Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[StatusX]

In wikipedia, qualia are defined as:

...the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them. These properties are, by definition, epistemically unknowable in the absence of direct experience of them; as a result, they are also incommunicable. The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind.

There is no way to prove they exist from third person methods alone, but many philosophers argue that we can know about them from the first person. I'm wondering who here thinks these are real and who thinks they are a delusion. For those who think they aren't real, do you at least admit that it seems like they are, but just feel that this intuition is wrong? And for those who do believe in them, do you think science will ever be able to account for their existence and/or specific (intrinsic) properties?

I mean for this to be a way to see who stands where, so I've made the voting public. I'd like people to take this oppurtunity to make some arguments for and against qualia. Obviously, anyone can deny the most convincing argument for their existence and still hold a perfectly consistent world view. But try to be open minded, and argue specifically why this intuition should both exist and be wrong.

 

[loseyourname]

I've never liked this question. I suppose not everyone will agree, but it's always seemed obvious that there is something that it is like to be in any conscious state. If that is the only restriction on what it is to be qualia, then sure, they exist. The real question is whether they are truly the ineffable phantoms that antiphysicalists want them to be, or whether they are the quantifiable brain events that opponents contend.

Either way, taking a stance on one position or the other seems foolish to me at this point. You do that, and all that ends up happening is that you'll defend that position no matter how absurd it becomes in particular circumstances. As far as I'm concerned, I've seen decent arguments against each side and that's all. There is little evidence at this point on which to base a definitive judgement.

 

[StatusX]

As the quote mentions, qualia are by defintion unknowable except by direct experience. In other words, if those states you talk about do turn out to be nothing more than quantifiable brain events, then they are not qualia, and qualia don't exist. In fact, it may be a contradiction to believe in physical qualia, but I know some people still do so I left it as a choice.

Also, it is very important to take a stand now. If you believe qualia are real and nonphysical, you believe that there is more to be explained after the entire physical brain has been mapped. Nothing that could be found there could explain qualia, even in principle, so no experimental evidence will sway your opinion.

If this sounds a little unreasonable, maybe it is. Because if they can explain why we believe in qualia, what retort could we give? This paradox is the reason I think many people don't believe in qualia, even though the evidence for them is overwhelming (right now you are observing qualia, as is always the case). I think we are misunderstanding some very basic properties of the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction, and that it is possible both that qualia are real and that there is a physical reason we talk about them.

 

[Doctordick]

I apologize to Nereid and honestrosewater for appearing to be rude but the people here make it very difficult. I tried to communicate the necessity of differentiating between logical thought and intuitive comprehension, but I suspect no one here has even begun to comprehend the value of recognizing this fundamental dicodomy. It should be clear to everyone that, by the very definition of the terms, that it is illogical to fail to differentiate between the two. Yet no one seems to be taking the trouble to do so. I can only conclude that no one has even begun to think about the issue.

StatusX asks if qualia are real. Obviously, the first question which must be answered is exactly what does one mean by real. And then, given the answer to that question, ask if the label "qualia" refers to something which fullfills the specification implied by the label "real". Qualia is something which has been squat up by a number of people. "Real", on the other hand, is a label squat up by most everybody! The general definition of "real" seems to be that it lablels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid (and I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective). Under that perspective, statusX's question becomes, what makes "qualia" necessary to the world view you hold? You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created. Please, what phenomena does it explain beyond its own existence?

That is, show to me something about "qualia" that is worth thinking about; I personally have no thoughts on the idea at all and, at the moment, I don't seem to be able to squink any up.

Have fun -- Dick

PS my wife tells me I have misspelled the past tense of squink; it should be squaught. I need an opinion – honestrosewater, you are the authority on this.

 

[Tournesol]

I apologize to Nereid and honestrosewater for appearing to be rude but the people here make it very difficult. I tried to communicate the necessity of differentiating between logical thought and intuitive comprehension, but I suspect no one here has even begun to comprehend the value of recognizing this fundamental dicodomy.

FYI, it is possible for two people who understand the distinction to
disagree.

You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created.

Qualia have consequences for

1) The scientific understanding of perception. Since objects do not have
scientifically speaking have all the properties they seem to have, we need
a term for the properties they seem to have

2) Aesthetics. How can a painting seem beautiful if it doesn't seem ? The
difference betwen tasting a wine and reading its label.

3) Ethics. There is cruely to animals, but not cruelty to machines, because machines do not *feel*.

