LHC - the last chance for all theories of everything?

[tom.stoer]

Dmitry67,

what do you think: do the areas beyond the horizion exist?

 

[Dmitry67]

Dmitry67,

what do you think: do the areas beyond the horizion exist?

Yes, like the alternative branches in the MWI
I think on our way to TOE we have to give up the falsifiability...

 

[ConradDJ]

Biological evolution is based on fundamental laws (DNA) which are not subject to the evolution process itself but provide a fixed, external system.

Tom – This is profoundly incorrect. The DNA code certainly did evolve. There are many regularities in biology, but none of them have the character that physical laws seem to have, as “a fixed, external system” of changeless laws governing how things change. All of them derive from an evolutionary process, the only “law” of which is just – whatever manages to reproduce itself, manages to reproduce itself. Everything follows from that.

Your earlier statement was more sensible:

My conclusion is that it is not sure that dynamic processes require dynamic laws. Far from it, progress in science tells us that in many cases the underlying laws of dynamic processes are static laws.

The word “dynamic” here is ambiguous. It’s very important to distinguish between physical laws (A) changing over time and physical laws (B) evolving, in a sense that’s comparable with the biological case.

(A) It’s certainly possible that some things we take as changeless laws of physics – the gravitational constant, for example – have actually changed over time. The whole development of cosmology over the past century has shown us how much more dynamic the universe is than anyone had expected. But this is not evolution in the significant sense, comparable to biology. If something in the structure of physical law can be meaningfully said to have changed over time, then that must have happened in the context of a “fixed, external system” – as you said – which doesn’t change. “Change” only has meaning if there is a context that is at least relatively changeless.

(B) When we talk about the laws of physics evolving, we’re talking about the “fixed, external system” itself and where it came from. Even in Smolin’s CNS – which I don’t buy at all – within any given universe, the basic laws of physics are still changeless. It’s only in the process of creating one universe out of another that they change. (And the weakness of Smolin’s idea is just that it has nothing to say about how this reproductive process happens, or why it would result in universes with different laws, or most important, why the laws in a “child” universe would be only a little bit different from those of its “parent”, which is critical to making an evolutionary process work).

In my view CNS is a way-too-literal attempt to apply the biological evolutionary theory to physics. If there is an evolutionary process underlying the laws of physics, I don’t think it’s based on self-replication. In the physical world, self-replication is very hard to achieve – which is why life is so rare in the universe.

On the other hand, I’ve tried to make the point in other threads that there is a “process” that’s as ubiquitous in physics as the reproductive process is in biology – namely what we call “measurement” or “observation” or just the “communication of information” between physical systems. This is harder to envision than self-replication, because it’s not about the multiplication of physical entities (organisms) but about the multiplication of “measurement-events” between entities. And of course the whole issue of the role of “measurement” in physics is tremendously confused.

I won’t go into the reasons why I think communicating systems can evolve via “natural selection” much the way reproducing systems can. But I want to emphasize again that this is not necessarily about some or any of the laws of physics being “dynamic” in the sense that they could be observed to be different at different historical times. That may or may not be the case, but it’s a different issue.

Here’s the thing – the laws of physics we observe now, in our well-established theories, let us look back in time and learn a great deal about the very early universe. But everything we’ve learned about it teaches us that for hundreds of thousands of years after the “beginning”, the physical conditions of the universe would not have supported any way of measuring or observing those laws. Before the emergence of atoms, it may well be that no definable information could have been communicated from one physical system to another.

I’m not saying our theories about the early universe are wrong – just that these theories are only meaningful if there are physical systems that function as “clocks and measuring rods”, etc. And the theories tell us that there was a time when no such systems existed anywhere.

So the early universe as we see it now, based on present-time data, is the early universe as communicated through a very different and far more elaborately structured informational environment than used to exist in our universe.

The point is that the laws of physics may or may not have changed over time, but clearly they did become meaningfully definable in the course of time. And it seems reasonable to ask about which aspects of these laws became physically determinable first, and which later on – and whether this sequence may reflect an underlying evolutionary process. And we should probably consider time itself as one aspect of the structure that evolved in this sense, not as a “fixed, external” background within which this process occurred.

If you appreciate how powerful the evolutionary principle is in biology – i.e. how much can be explained about living systems without having to make arbitrary, unexplainable assumptions – then I think it will seem worthwhile to pursue any avenue that might lead toward a similar principle for physics.

 

[Fra]

Tom – This is profoundly incorrect. The DNA code certainly did evolve.

Indeed. Not only did the DNA CODE evolve, but the structure for the code as wel (compare microstate vs microstructure), this is I think the even more important point.

I objected to this to Tom before as well, in post#209 in the same thread.

Tom's response was to dismiss this flawed analogy beeing off point. But I think it's very much to the point.

If we picture a configuration space of all possible DNA sequences, then the point is that not only does dna sequences evolve, within the space, the more profound point is tha the "configuration space itself" has an origin.

This is the deeper point that Smolin also tries to explain in his motivation for evoling law. The configuration space bounds the questions you can possibly pose, therefore new possibilities arise and the configuration space changes. The alternative would be an infinite totally out of control infinite configurations space that would drown any computation. Not to mention that we run into the same old problem of having to accept an utterly even infinitely unlikely initial condition.

Weird as it seems but the evolving law idea actuall solve a lot of problems too; fine tuning problem and the problem of initial conditions etc.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

I would like to make clear that when I am talking about "dynamically changing laws" I definately mean changes in the sense of "evolution of laws". Sorry for the confusion.

It is clear that "trivial changes" like the value of a "constant" might be explained by some deeper, fixed theory (string theory suggests dynamically changing constants as they are expectation values of certain fields). So what we are really interested in is the question if these deeper theory itself dissolves in some "evolution process" and dynamically changing w/o being grounded again on some deeper, fixed structure.

I appreciate the discussion regarding this possibility, but I think I already made clear that - for various reasons - I do not believe in this theory.

Regarding the applicability of laws at earlier times that we derive currently: it compares to the area that hides beyond the cosmic horizon. If a theory explains experimental results in some domain (time, space, energy range, ...) then we try to extrapolate beyond this domain. This is what usually happens in physics (or science in general): we believe that planetary orbits exist in distant galaxies, even if they are not measurable. We even believe that if a planetary system forms from interstellar dust then the new planets follow the same well-known planetary orbits. Therefore we extrapolate in timelike as well as in spacelike direction.

In biology it should be clear that the laws of evolution do exist even before the first DNA molecule was formed. That means that the existence of these laws (as they are based on chemical and physical laws as well as on mathematical ones) transcend their application. I believe that the same is true in physics.

w/o this principle science would not be possible at all, simply because it would restrict the domain of validity of laws to the domain of their application. That would mean that predictabiliyt gets lost as we are simply not allowed to predict the result of an experiment before we have collected and evaluated the data.

So my credo is: Science forces us to believe in laws transcending their application

 

[tom.stoer]

Tom – This is profoundly incorrect. The DNA code certainly did evolve.

I do not talk about the evolution of a collection of DNA molecules but about the evolution of the laws of the DNA code. There is no such evolution! The chemistry of DNA was, is and will be fixed forever. If DNA molecules are crossed, changed, if there are DNA defects or if they are dying together with their phenotype doesn't matter.

The same applies to the laws of physics. If in a far future all physical objects in the universe fade away in a "Big Whimper" doesn't affect the laws for planetary motion. As already indicated I somehow like structural realism which says that the Kepler orbits (as laws) do exist even if the planets (as materialization) cease to exist.

 

[Dmitry67]

Tom, there are 2 versions of the DNA code: old one (ribosomal DNA - rDNA) and modern (DNA in all other cells - mDNA). So DNA code did evolve. Ribosomal DNA code looks similar to the modern one, but some codons are interpreted there differently.

