I am opening a new thread to continue discussion of some interesting ideas around EPR and Bell. Specifically, this is about the idea of realism, and whether it is tenable in light of Bell and other HV no-go theorems. Note: I usually use Hidden Variables (HV) and Realism interchangeably although some people see these as quite different. I also tend to use Realism as being an extension of EPR's "elements of reality" as a starting point for most discussions. After all, if a physical measurement can be predicted with certainty without disturbing what is measured... well, I would call that as real as it gets. charlylebeaugossehad thrown out a few ideas in another thread - especially around some papers by Charles Tresser. So I suggest we discuss around these: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0608008 We prove here a version of Bell Theorem that does not assume locality. As a consequence classical realism, and not locality, is the common source of the violation by nature of all Bell Inequalities. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0503006 In Bohm's version of the EPR gedanken experiment, the spin of the second particle along any vector is minus the spin of the other particle along the same vector. It seems that either the choice of vector along which one projects the spin of the first particle influences at superluminal speed the state of the second particle, or naive realism holds true i.e., the projections of the spin of any EPR particle along all the vectors are determined before any measurement occurs). Naive realism is negated by Bell's theory that originated and is still most often presented as related to non-locality, a relation whose necessity has recently been proven to be false. I advocate here that the solution of the apparent paradox lies in the fact that the spin of the second particle is determined along any vector, but not along all vectors. Such an any-all distinction was already present in quantum mechanics, for instance in the fact that the spin can be measured along any vector but not at once along all vectors, as a result of the Uncertainty Principle. The time symmetry of the any-all distinction defended here is in fact reminiscent of (and I claim, due to) the time symmetry of the Uncertainty Principle described by Einstein, Tolman, and Podolsky in 1931, in a paper entitled ``Knowledge of Past and Future in Quantum Mechanics" that is enough to negate naive realism and to hint at the any-all distinction. A simple classical model is next built, which captures aspects of the any-all distinction: the goal is of course not to have a classical exact model, but to provide a caricature that might help some people. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0501030 We prove here a version of Bell's Theorem that is simpler than any previous one. The contradiction of Bell's inequality with Quantum Mechanics in the new version is not cured by non-locality so that this version allows one to single out classical realism, and not locality, as the common source of all false inequalities of Bell's type.