantage is that it requires no more than a set of reference labels for each and every ontological element going to make up each and every present going to make up your past (note that time has become a very personal thing here, having almost nothing to do with objective reality and everything to do with your interpretation of objective reality -- a mere mental tool for handling the issue of changing knowledge). Note that absolutely every flaw free epistemological construct must explain those "valid ontological elements": i.e., the rules deduced from those mental fabrications must allow those mental fabrications to constrain "what exists" to "what exists" without allowing alternate possibilities.

It is that final comment which should make it quite clear to you that no explanation actually explains anything beyond the known past (how the leopard got its spots), a clearly finite number of questions. That any specific explanation answers any questions outside the known past is an unprovable assumption. In the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation, these answers are no more than a finite table of answers. We have the answer "yes it exists" for every specific collection of valid ontological elements going to make up a specific "present". Since we can use numerical labels for those elements and the number "one" for "it exists", the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation can be seen as a simple tabular representation of a mathematical function. That is why I defined "an explanation" to be "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information". Under that definition, the tabular representation of the explanation yields exactly that "known information", plus some additional table entries for those fabricated elements which can, for the moment, be ignored as they are pure illusions required by that specific epistemological solution. What classical explanations yield which the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation does not yield, is one's expectations for the future (what we do not know).

From the perspective of the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation, the future is no more than an additional present being added to the known past: another collection of "valid ontological elements" or (from the perspective of undefined ontological elements) another set of numerical labels. What I am getting at is the fact that all explanation may be seen as mathematical functions which, besides reproducing that "what is" is "what is"[/color] tabular solution, also yield answers for configurations outside the known past.

If you can understand that, I will start doing some manipulation on those numerical labels and prove some very surprising constraints which must exist on any flaw free epistemological solution.

I should be back next week -- Dick

 

[tehno]

What would left of our physical theories without concept of time?If illusion ,that would be very useful one.
It's another thing that the concept of time needs better understanding.
What one doesn't understand enough shouldn't be called an illusion.
Is energy also illusion?I don't care if it is as long as it is very useful one.

 

[Doctordick]

What would left of our physical theories without concept of time?If illusion ,that would be very useful one.
It's another thing that the concept of time needs better understanding.
What one doesn't understand enough shouldn't be called an illusion.
Is energy also illusion?I don't care if it is as long as it is very useful one.

What would you call a mental construct which has no basis in reality? And I agree with you; I also care not a whit if it is useful. My point is that you certainly can't prove it is not an illusion. That being the case, we certainly have a conundrum on our hands: if it is indeed an illusion, why is it that all theories regard it as necessary?

Have fun -- Dick

 

[baywax]

if it (time) is indeed an illusion, why is it that all theories regard it as necessary?

Have fun -- Dick

The same reason a carpenter finds a measuring system necessary. Measurements are illusionary increments that only exist as mental constructs. The actual natural environment has no inch or yard or cubit measuring markers on it. We devised a measuring system to coordinate the actions of explorers, traders and builders. Measurement was conceived for trading fairness, so that scale drawings could become structures and relative distances calculated. But, the actual systems of measurement remain a simple mental construct. They are all an illusion that grew in importance until they became tools.

That's what's happened with time measurement. I wouldn't be surprised if the many theories that depend on the construct of time exist soley to justify the mental construct of time.

But what I'd ask is this: If an illusion becomes useful (in the manner of a tool) and is used by a majority of the people is it still an illusion? Or has it become a tangible tool that yields tangible results?

 

[Rade]

While we wait for Dr. D. to return (and Dr. D. I am truly sorry to hear about loss of your family member) let me put forward my problem about the "definition" of "explanation itself" being used by Dr. D.

He informs that his definition is:

explanation itself = "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information".​

But I ask three questions...

1. Is explanation itself always "a method" ?

For example, the word "method" has the meaning of being a "regular" "orderly" "logical" [way of doing something]. But I ask, cannot at least some explanation be non-regular, non-orderly, non-logical ? I think the answer to be yes, thus I find that Dr. D. errors when he claims that explanation itself is always "a method".

2. Must the goal of explanation itself always be to "obtain expectations" ?

For example, even if we we want "expectation" to be the outcome of explanation itself--why "must" it always be "obtained" ? Second, why must "expectation" always be the outcome of explanation, why cannot my explanation of some thing (X) be given to person (Y) with no thought of "expectation" at all ?

3. Must explanation itself only derive from "known information"

For example, why cannot the human mind obtain expectations from intuition--which is information not known but open to possibility of communication ?

I think one must allow for the possibility that the answers to any or all of the three questions above is NO. And, if I am correct, then Dr. D. does not have a valid definition of explanation itself from which to derive his philosophy.

Also while we wait, some may find this review of "explanation itself" to be of use as we attempt to understand the philosophy being presented by Dr. D.:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/explanat.htm

 

[Doctordick]

I am very sorry Rade, but in my opinion, you are a complete idiot. You strike me as giving utterly no thought at all to any of your complaints.

1. Is explanation itself always "a method" ?

Does not every explanation you are aware of explicitly tell you how to arrive at answers to your questions? And are not those answers a statement of your expectations?

... thus I find that Dr. D. errors when he claims that explanation itself is always "a method".

Can you provide an explanation of something which does not provide a "method" of obtaining answers?

2. Must the goal of explanation itself always be to "obtain expectations" ?

And what would you propose to be the purpose of "an explanation"?

... why cannot my explanation of some thing (X) be given to person (Y) with no thought of "expectation" at all ?

And what purpose would such an explanation serve?

3. Must explanation itself only derive from "known information"

If it is not derived from something you know, what else would it be derived from?

For example, why cannot the human mind obtain expectations from intuition--which is information not known but open to possibility of communication ?

And exactly where does this "intuition" come from?

Also while we wait, some may find this review of "explanation itself" to be of use as we attempt to understand the philosophy being presented by Dr. D.:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/explanat.htm

Rade, I sincerely doubt your ability to comprehend anything deeper than "boy that feels good".

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Does not every explanation you are aware of explicitly tell you how to arrive at answers to your questions? And are not those answers a statement of your expectations?

Of course the answers to these simple minded questions are no. I provide one example--you tell me how the explanation given in the example "explicitly" tells you how to arrive at the answer to the question:

Question: Was Smith invited ?
Explanation: Everybody was invited.

 

[Rade]

...And exactly where does this "intuition" come from?

Are you saying you do not know, or that you hold that "intuition" must come from "known information" ? If the latter, you would be incorrect, for philosophic "intuitivism" comes in many different forms--see as one example "intrinsicism":http://www.ismbook.com/intrinsicism.html

 

[AnssiH]

Hi AnssiH, I only have time for a quick and dirty response as my wife and I are leaving for the East Coast this afternoon. My brother in law died (old age – congestive heart failure) this last weekend and I need to attend the funeral. Beginning to feel a bit mortal.

I'm 26 and I've been feeling little bit too mortal for the last 10 years :P I can't imagine what's it going to be some 50 years from now... Or perhaps I can, I just don't want to :/

Anyway, I was away for a while too, but back now...

I am actually quite astonished as too how well you have picked up on my presentation. Looking back over some of my older posts (all my posts have to do with exactly the same issue) I think I may have learned a little about how to present these ideas; however, to date you seem to understand what I am saying a lot better than anyone else.

It's propably largely because of similarities in our worldviews. Although we are using little bit different language to discuss these issues.

And yeah, communicating your ideas to others can always be little bit tricky, especially if you've become so accustomed to your very personal terminology and definitions that every sentence that seems simple and straightforward to you is anything but to the others. This often hapens and it is obviously a very serious issue hindering communication. It is not trivial to overcome it though. Perhaps it's sometimes helpful to try and explain the issue from a completely different angle to people?

I want you to consider the set of all possible flawless epistemological solutions to your known past: the set of all possible world views consistent with what you know. What is important here is that every one of those solutions must also be consistent with the "what is" is "what is"[/color] tabular explanation I have already discussed. Just as you cannot prove the "brain in a vat" explanation of reality is wrong, you cannot prove the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] is the wrong explanation. It should be clear to you that every conceivable explanation of reality can be seen as no more than a specific example of that, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation together with a collection of mental fabrications necessary to create the rules that allows that particular explanation to explain your experiences[/color] (essentially fulfilling the need for cause).