But I agree that laws do not evolve.

 

[tom.stoer]

OK, fine. You found weakness in my biological reasoning :-)

No problem: The changes in the laws of the DNA code are explained on the basis of eternal laws of chemistry.

 

[ConradDJ]

Regarding the applicability of laws at earlier times that we derive currently: it compares to the area that hides beyond the cosmic horizon. If a theory explains experimental results in some domain (time, space, energy range, ...) then we try to extrapolate beyond this domain. This is what usually happens in physics (or science in general): we believe that planetary orbits exist in distant galaxies, even if they are not measurable... Therefore we extrapolate in timelike as well as in spacelike direction.

Yes – and this is difficult to make clear, because of all the confusion about measurement in QM – but I would argue that there is an important difference here:

1. Does the other side of the moon exist? Or does a planet exist before someone observes it? Or beyond the cosmic horizon?

2. Does an electron have a definite position, in a context in which its position it is not determinable by any interaction?​

My point is that the situation with the early universe could well be more like 2. than 1. In the first case, whether there determinate information is available or not depends on someone’s perspective. In the second case, it’s a matter of the structure of the laws of physics themselves, that allow some things to be measurable in certain circumstances, and not others.

In biology it should be clear that the laws of evolution do exist even before the first DNA molecule was formed. That means that the existence of these laws (as they are based on chemical and physical laws as well as on mathematical ones) transcend their application.

w/o this principle science would not be possible at all, simply because it would restrict the domain of validity of laws to the domain of their application. That would mean that predictability gets lost...

Again, this is a misunderstanding. There are no “laws” of biology in the sense that there are “laws” of physics. And indeed very little can be predicted in biology, though that doesn't disqualify it as "science". And in comparison with physics, the extent to which what happens in biology can be understood – after the fact – is quite remarkable. The explanations are essentially historical -- they don't refer back to fixed, changeless principles that apply in general, but to the specific circumstances in which something arose.

In physics, prediction is very powerful, just because so much can be understood in terms of changeless mathematical laws that apply to everything, at all times. On the other hand, the Standard Model remains so complex that to me it makes sense to look for a way of understanding why these laws and principles are the way they are... as we’ve discussed above. The model favored by most physicists is the traditional one -- look for more general principles from which those of the Standard Model can be "predicted". The quest for that kind of TOE has gone on for quite some time now, and it's hard to say whether it's closer to success than it was a few decades ago.

So this is why I think the very different scientific model of biology may turn out to be useful. Needless to say, there's room for disagreement!

 

[Dmitry67]

Again, this is a misunderstanding. There are no “laws” of biology in the sense that there are “laws” of physics. And indeed very little can be predicted in biology, though that doesn't disqualify it as "science". And in comparison with physics, the extent to which what happens in biology can be understood – after the fact – is quite remarkable. The explanations are essentially historical -- they don't refer back to fixed, changeless principles that apply in general, but to the specific circumstances in which something arose.

In MWI, or if our Universe is infinite in space, then everything which might happen happens. Then we can give - in some cases - accurate predictions of the evolution (of course, statistically on huge number of planets)

 

[Fra]

No problem: The changes in the laws of the DNA code are explained on the basis of eternal laws of chemistry.

I still insist there is something that you miss with this reduction, and it's complexity.

But the reductionist approach you advocate, the problem is that the information capacity and "computation power" need to implement this is massive. And unless this information and computation capacity is at hand, your reductionist approach fails.

Why doesn't biologist simply do numerical simulations of biological spieces from complex molecular and atomic mechanics? The complexity neede for that approach fails. Rounding errors and all kinds of chaotic problems makes this strategy inviable.

I'll rephrase the question I ask to make my point more clear: The question is howto predict the future, given the present (including retained parts of the history), but the constraints are also that we have finite representative capacity and computation power - thus an idea that in absurdum might work, but requires more information capacity and computational power than we actualyl have at hand, simple is of no use.

Thus, the theories themselves must "scale", this is what I think of as scaling the inference systems. The inference you picture, by the extreme reductionist approach (explain life from the laws of chemsitry) fails because these inference system gets a complexity that isn't physical.

Another example, an algorithm or computer code, written for one cpu, needs to be "scaled" to run on a smaller cpu wit less memory. For the case of physical law, I think this scaling can be nontrivial, it's not just averaging. It's also the reverse problem on howto scale up, this requires evolution as more information is added and needs to be tuned.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

1. Does the other side of the moon exist? Or does a planet exist before someone observes it? Or beyond the cosmic horizon?

2. Does an electron have a definite position, in a context in which its position it is not determinable by any interaction?​

My point is that the situation with the early universe could well be more like 2. than 1. In the first case, whether there determinate information is available or not depends on someone’s perspective. In the second case, it’s a matter of the structure of the laws of physics themselves, that allow some things to be measurable in certain circumstances, and not others.

The difference is not only that something may depend on someones perspective. The difference is - in addition - that in the first case the question is if some entity EXISTS whereas in the second case the question is if something HAS a specific PROPERTY or VALUE.

No it is certainly not the same level of existence in the two questions
if THE (OTHER SIDE OF) MOON EXISTS or
if A VALUE TO BE MEASURED EXISTS before the measurement process.

In the case of the electron there is (at least for me) no problem that there exists an entity called "electron" w/o having a certain property.

 

[tom.stoer]

But the reductionist approach you advocate, the problem is that the information capacity and "computation power" need to implement this is massive. And unless this information and computation capacity is at hand, your reductionist approach fails

I don't think so. The EXISTENCE of something (entity, law, ...) need not depend on the possibility to IMPLEMENT it. It could very well be that the complexity of the universe forbids its implementation or simulation.

Compare it to mathematics: the real numbers form an uncountable set, computer programs or algorithms form a countable set. Using algorithmic complexity as a condition for existence would mean that almost all real numbers do not exist.

Attention: My approach is not a reductionist one. I do not say that I can explain life with all its emerging properties from laws of chemistry. The latter one serve as a basis only. Look at language: assume for a moment that the English language would follow strict, logical rules. Do you think that would preclude literature to exist? Certainly not.

 

[Fra]

I don't think so. The EXISTENCE of something (entity, law, ...) need not depend on the possibility to IMPLEMENT it. It could very well be that the complexity of the universe forbids its implementation or simulation.

I know we differ here, but to me your notion of EXISTENCE is almost a non-physical and non-scientific one. I think it's because ou are more realist than me but from my point of view your question "does it exist" without considering how it's inferred, simply has no impact on the actions - which is the prime concern to me.

/Fredrik

 

[friend]

It sounds like you are thinking about stuff that doesn't exist. I don't know of any purely curve-fitting approach to anything in physics. Ideas will always creep in
Could you be wrestling with a straw man named Mr. Curve-Fitting Approach?

I'm skeptical of your being able to find any branch of science where practitioners consistently follow any stated rulebook method, as if they were automata.

Maybe I shouldn't argue this anymore with you, Friend. You have your opinion about the Limitations of Science based on your own concepts and reasoning. I have a different set of aperçus. In the end all we could do is make predictions about, say, the next 15 years of research and (if we both survive that long) check later to see whose mental model was closer to the real world.

Can you give me an example where the methods used are NOT curve-fitting. Yes we extend our models by trying to generalize the math and see if it's applicable. But how is that conceptually any different than finding the next term in a polynomial expansion in order to better match a curve? I mean even looking for gauge symmetries is just a means of trying to more easily find functions that match the data. Even string theory was first considered because it was math that seemed to closely match some nuclear physics. Yes, this may produce results. But it can never produce a TOE because you'll never know if it's not possible to find greater generalizations that might apply; let's add another term to the expansion and see what we get. What kind of creative thinking did you think we were doing?