4) Complex behaviour, if Ramachandran is correct. (3 laws of qualia)

 

[Tournesol]

Also, it is very important to take a stand now. If you believe qualia are real and nonphysical, you believe that there is more to be explained after the entire physical brain has been mapped. Nothing that could be found there could explain qualia, even in principle, so no experimental evidence will sway your opinion.

Of ocurse one can accept that qualia are real in some sense whilst "bracketting£ the question of whether they are physical, etc.

 

[hypnagogue]

I voted for the first option (not surprisingly): real and not physical. At the moment I favor Rosenberg's view of what qualia are and how they 'fit in' with the physical world. On this view, qualia are the intrinsic basis for the extrinsic relationships described by phyics. So it's not completely correct here to state that qualia are not physical; by hypothesis, physical phenomena (as described by extrinsic physical theory) literally are the sets of effective relationships engaged in by the intrinsic qualia. So, on this view, it would be more correct to say that physical phenomena are one aspect (but not all aspects) of qualia; they are qualia as seen 'from the outside.'

 

[StatusX]

The general definition of "real" seems to be that it lablels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid

That's not a helpful definition. If we have a world view that explains everything but qualia, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if qualia are real, then that view is lacking.

You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created. Please, what phenomena does it explain beyond its own existence?

It may not explain anything, and I disagree that it needs to. What about the intrinsic base of the physical, ie, whatever is at the bottom and being acted on by the rules? Its specific character has no logical consequences, but it is real. Of course, you might deny that there is anything at the bottom, but unless you can explain why that should be, you only believe that to protect your view that the extrinsic is all that's real.

 

[StatusX]

Qualia have consequences for

1) The scientific understanding of perception. Since objects do not have
scientifically speaking have all the properties they seem to have, we need
a term for the properties they seem to have

2) Aesthetics. How can a painting seem beautiful if it doesn't seem ? The
difference betwen tasting a wine and reading its label.

3) Ethics. There is cruely to animals, but not cruelty to machines, because machines do not *feel*.

4) Complex behaviour, if Ramachandran is correct. (3 laws of qualia)

I should just point out that many philosophers who believe in qualia do not believe they fill any roles like these. It certainly seems that all of these functions can be explained by the physical brain.

The paradox of qualia is that they seem to be epiphenomenal, that is, having no functional porperties at all. And yet, they also seem to be real in a way that's stronger than any possible illusions or mistaken intuitions could be. Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, and yet for it still to be necessary that they exist for us to actually talk and think about them.

 

[Doctordick]

I suspect no one here has even begun to comprehend the value of recognizing this fundamental dicodomy.

FYI, it is possible for two people who understand the distinction to
disagree.

So you are saying that you fully comprehend the difference between using logic and using intuition and that you feel recognition of the difference is of no value? I suppose you would suggest that the scientific community should accept intuition as just as good a defense of ideas they normally award to logic!

Perhaps that is the real reason for your illogical defense of the need for qualia:

1) The scientific understanding of perception. Since objects do not have
scientifically speaking have all the properties they seem to have, we need
a term for the properties they seem to have

So qualia are properties objects do not have and we need a name for this! Because your intuition tells you so? That has a familiar ring to it.

2) Aesthetics. How can a painting seem beautiful if it doesn't seem ?

Maybe there are important, "scientifically speaking", aspects to the situation which are not yet fully understood. What you seem to fail to understand is that giving a name to something is not a solution to the problem of understanding it. All giving it a name does is to assist in acquiring the emotional feeling that you understand it, a very dangerous ("scientifically speaking") anti science illusion.

3) Ethics. There is cruely to animals, but not cruelty to machines, because machines do not *feel*.

You are giving me a conclusion, not a defense of that conclusion. Contrary to what you say above, you apparently have no understanding of the fundamental difference between logic and intuition at all.

Have fun squinking, you are certainly wasting your time trying to think – Dick

PS Speaking of cruelty to animals, I am firmly of the opinion (what my intuition has squinked up) that cruelty is in the mind of the performer of the act. When a tiger chews on the haunch of a living zebra, is it being cruel or is it simply enjoying a meal? On the other hand, in a Sims game, you can surround a Sim with a wall so that it cannot fulfill its needs for survival. In such a case, the Sim will complain a lot and eventually die. Why would someone enjoy doing such a thing? I personally would attach the word "cruel" to the enjoyment of the suffering of others. Different strokes for different folks.

 

[Doctordick]

If we have a world view that explains everything but qualia, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if qualia are real, then that view is lacking.

If we have a world view that explains everything but santa and the easter bunny, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if santa and the easter bunny are real, then that view is lacking. Now you need to define what you mean by "explain".

