Quantum effects at the neurological level

[rasp]

I had read that Roger Penrose and others (like Hameroff and Chalmers from Arizona) have been studying the possibility that quantum events may influence the way our nerves fire and our brains develop thought. Can anyone comment on the scientific progress of these studies?

 

[alxm]

Sure: It's unwarranted speculation at best and pseudoscience at worst.

It's not taken seriously by anyone in the field. And by 'the field' I mean people who actually know both quantum physics and chemistry: Theoretical chemists, quantum chemists, chemical physicists - in particular the ones studying biochemical systems.

Penrose is a mathematician. Hameroff is an anesthesiologist. Neither are quantum chemists - despite that that's been an established field for about 80 years. If it doesn't strike you as odd that these ideas are being promoted by people completely outside the field, it should.

 

[rasp]

Sure: It's unwarranted speculation at best and pseudoscience at worst.

It's not taken seriously by anyone in the field. If it doesn't strike you as odd that these ideas are being promoted by people completely outside the field, it should.

Your point about the field is well taken. Yet, although it is odd, I still find it encouraging that some Nobel Prize winners like Penrose, Shrodinger, Crick, Polkinghorne, and others choose to exercise their minds beyond their disciplines to investigate what could be called "the moose on the table" i.e. the "mystery" of consciousness.

Perhaps, I should have asked what are the latest scientific theories regarding consciousness?

 

[Nick666]

Mistery of consciousness? What are you talking about ?

Ya mean why the wavelenght of red looks like red ? You should ask a color-blind person .

 

[Galteeth]

Mistery of consciousness? What are you talking about ?

Ya mean why the wavelenght of red looks like red ? You should ask a color-blind person .

I believe he is referring to the "hard problem."

 

[alxm]

Your point about the field is well taken. Yet, although it is odd, I still find it encouraging that some Nobel Prize winners like Penrose, Shrodinger, Crick, Polkinghorne, and others choose to exercise their minds beyond their disciplines to investigate what could be called "the moose on the table" i.e. the "mystery" of consciousness.

Actually, only Crick and Schrödinger are Nobel laureates out of those. I don't know that either made any kind of direct connection between QM and neurology, though.
Attributing mystery to consciousness is, IMO:
1) Anthropocentric.. it strokes our egos to think that maybe our brains are really spectacular and not simple chemical machines. That kind of thinking has very consistently been wrong. We're not in the center of the solar system. We're not in the center of the universe. We're not really different from other animals. "Animal magnetism" and "life force" etc don't exist. Organic substances turned out not to be fundamentally different from other chemicals, and so far, biochemistry has not turned out to be fundamentally different from other chemistry. Many things in biology are unexplained, but I don't know of anything that's considered unexplainable in the current framework of things. (quasi-)Macroscopic quantum behavior is not part of that framework.

2) Unwarranted, it's obviously a higher brain function and we've barely begun to understand the basics of how the brain works. There's no real reason to assume it'd be more difficult to understand than any other brain function, and even less reason to assume it'd be unexplainable by biochemistry, or chemistry, or anything short of a direct application of QM. I don't think anyone would ever have proposed such a far-fetched thing if it hadn't been for the reasons stated in (1).

Perhaps, I should have asked what are the latest scientific theories regarding consciousness?

It's an excellent question. But it's absolutely a question for neurologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and the whole plethora of folks that study the brain. It's not a question for physicists. That would only happen if the neurologists eventually ran into something that in no way could be explained by existing biochemistry, which in turn could not be explained by existing theoretical chemistry. Which is a pretty tall order, given that nothing of the sort has turned up.

(And again, there's no particular reason to think it'd turn up in connection with human consciousness)

 

[Fightfish]

Perhaps, I should have asked what are the latest scientific theories regarding consciousness?

Well, in the July issue of Physics World, Paul Davies wrote an article "The quantum life", which gives a rather comprehensive overview of "quantum biology", even including a discussion on the issue of decoherence. You can view it here: http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/print/39669

 

[rasp]

Actually, only Crick and Schrödinger are Nobel laureates out of those. I don't know that either made any kind of direct connection between QM and neurology, though.
Attributing mystery to consciousness is, IMO:
1) Anthropocentric.. it strokes our egos to think that maybe our brains are really spectacular and not simple chemical machines. That kind of thinking has very consistently been wrong. We're not in the center of the solar system. We're not in the center of the universe. We're not really different from other animals. "Animal magnetism" and "life force" etc don't exist. Organic substances turned out not to be fundamentally different from other chemicals, and so far, biochemistry has not turned out to be fundamentally different from other chemistry. Many things in biology are unexplained, but I don't know of anything that's considered unexplainable in the current framework of things. (quasi-)Macroscopic quantum behavior is not part of that framework.

2) Unwarranted, it's obviously a higher brain function and we've barely begun to understand the basics of how the brain works. There's no real reason to assume it'd be more difficult to understand than any other brain function, and even less reason to assume it'd be unexplainable by biochemistry, or chemistry, or anything short of a direct application of QM. I don't think anyone would ever have proposed such a far-fetched thing if it hadn't been for the reasons stated in (1).

Let me disagree with your philosophical points by quoting selectively from lectures given by Schrödinger in 1956 entitled What is Life, and Mind and Matter.

Anthropocentric.. it strokes our egos to think that maybe our brains are really spectacular and not simple chemical machines.

From Schrödinger "He who accepts this brushing aside of the question ought to be told what an uncanny gap he thereby allows to remain in his picture of the world." Schrödinger argues that the brain "is the most elaborate and most ingenious of all mechanisms for adaptation to a changing environment."