 

[Fra]

thank you for your reply.
I have another question
Is there an effective way to distinguish
1. MWI (everything happens) + AP (Anthrophic Principle)
from
2. Cosmic Darwinism
and from
3. Evolving law?

One would have to admit that "evolving law" is currently not a specific theory. It's IMO first of all a new way of thinking, that takes a while to get used to. And it might possibly define a new direction for research programs.

Smolins CNS cosmic darwinism is one possible realisation of evolving law.

But the major difference between CNS and what I envision is that I do not think diversity and selection takes place isolated in black holes, I think it takes place everywhere. The difference between predictable time evolution as per some laws of dynamics and the not so predictable evolution of laws, are simply two extremes of the same scale.

I try to combine the ideas of laws of physics following from rules of inference, with the evolving law concept. It's a mix of smolings evolving law, and ariel catichas and jaynes idea to "derive" the laws of physics from an extension of logic.

The purpose of of the evolution in this context (this is how I think of it, not smolin an his CNS) is to bridge the problems of the rigid logic systems, regarding proving completeness etc. Tom was acknowleding this, but has not yet given up the idea it seems. I have come to the conclusion that an evolving inference systems is a possible way to do. I have great personal confidence in this, but it's a very complex undertaking, and it's probalby not realistic that one person should start from this point, and complete the reconstruction up until the standard model level.

This is why I think ALL research that are more or less in this direction is very interesting and important.

MWI and AP doesn't even enter the same level of ambition for me, so distinguishing them from the two others seems obvious. MWI is an interpretation of QM - I am suggesting a reconstruction of the entire formalism of QM, by deeper insights in intrinsic information theory.

note: In fact, from the way I reason, taking an intrinsic inference perspective seriously, the evolution is even a prediction becase there is no static solution. So I do not "assume" ad hoc that parameters vary randomly and there is some undefined selection, I rather think that the evolving inference system follows from the self-constructive inference itself. Successful parts are reinforced by a kind fo statistical weight, and inconsistent parts and eventually diluted and eventually become indistinguishable and are erased. What I am fighting with is to make this precise, and then the next step is of course to extract the physics we are used to - to reproduce 4D spacetime and matter content. The matter content in my view IS the inference system population. This is definitely not what smolin is thinking - it is a clear mix of smolins GENERAL idea, AND the program of physical inference (ariel caticha, et jaynes etc).

There is a synthesis of these two ideas to be made. Since few seems to bother with this I see no better option but to try to do it myself, although it's an overwhealming task.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

I know we differ here, but to me your notion of EXISTENCE is almost a non-physical and non-scientific one ... from my point of view your question "does it exist" without considering how it's inferred, simply has no impact on the actions - which is the prime concern to me.

Let me ask one question again: Go to a room with a huge library, lock the door and throw away the key. Do the books continue to exist?

From your last postings I would say that you position is very close to idealism. Of course I can't prove that it's wrong, but you certainly run into trouble that you have to explain how your approach differs from pure subjectivism.

It seems to me that your position is always jeopardized to become non-scientific.

 

[Fra]

Ok, this is a simple example but let me put it to make me point more clear.

Let me ask one question again: Go to a room with a huge library, lock the door and throw away the key. Do the books continue to exist?

If we suppose that this is the door to another world, and that the door is irreversibly closed. Then to be honest, I would never raise the question - I would probably be better off investing my time in posing a more constructive question.

Do the books still exist in the world I will never be able to communicate with? I honestly would be completeley indifferent to which :)

However, if there was still interactions with that room, and there was mechanisms where the books beeing there or not, would influence my future, then I would take into consideration that the books exists or not exists, when inferring the possible future of mine, and it would also influence my action! And if we are talking about a macroscopic library then the mass of that makes it very probably that the information I received when the door was open, does not change immediately as I close and lock it.

So my answer is that the existence of the books is meaningul only if there is to me, an distinguishable mechanism for how it might influence my future. Otherwise I would not waste my time pondering about wether god is left or right handed, because I am completeley indifferent to these things. There is no basis at all for rising such question.

From your last postings I would say that you position is very close to idealism. Of course I can't prove that it's wrong, but you certainly run into trouble that you have to explain how your approach differs from pure subjectivism.

I think I've tried to explain this. In my view, objectivity is emergent as a RESULT of interactions and selection on the subjective inferenc esystems. This is a very important point.

My view of symmetry is for example NOT that there in a realist sense exists a set of subjective/relative views that happen to have a certain transformation which generates all of them. And the symmetry is again of realist type. (this is the COMMON view)

Instead, but view is that as a subjective inference system is put to interactions, the local group of interacting subjective inference systems will exert ON THE OTHERS a selective pressure that causes emergence of a local symmetry. However this symmetry has not global meaning beyond this local group of interactors.

I understand that on first glimps this may sound like anything goes etc, but that's not the case. The trick is the evolutio and selection. "Anything goes" simply doesn't survive the competition, a system needs to be in consistency with it's local environment to be in local equilibritum. About global equilibrium, there is no local definition of such a think. To make a very large scale equilibirum, you need a Very very complex and massive observer.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

If we suppose that this is the door to another world, and that the door is irreversibly closed. Then to be honest, I would never raise the question - I would probably be better off investing my time in posing a more constructive question.

Do the books still exist in the world I will never be able to communicate with? I honestly would be completeley indifferent to which :)

However, if there was still interactions with that room, and there was mechanisms where the books beeing there or not, would influence my future, then I would take into consideration that the books exists or not exists, when inferring the possible future of mine, and it would also influence my action!

OK, let's discuss this in the context of cosmic horizons. An area A of space that disappears from our "world" beyond the cosmic horizon will certainly no longer interact with you (your area X). But of course there are other distant areas B, C, D, ... still visible to you which can interact with area A. Therefore the EXISTENCE of area A does not only (as far as I can see) depend on the interaction with area X, but on the interaction with B, C, D, etc. Keep in mind that it is by no means clear that the interaction of X with B, C, D will (in the far future) be communicated to X. In a typical scenario with horizons these signals from B, C, D will be hidden in the future behind the same expanding horizon and will NEVER be received in X.

That means that you have to give up the subjective perspective and believe in the objective world telling you that other areas of space will "support" A to continue to exist.
So in some sense A ceases to exist from a subjective point of view, but it will continue to exist from an objective (or realistic) point of view.

This is exactly the consequence of Berkeley's idealism. He was very clear about the fact that if you assume that only "observed phenomena" are existing, then you have to explain how things can exist even if nobody is looking. As Berkeley was a bishop he trusted in good to observe everything in the universe and keep it existing.

What I am saying is that if your ontology is based on "your possible future, and influence on your actions", then this is essentially idealism. Your judgment regarding existence of certain entities is either subjective or incomplete. As you certainly want to avoid subjectivism you have to overcome incompleteness. You doubt that this will work w/o reference to any externally existing entity (material objects, laws, ...).

 

[Fra]

I'll get back later and try to elaborate about completeness, existence etc. I'm currently running low on time but i'll return with comments evenetually.

But in short, the completeness of percection you seen to seek, are not physically realisable. BUT you are right that seeking it is rational, but the process itself involves time and resources. This is exactly why there is evolution. Time is even a consequence of this failure to capture eternal perfection in a moment of time.

But more later... I'm stuffed with work atm

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

It was a trick: I did not want to discuss the meaning of "EXISTS", I wanted to show that there is no consensus on even basic things.
Let’s admit, based on this and all previous discussions: there is no consensus about the meaning of words:

Event
Exist
Real / Virtual
Reality/Realism
Measurement
Observation
Particle
Spacetime (4D? Bulk?)
Etc etc.