But there is one great advantage to that "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation. That advantage is that it requires no more than a set of reference labels for each and every ontological element going to make up each and every present going to make up your past (note that time has become a very personal thing here, having almost nothing to do with objective reality and everything to do with your interpretation of objective reality -- a mere mental tool for handling the issue of changing knowledge). Note that absolutely every flaw free epistemological construct must explain those "valid ontological elements": i.e., the rules deduced from those mental fabrications must allow those mental fabrications to constrain "what exists" to "what exists" without allowing alternate possibilities.

It is that final comment which should make it quite clear to you that no explanation actually explains anything beyond the known past (how the leopard got its spots), a clearly finite number of questions. That any specific explanation answers any questions outside the known past is an unprovable assumption. In the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation, these answers are no more than a finite table of answers. We have the answer "yes it exists" for every specific collection of valid ontological elements going to make up a specific "present". Since we can use numerical labels for those elements and the number "one" for "it exists", the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation can be seen as a simple tabular representation of a mathematical function. That is why I defined "an explanation" to be "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information". Under that definition, the tabular representation of the explanation yields exactly that "known information", plus some additional table entries for those fabricated elements which can, for the moment, be ignored as they are pure illusions required by that specific epistemological solution. What classical explanations yield which the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation does not yield, is one's expectations for the future (what we do not know).

From the perspective of the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation, the future is no more than an additional present being added to the known past: another collection of "valid ontological elements" or (from the perspective of undefined ontological elements) another set of numerical labels. What I am getting at is the fact that all explanation may be seen as mathematical functions which, besides reproducing that "what is" is "what is"[/color] tabular solution, also yield answers for configurations outside the known past.

If you can understand that, I will start doing some manipulation on those numerical labels and prove some very surprising constraints which must exist on any flaw free epistemological solution.

Well I can't see anything wrong in the text, but I'm not sure if I understand everything correctly either. Let's get to the manipulation and we'll see if I can understand any of that.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

I'm 26 and I've been feeling little bit too mortal for the last 10 years :P I can't imagine what's it going to be some 50 years from now... Or perhaps I can, I just don't want to :/

The biggest difference is that time goes by a lot quicker. They say time flies when your having fun so I guess I am having fun.

It's propably largely because of similarities in our worldviews. Although we are using little bit different language to discuss these issues.

At least you seem to have thought about the same issues which bothered me when I was young. It's nice to know you are only 26 as, if I can reach you, you'll have a long time to present it to others. Paul seems to understand a lot of it but he is almost as old as I am and teaching what I have discovered to him is pretty much a waste of time (other than teaching me how not to express my ideas).

Perhaps it's sometimes helpful to try and explain the issue from a completely different angle to people?

I have tried a number of different attacks and achieved mostly failure, but I am certainly willing to put things in a different perspective if it will help.

Well I can't see anything wrong in the text, but I'm not sure if I understand everything correctly either. Let's get to the manipulation and we'll see if I can understand any of that.

The single most important part of the post you quote is my comment that "all explanations may be seen as mathematical functions".

What I am getting at is the fact that all explanation may be seen as mathematical functions which, besides reproducing that "what is" is "what is"[/color] tabular solution, also yield answers for configurations outside the known past.

(My use of a "singular" for "explanation" in the post was a typing error.) Since the "reference labels" being used are taken from the set of numbers (their definitions being deduced from the structure of the explanation itself) and the expectations are to be (true/false) specifications on a particular set of numbers as an entry in that tabular representation, the method can be seen as a mathematical function: i.e., the method of obtaining expectations (an explanation) is a mathematical function (it converts a set of numbers into a specific number). What you should remember here is that these numbers are mere references and that their mathematical nature has nothing at all to do with the problem other than allowing us to define specific manipulations of those labels.

Other than that, before we go on, you need to understand the nature of symmetries and the power of what is called "symmetry arguments". I tried several times to introduce that issue on this forum with little success. My first attempt was a post almost three years ago on the "Theory Development" thread (used to be referred to by the mentors as the "Nuts Are Us" thread). I think I was the major reason the thread was removed from the forum.

What I would like you to do is to read a portion of the "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" thread. About two years ago, it seemed that I had the interest of a one "saviormachine". I started make a serious presentation of my ideas but saviormachine apparently lost interest shortly before I finished and the exchange went nowhere. Nonetheless, I would like you to read a few posts from that thread (it's easier than reposting the same information again).

Since there are a large number of intervening posts, I will give you a list of of the specific posts I am referring to:
02/10/05 --- My opening mention of symmetry to saviormachine:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=458593#post458593[/URL][/center]
Followed immediately with a comment by selfAdjoint.

02/10/05 --- My response to selfAdjoint on the difference between ignorance and indifference:
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=459227#post459227[/URL][/center]

02/20/05 --- An attempt to explain to saviormachine how undefined elements (which I have come to call "ontological" elements) are used to define important entities (which I now call "objects"). I personally feel this is a very important post and you should try to think about it seriously.
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=467528#post467528[/URL][/center]
Most important point, "Remember, my sole purpose is to establish the parameters on my thoughts which will assure me that I am not inadvertently presuming information I do not have."

Just take a look at those posts and see if what I say makes sense to you. It is my opinion that it is only symmetry issue which is of paramount insterest at this moment; however, they do bring up some important concepts. I know you don't know much math but symmetry is a very important issue and it would be quite valuable to take a look at [URL=http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html][URL='https://www.physicsforums.com/insights/author/john-baez/']John Baez[/URL]'s web site[/URL].

If you have any questions about the sense of those posts I will do my best to clarify my position.

Looking forward to further discussion on the issue of symmetry -- Dick​

 

[Rade]

Good Dr. D.--a question. On one of the threads you mention I note this definition you provide for "explanation"

...So I define an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us...

So clearly, your concept of "explanation" is constrained--that is, you hold that "explanation itself" must be silent about "events experienced". Thus, you hold that if you experience the event (A), based on your definition above, it is logically impossible for you to "explain" (A).

Now, of course, from the many posts you have made in this present thread it is clear that you now offer a contradictory definition of explanation than the one above:

.. explanation itself = "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information"...

So, my question, what happened to the "events not yet experienced" constraint ? Why have you done a flip flop so that you now hold that if you experience (A) you logically can explain (A) ?

Now, my explanation for this observation of your sloppy use of "definition itself" is that (1) you flip flop your definition of "explanation itself" to fit the needs of your argument; (2) either the first (in blue) or second (in red) definition above is a false statement--if so, kindly inform all of us which one is false and the reason why you once (in the past) attempted to develop a philosophy of undefined ontology from a false definition of "explanation itself".

 

[Doctordick]

Now, my explanation for this observation of your sloppy use of "definition itself" is that (1) you flip flop your definition of "explanation itself" to fit the needs of your argument; (2) either the first (in blue) or second (in red) definition above is a false statement--if so, kindly inform all of us which one is false and the reason why you once (in the past) attempted to develop a philosophy of undefined ontology from a false definition of "explanation itself".

No, that is not at all the correct explanation of my so called "sloppy use". Your problem is no more than a total inability to comprehend what I a talking about and I am quite confident that this post will do little to alleviate that problem as I am, at this point, pretty well convinced that understanding what I say is simply beyond your mental abilities; however, for the sake of those who cannot see that fact, I will point out the difference between the two issues you bring up.

I have defined an explanation to be a method of obtaining expectations from known information. I have defined the past to be "what is known", the future to be "what is not known" and the present to be "a change in what is known". Having done that, it should be clear that "the past" can be seen as a collection of presents. Since "the past" is (by definition) known, my expectations for the past are known; however, in analyzing an explanation of that past every present going to make up that past must be in agreement with that explanation under the view that all subsequent "presents" lie in the future. The "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation of the past satisfies this perspective perfectly. It makes no predictions whatsoever for the next present but yields an exact yes/no answer for every "known past" in that analysis. That is a fact.

The difficulty with the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation which makes it unacceptable is that it yields no expectations whatsoever for the future and it thus has very little value; however, what must be recognized is that every acceptable explanation can be seen as a specific "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation where the labels have all been defined.