Organic substances turned out not to be fundamentally different from other chemicals, and so far, biochemistry has not turned out to be fundamentally different from other chemistry.

Schrödinger speaking of biology from the standpoint of entropy, "From all that we have learned about the structure of living matter, we must be prepared to find it working in a manner that cannot be reduced to the ordinary laws of physics" (italics mine) "In biology we are faced with an entirely different situation...events whose regular and lawful unfolding is guided by a mechanism entirely different from the 'probability mechanism' of physics...it is unknown anywhere else except in living matter."

or anything short of a direct application of QM.

Schrödinger didn't believed QM played a significant role in the biology of the mind for he says, " the space-time events in the body of a living being, which correspond to the activity of its mind, to its self-conscious or any other actions, are...if not strictly deterministic at any rate statistico-deterministic". He makes an interesting logical point of why consciousness cannot be confined within the physical bounds of the brain. He hypothesizes the state of the world if consciousness were linked to the brain, and the brain never evolved "Would it (the world) otherwise have remained a play before empty benches, not existing for anybody, thus quite properly speaking not existing?" (italics mine)


He states the problem as the need to draw a correct, non-contradictory conclusion from the following two premises:
"1) My body functions as a pure mechanism according to the Laws of Nature
2) Yet I know, by incontrovertible direct experience, that I am directing its motions, of which I forsee the effects, that may be fateful and all-important, in which case I feel and take full responsibility for them."

I believe he takes the stance that consciousness must exist outside the body because of his very strong personal belief that an observation is required to separate existence from possibility via the collapse of the wavefunction.
Your comments?

 

[rasp]

Mistery of consciousness? What are you talking about ?

Ya mean why the wavelenght of red looks like red ? You should ask a color-blind person .

This is an old question. I was just wondering if there are some new answers.
Schrodinger wrote in Mind and Matter in 1956 "the sensation of color cannot be accounted for by the physicists objective picture of light waves." Yellow is produced by a certain numerical wavelength. Yet an indistinguishable sensation of yellow can be produced by mixing green and red of different wavelengths. "Is there a numerical connection between these physical objective characteristics of these waves? No".

 

[f95toli]

Yes, Schrödinger did not know enough of neither neurology nor quantum physics to be considered an authority in this matter.

Remember that he died in 1961 and did most of his important work in the very early days of QM when it was still being developed. Most of the physics and biology that is relevant here simply did not exist when he was active.

Peter Knight likes to illustrate how much our view and understanding of QM has changed over the past few decades by using the following quote from Schrödinger:

we never experiment with just one electron or atom or (small) molecule. In thought-experiments we sometimes assume that we do; this invariably entails ridiculous consequences….*

Which is of course now incorrect; and we also know that those "ridiculous" consequences are real.

 

[rasp]

Well, in the July issue of Physics World, Paul Davies wrote an article "The quantum life", which gives a rather comprehensive overview of "quantum biology", even including a discussion on the issue of decoherence. You can view it here: http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/print/39669

Thanks for the reference, which was enlightening regarding biology in general, although it didn't say much regarding neuroscience. I admire Davies' strong stance on the incredibility of random events explaining the origin of life.

 

[rasp]

Yes, Schrödinger did not know enough of neither neurology nor quantum physics to be considered an authority in this matter.

You say yes, meaning there are new developments in relating the subjective quality of conscious experience to the physical phenomenon? Can you reference them?

 

[f95toli]

I'd say you are starting from the wrong end here. We are not even sure there IS such as thing as a "consciousness" in the traditional sense (as far as I can tell modern research seems to indicate that there isn't). Much less any reason to expect it to be related to "physics" beyond the normal (or at least well known) physics you need to understand chemistry.
I don't know much about neurology (although I have an "indirect" interest since some of the potential applications of some of work is in that field); but I'd say it might be worth starting with one of Dennet's books. You should also look up some references on fMRI and other modern experimental methods.

 

[rasp]

I'd say you are starting from the wrong end here. We are not even sure there IS such as thing as a "consciousness" in the traditional sense (as far as I can tell modern research seems to indicate that there isn't).

There is NO traditional sense of consciousness. Only an ostrich with its head in the sand would say there is no consciousness. Perhaps you'd be happier with the term awareness.

Much less any reason to expect it to be related to "physics" beyond the normal (or at least well known) physics you need to understand chemistry.

There are NO working theories of consciousness on a physics or chemical basis as far as I know. And there are unique qualities of consciousness that make it different than most neurological events, and which lead researchers to postulate exotic theories like emergence from organizational complexity or QM.

 

[f95toli]

There is NO traditional sense of consciousness. Only an ostrich with its head in the sand would say there is no consciousness. Perhaps you'd be happier with the term awareness.

I mean "traditional" as in how the term was used be e.g. Decartes.

There are NO working theories of consciousness on a physics or chemical basis as far as I know. And there are unique qualities of consciousness that make it different than most neurological events, and which lead researchers to postulate exotic theories like emergence from organizational complexity or QM.

There are definitely at least fragments of theories for what we perceive as consciousness; but you are right that there are no fully developed theory yet.

btw, which "unique qualities" are you referring to that can NOT be explanined without using "exotic" physics?

Note that neither QM nor complex system (or emergence) are very "exotic", the former has been around for over a 100 years now and although there are many unanswered questions we do know quite a lot about how QM applies to essentially classical systems such as the brain.
Emergence and more generally the study of complex systems has also been around for quite a while and there are plenty of applications; e.g. much of modern condensed matter theory uses concepts from these fields (it is hardly a coincidence that e.g. Laughlin is a big proponent of emergence). It is likely that any theory for how the brain works will use elements of these fields, but that does not make such a theory "exotic".