If we think about the words as some clouds in some space of meanings, then before they had sharp borders. Then they because more and more fuzzy. They started to intersect with each other.

But wait: this is exactly what Max Tegmark predicted! On our way to TOE all these words MUST lose their meaning, becoming “mere labels” (c) These fuzzy clouds are the last image we see as the objective of our science photo-camera is de-focused completely.

 

[Fra]

On my way but some more meanwhile..

Mmm you seem as obsessed with "existence", as I am with "inference", not sure what to say here...

I assume your argument is that the subjective view is different from your imagine objective view? Sure, but so what? I mean, what physical impact does this have? You seem to think it's a logical inconsistency, as it breaks your realist logic, that every question, even the ones that aren't asked, must have a definite - observer independent/inference independent - answer?

In my view, the "inconsistencies" actually imply physical interactions, in the sense of a selective pressure in the evolution.

This is what you do in symmetry arguments as well, that two choices of a gauge, imply an physical interaction. The difference is that I apply the inference also to the symmetry transformation itself, so we get an hierarchy of information.

That means that you have to give up the subjective perspective and believe in the objective world telling you that other areas of space will "support" A to continue to exist.
So in some sense A ceases to exist from a subjective point of view, but it will continue to exist from an objective (or realistic) point of view.

This is exactly the consequence of Berkeley's idealism. He was very clear about the fact that if you assume that only "observed phenomena" are existing, then you have to explain how things can exist even if nobody is looking. As Berkeley was a bishop he trusted in good to observe everything in the universe and keep it existing.

I'm not sure I follow your reasoning here. That something is indistinguishable from the point of view of observer 1, does not mean we can infere there is nothing there, it only means we know noting of it, and this unkonwn also does not influence our actions in a distinguishable way.

That's enough for me, I don't understand why you keep insisting in want to konw what you can't know, when it's indifferent to you?

I'm not one single bit religious :)

Your judgment regarding existence of certain entities is either subjective or incomplete. As you certainly want to avoid subjectivism you have to overcome incompleteness. You doubt that this will work w/o reference to any externally existing entity (material objects, laws, ...).

Incomplete? Of course there is a limit to my predictive power of the future - for several reasons, that is the whole starting point. It's the basic observation that is the starting point for it. My whole approach is based on inference based upon incomplete information. But the intrinsic form of this, is not like standard information theory, where you can exactly quantify what you don't know, instead you simply act on what you know, period. It's a game, the choices are to play or not to play.

If you are considering a realist view, where the information exists in some external sense, and in this birds view you can explain the incompleteness of the inside view, then it's not intrinsic inference.

Actually in my view, the external inference model DOES apply, when you as a large observer study small subsystems, because then you can physically justify at least an emergent EFFECTIVE birds view.

But this is a special case. Looking at your remote horizon is not a subsystem which environment you cna monitor.

This is - IMHO - why a new "evolving" logic is needed.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

I'm not sure I follow your reasoning here. That something is indistinguishable from the point of view of observer 1, does not mean we can infere there is nothing there, it only means we know noting of it, and this unkonwn also does not influence our actions in a distinguishable way.

I just responded to the following statement

If we suppose that this is the door to another world, and that the door is irreversibly closed. Then to be honest, I would never raise the question - I would probably be better off investing my time in posing a more constructive question.

... I don't understand why you keep insisting in want to konw what you can't know, when it's indifferent to you?

I do not insist that I want to know something about a certain entity, but I am insisting on the fact that my examples point into the direction that talking about existence of some entity must not only be based on its affect it has on your actions. If you restrict the meaning of existence to "is observed" or "has an affect" then you have to answer the question "who is the observer?" or "who is affected". With my examples I try to show that restricting to you as an observer may not be sufficient because then some entity that existed in some sense may cease to exist because of your horizons. That means the existence of this entity relies on "external observers" which essentially saves us from idealism (solipsism). I hope this clarifies what I mean by "incomplete".

One remark: I think the discussion is still interesting and we continuously uncover new aspects. But finally it always boils down to the fundamental different perspectives we have. I only want to make clear that I appreciate your reasoning! It's not that I am blind or ignorant, it's only that I see (from my perspective) certain obstacles in changing to the "dark side". So if you still like the discussion it's fine for me; if it becomes boring or if you think that we start to go round in circles then let me know.

Thomas

 

[Fra]

With my examples I try to show that restricting to you as an observer may not be sufficient because then some entity that existed in some sense may cease to exist because of your horizons. That means the existence of this entity relies on "external observers" which essentially saves us from idealism (solipsism). I hope this clarifies what I mean by "incomplete".

Ok, if I understand you right which I think, the yes, we have "incompleteness". Agreed.

Now what I suggest is that this incompletness is no arfitfact due to a my flawed reasoning (like I think you think?) - it is a physical incompleteness to me, consistent with all I know. That's my point, and this incompleteness in any inference system, has measurable consequences in the actions.

I think it's also responsible for the arrow of time.

It is correct in a sense that my reasoning is unstable! It's just that from a realist view it is not unstable, it's incomplete and possibly inconsistent.

I'm suggesting instead that the instability has a direction, the subjective arrow of time. In this "flow" evolution of law are the slowest changes in the hiearchy and hardest to predict, the most vibrant "flow" is the ordinary time, that is flowing respect to the lower level states.

This is of course just a vision, but it's how it should work in detail when I get this worked out.

One remark: I think the discussion is still interesting and we continuously uncover new aspects. But finally it always boils down to the fundamental different perspectives we have. I only want to make clear that I appreciate your reasoning! It's not that I am blind or ignorant, it's only that I see (from my perspective) certain obstacles in changing to the "dark side". So if you still like the discussion it's fine for me; if it becomes boring or if you think that we start to go round in circles then let me know.

I know :) I'm not blind either, in a certain sense I do see your points. I guess I wanted to explain how the weaknesses you see, are handled in my view.

In a nutshell we do seem to get back to the deductive systems. From the point of view of deductive reasoning, my stance IS inconsistenct or incomplete. You conclude from within that system that my view is thus "probably" wrong? Does that sound fair?

Insteaf from My point of view, this inconsistency and incompleteness are real and physical, and instead the problem is the deductive inference system! If we instead take on an inductive type of inference, inconsistencies are not fatal, they just cause the inference system itself to revise.

I think like this:

The problem with your approach is that is risks to come to a halt, or simply fail to make progress in a rational way. The advantage is that it's more definitive, and not as subjective, and inferences are certain.

The problem with my approach is how to make sense out of this subjective mess. The advantage is that it does not easily come to a halt and it' a builtin deadlock avoidance since inconsistences are handled be evolving hte inference system which inferred it! Thus inconsistencies are interpreted as a need to revise the inference system itslelf.

I have tried to defined the motivation for why the deductive fixed axiomatic model are likely to fail, and motivate a search for a more flexible framwork. I also have at least tried to argue how I handle subjectivity. When two rational solipsists interact adn communicate, they will come to a consensus, a kind of emergent objectivity, but this objectivity has meaning only to the interacting parties.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

Thanks for the excellent summary!

 

[John86]

Hello Fra,

I am following this thread for quite a while now, and find your ideas really inspiring and usefull in more than one way. Subjectivism an evolution of physical law sounds very reasonable to me. But what role does Non-locality play in your ideas ?.

 

[Fra]

Hello Fra,

I am following this thread for quite a while now, and find your ideas really inspiring and usefull in more than one way. Subjectivism an evolution of physical law sounds very reasonable to me. But what role does Non-locality play in your ideas ?.