What is important is to comprehend here is that absolutely any explanation must yield the correct expectations for what is already known before we even begin to worry about expectations for the future. The only apparent problem (with regard to this issue) here is that, in my original solution, I began with the simplified case where all ontological elements in that past (what is known) were "valid ontological elements" and it is quite clear to anyone that, what we think we know, probably includes a great number of "invalid ontological elements". In the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation of the past, this is actually a rather trivial issue as it really amounts to no more than a number of invalid entries in that collection of labels going to make of the past (what is known). That is to say, any acceptable explanation must still yield the correct expectation for those valid ontological elements. It just must also yield acceptable expectations for those invalid ontological elements the explanation presumed were valid. This fact does not allow any additional acceptable explanations, it instead only reduces the number of possibilities being considered in that "by guess and by golly" procedure used by everyone.

What we want to know is a way of introducing the simplest set of "invalid ontological elements" which will constrain the "valid ontological" elements to what we know without eliminating any possibilities for the future (what we do not know).

That is really quite a simple problem once you begin to understand what you are trying to do.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Ivan Seeking]

This exchange is in violation of the forum's posting guidelines. Please refrain from making personal insults.

 

[Doctordick]

This exchange is in violation of the forum's posting guidelines. Please refrain from making personal insults.

I am sorry, sometimes I get a little emotional. I was very disappointed by your post. I will put Rade on my ignore list so I won't be driven to such improprieties again.

 

[AnssiH]

I thought I'd drop in a sign of life since I've been silent for so long and didn't get the chance to drop a line last weekend.

At least you seem to have thought about the same issues which bothered me when I was young.

Yeah, for me, all the stuff about how we don't really know much but merely assume a self-coherent worldview, is something that really got crystallized when I was considering some aspects of AI systems. You are really forced to ask what knowledge is, and where it comes from when you think about something like AI. And there appears to be quite a few people in the AI field who are kind of having similar ideas, although there also are a lot of people whose philosophy tends to lean towards "absolute knowledge" of some sort (if I got a penny every time I hear "but of course photons exist; we can objectively measure them!").

btw, I have also used the "words defined in dictionaries by other words" as an analogy when trying to explain how our worldviews are internally coherent but completely circular constructions... ...without much success I guess :)

Anyway, that kind of "relative knowledge"-philosophy turned out to be incredibly powerful not only in explaining various problems regarding intelligence (creativity) and subjective experience (getting rid of naive realism completely), but also in giving better idea about what physical models are and how they should be viewed if one wishes to stay objective at all.

I have tried a number of different attacks and achieved mostly failure, but I am certainly willing to put things in a different perspective if it will help.

Yeah, it's just that the difficult part is to know what that good perspective would be... It kind of differs from person to person a bit, depening on what kind of worldview each individual might have...

Also a tiny bit of psychology can help, for example if there's any way to interpret someone's comments in a way that I could agree with them, I usually do just that. Often times people concentrate on their presentation of their own view so fully that they can't hear anything you are saying. But once you say you agree, they actually start paying attention to what you are saying. Then I tell them in what way I agree with them, and maybe, just maybe they understand what I'm saying.

Of course that doesn't always help since sometimes it's just impossible to agree with some painfully incoherent ideas no matter which way I choose to look at them...

The single most important part of the post you quote is my comment that "all explanations may be seen as mathematical functions".
(My use of a "singular" for "explanation" in the post was a typing error.) Since the "reference labels" being used are taken from the set of numbers (their definitions being deduced from the structure of the explanation itself) and the expectations are to be (true/false) specifications on a particular set of numbers as an entry in that tabular representation, the method can be seen as a mathematical function: i.e., the method of obtaining expectations (an explanation) is a mathematical function (it converts a set of numbers into a specific number). What you should remember here is that these numbers are mere references and that their mathematical nature has nothing at all to do with the problem other than allowing us to define specific manipulations of those labels.

Other than that, before we go on, you need to understand the nature of symmetries and the power of what is called "symmetry arguments". I tried several times to introduce that issue on this forum with little success. My first attempt was a post almost three years ago on the "Theory Development" thread8

Well I understand what you mean by the symmetries in physical models being cases of some information missing; not being able to differentiate between some things.

I don't know where this is leading, but I'll just briefly explain how I view it, since I would choose to state the epistemological side of the issue little bit differently than you did in the old post (although I don't think this really has any relevant effect to the method you are proposing, but I think it is such fundamental aspect of our "knowledge" that I'll state it anyway). You said; "there exists only one thing which can produce knowledge from nothing; the comprehension of symmetry".

One of the problems regarding AI systems (and brain) was; when it builds a worldview, how could it build one if it begins with nothing? Somehow it ends up to classify reality into "sensible objects" (assume identity to objects in its model of reality), but it cannot just state (internally) that something is "a ball", unless it has assumed some definition about what a "ball" is. And it cannot make such a defninition unless it defines other things, telling, for example, what a ball is not. I.e. ball is not a cube.

Likewise, the cube can defined by what it is not (a ball). There are more complex associations than just "juxtapositioned pairs", but this is one way to start with nothing and the end result is that completely self-supporting worldview where no knowledge exists independently (=no knowledge is really "objective"), and of course nothing constraints you to use such concepts as "balls" and "cubes" at all.

So, one pair of concepts that arises in this sort of "concept development" would be "symmetry" & "difference". That is to say, the comprehension of symmetry doesn't seem to be "the only way to produce knowledge" in an epistemological sense. I would rather say "symmetry" is just one (low-level) concept that can be used as a tool in our logic.

Given Noether's theorem (which I didn't know about), perhaps you rather meant to say something like, the comprehension of symmetry is what makes it possible to build physical models, i.e. to describe physical systems/laws mathematically? I can kind of superficially understand what the theorem is saying.

What I would like you to do is to read a portion of the "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" thread. About two years ago, it seemed that I had the interest of a one "saviormachine". I started make a serious presentation of my ideas but saviormachine apparently lost interest shortly before I finished and the exchange went nowhere. Nonetheless, I would like you to read a few posts from that thread (it's easier than reposting the same information again).

Since there are a large number of intervening posts, I will give you a list of of the specific posts I am referring to:
02/10/05 --- My opening mention of symmetry to saviormachine:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=458593#post458593[/URL][/center]
Followed immediately with a comment by selfAdjoint.

02/10/05 --- My response to selfAdjoint on the difference between ignorance and indifference:
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=459227#post459227[/URL][/center]

02/20/05 --- An attempt to explain to saviormachine how undefined elements (which I have come to call "ontological" elements) are used to define important entities (which I now call "objects"). I personally feel this is a very important post and you should try to think about it seriously.
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=467528#post467528[/URL][/center]
Most important point, "Remember, my sole purpose is to establish the parameters on my thoughts which will assure me that I am not inadvertently presuming information I do not have."[/QUOTE]

Yeah it makes sense and it kind of makes me want to ask your opinion on one particular way to model inertia as non-fundamental (which obviously would have rather far reaching consequences), especially since you have studied physics AND can understand models are models... But we'll get to that later I guess.

[QUOTE]Just take a look at those posts and see if what I say makes sense to you. It is my opinion that it is only symmetry issue which is of paramount insterest at this moment; however, they do bring up some important concepts. I know you don't know much math but symmetry is a very important issue and it would be quite valuable to take a look at [URL=http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html][URL='https://www.physicsforums.com/insights/author/john-baez/']John Baez[/URL]'s web site[/URL]. [/QUOTE]

After viewing it once, I can kind of superficially understand it. I don't really have a clear picture but I can kind of understand how an idea of something being symmetrical should yield something being conserved as well... Hmmm... Well let me just state where I'm at:

1. Symmetry can be seen as a case of not knowing the differences
2. Symmetry can be and has been used to get conserved quantities
3. Since a particular symmetry may have been a case of unobservable but real differences... this has got obvious (ontological) implications to the those conserved quantities that were derived from that symmetry.

Something like that?

-Anssi​

 

[Doctordick]

I thought I'd drop in a sign of life since I've been silent for so long and didn't get the chance to drop a line last weekend.

Thank you, I needed that. Believe me I very much appreciate that "sign of life". You are truly astonishing in that you seem to be exactly what I expected everyone to be forty years ago and, except for Paul (who is almost as old as I am) I have failed to find anywhere. Most disappointing was that I couldn't find any professional physicists who were open to my thoughts. And you are young yet. What more could a man ask. I was 26 when I entered graduate school (that was after I got out of the army -- GI bill thing). You have absolutely no idea how young you are! As I often say, "youth is wasted on the young they have no appreciation of it at all!"

All I can really say about your post is that you seem to be thinking along the same lines I am.

... although there also are a lot of people whose philosophy tends to lean towards "absolute knowledge" of some sort (if I got a penny every time I hear "but of course photons exist; we can objectively measure them!").

