Turbo's article, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39235, illustrates the real reason Fallon is resigning. He lost his battle over the surge to a subordinate (and one he particularly dislikes):
In sharp contrast to the lionisation of Gen. David Petraeus by members of the U.S. Congress during his testimony this week, Petraeus's superior, Admiral William Fallon, chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM), derided Petraeus as a sycophant during their first meeting in Baghdad last March, according to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting.
Fallon told Petraeus that he considered him to be "an ass-kissing little chicken****" and added, "I hate people like that", the sources say. That remark reportedly came after Petraeus began the meeting by making remarks that Fallon interpreted as trying to ingratiate himself with a superior.
An opposing view on Fallon is provided by http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot12mar12,0,3473735.story .
This is not, however, a strategy that Fallon favored. Not only was Fallon "quietly opposed to a long-term surge in Iraq," as Barnett notes, but he doesn't seem to have changed his mind in the past year. He has tried to undermine the surge by pushing for faster troop drawdowns than Petraeus thought prudent. ("He wants troop levels in Iraq down now.") The president wisely deferred to the man on the spot -- Petraeus -- thus no doubt leaving Fallon simmering with the sort of anger that came through all too clearly in Esquire.
Like a lot of smart guys (or, at any rate, guys who think they're smart), Fallon seems to have outsmarted himself. He thinks the war in Iraq is a distraction from formulating "a comprehensive strategy for the Middle East," according to the profile. The reality is that the only strategy worth a dinar is to win the war in Iraq. If we fail there, all other objectives in the region will be much harder to attain; if we succeed, they will be much easier.
There's two things that affect Fallon's viewpoint on the surge:
1) The US military only has so many troops. Committing so many to Iraq means the US has less ability to respond to whatever may happen in Pakistan, less ability to take matters into their own hands along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and less ability to maintain some kind of status quo with Iran. Starting a new war in Iran would push military manning so far beyond its capabilities that our entire Middle East strategy would collapse. (Max Boot is wrong that "By irresponsibly taking the option of force off the table, Fallon makes it more likely, not less, that there will ultimately be an armed confrontation with Iran." Thinking Iran can't see how far the military is already stretched is assuming that Iran's leadership consists of morons.)
2) While Boot is right that success in Iraq will make other objectives in the region easier to obtain, he doesn't talk about the odds of succeeding. Historically, civil wars last for decades and are only resolved by one side wiping out the other. The actions of Iraq's government has shown very little reason to believe Iraq will wind up any different than other countries that have been torn by ethnic civil wars. Banking on success in Iraq is like planning to pay your bills as soon as you win the lottery - it might actually happen! But, it probably won't. A Middle East plan that accepts and accounts for an ongoing ethnic civil war in Iraq has a better chance for success than one that depends on success in Iraq. The reduction in violence as a result of the surge just delays development of a realistic plan for the entire Middle East region.
If the administration could point to some other ethnic civil war that was resolved by a peaceful sharing of power in a democratic government and point to how they were using lessons learned from that civil war to improve the chances of success in Iraq, their position would be more credible. The fact that they haven't is a pretty telling gap in their story.
As it is, there's good reason for Fallon (and others) to doubt the wisdom of making such a long shot roll of the die an absolutely critical piece of the overall US Middle East strategy.