Hello John. I'm glad to be of some inspiration :)

Usually locality or non-locality refers to spacetime and distance. In my view, spacetime is emergent but there is a sort of locality principle that is can be defined prior to the regular spacetime.

I could it phrase it so that the principle is simply that the physical action of a system depends only from the evidence encoded in it. Thus there is "locality" in the sense where you envision a distance measure in "hypothesis" space, where the action weights possibilities in accordance to their respective confidence level. Thus, things with low or zero confidence level, has low or zero impact on the action.

Edit: I don't think I explained this well. I want to point out that I distinguish between action and reaction. The reaction is the backreaction from the environment following the systems action. This together gives evolution. So the action, is not a global action, it is only defined differentially so to speak. The action defines a differential change; it does not define the definite change since this involves evolution which has an undecidable part that is due to physical incompleteness.

In fact, this type of distance measure beeing a kind of information divergence, is a possible hint to how spacetime can emerge. Ariel Caticha (which is not as radical as i am, but still) has turned the coin around and suggest that instead of saying that things that are remote from each other are unlikely to influence each other; that things that as a matter of fact appears to have little or no influence on each other, and pretty much no correlation defines a distance, this way one can define distance in information space.

Some technical details though is that there are different ways to do this, there is also a standard topic (information geometry) where there are information theoretic origns of the metric. I picture it differently, that gives a more weird and "subjective" geometry, but then that advantage it's exactly the subjectivee view of the geometry that implies interaction forces. I consider a intrinsic kind of information divergence ( that lacks objective meaning) and it's exactly the relativity of this measure that implies that these systems when interacting in "their view of space" are subject to interactions from the disagreeing systems.

But this is all open questions as I see it, and the details remain to be nailed exactly. For any later comers, my modest contribution to this thread on TOE etc is just to try to convey my view what I think requiring a coherence of reasoning suggest about how it may or may not look like. And that this alone, may actually guide us to finding not a static TOE, but maybe as close to an effective TOE as might be possible.

/Fredrik

 

[moniker2]

It was a trick: I did not want to discuss the meaning of "EXISTS", I wanted to show that there is no consensus on even basic things.
Let’s admit, based on this and all previous discussions: there is no consensus about the meaning of words:

Event
Exist
Real / Virtual
Reality/Realism
Measurement
Observation
Particle
Spacetime (4D? Bulk?)
Etc etc.

If we think about the words as some clouds in some space of meanings, then before they had sharp borders. Then they because more and more fuzzy. They started to intersect with each other.

But wait: this is exactly what Max Tegmark predicted! On our way to TOE all these words MUST lose their meaning, becoming “mere labels” (c) These fuzzy clouds are the last image we see as the objective of our science photo-camera is de-focused completely.

labels? I got kick out of the forum two years ago for posting this.

Liquid Space Theory
F = force
M = mass initial
V = velocity
C = speed of light
A = acceleration
H = Planck’s constant
E = energy


F = {[(m/ (1-(v^2/c^2)) ^(1/2)]-m}a

Second law of time

A ={{[(m/ (1-(v^2/c^2)) ^(1/2)]-m}^-1}f

Infinite change of time

M = [f /{[(1/ (1-(v^2/c^2)) ^(1/2)]-1}a

Mass as a vector in a 3- orthogonal space

V = c [- (ma/ma-f )^2 +1]^1/2

Velocity of time

C = [v / [- (ma/ma-f )^2 +1]^1/2

Speed of light as a function of mass

E = {[f /{[(1/ (1-(v^2/c^2)) ^(1/2)]-1}a}{[v / [- (ma/ma-f )^2 +1]^1/2 }^2

Time conservation law

Wave = {{[f /{[(1/ (1-(v^2/c^2)) ^(1/2)]-1}a}{[v / [- (ma/ma-f )^2 +1]^1/2 }^2 } / h

(e / h)

Wave length and energy of the force
Energy of the force = {{[(m/(1-(v^2/c^2)) ^(1/2)]-m}c^2}
Wave = {{[(m/ (1-(v^2/c^2)) ^(1/2)]-m}c^2} / h

Time has an avg. 10^18 – 10^23 Hz

Not a good source at all but interesting...
http://www.timetravelinstitute.com/ttiforum/showflat.php?Cat=&Board=time_travel&Number=47124&Forum=time_travel&Words=satown&Match=Entire%20Phrase&Searchpage=0&Limit=25&Old=allposts&Main=46807&Search=true#Post47124"

 

[John86]

Thanks for your reaction Fra,

But this inference proces is a purely informational relational proces as i understand it ! The subjective observer acts on i'ts environment and viceversa am i right. Then this will have certain fundamental consequences for measurements undertaken in science, because they then are purely subjective and belong more or less to the classical measurement outcomes taking place in our brains.

 

[Fra]

But this inference proces is a purely informational relational proces as i understand it ! The subjective observer acts on i'ts environment and viceversa am i right. Then this will have certain fundamental consequences for measurements undertaken in science

If I read you right, I can roughly agree so far.

they then are purely subjective and belong more or less to the classical measurement outcomes taking place in our brains.

? I don't quite follow this parts, and how it relates to the ideas I describe?

My ideas are not directly related to models of the human brain. Observer also does not refer to a human.

Observer is a general physical system.
The inference system is physical inference system, not a biological brain. If you use brain as a metafor for inference system, then any physical system has this. But the word brain and humans brings in totally misguiding associations. I do not think in terms of humans or brains at all.

Maybe I missed your point here?

Edit: Maybe your reason for talking about hte brain, is because you consider human science? OK, then I agree. BUT there are complications, humans are far more complex than particles, and humans are not only constrained to their brain. Humans pretty much control an entire planet, and has learned howto exploit control and use it's environment as an extension of itself.

So the inference system of human science inference, is not just the biological brains, it's much more. We have techonology, computers, libraries etc that are a significant part of our "complexity". Not to mention gigantic laboratories they we have built be exploiting our acquired knowledge of our environment. This technology continously increase.

But in a sense that's no different than how I picture it on the microscale, and how complexity is gained by taking control of the enviroment.

But all this, is no "problem" as I see. It's just another illustration that science is a complicated by evolving thing. Our environment, in several ways connects our subjective brains, so the emergent consensus is not subjective.

/Fredrik

 

[John86]

No sorry you are wright. This doesn't work very well in biological systems. I used the human brain merely as a metaphore.

But is this inference proces purely materialistic of nature ?.

 

[Fra]

But is this inference proces purely materialistic of nature ?.

I am not sure what you mean, if you mean if it's materialistic - as opposed to say something spiritual or divine :) Then yes it's materialistic.

However, what does "materialistic" mean? Usually that means it's made of matter, but in the reconstruction I envision matter is also emergent and I reall don't see a firm starting platform, this is exactly why the evolution appears as the ratioanl solution.

There is also a difference between the observers own inference system, and inference systems existing in it's environment (other obserers, or particles etc): From the point of view of any given observer, the inference system of the environment is reflected in it's own emergent inference system.

I picture a mutual selective pressure where at a certain level of equilibirum, the inference systems reach a maximum of consistency, this corresponds to the case where all observers are in maximum agreement about the "laws of physics". But du to intrinsic limitations of complexity, there can never be perfect consistency - this "residual inconsistecy" - manifests as interactions between the observers that are described by the locallly objective laws.

I used the human brain merely as a metaphore.

Ok, then it's great question. But of course, the inference system of the environment, is always inherently uncertain as inferred from the instrinsic perspective of one observer.

So, in my view, the evolving laws means that, not only like QM where we have set laws, and a state of the system (wave function) which evolves, we have both a state of the system, AND a "state" of the inference systems (state of laws) but these laws are not predictable from the inside view, there are only expecations - which gives an arrow of change - and the only way to find out the real future is to act as per the expectations, and also face the feedback.