 

[rasp]

I mean "traditional" as in how the term was used be e.g. Decartes.

Some "traditional" questions of consciousness go back before Descartes and are still viable. Descartes divided the world into thinking substances "res cognita" and extended substances "res extensa". In the 5th century BC Democritus wrote a play in which the intellect, "res cognita", argues with the senses, "res extensa", about what is real. The former says, " Ostensibly there is color, ostensibly sweetness, ostensibly bitterness, actually only atoms and the void. . To which the senses retorted,'Poor intellect, do you hope to defeat us while from us you borrow your evidence?'

One unique characteristic of consciousness is just this. That all knowledge of the external world, observations, quantum and other wise must eventually pass though our senses.

Emergence and more generally the study of complex systems has also been around for quite a while and there are plenty of applications; ... that does not make such a theory "exotic".

I call emergence "exotic" because in the normal sense "the sum" is not greater than the integration of its parts, and the integral can always be differentiated into its constituent parts. When some delta exists between sum and integral that delta is exotic.

 

[Galteeth]

I could go on and on about Dennet and these arguments, but perhaps it would be better to move this thread?

 

[Nick666]

rasp, you should watch all these 5 episodes. http://www.tvokay.com/documentary/bbc-s-brain-story.htm (click cancel if that weird window appears)

BBC's Brain Story. If you're interested in scientific progress on the brain, you should watch this.

 

[atyy]

For what is worth, even though it's from a superb scientist who also has fun being an occasional crackpot, here is a rebuttal of QM having anything to do with consciousness: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9907009

My own view is that the difficulty with "consciousness" is defining it operationally - like "long range entanglement" - a concept which theorists don't understand well enough yet to tell experimentalists what they should measure to determine whether the property is absent or present in the sample: http://pirsa.org/08110003/ (try 58:30).

 

[nikman]

Don't lump Chalmers with Hameroff-Penrose (he's not a scientist, and not at Arizona any longer anyway ... he's gone home to Oz).Interesting paper on avian magnetoreception involving the quantum Zeno effect:

http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.2646The UIUC Theoretical and Computational Biophysics Group:

http://www.ks.uiuc.edu/Research/quantum_biology/

 

[rasp]

Thanks to all who have replied. I got what I wanted from this thread, which is an update to my knowledge. I haven't read all the references yet but I will. So for now adios.

Can't resist one last question. Anyone have an opinion on Henry Stapp's work on quantum computing?

 

[nikman]

Stapp seems like Penrose-Hameroff gone holistic. And since you're still around and receptive to speculative input, here's Johnjoe McFadden, a reputable molecular biologist who believes the brain and consciousness need to be understood in terms of electromagnetic fields:

http://machineslikeus.com/MLU-interviews-johnjoe-mcfadden.html

 

[alxm]

Schrödinger speaking of biology from the standpoint of entropy, "From all that we have learned about the structure of living matter, we must be prepared to find it working in a manner that cannot be reduced to the ordinary laws of physics" (italics mine) "In biology we are faced with an entirely different situation...events whose regular and lawful unfolding is guided by a mechanism entirely different from the 'probability mechanism' of physics...it is unknown anywhere else except in living matter."

Sure, we can be 'prepared' to find it working in a matter that defies 'ordinary' laws of physics. But we have no reason to expect it to do so. None at all, especially given that - as I said- every time an "outside of ordinary physics" mechanism has been proposed in biology, it's turned out to be false. (Oh and I forgot another one: Newton, in Opticks, thought "That which causes fermentation" was a fundamental force of nature, like gravity.) Every day, more and more aspects of biology are being explained in terms of the physics and chemistry we all know.

 

[alxm]

Interesting paper on avian magnetoreception involving the quantum Zeno effect:

I don't think anyone said I never said that processes in biology don't sometimes require quantum-mechanical treatment. If you think I did, perhaps I took it for granted that as obvious. Just to take an example: Eyesight, the absorption of (down to) individual photons, is not something chemistry has traditionally dealt with. Neither is the nature of most electron transfer.

The point I was making was that, none of this is unique or specific to biochemistry.

The UIUC Theoretical and Computational Biophysics Group:

Yup, they work with similar stuff to what I do. I've used their software, VMD, as well.
I could say that I work in "quantum biology", only I despise that term exactly because of this - getting conflated with all this unserious Deepak Chopra stuff. (A misguided acquaintance gave me a book of his, "I heard you did quantum physics, so I thought you'd find this interesting..")

here's Johnjoe McFadden, a reputable molecular biologist who believes the brain and consciousness need to be understood in terms of electromagnetic fields:

Yet another person way out of their field. You don't need to know anything about quantum mechanics to get a degree in molecular biology, you know. Wonder why the actual quantum chemists studying biological systems you linked to aren't advocating any such things... hmm?

(Just to be nice I'll give an example of the reverse: Henry Schaefer is very reputable quantum chemist. He's also an outspoken creationist, meaning he believes complete nonsense about biology)

Ridiculous, he's got no calculations there. The physics is all hand-waving. There's no model of the brain. It's idle speculation.

Seriously, if anyone thinks they know how the brain works, they should go explain the causes of schizophrenia, and all the many, many, many other neurological disorders. Help the sick.

There will never be a problem with explaining consciousness until every other aspect of the brain is understood. Because until then: How do you know it's not due to one of the things you don't understand yet?