I know exactly what you are talking about.

Anyway, that kind of "relative knowledge"-philosophy turned out to be incredibly powerful not only in explaining various problems regarding intelligence (creativity) and subjective experience (getting rid of naive realism completely), but also in giving better idea about what physical models are and how they should be viewed if one wishes to stay objective at all.

In my head, you sound a lot like me. I am curious as to the problems regarding intelligence you have in mind (in the explanation you refer to).

Of course that doesn't always help since sometimes it's just impossible to agree with some painfully incoherent ideas no matter which way I choose to look at them...

It's either that very issue or the obvious fact that one is wasting one's time to get their interest.

Well I understand what you mean by the symmetries in physical models being cases of some information missing; not being able to differentiate between some things.

What is important there is that the representation of the circumstance in your world view requires the differentiation and that requirement must be met. Since you cannot meet it, you must include a constraint which eliminates that requirement. I call it "conservation of ignorance".

You said; "there exists only one thing which can produce knowledge from nothing; the comprehension of symmetry".

At this point, I would really like to adjust that statement to something more rational: "there exists only one thing which can produce the appearance of[/color] knowledge from nothing ..." .

I would rather say "symmetry" is just one (low-level) concept that can be used as a tool in our logic.

You are absolutely correct!

But we'll get to that later I guess.

Actually, it is not far away at all!

3. Since a particular symmetry may have been a case of unobservable but real differences... this has got obvious (ontological) implications to the those conserved quantities that were derived from that symmetry.

Close but not quite. The problem is that the difference does not exist (if it did exist, it would present itself as some kind of observable). But our world view requires the difference so there must be a rule which dispenses with that difference (either that or we must throw our world view out). A subtle but very important difference.

Please let me know if you have any difficulty with my comments. I hold your opinion in quite high regard.

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Well I understand what you mean by the symmetries in physical models being cases of some information missing; not being able to differentiate between some things.

What is important there is that the representation of the circumstance in your world view requires the differentiation and that requirement must be met. Since you cannot meet it, you must include a constraint which eliminates that requirement.

Hmm, let me munch on this one little bit to make sure I understand what you mean... Perhaps we can consider some simple practical example, like a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation. My worldview requires differentiation, does this refer to me having to imagine some orientation to that spherical shape? Or perhaps there is a better example?

The problem is that the difference does not exist (if it did exist, it would present itself as some kind of observable). But our world view requires the difference so there must be a rule which dispenses with that difference (either that or we must throw our world view out). A subtle but very important difference.

Hmmm, interesting. But I'm not sure if I'm quite getting it. Or perhaps I just can't figure out where this is heading... In the absence of some difference that our worldview requires for the situation (so it'd be logical), we must shape that worldview into some direction that explains this scheme of things... is a new "conservation law" of some sort always the only way through? I think I should try and get a better understanding about that Noether's theorem...

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hmm, let me munch on this one little bit to make sure I understand what you mean... Perhaps we can consider some simple practical example, like a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation.

Sure! The problem is that "a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation" is a mental construct which explains why nothing (associated withs an object so described) changes under a "rotation", a phenomena which is defined in any space with more than two orthogonal dimensions (independent variables required to specify the "position" of the object -- which is, of course, another mental construct). People are so convinced that "a three dimensional space" is the only way of describing reality that they think the space itself is real and not a mental construct. (Perhaps it is real, but I am afraid such a thing can not be proved; what is important is that it need not be proved.)

My worldview requires differentiation, does this refer to me having to imagine some orientation to that spherical shape? Or perhaps there is a better example?

Exactly correct, your world view does require you to concieve of that sphere as having an orientation. I think the issue will become clearer when I show you how to use the concept of dimensionality to represent that collection of undefined ontological elements which constitute the past (under my definition of "the past") that we are all trying to understand.

I think I should try and get a better understanding about that Noether's theorem...

I would say yes, in the sense that it is always better to understand physics, as Noether's theorem is a mathematically exact proof of the requirement in a large collection of circumstances useful to physical representation of phenomena. However, I think it is very valuable to comprehend the necessity of these conservation laws from a slightly different perspective which you will not discover in any presentation of Noether's theorem.

What is really important to comprehend is that all mathematical proofs are actually tautologies (based upon some set of axioms) in that, what is proved, is already embedded in the axioms: i.e., the axioms themselves require the result. I have actually had professors tell me that symmetry arguments are the most powerful arguments which can be made because they are the only arguments which can generate "knowledge" from "ignorance". That statement is false on the face of it as no proof can yield anything not embedded in the axioms used in that proof.

It is interesting to look at the first "symmetry" argument I ever heard. When I was a child, someone (it might have been my grandfather or maybe it was my father) asked me if I knew why quarter sawed lumber didn't warp as much as plane sawed lumber. In case you don't know it, a quarter sawed board is one who's width is as close as possible to being a radial cut in the original tree and the commonest type of warp is for the board to dish out on one side.

Perform the following thought experiment. Give someone a drawing of the cross section of a hypothetical tree with an outline of a board cross section drawn on it where the width of the board is centered exactly on a radial line and ask him which way the board will warp. Then give him a mirror image of that same drawing and ask the same question. It should be clear that, if the information necessary to predict the warp is there, the answer must be exactly the same (the mirror image of the drawing is the same as the original). On the other hand, the direction of the dish must be opposite (since it is a mirror image). The only answer is, the board cannot warp.

Of course, in most real cases, there is a flaw in the symmetry of a actual tree but the real result will be related to the actual extent of the symmetry error. Even an all knowing god would have to agree that, if mirror symmetry is actually present, the board cannot warp. This is the characteristic that makes "symmetry arguments" so powerful.

Now, let's go back to that "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation of the known universe with an undefined ontology. Note that, even any explanation (which constitutes a epistemological solution based on a defined ontology) constitutes a case of an undefined ontology to a new student until they manage to deduce the meanings of the reference labels from their usage. What I am getting at is the fact that the only difference between the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation and the conventional explanation is the fact that the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation have been assigned specific labels (i.e., certain instances of those ontological elements have been identified as being the same element).

The only other difference (between the ideal puzzle I put up earlier and some other explanation) is the fact that some of the ontological elements may not be valid ontological elements. That issue is actually of no consequence (in that the tabular representation expressing my knowledge of that explanation of the past) as it simply amounts to some entries which don't actually need to be there. (The "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is, by definition, based on the "valid ontological elements). If the explanation yields that tabular result including those additional "invalid ontological elements" (and it would be flawed if it didn't) then it must also yield all of the known "valid ontological elements" as they are clearly a subset of the explanations ontological elements.

So the explanation (that would be any flaw free explanation possible) only differs from the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation by virtue of the fact that the elements are given defined labels. Notice that, in our logical analysis, it is not necessary to know the definitions all one needs are the labels themselves (their definitions are to be deduced from the explanation). Now, these labels will indicate that the explanation considers certain occurrences of specific ontological elements to be "the same element". Consider how can one have two occurrences of the same element unless there is some specific difference between the two occurrences. That difference can only be embedded in the explanation itself. and will be part of one's world view when the explanation is understood.

Just as I earlier introduced my concept of time ("the past" is what is known, "the future" is what is not known and "the present" is a change in what is known) as no more than an index on that change, I will introduce my definition of "position" as no more than an index on those ontological elements in a given change represented by the labels going to make up a specific B(t). If I am using numerical labels for these entities, I can simply use the index numbers as positions on the x-axis without losing any information contained in that explanation.

There is one subtle error in the last paragraph above. Although the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation explanation considers every occurrence to be a different ontological element, there is no expectation of such a thing in any clearly defined explanation. A specific B may clearly contain two instances of the same ontological element (the difference and the need for them to be there being part of that explanation -- once that explanation is understood). If such a thing occurs, those two entries in that tabular representation would be the same. If the numerical label is going to be represented by a position on that x axis, the fact of the existence of multiple instances of the same label is lost as there is but one such "position" on the x axis.

That problem is easily fixed by introducing another orthogonal axis. which I have chosen to call "tau" (for reasons which will become evident further on down the line). By the way, the fundamental significance of "orthogonal" is that associated values on one axis are totally independent of associated values on another. Having introduced that tau axis, one can easily represent multiple occurrences of a given x label by simply attaching a different tau index to each of those multiple ontological elements with the same x index.