In a well equilibrated system, one expects a layers of effective objective laws ot have been stabilised, realtive to which we have a time evolution probably like what we have in the current standard model - thus the standard model and QM, corresponds to steady state of effectively stable laws. The residual mutual uncertaints that are irreducible cause interactions that are descried by effectivelt(not fundamentally) fixed laws.

This is exactly how human science also works, but we have not yet translated this logic to physical interactions. I am convinced there is more insight to collect there.

In the end, "material properties" are properties of inferred inference systems, I'm stills struggling but for sure there is a close link with inertial mass and complexity of the inference system. This will also PROBABLY be strongly related to gravitational mass since the inference systems ability to take control of the environment and thus INCREASE it's own complexity(mass) will increase with it's own starting complexity(mass). I see great potentials on howto develop this into something nice.

The phenomenology of interactions would be expected when we can find the steady states of the effective laws. In there we should also hopefilly find some things that are currently "parameters". The parameters are explain as the ones required for a steady state.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

But is this inference proces purely materialistic of nature ?.

That's a very good question to step in again. Usually we distinguish (in an ontological sense) between physical objects (like electrons, photons, ...) and the corresponding laws (quantum mechanics, quantum field theory like QED, ...).

As far as I understand the idea of the mathematical universe everything is simply an entity, element, ... of a (consistent) mathematical framework. Therefore the ontologoical difference between physical objects and laws of physics does no longer exist.

@Dmitry67: Am I right?

Now back to the context of evolving laws due to inference processes.

@Fra: is there an ontological difference between objects and laws? are the objects somehow "materialistic" whereas the laws are "super-materialistic", i.e. is there a different level of existence forthe laws? or does the difference between objects and laws no longer makes sense?

If there is no difference between objects and laws then there should be no difference between evolution of laws and interaction of particles.

Tom

 

[Fra]

@Fra: is there an ontological difference between objects and laws? are the objects somehow "materialistic" whereas the laws are "super-materialistic", i.e. is there a different level of existence forthe laws? or does the difference between objects and laws no longer makes sense?

If there is no difference between objects and laws then there should be no difference between evolution of laws and interaction of particles.

Tom

Yes, there is no distinct principal difference! The difference is merely the stability and decidability. Laws are the most stable structures in this evolving view, and they correspond to different levels in a hiearchy.

This is the unification. Nothing escapes the inference framework. Not even the inference system itself. However inference has two extremes: deductive logic or deterministic predictions, or free evolution. I'm exploiting the range in between.

/Fredrk

 

[Fra]

If there is no difference between objects and laws then there should be no difference between evolution of laws and interaction of particles.

In here is also IMO the key to understanding the difference between (as smolin also pointed out about the validity of the current logic of eternal law in subsystems).

The same interaction can appear either described by effective laws, seen from an outside observer controlling/monitoring the environment, or as unpredictable evolution (the inside view).

The key I think is to see that these two pictures are not in contradiction, they are two sides of the same coin and I think one key is the scaling of the complexity of the inference system - this is why from the point of a more massive infrence system, things that to a small inference system appear unpredictable are effectively predictable.

One can think of this also as a sort of deeper "renormalisation" picture. The distinguishable laws are dependent of the complexity. But the scale itself is not objective.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

One can think of this also as a sort of deeper "renormalisation" picture. The distinguishable laws are dependent of the complexity. But the scale itself is not objective.

Clarification:

One key question in my approach is, How does the inference systems themselves change as we scale the complexity of the inference systems?

This is exactly the same question as to ask, how a physical systems perceives physical laws as the systems get lower and lower mass. Ie. what "laws of physics" does say a proton "see" or a quark "see" and thus act according to?

I think this is a key to the unification. Since the logic of the action of these microconstitutiens are I think constrained by the relative simplicity or low complexity of their inference system.

Gravity I picture here beeing related to the fact that the running of the "complexity scale" is actually related to the physical process of a system loosing or gaining mass (by controling or loosing control of it's environment)

So all interactions, including gravity, really does have a very logical connection here. With some stretch of imagination this is how I probably with some strong biaos of mine interpreted some of Frank Wilzceks ponderings about what symmetry really is.

One can also picture here a plausible way to expect something like asymptotic freedom as we scale down the complexity of the inference system (which is what happens inside the collisions in a high energy experiment), since some interactions themselves become less distinguishable from the inside poitn of view - thus their mutual interacting get weaker.

As far as I see, it's not hard at all to imagine how this inference reasoning connects to many open questions in physics. That's one of the motivators for me. It's really exicting and promising, and it has IMHO a very higg level of coherence in the reasoning, which is very important for me. But indeed it's also currently at least very fuzzy.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

Usually we distinguish (in an ontological sense) between physical objects (like electrons, photons, ...) and the corresponding laws (quantum mechanics, quantum field theory like QED, ...).

As I am not sure if everybody understands my reasoning correctly I would like to comment on this remark. Therefore I use a very simply, unrealistic example, namely a universe with only finitely many, structureless, massive bodies interacting via V(r) ~1/r. There are no humans (therefore no measurement, no minds/brains etc.).

1) you have the bodies
2) you have a representation of the bodies, their masses m_i and coordinates r_i; these representations are equivalent to the trajectories
3) you have the physicals laws; in my example there is just one law, namely an Hamiltonian H(r_i, p_i); m-dependence suppressed.
4) initial conditions for the movement of the bodies; these are not contained in 3)
5) in addition you can think about a sheet of paper on which you can write H, draw the trajectories etc.; This is certainly different from (2) and (3); I would say that physical laws "exist" even if there is no sheet of paper or computer monitor to display it.
6) you can introduce god into that theory; he may know about all bodies, laws, trajectories and initial conditions

Note that the existence of (3) is different from the existence of the bodies, simpy because (3) applies for all bodies you can think about, whereas (1) applies on to the bodies which exist in a physical sense. In a universe with three bodies you can still think about applying H to a fictitious fourth body.

As far as I understand the discussion here the aim is to collapse at (1) - (4) into one framework where the differences between them disappears or become irrelevant (just as the difference between the Earth and the moon is irrelevant in the context of Newtonian physics; they are two special cases of massive bodies, nothing else). As this would be a ToE it would certainly contain (5) and (6) as well.

But I think this is where most people will have problems with. It is by no means clear that a physical body and its mathematical representation (in some appropriate framework) are identical! We haven't found such a framework; we cannot even guess how it would look like. I have tried to describe a very simple universe,but still most of iús would agree that the sentence

(M_moon, R_moon) IS the moon

is wrong. It is a representation of the moon.

I have one final question rearding MUH: We discuss very complex issues like universes with different physical laws. Let's discuss one rather simple problem, namely two universes looking absolutely identical, except for the fact that in one universe the solar system is missing. Are these too universes two different mathematical frameworks, or are they on such framework in two different occurences? Does the MUH imply that all those universes (w/ or w/o solar system; w/ or w/o you and me, with other planets) exist? Does the possibility that I am able to write some equations specifiying the movement of a 10th planet in our solar system create universes where this planet exists?

 

[Dmitry67]

As far as I understand the idea of the mathematical universe everything is simply an entity, element, ... of a (consistent) mathematical framework. Therefore the ontologoical difference between physical objects and laws of physics does no longer exist.