That's how science works. You don't put the cart in front of the horse, and you don't try to solve problems until you know what the problem is.

 

[nikman]

I don't think anyone said I never said that processes in biology don't sometimes require quantum-mechanical treatment. If you think I did, perhaps I took it for granted that as obvious. Just to take an example: Eyesight, the absorption of (down to) individual photons, is not something chemistry has traditionally dealt with. Neither is the nature of most electron transfer.

The point I was making was that, none of this is unique or specific to biochemistry.

Yup, they work with similar stuff to what I do. I've used their software, VMD, as well.
I could say that I work in "quantum biology", only I despise that term exactly because of this - getting conflated with all this unserious Deepak Chopra stuff. (A misguided acquaintance gave me a book of his, "I heard you did quantum physics, so I thought you'd find this interesting..")


Yet another person way out of their field. You don't need to know anything about quantum mechanics to get a degree in molecular biology, you know. Wonder why the actual quantum chemists studying biological systems you linked to aren't advocating any such things... hmm?

(Just to be nice I'll give an example of the reverse: Henry Schaefer is very reputable quantum chemist. He's also an outspoken creationist, meaning he believes complete nonsense about biology)

Ridiculous, he's got no calculations there. The physics is all hand-waving. There's no model of the brain. It's idle speculation.

Seriously, if anyone thinks they know how the brain works, they should go explain the causes of schizophrenia, and all the many, many, many other neurological disorders. Help the sick.

There will never be a problem with explaining consciousness until every other aspect of the brain is understood. Because until then: How do you know it's not due to one of the things you don't understand yet?

That's how science works. You don't put the cart in front of the horse, and you don't try to solve problems until you know what the problem is.

To the extent that this responds to my post: I wasn't aware I was talking to you. Why would I want to do that?

 

[alxm]

To the extent that this responds to my post: I wasn't aware I was talking to you. Why would I want to do that?

If you were talking to someone in particular, it certainly wasn't obvious. So what's your problem?

 

[nikman]

If you were talking to someone in particular, it certainly wasn't obvious. So what's your problem?

I was clearly responding to the thread-starter, rasp, whose post mine followed and whom I called "you", even if I didn't bother to quote him. And I did stipulate that McFadden is speculative. As he certainly is. But not ignorant or necessarily wrong.

You tone impresses me as unnecessarily aggressive, if not hostile. Like who appointed you to be cop on the beat? If I'm wrong I apologize. (It's just that, like you, I'm seldom if ever wrong.)

 

[Galteeth]

There will never be a problem with explaining consciousness until every other aspect of the brain is understood. Because until then: How do you know it's not due to one of the things you don't understand yet?

That's how science works. You don't put the cart in front of the horse, and you don't try to solve problems until you know what the problem is.

Well, not necessarily. The basic concept behind evolution was worked out before the particulars of DNA.

 

[alxm]

You tone impresses me as unnecessarily aggressive, if not hostile. Like who appointed you to be cop on the beat? If I'm wrong I apologize. (It's just that, like you, I'm seldom if ever wrong.)

Yes, I am hostile to "quantum-consciousness" theories, for reasons I stated. They're overly speculative at best, pure pseudoscience at worst, and I'm fed up with having that nonsense conflated with the quite legitimate research that's being done in biophysics and quantum (bio)chemistry. In much the same way that an astronomer is going to be hostile to a question about horoscopes.

If you can't handle criticism of ideas without taking it as a personal slight: grow up.

 

[alxm]

Well, not necessarily. The basic concept behind evolution was worked out before the particulars of DNA.

That's simply not the same thing. Darwin knew exactly what he was trying to explain: the origin of the species. How speciesization occurs. The ultimate physical details of his solution weren't known. (and several erroneous theories would come about before it all got sorted)

What I was criticizing is the very opposite: They're proposing detailed physical theories to a biological question that is not well-defined.

 

[Galteeth]

That's simply not the same thing. Darwin knew exactly what he was trying to explain: the origin of the species. How speciesization occurs. The ultimate physical details of his solution weren't known. (and several erroneous theories would come about before it all got sorted)

What I was criticizing is the very opposite: They're proposing detailed physical theories to a biological question that is not well-defined.

Ok, I'll give it a shot. Consciousness is an emergent property of brains. Unlike say, water, we have no real understanding of the relationship between the physical arrangement of the matter and this particular emergent property.
In many ways we lack the intellectual tools to investigate it, as consciousness can only be directly observed by the one experiencing it. Nevertheless, it is clearly a natural property that somehow emerges from the matter in our brains. We generally assume that brains produce a bounded consciousness (i.e., I can access my own memories and prior experiences in my stream of conscousness, but not yours) and that things that are not brains (like rocks) do not have consciousness.

So the question is, what physical properties result in this emergence?

 

[alxm]

In many ways we lack the intellectual tools to investigate it, as consciousness can only be directly observed by the one experiencing it.

Which isn't true. There are many physical ways of telling the difference between say, a conscious and unconscious brain. With recent advances in fMRI and similar, they're getting better and better at it; to the extent that they can tell quite a lot about what you're thinking about. Whether it's pleasant or unpleasant, whether you're fantasizing or remembering an actual event, etc. There's no reason to believe that consciousness cannot be observed.

Nevertheless, it is clearly a natural property that somehow emerges from the matter in our brains.

Which is a statement so vague as to be useless. That's just not a scientific theory of any sort. Begin with: How do you measure that 'natural property'? How do you know it's 'emergent'? What do you mean by 'emergent'? That it's not something done by an individual neural cell? What bodily function is performed by cells working individually? Wouldn't most everything a complex being does be an 'emergent property' then?