Thus it is that, it is always possible to display the past as a finite set of discrete points in an (x,tau) plane where the plane itself is indexed on a third orthogonal axis referred to as time. The complete representation consists of a finite set of discreet points in a three dimensional space. (Paul, if you are reading this, you should note that the representation is wholly discreet and makes no use of either continuity or infinity.) It should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible "past". This is the key issue which must be comprehended before we go on.

I'll stop there and see if you have any questions about such a representation.

Looking to hear from you again -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Sure! The problem is that "a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation" is a mental construct which explains why nothing (associated withs an object so described) changes under a "rotation", a phenomena which is defined in any space with more than two orthogonal dimensions (independent variables required to specify the "position" of the object -- which is, of course, another mental construct).

Right, so looks like I picked it up correctly.

People are so convinced that "a three dimensional space" is the only way of describing reality that they think the space itself is real and not a mental construct. (Perhaps it is real, but I am afraid such a thing can not be proved; what is important is that it need not be proved.)

Yeah, well it certainly turns out that very careful definition for so-called "space" is in order anyway. I think right after GR it was already completely fair to say the reality of space hinges on definition, just like the reality of anything else. And now with this issue it is of course more important than ever to realize this.

Perform the following thought experiment. Give someone a drawing of the cross section of a hypothetical tree with an outline of a board cross section drawn on it where the width of the board is centered exactly on a radial line and ask him which way the board will warp. Then give him a mirror image of that same drawing and ask the same question. It should be clear that, if the information necessary to predict the warp is there, the answer must be exactly the same (the mirror image of the drawing is the same as the original). On the other hand, the direction of the dish must be opposite (since it is a mirror image). The only answer is, the board cannot warp.

Of course, in most real cases, there is a flaw in the symmetry of a actual tree but the real result will be related to the actual extent of the symmetry error. Even an all knowing god would have to agree that, if mirror symmetry is actually present, the board cannot warp. This is the characteristic that makes "symmetry arguments" so powerful.

Right. If that beforementioned spherical shape really is "symmetric under rotation", it is the same as saying "it cannot rotate". That's true. And it seems to show that tautology as well.

This also kind of reminds me of someone who held such a philosophy that our explanations of reality are all basically made of "differences".

Now, let's go back to that "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation of the known universe with an undefined ontology. Note that, even any explanation (which constitutes a epistemological solution based on a defined ontology) constitutes a case of an undefined ontology to a new student until they manage to deduce the meanings of the reference labels from their usage. What I am getting at is the fact that the only difference between the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation and the conventional explanation is the fact that the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation have been assigned specific labels (i.e., certain instances of those ontological elements have been identified as being the same element).

The only other difference (between the ideal puzzle I put up earlier and some other explanation) is the fact that some of the ontological elements may not be valid ontological elements. That issue is actually of no consequence (in that the tabular representation expressing my knowledge of that explanation of the past) as it simply amounts to some entries which don't actually need to be there. (The "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is, by definition, based on the "valid ontological elements). If the explanation yields that tabular result including those additional "invalid ontological elements" (and it would be flawed if it didn't) then it must also yield all of the known "valid ontological elements" as they are clearly a subset of the explanations ontological elements.

So the explanation (that would be any flaw free explanation possible) only differs from the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation by virtue of the fact that the elements are given defined labels. Notice that, in our logical analysis, it is not necessary to know the definitions all one needs are the labels themselves (their definitions are to be deduced from the explanation).

Okay, yeah, I can kind of understand where you are getting at with this. Since the meaning of a certain ontological element is going to be defined by how it associates to other elements, it should be possible (and reasonable) to explicitly keep the meanings loose while working with the associations. I don't understand yet how you do this but it seems this should be possible to some extent anyway.

Now, these labels will indicate that the explanation considers certain occurrences of specific ontological elements to be "the same element". Consider how can one have two occurrences of the same element unless there is some specific difference between the two occurrences. That difference can only be embedded in the explanation itself. and will be part of one's world view when the explanation is understood.

Just as I earlier introduced my concept of time ("the past" is what is known, "the future" is what is not known and "the present" is a change in what is known) as no more than an index on that change, I will introduce my definition of "position" as no more than an index on those ontological elements in a given change represented by the labels going to make up a specific B(t). If I am using numerical labels for these entities, I can simply use the index numbers as positions on the x-axis without losing any information contained in that explanation.

There is one subtle error in the last paragraph above. Although the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation explanation considers every occurrence to be a different ontological element, there is no expectation of such a thing in any clearly defined explanation. A specific B may clearly contain two instances of the same ontological element (the difference and the need for them to be there being part of that explanation -- once that explanation is understood). If such a thing occurs, those two entries in that tabular representation would be the same. If the numerical label is going to be represented by a position on that x axis, the fact of the existence of multiple instances of the same label is lost as there is but one such "position" on the x axis.

That problem is easily fixed by introducing another orthogonal axis. which I have chosen to call "tau" (for reasons which will become evident further on down the line).

Ok so above you are explaining simply how you choose to mark it down when and how a specifiic explanation tacks "identity" on things (through time)?

By the way, the fundamental significance of "orthogonal" is that associated values on one axis are totally independent of associated values on another. Having introduced that tau axis, one can easily represent multiple occurrences of a given x label by simply attaching a different tau index to each of those multiple ontological elements with the same x index.

Thus it is that, it is always possible to display the past as a finite set of discrete points in an (x,tau) plane where the plane itself is indexed on a third orthogonal axis referred to as time. The complete representation consists of a finite set of discreet points in a three dimensional space. (Paul, if you are reading this, you should note that the representation is wholly discreet and makes no use of either continuity or infinity.) It should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible "past". This is the key issue which must be comprehended before we go on.

I'll stop there and see if you have any questions about such a representation.

Well, I think I can understand what you are saying. First of all mark down what exists at one moment onto an X-axis, then mark a value to "tau-axis" which will say which elements are the same from one moment to the next(?) once you have a third dimension to represent time. Is this correct?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Well, I think I can understand what you are saying. First of all mark down what exists at one moment onto an X-axis, then mark a value to "tau-axis" which will say which elements are the same from one moment to the next(?) once you have a third dimension to represent time. Is this correct?

You are very close but I think you are making a subtle error. We have a finite number of ontological elements, each associated with a specific t index. These references (which are going to be represented by numerical labels) are explicitly displayed as points on the x axis. The only purpose for which the tau axis was created was to allow us to display multiple occurrences of the same x label. You should understand that actual specific labels only occur with a specific epistemological solution to the problem of explaining those "valid ontological elements": i.e., an explanation of reality other than the what is, is what is[/color] explanation where every element is presumed to be unique.

I repeat, "it should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'". This is the key issue which must be comprehended before we go on.

How do you feel about that? -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

You are very close but I think you are making a subtle error. We have a finite number of ontological elements, each associated with a specific t index. These references (which are going to be represented by numerical labels) are explicitly displayed as points on the x axis. The only purpose for which the tau axis was created was to allow us to display multiple occurrences of the same x label.

Multiple occurrences at different moments, right? Well, the same thing cannot be said to exist twice at the same moment so I'm guessing this is what you are saying... That this is a question of how we assume identity of things in specific solutions?

You should understand that actual specific labels only occur with a specific epistemological solution to the problem of explaining those "valid ontological elements": i.e., an explanation of reality other than the what is, is what is[/color] explanation where every element is presumed to be unique.

Yeah so what I'm assuming you are saying in other words is:
The "what is, is what is" explanation defines what exists at each moment without assuming any identity to something in that it could be said to exist as the "same thing" from one moment to the next. Such an identity is to be defined by some specific solution, and you are marking this down with the tau-dimension?

Am I getting it wrong?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Ah, Anssi, you are very close to understanding what I am saying but are making a subtle error.

Multiple occurrences at different moments, right? Well, the same thing cannot be said to exist twice at the same moment so I'm guessing this is what you are saying... That this is a question of how we assume identity of things in specific solutions?

We are not talking about identity of things yet. That is a bit down the road. Remember, these labels are for "ontological elements". Certainly, in the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation no real ontological elements cannot occur twice at any moment unless they are truly the same ontological element. But we are ignorant and wouldn't "know" it if it happened. Thus it is that we require that additional axis in order to represent the fact that, what we think is new information is, in fact, mere repetition of some ontological element we were already aware of. A flaw free epistemological solution might certainly label two instances in our "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation to be, in fact, the same ontological element.