@Dmitry67: Am I right?

correct

 

[Dmitry67]

1) you have the bodies
2) you have a representation of the bodies, their masses m_i and coordinates r_i; these representations are equivalent to the trajectories
3) you have the physicals laws; in my example there is just one law, namely an Hamiltonian H(r_i, p_i); m-dependence suppressed.
4) initial conditions for the movement of the bodies; these are not contained in 3)
5) in addition you can think about a sheet of paper on which you can write H, draw the trajectories etc.; This is certainly different from (2) and (3); I would say that physical laws "exist" even if there is no sheet of paper or computer monitor to display it.
6) you can introduce god into that theory; he may know about all bodies, laws, trajectories and initial conditions

This is what Max Tegmark calls a 'baggage'. If you try to get rid of ALL words in this toy universe, you will see that the difference between 2 and 3 will dissapear. 1 is a mere label (definition of a 'body'). 5 does not make any sense. "I would say that physical laws "exist" even if there is no sheet of paper or computer monitor to display it." - correct.

But I guess the your idea to discuss some 'toy' universes is a very good one; we don't know OUR TOE, so it easier to discuss simpler universes. For example, "Game of Life" is a perfect example. So, in the Universe "Game of Life", what is a difference between structures (bodies) and laws? When I was young boy, I discovered that game and played a lot with figures on the chessboard. Does that game require a chessboard?

I think many people agree that methematics can perfectly describe the reality. But (they think) the formulas are dead until you "incarnate" them into something, until you fill them with some substance. But for TOE, there should be no magical substances, because TOE by definition must describe everything.

TOE is different from any theories we had because TOE ends the reduction: "bodies-molecules-atoms-hardrons-quarks-strings.." so the most fundamental entities can not be "made of something". If they are not "made of something" they are just "described by formulas". I don't see any possible void where the difference between the ultimate description of reality and reality can hide.

 

[Dmitry67]

I have one final question rearding MUH: We discuss very complex issues like universes with different physical laws. Let's discuss one rather simple problem, namely two universes looking absolutely identical, except for the fact that in one universe the solar system is missing. Are these too universes two different mathematical frameworks, or are they on such framework in two different occurences? Does the MUH imply that all those universes (w/ or w/o solar system; w/ or w/o you and me, with other planets) exist? Does the possibility that I am able to write some equations specifiying the movement of a 10th planet in our solar system create universes where this planet exists?

So, the laws are identical, but initial conditions are different?

If Universe is infinite, all combinations must happen. But MUH is much easier to be accepted if you accept MWI (eliminating the problem of initial conditions of matter in our universe) and if there is a mechanism to generate all possible Universes with all possible parameters of the Standard Model (eternal inflation?).

MUH will be in big trouble if MWI would be proven wrong or if there are some fundamental initial conditions (God Had choice when created our Universe). This is a good news because it is a falsifiable prediction.

Max Tegmark wrote:

common feature of much string theory related model building is that there is a “landscape” of
solutions, corresponding to spacetime configurations involving different dimensionality, different types of fundamental particles and different values for certain physical “constants” , some or all of which may vary across the landscape. Eternal inflation transforms such potentiality into reality, actually creating regions of space realizing each of these possibilities. However, each such region where inflation has ended is generically infinite
in size, potentially making it impossible for any inhabitants to travel to other regions where these apparent laws of physics are different. If the MUH is correct and
the Level IV multiverse of all mathematical structures (see Section V) exists, this historical trend is completed: even the “theory of everything” equations that physicists
are seeking are an environmental accident, telling us not something fundamental about reality, but instead which particular mathematical structure we happen to inhabit,
like a multiversal telephone number. In other words, this would entail a crushing complete
defeat of fundamental physical laws. However, contrary to how it may at first appear, it would not constitute a victory for initial conditions in the traditional sense.

There is nothing “initial” about specifying a mathematical structure. Whereas the traditional notion of initial conditions entails that our universe “started out” in some particular state, mathematical structures do not exist in an external space or time, are not created or destroyed, and in many cases also lack any internal structure resembling time. Instead, the MUH leaves no room for “initial conditions”, eliminating them altogether. This is because the mathematical structure is by definition a complete description of the physical world. In contrast, a TOE saying that our universe just “started out” or “was created” in some unspecified state constitutes an incomplete description, thus violating both the MUH and the
ERH.

 

[Fra]

As I am not sure if everybody understands my reasoning correctly I would like to comment on this remark.

If you were referring to me then I defeinitely think I see your position. It's just that I don't share it so to speak. My arguments serve to try to convey why your position is questionable from my point of view, and what the weaknessess are. But it doesn't mean I don't see your position.

But indeed, I also see what the weaknesses of my view are - from your point of view.

Somehow I think this mutual understanding is as far as we can get until you agree to join the dark side ;-)

I feel I have tried the structural realist side. It was the side I am coming from and my own reasoning and experience has lead my onto another path because the realist/axiomatic view has IMO serioust problems, some of that I think you posted about as well, and it's not cast in stone but it would take extraordinary arguments or input the revise this position.

6) you can introduce god into that theory; he may know about all bodies, laws, trajectories and initial conditions

This is one of the things I objected to before. The birds view supposedly justifies the realism. But as long as the complete birds view is inaccessible, which it is for several reasons it seems to be only a mental construct to justify a (from my point of view) "flawed" reasoning.

But I think you know my position there already no need to repeat.

But I think this is where most people will have problems with. It is by no means clear that a physical body and its mathematical representation (in some appropriate framework) are identical! We haven't found such a framework; we cannot even guess how it would look like.

Maybe I mix up your comments on the evolving law idea, and Dmitrys view, so I am not sure to whom this was addressed.

If the comment applies to my view, then it's true that many has problems with it. It's like having the ground under you removed. But that we cannot even guess is not fair I think. I think the latest discussions has hinted at least conceptually how the framwork could look like. At least to speak for myself, I have a much better guess even if it's currently immature how this evolving framework is going to solve problems, than ideas howto make progress starting from the QFT framework and GR without changing anything.

The most common and most natural objection to the somewhat inference approach is I think that it renders everything apparently subjective, and that it would be hard to do science without an objective basis. I've tried to explain how this is not a problem once you see the whole picture.

But as far as I know, compare to string theory and the other large competing approaches, it seems that almost nooone is working seriously on this. Wether it's because no one has any ides or simply because the ideas are suppressed by the community is another discussion.

So I certainly have ideas on this framework, and I will also keeping searching for it independently of wether most others aren't motivated. The price I pay is of course, that I am on my own, an this is constrained to beeing a sidetrack along with alternative professional carriers. But I think that is a reasonable price ot pay. It would not make sense for the public to invest in all small possibilities. That some minor approaches are suppressed is somehow how the world works.

New ideas doesn't necessarily come out of the mainstream work. So the fact that there aren't much "almost mainstream" ideas on how this framework is like is not one bit discouraging or surprising for me.

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

Fra, it was difficult for me to formulate the question about your approach, because everything looked so fuzzy. But now I have one:

So, everything is subjective. Say, there are observers O1, O2, ON, ... etc

Is view of different observes consistent? Or is the notion of self-consistency applicable? If yes, then to what extent? For example, in the macroscopic realism approach all views are consistent on the macroscopic level. But in MWI, view of observers in different branches is not macroscopically consistent (in different branches, but consistent in the same branch). Is it possible that O1 is observing the dead cat, O2 - alive cat, and O3 denies the existence of observers O1 and O2? Are there any invariants in your approach?

 

[tom.stoer]

@Fra: I am sorry for the confusion. I did NOT address you, neither with the comment that not everybody is clear about the problems, nor with the problems people have about the approaxches just discussed.

Why I was posting this was mainly because I found one aspect which seems to be common to both, Fra and Dmitry67, namely the fact that the differences between objects, representation of objects and laws for the objects fades away. In that sense both approaches are even more radical than evolving law, multiverses etc. Therefore I think that even people who could basically agree would refuse to agree to the more radical implications.

 

[Fra]

Dmitry, we concluded previously that we differ quite a bit, so my response to the below questions are relative to my reasoning.