Have fun -- Dick

 

[StatusX]

If we have a world view that explains everything but santa and the easter bunny, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if santa and the easter bunny are real, then that view is lacking. Now you need to define what you mean by "explain".

I'm glad you found that so amusing, but I was pointing out how your defintion of "real" was circular. You're the one who needs to clarify.

 

[Picklehead]

Quoted by StatusX: "Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, . . ."

I would opine that studies done on patients diagnosed with 'blindsight' show that qualia are in fact functional and not at all epiphenomenal. Apparently, these people do process visual information, they just don't (or wont) consciously access it (or something to that effect). If qualia were real but non-functional, they would not be able to report it, they would just go on behaving as though they were experiencing visual qualia. Qualia, if real, would necessarily have to 'function', in the sense that it would have to do something . . . have some sort of effect, when it is 'kicked'. That is if 'blindsight' (notice the scare quotes) is a real disorder in its own right. But that goes right back to the beginning . . . so, nevermind.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Quoted by StatusX: "Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, . . ."

I would opine that studies done on patients diagnosed with 'blindsight' show that qualia are in fact functional and not at all epiphenomenal. Apparently, these people do process visual information, they just don't (or wont) consciously access it (or something to that effect). If qualia were real but non-functional, they would not be able to report it, they would just go on behaving as though they were experiencing visual qualia. Qualia, if real, would necessarily have to 'function', in the sense that it would have to do something . . . have some sort of effect, when it is 'kicked'. That is if 'blindsight' (notice the scare quotes) is a real disorder in its own right. But that goes right back to the beginning . . . so, nevermind.

This seems to equate qualia with internal processing of sensory data. I don't think this is what philosophers mean by the term. The usual referent is that a quale is "what it is like to have a sensory experience". I believe Chalmers (but maybe not Rosenberg) accepts the distinction, placing sensory signals in the physical box and qualia in the nonphysical.

 

[Picklehead]

IE, the qualia RED is not the color red, but the experience of the color red. But what if one night the cells in your retina that respond to the 'color' red were removed, or anywhere else from eye to brain where color is 'dealt with'. If qualia were non-physical, you wouldn't be able to form a report to tell yourself that you were no longer able to experience the color red. If it were to happen while you were awake and in conversation, you would go on as before without the slightest break, only now you are a zombie.

 

[StatusX]

IE, the qualia RED is not the color red, but the experience of the color red. But what if one night the cells in your retina that respond to the 'color' red were removed, or anywhere else from eye to brain where color is 'dealt with'. If qualia were non-physical, you wouldn't be able to form a report to tell yourself that you were no longer able to experience the color red. If it were to happen while you were awake and in conversation, you would go on as before without the slightest break, only now you are a zombie.

But you said it yourself: "...the cells in your retina that respond to the 'color' red were removed...". That is why you can report a difference, because there is a physical change. Qualia are what its like to see those colors, and that would also change. But qualia don't do anything, and if you could somehow change just the qualia, no one would be able to tell, including you. That is a big reason why many people don't believe in them.

 

[Picklehead]

Is it possible even in principle to 'change just the qualia'? Are there any examples of physical effects that completely terminate in such a local area that are analogous to epiphenomena?

 

[AKG]

We know and are certain of our experiences, although we can doubt their causes. We can conceive of a situation where we are just "brain-in-vats." We normally assume that when we see a computer, there is physically a computer in front of our physical bodies causing this experience, but it is conceivable that we are hallucinating, or as I said, "brains-in-vats." Now, we also normally assume that we have brains, but I believe it is conceivable that we have not. Perhaps we have something like brains, and we are "things-like-brains-in-vats." In fact, although it has no practical value, we could assume that we know only our experiences, and assume that we should infer nothing beyond: neither that we have brains like we think we do, nor bodies, nor is there physically a computer in front of whatever I am, causing me to experience it that way.

We can be certain of our experiences, and that they exist. The image of the computer, what it's like to see redness, etc., we are sure of those things. We can't be certain of anything beyond them, so clearly, the two are different. Physical things like brains and computers are such things (i.e. things beyond experience which are inferred from experience), so these qualia must be different from such things.

 

[selfAdjoint]

We can be certain of our experiences, and that they exist.

We can be certain that we have immediate memories of having had experiences, but that is all. Dennett, and the neurological experimenters along with him, testify that our brain processes systematically create false memories in our own best interests. Much better to shy at the false face in the bushes our internal processes have constructed of branches and twigs, than to ignore the real tiger hidden in there because it was only sketchily glimpsed.