As an example, the common current explanation of reality considers "electrons" to be fundamental ontological elements and it should be quite clear to you that any representation (under that epistemological construct) would require a great number of "electrons". Since our space is an ontological space, we need to provide a dimension to denote whatever differences that epistemological solution might bestow on those "electrons".

What I am getting at is the fact occurrences at different moments has already been handled by the introduction of the time index.

The "what is, is what is" explanation defines ...

I think what you have missed is that the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation defines absolutely nothing1 It openly regards every case as possibly totally different from any other case. It is the actual assignment of specific labels for those events which yields the patterns from which the epistemological solutions are built. In the common work of science, those assignments are made via what I call the "guess and by golly" approach. Over hundreds of millions of years we have managed to find some assignments (specific labels for those valid ontological elements which have become our past). The problem is that the assignment directly prevents us from seeing other possibilities. What I am presenting to you is a way of representing those ontological elements which creates no constraint upon our epistemological solutions.

I hope I have cleared this up a little. Actually, what I am presenting is a way of representing the situation which makes utterly no presumptions as to what that situation is. As I have said, the key issue here is that this representation can "represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'" without making any assumptions about the nature of reality.

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Ah, Anssi, you are very close to understanding what I am saying but are making a subtle error.
We are not talking about identity of things yet. That is a bit down the road. Remember, these labels are for "ontological elements". Certainly, in the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation no real ontological elements cannot occur twice at any moment unless they are truly the same ontological element. But we are ignorant and wouldn't "know" it if it happened. Thus it is that we require that additional axis in order to represent the fact that, what we think is new information is, in fact, mere repetition of some ontological element we were already aware of. A flaw free epistemological solution might certainly label two instances in our "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation to be, in fact, the same ontological element.

As an example, the common current explanation of reality considers "electrons" to be fundamental ontological elements and it should be quite clear to you that any representation (under that epistemological construct) would require a great number of "electrons". Since our space is an ontological space, we need to provide a dimension to denote whatever differences that epistemological solution might bestow on those "electrons".

Ah! Practical examples are helpful even if they can sometimes be little bit misleading too for this subject :)

So this is simply about being able to represent a number of... um... "identical things" (differentiated perhaps only by their location in "space") exisiting at a given moment? If so the error wasn't very subtle at all :)

The "what is, is what is" explanation defines ...

I think what you have missed is that the "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation defines absolutely nothing1

I haven't missed that bit, I just should have phrased myself more clearly that's all. But it is irrelevant now, if the tau is just enabling us to say there exists a number of "electrons" or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements?

-Ansi

 

[Rade]

...We have a finite number of ontological elements...

This is false. There are an infinite number of ontological elements (the metaphysical given) when you take into account the sum total of "valid ontological elements" and "fabricated ontological elements" (your terms Dr.D. not mine). At best you can argue that we may have a finite number of "valid ontological elements"--yet evolutionary theory suggests this is false given that new valid ontological elements called species continue to be formed over time, and there is no finite limit to the information provided within the DNA molecule. Clearly the human mind can imagine an endless and infinite number of fabricated ontological elements as well as fabricated philosophies.

 

[Doctordick]

Ah! Practical examples are helpful even if they can sometimes be little bit misleading too for this subject :)

Please let me know what you find misleading about my "electron" example so I might better understand your confusion.

So this is simply about being able to represent a number of... um... "identical things" (differentiated perhaps only by their location in "space") existing at a given moment? If so the error wasn't very subtle at all :)

This is, very simply, about how to handle undefined information. What I am doing is setting up a way of representing the undefined valid information which underlies all of our epistemological solutions solutions. Paul has always held that what I have done is proved a theorem. I can see how that interpretation could be made of my work; but it isn't really how I see it. Would anyone ever suggest that the Dewy Decimal System is a theorem? It is no more than a way of indexing books which can be applied to any library collection.

Likewise, what I am doing at this point is setting up a system which will allow me to talk about any collection of information without putting any constraints on the interpretation of that information at all. I like to think of it as a way of indexing the fundamental elements expressing that information. That is why I often refer to to these "valid ontological elements" (which I have defined to be "reality") as "references".

My first problem was that the collection of knowledge changes: and that would be the valid ontological elements which actually form the basis of our epistemological constructs. Our knowledge changes "from time to time". That is why I call the index representing such a change "t" or time.

I define "the past" to be what we know, "the future" to be what we do not know, and "the present" to be a change in what we know.

Time (or "t") is no more or less than an index on that collection of fundamental elements which underlie our world view. And any past you can conceive of can be seen as a collection of such "presents". You can see your "past" as being coherent collection of "presents" identified by this thing called time can't you?

So the next step is to come up with a way of indexing the collection of valid elements underlying a specific "present". Again, I simply attach a label to each and every one of those elements. Since I don't know what those elements are (if I did know, I would be working with an epistemological solution and not with "undefined references") I will simply attach a number "i" to each reference. If I ever have to apply this indexing system to an actual epistemological solution, I will have to understand that solution and correlate each of those indexes to the proper reference. But, I am not concerned with the problem of understanding any epistemological solution (that would be theorizing and, for the moment, I want simply to make sure that I am not ignoring any information).

My next step was to define "position". All I did was decide to see that index "i" as a position on the x axis. There is nothing deep and profound about such a step; it is actually quite common in quite a lot of scientific representations. Take for example, the family tree of primates. You will see it laid out on a sheet of paper with forks leading to various different species. They are using the concept of position (different horizontal placement on a sheet of paper) to represent branching to these different species. Now they simply draw a line on the paper; one could just as well attach some index "i" to each branch. In fact, if one were to create a computer model of that picture of lines, one would attach some specific x displacement for the same phenomena.

The problem, since we are working with a finite number of "references" here, is that the picture loses information if two or more of those "fundamental elements" happen to be assigned the same label (by some specific epistemological solution). How does one manage to maintain that information in such a representation? Clearly one can not. That is exactly why I introduced the tau axis. One can then give any element both an x coordinate and a tau coordinate. Remember, they are actually mere indices and the actual values are of no concern. No more than the family tree of the primates would lose meaning if the branches were drawn farther apart or in a different horizontal order. If I ever have to apply this indexing system to an actual epistemological solution, I will have to understand that solution and correlate each of those indexes to the proper reference.

None of this is any more or less than an indexing procedure. What I have done is transformed the original problem into a collection of points in a three dimensional space. If those points are constrained to be "valid ontological elements" which are known by person generating the epistemological solution, then any flaw free epistemological solution must yield those points.

An explanation is a method of obtaining one's expectations from known information!

If your epistemological solution does not yield expectations consistent with your own past, then you should certainly regard it as flawed.

What is really important here is that your understanding of any given specific epistemological solution consists of a finite number of specific labels (symbols for supposed valid ontological elements of the past) together with underlying presumed ontological elements not actually contained in that specific finite set (these are the presumptions in your understanding itself). The basis of your understanding is in the correlations you see in some finite set of specific labels.

I began with the simplified case where all ontological elements in that past (what is known) were "valid ontological elements" and it is quite clear to anyone that, what we think we know, probably includes a great number of "invalid ontological elements". In the, "what is" is "what is"[/color] explanation of the past, this is actually a rather trivial issue as it really amounts to no more than a number of invalid entries in that collection of labels going to make of the past (what is known). That is to say, any acceptable explanation must still yield the correct expectation for those valid ontological elements. It just must also yield acceptable expectations for those invalid ontological elements the explanation presumed were valid. This fact does not allow any additional acceptable explanations, it instead only reduces the number of possibilities being considered in that "by guess and by golly" procedure used by everyone.

What we would like to do is to introduce the simplest set of "invalid ontological elements" which will constrain the "valid ontological" elements to what we know without eliminating any possibilities for the future (what we do not know).

The fundamental insight here is that the fabricated ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological construct and are free variables unconstrained by "reality". It follows that one must handle ontological elements as two different types of "unknowns"; one collection which is set and immutable and another which is free to anything at all: i.e., the rules are different for the two sets and that difference must be embedded in the logic of the representation.

Once again, I repeat, "it should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'". This is the central key issue which must be comprehended before we can possibly go on.

But it is irrelevant now, if the tau is just enabling us to say there exists a number of "electrons" or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements?

