Yesterday I debated the World Bank at a conference in the Swedish parliament. My point was this: Statistics clearly show that free markets are successful where they are practised, but the WB, despite its advocacy of market economics, can show very few successful economies among those they have advised and sent money. Why? Simply because it’s almost impossible to push averse governments into reform with aid promises. They will take the money and do minimal reforms. Kenya’s dictator Daniel Arap Moi got 19 structural adjustment loans but never reformed, Pakistan got 20 loans, all with the condition that it reduced the budget deficit, but never did, and Zaire’s dictator Mobutu got 9 loans, and the only privatisation he ever practised was when he stole all the government funds himself.
Some WB-countries really reformed and made progress, such as Uganda and Mauritius, but most corrupt regimes never consented to the “Washington Consensus”. So why did they get funds again and again? The problem is that the World Bank is a political, tax-funded institution with its own interests. The country department’s budgets, staff and career opportunities depend on how much money they can give away. Noone ever wants to close their department just because the country they advise never reforms. The only graph that makes steady progress is the one on the World Bank’s staff – from 657 people in the 1960s to more than 10 000 today. Former World Bank economist William Easterly has written a great book on this problem, The Elusive Quest for Growth, which I highly recommend.