We generally assume that brains produce a bounded consciousness (i.e., I can access my own memories and prior experiences in my stream of conscousness, but not yours) and that things that are not brains (like rocks) do not have consciousness.

Which is a convoluted way of saying 'thinking goes on inside your head'. Well, we've known that for quite some time.

So what's the problem here? That you feel there's a difference between your subjectively experienced consciousness and what an MRI machine might register? So what? That's a metaphysical question, not a science question.

 

[kote]

Which is a convoluted way of saying 'thinking goes on inside your head'. Well, we've known that for quite some time.

So what's the problem here? That you feel there's a difference between your subjectively experienced consciousness and what an MRI machine might register? So what? That's a metaphysical question, not a science question.

That's exactly the issue. Science apparently can't solve the hard problem. Science is one tool useful for gaining knowledge. I would certainly argue that there are meaningful questions that science can't answer. The most obvious example might just be "why should anyone do science?" It's not a scientific question, but unless you've implicitly answered it you won't be doing any experiments.

Are you saying that a blind person could have the same type of knowledge of the color red that I have? That a deaf person could observe music in the way that I do?

Also, what's with the Chalmers bashing? I'm not with him on this issue, but the guy has employment offers at all of the top philosophy departments in the world including NYU, Oxford, Princeton, and Rutgers. Arizona is also a top 15 school.

 

[ViewsofMars]

Answering the OP, Brain MRI Scan (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) comes to my mind.

"Magnetic resonance imaging, the scientific term behind a brain MRI, is a relatively new technique which uses the quantum mechanical characteristics of protons in your body tissues to create an image. The specific details of the science behind an MRI is quite complex. In general, the patient is placed in a large magnet which aligns all their protons into the same spin. A radiofrequency pulse stimulates these protons, most abundant in water, and an electrical coil around the head detects the signals that result. In the end, the computer uses complex mathematics to convert these signals into an image which the physicians read and interpret."
http://www.nervous-system-diseases.com/brain-mri.html

The whole article is educational. :) Worth the read. Of course, I love to read about everything. LOL! I'm a speed reader. Amoung the first kids they experimented speed reading on in elementary school decades ago.

 

[Galteeth]

Which isn't true. There are many physical ways of telling the difference between say, a conscious and unconscious brain. With recent advances in fMRI and similar, they're getting better and better at it; to the extent that they can tell quite a lot about what you're thinking about. Whether it's pleasant or unpleasant, whether you're fantasizing or remembering an actual event, etc. There's no reason to believe that consciousness cannot be observed.



Which is a statement so vague as to be useless. That's just not a scientific theory of any sort. Begin with: How do you measure that 'natural property'? How do you know it's 'emergent'? What do you mean by 'emergent'? That it's not something done by an individual neural cell? What bodily function is performed by cells working individually? Wouldn't most everything a complex being does be an 'emergent property' then?



Which is a convoluted way of saying 'thinking goes on inside your head'. Well, we've known that for quite some time.

So what's the problem here? That you feel there's a difference between your subjectively experienced consciousness and what an MRI machine might register? So what? That's a metaphysical question, not a science question.

Ok, I'll start with the assertion about the usefulness of saying consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. In the historical past, there was a debate as to whether mind was of some fundamentally different substance then matter. One side has won this debate, dualism clearly lost. We can then say, consciousness must be a property that results from the brain, not something existing in some other platonic realm.


Wouldn't most everything a complex being does be an 'emergent property' then?
Yes, but we have a coherent picture of that emergence for other functions. Understanding the circulatory system, we can go to the organ level, the tissue level, the cellular level, the molecular level, to some extent even to the quantum level, and there's no trouble with a gap of how each stage of complexity leads to the next. The brain could presumably be described in such a fashion except for consciousness.

This leads directly into the philosophical zombie problem. Science has no fundamental issue with describing the brain assuming people are just p-zombies. However, consciousness does not "intuitively" seem to be neccessary, but nevertheless it exists. What function does it serve? What physical properties will lead to consciousness as oppossed to non-consciousness? Is it a matter of information processing? If so, can non-organic systems produce consciousness? What is the threshold? What kind of information creates consciousness? HOW does it do this? It is something else, a biological feature? Does it have an evolutionary advantage, or is it some sort of spandle?

You can go the way of Dennet and deal with the problems by essentially asserting that consciousness, in the immediate, qualia sense, does not exist.
Well, great, but... it's not true.

You can not directly observe consciousness. You can observe neurological events that are correlated with changes in consciousness.
I agree that we can tell to some extent the difference between a brain that's conscious and one that's not by observing its physical properties. And this is my exact point. That matter, those processes, are somehow creating consciousness. But there is still a fundamental gap in how we get from the level of the brain as an organ to consciousness as it exists.

You can pretend this problem doesn't exist, but it does, and ultimately it is a scientific question, not just philosophical musing.

 

[sokrates]

What does the fact that you cannot directly observe consciousness have to do with quantum mechanical processes in the brain?

We cannot understand the brain because of the huge number of "physiological" processes that are going on... We cannot track every biochemical event and associate it with a particular function in the brain.

This, at the current time of understanding, HAS NOTHING to do with quantum mechanics ( keeping in mind that all classical phenomena can emerge out of QM rules but that's another story ). It is like suggesting "different laws are taking place" in multi-electron atoms just because we cannot solve the many-body Schrodinger equation due to practical difficulties.

