(c) THE ELECTION CERTIFICATION PROCESS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH (b) OF THIS SUBSECTION SHALL APPLY TO THE BALLOTS CAST FOR PRESIDENTIAL TICKETS AT THE NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION AND AT GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD AFTER 2004 AT WHICH PRESIDENTIAL TICKETS ARE ON THE STATEWIDE BALLOT.
...(c) "THIS INITIATIVE" MEANS THE VOTER-INITIATED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT, APPROVED AT THE NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION,
PROVIDING FOR POPULAR PROPORTIONAL SELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
The Mode of Electing the President
From the New York Packet.
Friday, March 14, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.1 I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possesses the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.
BobG said:It will be voted on this election, to take effect immediately, if approved. Of course, the lawyers for both sides are perched and ready, so, if approved, it will be weeks at the earliest before it's really resolved, probably before the US Supreme Court.
My opinion on this is mixed. I like the general principle and might even vote for it, but I would have preferred something along the lines of Maine and Nebraska. I think the state's giving up too much by reducing it's electoral votes to one as compared to the electoral votes of California or New York. (Of course, the Nebraska/Maine system wouldn't be very good for me this election - Colorado Springs is very pro-Bush - he'll win a huge majority of the vote from my congressional district).
The winner take all system is definitely flawed. Western New York and New York City are practically like different states, but the state goes wichever way New York City goes - people in Buffalo may as well not vote for president.
Many other states have a huge divide in their populace. Western Washington and Eastern Washington have little in common. Ohio is very segmented between Southern Ohiya and the Northeastern Ohio rust belt. Colorado is practically like four different states - Western 'We have all the water' Colorado, Eastern 'This looks like Kansas to me' Colorado, I-25, and Denver.
On the flip side, I'm not even in favor of the idea of Amendments to the State Constitution being accomplished via voter initiative. The amendments that have been approved in Colorado tend to support the idea that a representative republic works a lot better than a true democracy. I don't think the average voter understands the difference between voting on a tax initiative or an amendment to the constitution - one is like dating and the other is like marriage.
Colorado Amendment 36 is a state constitutional amendment that proposes to change the voting date in Colorado from the first Tuesday in November to the first Tuesday in October for presidential elections.
The amendment was proposed in order to increase the influence of Colorado voters in the presidential election by giving them a chance to vote earlier than other states. It was also hoped that a change in date would lead to more attention being paid to Colorado by presidential candidates.
No, the amendment was voted on in the 2004 election but was rejected by the majority of voters. It needed a simple majority to pass, but only received 33% of the vote.
If the amendment were to pass, the new voting date for presidential elections in Colorado would be the first Tuesday in October.
Some potential implications include increased voter turnout and earlier campaigning by presidential candidates in the state. However, there could also be logistical and financial challenges to implementing the change, as well as concerns about the impact on other state and local elections. Additionally, some argue that changing the voting date could disrupt the current balance of the election process and give an advantage to certain political parties or candidates.