Irrelevant isn't a word I would use here. The tau axis is not just allowing us to say, "there exists a number of 'electrons' or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements"; it is allowing us to specify exactly how many occurrences exist in that epistemological solution.

I should comment that, the ability to express such a thing is not a requirement that we do so. No more than the Dewy decimal system requires us to specify every possible book which could exist, the only requirement is that every book we have in our library can be given a specific label: i.e., a counter example can not be found.

Have fun -- Dick

PS I am sorry I write so much. I wish I could be clearer.

 

[AnssiH]

Ah! Practical examples are helpful even if they can sometimes be little bit misleading too for this subject :)

Please let me know what you find misleading about my "electron" example

Nothing! :)
I was just saying practical examples are helpful in general, and thought you usually try to avoid them (since you seldom use them) because they are cases of defining some ontological elements, and people can be misled to think you are suggesting such a defined ontology.

This is, very simply, about how to handle undefined information. What I am doing is setting up a way of representing the undefined valid information which underlies all of our epistemological solutions solutions. Paul has always held that what I have done is proved a theorem. I can see how that interpretation could be made of my work; but it isn't really how I see it. Would anyone ever suggest that the Dewy Decimal System is a theorem? It is no more than a way of indexing books which can be applied to any library collection.

Likewise, what I am doing at this point is setting up a system which will allow me to talk about any collection of information without putting any constraints on the interpretation of that information at all. I like to think of it as a way of indexing the fundamental elements expressing that information. That is why I often refer to to these "valid ontological elements" (which I have defined to be "reality") as "references".

My first problem was that the collection of knowledge changes: and that would be the valid ontological elements which actually form the basis of our epistemological constructs. Our knowledge changes "from time to time". That is why I call the index representing such a change "t" or time.

Right, this seems pretty clear.

Time (or "t") is no more or less than an index on that collection of fundamental elements which underlie our world view. And any past you can conceive of can be seen as a collection of such "presents". You can see your "past" as being coherent collection of "presents" identified by this thing called time can't you?

Sure.

So the next step is to come up with a way of indexing the collection of valid elements underlying a specific "present". Again, I simply attach a label to each and every one of those elements. Since I don't know what those elements are (if I did know, I would be working with an epistemological solution and not with "undefined references") I will simply attach a number "i" to each reference. If I ever have to apply this indexing system to an actual epistemological solution, I will have to understand that solution and correlate each of those indexes to the proper reference. But, I am not concerned with the problem of understanding any epistemological solution (that would be theorizing and, for the moment, I want simply to make sure that I am not ignoring any information).

Yup.

My next step was to define "position". All I did was decide to see that index "i" as a position on the x axis. There is nothing deep and profound about such a step; it is actually quite common in quite a lot of scientific representations. Take for example, the family tree of primates. You will see it laid out on a sheet of paper with forks leading to various different species. They are using the concept of position (different horizontal placement on a sheet of paper) to represent branching to these different species. Now they simply draw a line on the paper; one could just as well attach some index "i" to each branch. In fact, if one were to create a computer model of that picture of lines, one would attach some specific x displacement for the same phenomena.

Yeah, so this step of the indexing process doesn't imply any specific ontology either?

The problem, since we are working with a finite number of "references" here, is that the picture loses information if two or more of those "fundamental elements" happen to be assigned the same label (by some specific epistemological solution). How does one manage to maintain that information in such a representation? Clearly one can not. That is exactly why I introduced the tau axis.

Yeah, and so one example of assigning the same label to a number of fundamental elements would be when one ends up defining that many electrons exist at a specific "present"?

Hmmm, I think at this point it would be helpful for me if you could explain how you end up manipulating this representation for some useful end. I think it might clear up some things that might be little bit blurry to me right now.

None of this is any more or less than an indexing procedure. What I have done is transformed the original problem into a collection of points in a three dimensional space. If those points are constrained to be "valid ontological elements" which are known by person generating the epistemological solution, then any flaw free epistemological solution must yield those points.
If your epistemological solution does not yield expectations consistent with your own past, then you should certainly regard it as flawed.

i.e. if it cannot explain your past?

What we would like to do is to introduce the simplest set of "invalid ontological elements" which will constrain the "valid ontological" elements to what we know without eliminating any possibilities for the future (what we do not know).

The fundamental insight here is that the fabricated ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological construct and are free variables unconstrained by "reality". It follows that one must handle ontological elements as two different types of "unknowns"; one collection which is set and immutable and another which is free to anything at all: i.e., the rules are different for the two sets and that difference must be embedded in the logic of the representation.

Once again, I repeat, "it should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'". This is the central key issue which must be comprehended before we can possibly go on.

Well at least I cannot think of how it could fail to represent some kind of past, so this seems quite valid.

I just should have phrased myself more clearly that's all. But it is irrelevant now, if the tau is just enabling us to say there exists a number of "electrons" or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements?

Irrelevant isn't a word I would use here.

Heh, you know how sometimes when you try to sort out a misunderstanding, it just turns into more misunderstandings like a snowball-effect? This is one of those moments :)
What "irrelevant" was referring to was "I should have phrased myself more clearly before" (which I included in my quote).
What that was referring to was when I said something in the effect of your solution being used to define things... it was the "method of defining" things that were under discussion, not the actual definitions that one might end up to... Anyway, this was irrelevant because I had understood the use of "tau-dimension" incorrectly.

PS I am sorry I write so much. I wish I could be clearer.

Don't worry about it :)

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Anssi,

Your posts are delightful. You make it quite clear that you think deeply about what I say; something I wish some of the other people reading this forum would do. (Who knows, maybe there are others who have a grasp of what I am saying, If they are out there, I wish they would comment.)

Yeah, so this step of the indexing process doesn't imply any specific ontology either?

Of course not. You cannot have an epistemological solution to any problem without an ontology to build that solution on. And, you certainly cannot explain that solution to anyone without communicating the required ontology; so, if we can find a valid epistemological solution, we can certainly refer to the required ontological elements. That is what language is all about: mere symbolic representation of concepts we feel are important so we can communicate those thoughts with others.

An Aside: (you can skip this if you want!) There is a short column in the April 14, 2007 issue of "Science News" ("Rats take fast route to remembering") where the authors say,

Prior studies, which have focused on task learning unrelated to preexisting knowledge, indicate that a brain region called the hippocampus incorporates new facts and events into memory. The hippocampus gradually yields to another structure, the neocortex, as new memories become stronger. [And correlated into preexisting knowledge.][/color] This process typically takes at least 1 month in rodents and a few years in people.

The blue comment is mine. As I told my wife, that sort of means rats are pretty smart. I guess we should be thankful their life span is short and they haven't come up with language yet or they would take the world over!

But really, I think the difference might very well be that the rats are hard wired for specific types of memories and don't waste any time trying to think of alternate explanations whereas the essence of human success is that they spend a lot of time (as a species, not as individuals) considering alternate possibilities before new information is correlated into preexisting knowledge. Of course I could be wrong.

Just a comment on the importance of learning a language.

Yeah, and so one example of assigning the same label to a number of fundamental elements would be when one ends up defining that many electrons exist at a specific "present"?

Yes, exactly. Another good example would be that family tree of the primates I brought up. How would you show multiple entries for the same species? You already use horizontal displacement to indicate different species and vertical displacement to indicate time and you would have to include another axis if you wanted to show the time change in populations.

Hmmm, I think at this point it would be helpful for me if you could explain how you end up manipulating this representation for some useful end. I think it might clear up some things that might be little bit blurry to me right now.

The useful end is the organization of your thoughts and that organization yields results almost beyond belief. That is exactly where I want to lead you.

i.e. if it cannot explain your past?

If any explanation turns out to be counter to my past (i.e., inconsistent with what I know to have happened beyond doubt) I certainly wouldn't accept it as valid. Would you?

As far as "a useful end" is concerned, we need an exact definition of "an explanation" (otherwise, we don't know how to go about explaining things). That is why I defined an explanation to be a method of obtaining one's expectations from known information.

Under that definition, the structure of the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is quite simple in that it is no more than a table of "undefined ontological elements" going to make up every discrete present going to make up that "past" which constitutes "what one thinks one knows". Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number. One's expectation are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular list is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element. In such a case, we need comprehend only that element in our logic, taking the rest as "understood": i.e., as established by that rule. So I will show you a way of accomplishing such a result by including intentionally invalid ontological elements, an extremely powerful procedure. After all, if you can't prove that your explanations of reality include no "invalid ontological elements" how can you constrain me to a presentation which excludes such things? Particularly if I explicitly declare these additions to be "invalid".