If esoteric quantum phenomena is actually taking place in the brain, why is it not taking place in the kidney, which is very much better understood.. What is so special about consciousness that it warrants a complete departure from the conventional ways evolution has created through millions of years hardship. Plus, remembering that we ALL evolved from a prokaryotic primate would be another mystery to solve the "quantum" peculiarity of our brain while all the other biological organisms are operating with simple chemical laws.

So the point is: There are not even HINTS of these fantasies in the physiological processes of living organisms, be it a single cell complex adaptive system or a chimpanzee. Check for instance, the electro-physiology of heart. Or the sodium-potassium pump or the blood-brain barrier... Choose anything other than the holy "consciousness" and you will see that these are VERY well understood (because of the relative simplicity and isolation of the function involved) in terms of SIMPLE biochemistry laws, most of which are simply empirical, let alone complicated exact physics.

And if you pause for second and look at the title of the thread, you'll see that the argument is really about quantum versus classical in human body, which I believe like others, is on the borders of pseudo-science.

 

[alxm]

Yes, but we have a coherent picture of that emergence for other functions. Understanding the circulatory system, we can go to the organ level, the tissue level, the cellular level, the molecular level, to some extent even to the quantum level, and there's no trouble with a gap of how each stage of complexity leads to the next. The brain could presumably be described in such a fashion except for consciousness.

That's completely false. There are huge, whopping gaps in our knowledge of our body in general, and our brain in particular. There are millions and millions of proteins for which the function is almost entirely unknown. Heck, we don't even know where they are, which tissue expresses them, or when - under what conditions. We don't know what actually causes diabetes or lupus or most illnesses, in fact. And we know even less about neurological/psychiatric conditions, ranging from OCD to schizophrenia.

It is simply not the case that everything is neatly understood, and that consciousness remains a big and singular mystery. Just to take a higher brain function that's not related to conciousness: Explain how instincts and reflexes work? How are they inherited? Etc. We have very little idea.

What function does it serve?

No doubt a current source of inquiry among evolutionary biologists.

What physical properties will lead to consciousness as oppossed to non-consciousness?

What physical properties will lead to babies, as opposed to non-babies? What kind of question is that? There's no reason to assume a higher-level biological function (not present in the vast majority of animal life) can be described as being directly related to any physical properties in a meaningful way.

You can not directly observe consciousness. You can observe neurological events that are correlated with changes in consciousness.

That's just saying I cannot observe the metaphysical. So what? I can't directly observe 'blue' either. I know what physical thing is perceived by me as blue. I know something about how that perception occurs. Perhaps soon we'll know what physical things happen in the brain when that happens. But it's never going to be 'blue' in your metaphysical sense, because that is by definition outside of science. We can discuss subject-object relations in Heidegger versus Descartes or whatever until the cows come home, but it's never going to be physics.

But there is still a fundamental gap in how we get from the level of the brain as an organ to consciousness as it exists.

You can pretend this problem doesn't exist, but it does, and ultimately it is a scientific question, not just philosophical musing.

I'm not pretending that we know how consciousness works. I'm saying that we don't, and that there's
1) Nothing strange about that, because there's lots and lots we don't understand.
2) Nor is there anything that points to consciousness being particularly difficult compared to other brain functions. It may well turn out to be a relatively easy brain function to understand.
and
3) As elaborated on in good detail by Sokrates above, there's absolutely no reason to assume that there are any physical processes going on in the brain that are unique to the brain. Much less distinctly quantum processes.

 

[BAnders1]

The mind is such a complex subject, and right now physics fails to provide an accurate model describing turbulent fluid flow. I think we're a long way from understanding how consciousness works, but like rasp said, the question shouldn't be brushed away. Pinching at the subject is the only way we'll ever get a grasp on it.

 

[alxm]

The mind is such a complex subject, and right now physics fails to provide an accurate model describing turbulent fluid flow.

Which does not mean that we think turbulent flows are a great mystery, or that they're 'un-understandable', or that they require some kind of physics outside of fluid dynamics.

We have every reason to brush away the idea that quantum physics is required to understand consciousness for very much the same reasons that a fluid-dynamicist would brush away the idea that quantum mechanics would be required to describe turbulent flow: At the very least, we currently have no reason to resort to that.

 

[BAnders1]

We have every reason to brush away the idea that quantum physics is required to understand consciousness for very much the same reasons that a fluid-dynamicist would brush away the idea that quantum mechanics would be required to describe turbulent flow: At the very least, we currently have no reason to resort to that.

Sorry, I wasn't suggesting that QM is required to understand turbulent fluid flow (or the mind). I was just trying to say that if we (physicists) can't explain such a common phenomenon as turbulent fluid flow using our current understanding of nature, then how could we suggest that we could explain something more complex, if not at least as complex as the brain, using the same physics that have failed to provide us with an accurate model for fluid flow?

We do not, however, have reason to brush away the question of how the mind works. Even the non-scientist is not satisfied with ignoring such a fascinating thing.

 

[Galteeth]

What does the fact that you cannot directly observe consciousness have to do with quantum mechanical processes in the brain?

.

Almost nothing. I admittedly got off topic here.

 

[Galteeth]

That's completely false. There are huge, whopping gaps in our knowledge of our body in general, and our brain in particular. There are millions and millions of proteins for which the function is almost entirely unknown. Heck, we don't even know where they are, which tissue expresses them, or when - under what conditions. We don't know what actually causes diabetes or lupus or most illnesses, in fact. And we know even less about neurological/psychiatric conditions, ranging from OCD to schizophrenia.