Is view of different observes consistent?

Note that an "inconsistency" requires an inference system, and in the deductive inference inconsistency usually means you can make two deductions which shows a contradiction, say something beeing both true and false at the same time. Such inference system is "inconsistent".

But in my view, the inference system itsel is evoling, and always uncertain! An inconsistency of the type above in this case, simply is an "observation" that decreases the confidence in the inference system in question, which effectively is why it evolves.

Is view of different observes consistent?

Also for this to even have meaning in my view, the observers must be interacting.

In this respect I think Rovelli phrased it well in his RQM paper that the only way for two observers to relate their measurements is to communicate - ie. to interact.

So given that requirement, then a certain form of consistency or consensus between the observer is emergent, as a result of the interaction.

This means that in my view

- observers that aren't interacting, does not even have the notion of mutual consistency defined since it is only defined throught the interaction.

- even observers that are communicating, can be inconsistent transiently, but mutual inconsistency always means off-equilibrium and thus interaction forces.

The main difference from the standard notion of consistency as defined by say a symmetry transformation, is that in my view this transformation itself is not given, it's emergent, and without interactions the transformation itself is undefined.

But in MWI, view of observers in different branches is not macroscopically consistent (in different branches, but consistent in the same branch).

I'm not much into MWI, but certainly if the observers are in different non-interacting branches the notion of consistency has no meaning; which also means that any INconsistency is IMO simply unphysical because hte physical event realising the "inconsistency" will never happen.

Is it possible that O1 is observing the dead cat, O2 - alive cat, and O3 denies the existence of observers O1 and O2? Are there any invariants in your approach?

Sure, that's possible. but wether it's a stable state or likely to be observered is another question :)

In my view, it's not so much a question of what's possible, but more of what's probable to
be observed. In general inconsistencies means interaction forces, which means off-equilibrium.

Are there any invariants in your approach?

There are subjectively EXPECTED invariants, that is reflected in the action of the observer. But these invariants are not universal, global or objective and are generall subject to evolution as real interactions take place.

/Fredrik

 

[friend]

Note that an "inconsistency" requires an inference system, and in the deductive inference inconsistency usually means you can make two deductions which shows a contradiction, say something beeing both true and false at the same time. Such inference system is "inconsistent".

But in my view, the inference system itsel is evoling, and always uncertain! An inconsistency of the type above in this case, simply is an "observation" that decreases the confidence in the inference system in question, which effectively is why it evolves.

In this respect I think Rovelli phrased it well in his RQM paper that the only way for two observers to relate their measurements is to communicate - ie. to interact.

So given that requirement, then a certain form of consistency or consensus between the observer is emergent, as a result of the interaction. /Fredrik

Fredrik, your "theory" or "view" seems to lack any faith in reason or logic. And I see an inconsistency in what reasoning you so far present.

What you are suggesting is that there is no system of logic applicable to all of reality independent of observation. But isn't that what we are forced to assume, unless we are to think there is something in reality that is inherently illogical. That doesn't sound like a very plausible scientific premise to build any kind of theory on. I think the scientific expectation that all things are reasonable means we have to start with the assumption that all things are logically consistent with each other. The only question after that is how does that dictate the math we are to use.

Can consistency "emerge" from an illogical basis? That seems to be what you are saying. But I think that is impossible. Consistency can only be derived from a logical system - and not from a system of contradictions. If different Observers see everything to be logical arbitrarily close or distant from each other, then the entire universe must be everywhere and always a consistent set of facts.

If you think your theory somewhere can have inconsistencies in it, then your theory is so vague and speculative that it would be impossible to write any mathematics to describe it. I think you need to come to your senses and appologize for your incomprehensible musings.

 

[qsa]

friend, do you think this website can support DR Max Tegmark's theory

http://www.qsa.netne.net

 

[friend]

friend, do you think this website can support DR Max Tegmark's theory

http://www.qsa.netne.net

Obviously we have no choice but to describe reality with mathematics; there is no other language capable of describing it. But there are things in reality that have properties that are discovered through experiment, mass and charge of an electron, for example. These "inherent" properties are the 30 or so constants inserted by hand into the Standard Model. However, it is hoped that eventually we will find some mathematical explanation for these inherent properties, and so they too will be derived mathematically from some more basic theory. So ultimately I think all of reality can be derived from a pure mathematical/logical basis. We just haven't found that basis yet.

Everything having a mathematical basis does not mean that every mathematical system describes reality. It might describe a subset of what we know because it may serve as an approximation in some limited realm. For example, the system of whole numbers can be used to count apples in a basket. But that does not mean that reality is limited by this narrow subset of mathematics.

So the question is what mathematics can we trust will lead to a theory of everything. I suppose we will not be sure until it reproduces something familiar to physicists, like the basic formulation of QM or GR.

 

[Fra]

Friend, I certainly respect your position that you don't see any possible way howto make sense of of the reasoning I advocate.

There is a certainly a clear kind of logic in my approach, but it seems you do not see it, or you see it as inconistent, that's because I don't believe in rigid axiomatic deductive inference - that systems seems not flexible enough to efficiently describe nature.

I guess we will see in the future if we are able to overcome all problems and solve all open problems in physics without radically finding a more flexible framework.

What you are suggesting is that there is no system of logic applicable to all of reality independent of observation. But isn't that what we are forced to assume, unless we are to think there is something in reality that is inherently illogical.

Let's just note for a fact, that the logic system we are all talking about here ARE in fact inferred from interactions - human laboratory interactions with nature. Even mathematics and logic are produced by humans as a result of contemplation and study of nature.

So what I am suggesting is not really as insane as it may first seem, if you see it in the right way.

Maybe you you then say that Earth and nature and the laws of nature was here long before humans - yes of course it was, but at a lower level even matter was once not here, instead it was maybe emergent from a great chaos?

I think the scientific expectation that all things are reasonable means we have to start with the assumption that all things are logically consistent with each other. The only question after that is how does that dictate the math we are to use.

What I suggest is not all that different to what you say. The difference is wether the logic system is fixed and eternal, or if it's emergent?

At human level for example, are we creating the laws of physics or are we discovering them?

I'm saying there is no clear difference.

Can consistency "emerge" from an illogical basis? That seems to be what you are saying. But I think that is impossible. Consistency can only be derived from a logical system - and not from a system of contradictions.

I think I have tried to explain all this already, but I'm sorry to not be able to be more clear but this isn't easy stuff. And there are for sure many unsolved problem as well.

But the problem even in Your approach, from a scientific point of view is, when a given "logic system" or say "theory" is proving WRONG, it when it's falsified - HOW do you find a new theory without starting from scratch? - This is where my main point is, here my view contains a rational scheme for howto infere the new inference system from the old system given detection of slight inconsistency.

This even develops the scientific method in the area where popper left a whole - the logic of hypothesis generation? Hypothesis TESTING is the easyl part.

If you think your theory somewhere can have inconsistencies in it, then your theory is so vague and speculative that it would be impossible to write any mathematics to describe it. I think you need to come to your senses and appologize for your incomprehensible musings.

I don't see what I need to apologize for, except that I am sorry that I don't have more progress made. I rather see adding my point of view in here as part of an intellectual discussion in the search for the framework what can solve the real problems in physics.

As I said before, the real argument is when solution on open problems are on the table. Until them I have to admit I find the competing arguemtns far more inconsistent, simply consistency doesn't lead to uniqeuness. The evolving logic system solves to a larger extent the question of "why these laws".

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

Fra, do all observers share the same verson of mathematics? Is it possible that for some observers 2+2=5?

 

[qsa]

Dmitry, do you think this website can support DR Max Tegmark's theory

http://www.qsa.netne.net

I hope you got the private message I sent you