The first "invalid ontological elements" I would like to add, is a very simple set. As defined, all real presents consist of specific changes in my knowledge of valid ontological elements. I have already eluded to the fact that I am using numerical labels because I can then talk about that "method of obtaining one's expectations" as a mathematical function. The "true/false" can be seen as a "one/zero" dichotomy and I am using numerical labels for that "known knowledge" (those specific "valid ontological elements" which constitute the "reality" of any given "present") so the method is a mathematical function: i.e., it transforms one set of numbers into a second set (you give me a set of numbers which could possibly be a real "present" and that "mathematical function" returns either a one or a zero (depending upon whether or not that collection of numbers is in that table of my "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation.

But this is a very strange "mathematical function". The number of arguments for any particular "real" present is neither fixed or known.

In order to simplify the situation (given that I have a specific epistemological solution to represent), I will simply add a sufficient number of "invalid ontological elements" (additional numbers) to each "valid present" until all cases have exactly the same number of arguments. Now you have to understand that, after I add these "invalid ontological elements" there need be no method within my finished explanation (where I am going) to tell the difference between the valid and invalid elements; in fact there cannot be such a method for if there were, it would constitute a flaw in the epistemological solution (invalidating that ontological element). Notice that the numbers I have added to the collection are totally arbitrary; counter to the valid ontological elements which are immutable. (This fact will become extremely important down the line a ways.)

So, after that agumentation, it is not a very strange function at all, it has a clear set of arguments (that total number of ontological elements that flaw free epistemological solution presumes makes up all presents, some of which are valid and some invalid). My flaw free epistemological construct must yield a one or zero for each and every such possible collection.

At this point, I would like to add a second set of invalid ontological elements. Again, I add these elements for my own convenience as they will make that explanation I am looking for (that mathematical function which constitutes the "fundamental rule") simpler. As that mathematical function (which is a direct explicit expression of our explanation) now stands (per what I have laid out above) there could exist identical "presents". That issue is the source of some conceptual difficulties. All of my presents are supposed to have a unique index on them and that unique index can not be established by my proposed epistemological solution unless the value of that index is embedded in the collection of presents themselves. If two presents are identical, the index can not be embedded in the collection: i.e., no epistemological solution based on that collection of ontological elements can yield a different index for those two "presents".

The solution to this difficulty is very simple. All one need do is find all identical entries in that table of our "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation (where we have already added the entries which made all presents have the same number of arguments). We can now add another entry (just another invalid ontological element) to every present, making sure that the entry is different in every case where the earlier table had identical entries. Now every "present" going to make up our "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation is an identifiably different case. This provides us a direct procedure for obtaining that embedded index. You give me any hypothetical entry for that table and I can examine the table and tell you not only if it is a member (give you the true/false answer) but I can also give you the "t" index for every true case. By the way, I am not suggesting this as a reasonable way of explaining reality, I am simply saying that it must work as the collection of table entries is finite so the job can be completed.

So, let's extend this idea of adding invalid ontological elements to simplify the problem one more very subtle step. Let us make a new table consisting of a list of all entries in the table we now have but omitting one number (that's one of those reference labels) from each specific present. To make what I am proposing very clear: if every present in the current list (that is both the additions above have been done) consists of n numbers, this new table will have n entries for every specific "t" index: each one being the entry for the "t" present with a different specific numerical reference removed. We can call this subsidiary table, "table number two".

Again, after removing one number, we introduce the possibility that this second table will have some identical entries. We can once again get rid of identical entries by adding more "invalid ontological elements" (using the same method described above) until table number two consists of totally different entries (please note that, since nothing has been said about order in those arguments, the same set of numbers listed in a different order will be considered to be identical lists). This step may be quite extensive but it is nonetheless finite and can thus be accomplished.

Now this augmented table number two can also be seen as a tabular representation of a function (which I will call function number two). A function which yields a one/zero result for each of all possible collections of arguments (including that "t" index): one for "true" (that set of numbers is in the table or) zero for false (that set of numbers is not in the table). These two tables (the table yielding probabilities and table number two), taken together provide the definition of a new function with a very interesting property. Given that the original table upon which table number two is based (that primary table being augmented with those new "invalid ontological elements") has n entries; given any possible set of (n-1) arguments, one can find first if that set is an entry in table number two (in which case there is either one or zero entries). Since that entry includes the "t" index, the associated entry in the primary table can be examined. That entry will have exactly the same arguments as the set which was given plus one more additional argument: the entry which was removed to create table number two.

What I have just described is a method of finding the missing number given all the labels except the missing label. That means that, if I have a flaw free epistemological solution to this uniquely augmented "what is", is "what is"[/color] explanation, there must exist a mathematical function of all but one argument which will yield the missing argument (I have just explained how to construct such a table). Now, it may be true that I only have given the mechanism for constructing a table of the results which corresponds to my presumed past (what I think I know, including those invalid ontological element) but it should be clear to you that the procedure must also yield all of the known "valid ontological elements". What I have just proved is that, if I have a flaw free epistemological solution, I can use that solution to build a tabular function which will yield the missing argument for every valid set of arguments where one argument is missing. That function can be written as

x_n(t) = f(x_1, x_2, x_3, \cdots, x_{n-1}, t)

or,

F(x_1, x_2, x_3, \cdots, x_n, t) = x_n(t) - f(x_1, x_2, x_3, \cdots, x_{n-1}, t) = 0.
​

Note that, since order of arguments is of no significance, x sub n can be any element in the set. To clarify what I have just proved: Given a flaw free epistemological construct based on the collection of valid ontological elements plus a designed set of invalid ontological elements, there always exists a function (which I will refer to as the function F( B(t) ) of those numerical labels which will yield exactly that "what is", is "what is"[/color] table under the very simple rule, F=0. Likewise, given that table, there exists a function (which I will call P( B, t) ) which yields the probability the collection of arguments B exist in the particular present indexed by t: i.e., that function will yield either one or zero to indicate that B(t) is or is not an entry on the table.

Now, not only must such a functions exist, but anyone with a little mathematics training must realize that an infinite set of functions satisfying that constraint exists for every possible set of valid ontological elements. These numbers constitute a finite set of points in that (x, tau, t) space and there are an infinite number of functions which will fit that set of points exactly so no constraint whatsoever has actually been placed on the future (which is, by definition, what I do not know). In other words, there exists no epistemological solution based upon any set of valid ontological elements which can not be expressed by a specific P( B[/b), t) under the simple rule that the only constraint on the numerical references is that they satisfy a relationship which can be written: F( B(t) ) = zero.

The only difference between this mathematical representation and the specific explanation it represents is the fact that I have added one hell of a lot of "invalid ontological elements": i.e., an epistemological construct invented by a theorist could possibly contain fewer "invalid ontological elements" but it certainly could not depend on a simpler rule ( F=0 is a pretty simple rule).

I think I have given you enough to think about for the moment. Check out what I have said carefully and if you find any part of it confusing, I will do my best to clear things up. When this all makes sense to you, I will take you to the next step. Let's see if you can get your head around the above exposition.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[RVBuckeye]

You make it quite clear that you think deeply about what I say; something I wish some of the other people reading this forum would do. (Who knows, maybe there are others who have a grasp of what I am saying, If they are out there, I wish they would comment.)

Hello DD,
Actually, I have been following this thread since the beginning and have read most of your posts on this forum. I've hesitated to comment to this because, well, you were a little mean to people in the beginning (and used waaay too many emoticons ) Anyway, I'm here just trying to learn something, so please proceed.
Having fun
RV

 

[Rade]

...If any explanation turns out to be counter to my past (i.e., inconsistent with what I know to have happened beyond doubt) I certainly wouldn't accept it as valid. Would you?

Well yes, because I realize that it is impossible for any human to "know" what happened in the past "beyond doubt". By definition, science (= search for knowledge) always provides uncertain (= with doubt) knowledge.

ps/ Sorry for the interruption--please continue.

edit example: Let A = the birth doctor explanation for an event [E] that occurred to you when you were born (say 30 seconds after birth from womb). Let B = your explanation of "what you know to have happened" at that exact past time. Now, which explanation is "valid", A or B ? The criterion of being "counter to my past" is of no value in this example to understanding why any explanation of past events is valid for the simple reason that "your past" provides uncertain knowledge of the present.