It is simply not the case that everything is neatly understood, and that consciousness remains a big and singular mystery. Just to take a higher brain function that's not related to conciousness: Explain how instincts and reflexes work? How are they inherited? Etc. We have very little idea.



No doubt a current source of inquiry among evolutionary biologists.



What physical properties will lead to babies, as opposed to non-babies? What kind of question is that? There's no reason to assume a higher-level biological function (not present in the vast majority of animal life) can be described as being directly related to any physical properties in a meaningful way.



That's just saying I cannot observe the metaphysical. So what? I can't directly observe 'blue' either. I know what physical thing is perceived by me as blue. I know something about how that perception occurs. Perhaps soon we'll know what physical things happen in the brain when that happens. But it's never going to be 'blue' in your metaphysical sense, because that is by definition outside of science. We can discuss subject-object relations in Heidegger versus Descartes or whatever until the cows come home, but it's never going to be physics.



I'm not pretending that we know how consciousness works. I'm saying that we don't, and that there's
1) Nothing strange about that, because there's lots and lots we don't understand.
2) Nor is there anything that points to consciousness being particularly difficult compared to other brain functions. It may well turn out to be a relatively easy brain function to understand.
and
3) As elaborated on in good detail by Sokrates above, there's absolutely no reason to assume that there are any physical processes going on in the brain that are unique to the brain. Much less distinctly quantum processes.

Not sure what the etiquette is here with large amounts of text, multi-quote function doesn't seem to be working.

Ok, on the first point, i wasn't suggesting our knowledge of biology is complete, but there's no intuitive problem with seeing how the processes at one level lead to the emergence of the next level- Quantums lead to atoms, which lead to molecules, which lead to compounds, all of those lead to organic chemistry, from which you can understand cells, tissue, organs, systems, etc.

Of course our knowledge is not complete, but we understand generally how one creates the next. There is a fundamental gap between the physiological correlates of consciousness and consciousness itself.

It seems like you are the one who is arguing some metaphysical separation between "mind" and "matter," I am saying that it is a poorly understood natural property.


"What physical properties will lead to babies, as opposed to non-babies?"

Life, which is defined by subsets of properties. The specific property in this case is reproduction.



"I know what physical thing is perceived by me as blue. I know something about how that perception occurs. Perhaps soon we'll know what physical things happen in the brain when that happens"- agreed, we already know quite a bit!



"But it's never going to be 'blue' in your metaphysical sense, because that is by definition outside of science" Not necessarily! It may just reflect a gap in our knowledge. You are definitely arguing for dualism here.


The quantum thing, well, the only advantage of that approach is that is might solve the integration problem, but it doesn't really solve the hard problem.

 

[alxm]

Of course our knowledge is not complete, but we understand generally how one creates the next. There is a fundamental gap between the physiological correlates of consciousness and consciousness itself.

You keep making that statement, but you've yet to back it up with anything. You didn't explain why our lacking understanding of consciousness is fundamentally different from our lacking understanding of instincts, for instance.

It seems like you are the one who is arguing some metaphysical separation between "mind" and "matter," I am saying that it is a poorly understood natural property.

No, there is a metaphysical separation between signifier and signified. There is a fundamental difference between a physical object like a page of text, and the metaphysical entity of that texts 'meaning' and 'interpretation'. Etc. Your definition of "consciousness" seems to be exactly that, the metaphysical idea.

"What physical properties will lead to babies, as opposed to non-babies?"

Life, which is defined by subsets of properties. The specific property in this case is reproduction.

There's no agreed-upon definition of 'life', but none of them involve any kind of physical properties. A common criteria is the ability to self-replicate. That is not a physical property.

"But it's never going to be 'blue' in your metaphysical sense, because that is by definition outside of science" Not necessarily! It may just reflect a gap in our knowledge. You are definitely arguing for dualism here.

No, I was not arguing for or against dualism. Mind/matter dualism á la Descartes, whether you're for it or not, is a metaphysical debate, which I am not interested in. I merely said that the metaphysical concept of 'mind' is and will continue to be, by definition, something other than the physical object known as 'the mind'. And the 'text' I'm writing here will continue to be something different than the bits and bytes that happen to be the physical origin of that manifestation.

Physics is by definition not metaphysics. That has nothing to do with any gaps in our knowledge of physics, chemistry or biology. Philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, semiotics are all fine, but they're fundamentally not the same thing as natural sciences.

The purely subjective matter of what you percieve as going on in your brain, is simply not a measurable, objective physical thing. It's inherently subjective. You will always have the question: "how do I know what I'm thinking is really the same as what's measured?", and there will never be a physical answer to that, because it's a metaphysical question. On the same order as "how can I know anything?". Cartesian dualism has an answer to that, other philosophers have other answers to that. But it's still not science. Science cannot answer those questions, because they're simply not objectively measurable. They're implicitly subjective. (And science will never yield an answer to the epistemological question "how can I know anything?" either)

 

[quantneuro]

the problem here is in the question itself which mix up the physiological effects which were focus of penrose's attention and philosophical aspects explored by chalmers... coming from the medical background please bear with my question...i wonder about an moffat's antisymmetric component as possibly another manifestation of gravity having some effect on humans and as a consequence their nervous system...

 

[PeterDonis]

This leads directly into the philosophical zombie problem. Science has no fundamental issue with describing the brain assuming people are just p-zombies. However, consciousness does not "intuitively" seem to be neccessary, but nevertheless it exists. What function does it serve?

I often see this kind of claim, and I don't understand it; that is to say, I don't understand how anyone who is conscious can say, in effect, that consciousness makes no difference to their functioning--let alone that it's possible, as the philosophical zombie problem claims, for two creatures to exhibit exactly the same behavior, yet for one to be conscious and the other not. Does anyone here really think that their own behavior would be exactly the same if they weren't conscious?

 

[kote]

I often see this kind of claim, and I don't understand it; that is to say, I don't understand how anyone who is conscious can say, in effect, that consciousness makes no difference to their functioning--let alone that it's possible, as the philosophical zombie problem claims, for two creatures to exhibit exactly the same behavior, yet for one to be conscious and the other not. Does anyone here really think that their own behavior would be exactly the same if they weren't conscious?

Actually, unless you take the stance that mental phenomena (consciousness / qualia) play an active role in interfering with the physical processes in your body, you are forced to answer that our behavior would be the same without them. This assumes, of course, that we could have the exact same physical configurations without having the same experiences, and that is a claim that has been more widely disputed. In that case, if they weren't conscious they couldn't be the same physically, and as a result of that their behavior would not be the same.

 

[rasp]

What is so special about consciousness that it warrants a complete departure from the conventional ways evolution has created through millions of years hardship. Plus, remembering that we ALL evolved from a prokaryotic primate would be another mystery to solve the "quantum" peculiarity of our brain while all the other biological organisms are operating with simple chemical laws.

And if you pause for second and look at the title of the thread, you'll see that the argument is really about quantum versus classical in human body, which I believe like others, is on the borders of pseudo-science.

As I quoted in the beginning of this thread, like Sokrates, Schrödinger also didn't believed QM played a significant role in the biology of the mind. He says, " the space-time events in the body of a living being, which correspond to the activity of its mind, to its self-conscious or any other actions, are...if not strictly deterministic at any rate statistico-deterministic".

YET, and THIS IS THE KEY POINT IN MY "MIND" (pun, intended) (BTW "intended" is another pun) Shroedinger can't comprehend a world in which consciousness doesn't exist. He says "Would it (the world) otherwise have remained a play before empty benches, not existing for anybody, thus quite properly speaking not existing?"

I think (might I still use this word?) that when he says "quite properly speaking not existing" he means scientifically speaking not existing. So the implication is that there is a VERY SPECIAL and totally unique attribute of consciousness which shapes possibilities into realities.

For my own benefit I relate the terms awareness, observation and consciousness. I define awareness as the least invasive interface between a sentient being and an object (which could be itself). An analogy in information terms could be a ping, or an initial ack. I believe consciousness is another name for awareness and is necessary and sufficient for observation. Therefore, according to some interpretations of QM, consciousness plays a role in the manifestation of existence.

We all know quantum mechanics represent processes that are not bridged with macro theories of physics, so I "chose to imagine" (there are those puns again) that within the brain there may be QM processes that can be identified, which would help us understand how awareness alone can effect change in the object observed.

Why should this line of research seem irreverent to purist physicists, like Sokrates?

 

[alxm]

I think (might I still use this word?) that when he says "quite properly speaking not existing" he means scientifically speaking not existing.

No, he didn't mean 'scientifically speaking'. Wondering if the world disappears when someone isn't looking isn't science, it's metaphysics. It's by definition an unfalsifiable hypothesis. Quit dragging philosophy into this! If you're going to discuss philosophy, take it elsewhere. (And perhaps study some philosophy first. Berkeley already expressed that idea 300 years earlier)

We all know quantum mechanics represent processes that are not bridged with macro theories of physics

That's not true.

so I "chose to imagine" (there are those puns again) that within the brain there may be QM processes that can be identified

Define 'QM process'. Chemistry is intrinsically quantum-mechanical. So what are you saying? That there's unknown chemistry going on in the brain? Or that there's a quantum-mechanical process that skips several orders of magnitude and then suddenly becomes significant again, magically bypassing chemistry?

Be specific.

Why should this line of research seem irreverent to purist physicists, like Sokrates?

You haven't suggested any line of research.

 

[rasp]

No, he didn't mean 'scientifically speaking'. Wondering if the world disappears when someone isn't looking isn't science, it's metaphysics. It's by definition an unfalsifiable hypothesis. Quit dragging philosophy into this! If you're going to discuss philosophy, take it elsewhere.

(And perhaps study some philosophy first. Berkeley already expressed that idea 300 years earlier)

Alxm, wondering if the world disappears is poetic but that's not what he said. He said can something exist if it's not observed. This sounds like a similar hypothesis that underlies the delayed choice experiment.

(And perhaps study some philosophy first. Berkeley already expressed that idea 300 years earlier)

When person 1 tells person 2 who is unknown by person 1 that person 1 doesn't know something, any scientist would realize it is person 1 who is mistaken , drawing conclusions without sufficient data. I find your attitude defensive.

I know that the philosophy has been around a long time WAY BEFORE Berkeley, (read my beginning thread) its the science that is new.
Perhaps, you think new shouldn't be speculated about.

 

[PeterDonis]

Actually, unless you take the stance that mental phenomena (consciousness / qualia) play an active role in interfering with the physical processes in your body, you are forced to answer that our behavior would be the same without them.

And why *wouldn't* mental phenomena play an active role in interfering with the physical processes in your body? Isn't it obvious that they do? (To a physicalist like myself, of course, who believes that mental phenomena *are* physical phenomena, this is not only obvious, but trivial. But isn't it also obvious just from the standpoint of common sense? Isn't it part of our common experience that our thoughts can affect our behavior?)