 

[AKG]

We can be certain that we have immediate memories of having had experiences, but that is all. Dennett, and the neurological experimenters along with him, testify that our brain processes systematically create false memories in our own best interests. Much better to shy at the false face in the bushes our internal processes have constructed of branches and twigs, than to ignore the real tiger hidden in there because it was only sketchily glimpsed.

You've confused what I meant. When I say "experience," I mean whatever it is you see. I don't mean, when I say you experience a computer, that you have a physical experience of a computer. Indeed, my point was that we can't be sure of any such experiences, but we can be sure of the current experience we have, i.e. we can be sure that to us, we see an image. Whether this image is the result of experiencing a "false" memory or a direct perception, whatever, is irrelevant. If this is confusing, then, in your words, yes, we are certain of our potentially false memories, and that is all. We can be certain of what our memories are, but they could be false, i.e. they may not correspond to anything beyond themselves. Not only could they be false in the sense that they tell us there is a face where there are only twigs, it is conceivable that they are false in that they tell us we're sitting at a computer when we may be brains-in-vats, or even, something-like-brains-(but-not-exactly)-in-vats. We can't even be sure that there are brains beyond our "memories" of brains. Nonetheless, we can be certain that our memories contain brains.

 

[Doctordick]

I'm glad you found that so amusing, but I was pointing out how your defintion of "real" was circular. You're the one who needs to clarify.

Somehow I just don't believe you. It seems much more reasonable that your response was a totally emotional reaction to your impression that my comment implied you had nothing of value to say. If you take the trouble to examine what I said you will discover nothing circular there at all.

The general definition of "real" seems to be that it lablels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid (and I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective). Under that perspective, statusX's question becomes, what makes "qualia" necessary to the world view you hold? You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created. Please, what phenomena does it explain beyond its own existence?

Now, it becomes circular if you add the idea that "real" is the basis of your world view; but that squat is in your head, not mine. I think the real trouble here is that you don't have the intellectual wherewithal to differentiate between squat and thought.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

(qualia) may not explain anything, and I disagree that it needs to. What about the intrinsic base of the physical, ie, whatever is at the bottom and being acted on by the rules? Its specific character has no logical consequences, but it is real. .

How can the intrinsic base of everything fail to have logical consequences ?

 

[Tournesol]

I should just point out that many philosophers who believe in qualia do not believe they fill any roles like these.

Some do, some don't.

It certainly seems that all of these functions can be explained by the physical brain

.

I have seen no such explanation.

The paradox of qualia is that they seem to be epiphenomenal,

They do not seem to be epiphenomenal -- introspection tell's us just the opposite,
that pains make us go "ouch!". They can be argued to be epiphenomenal,
but the argument is mistaken as I have shown before.

that is, having no functional porperties at all. And yet, they also seem to be real in a way that's stronger than any possible illusions or mistaken intuitions could be. Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, and yet for it still to be necessary that they exist for us to actually talk and think about them.

Why cling to non-functionaliity ? There is no reason too.

 

[Tournesol]

So you are saying that you fully comprehend the difference between using logic and using intuition and that you feel recognition of the difference is of no value?

I am saying that two people who employ logic can still disagree.
ie you are not entitled to claim that anyone who disagrees with you august self
is automotically being illogical.

Perhaps that is the real reason for your illogical defense of the need for qualia:

You have not demonstrated any flaw in my logic.

So qualia are properties objects do not have and we need a name for this!

Perhaps yo could suggest your preffered alternative out of:

1) Things do no seem like anything at all; we are zombies and live in perceptual
void

2) Things are exactly as they seem

Because your intuition tells you so?

Introspection is not intuition. Consciousness, self-awareness, exists; it is
a pefectly respectable scientifics phenomeon and deserves an explanation.

Maybe there are important, "scientifically speaking", aspects to the situation which are not yet fully understood. What you seem to fail to understand is that giving a name to something is not a solution to the problem of understanding it.

I never remotely suggested it was. The point of 'qualia' is to put a problem on the table.

Have fun squinking, you are certainly wasting your time trying to think – Dick

Do try to be less patronisng.

PS Speaking of cruelty to animals, I am firmly of the opinion (what my intuition has squinked up) that cruelty is in the mind of the performer of the act. When a tiger chews on the haunch of a living zebra, is it being cruel or is it simply enjoying a meal?

Does it have a choice ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am saying that two people who employ logic can still disagree. ie you are not entitled to claim that anyone who disagrees with you august self is automotically being illogical.

You have hit the nail on the head. Doctordick has little more to say than "you're stupid if you don't agree with me." Read his posts . . . you seldom see one where he doesn't imply or outright say it. Yet when it comes time to step up and demonstrate his self-proclaimed brilliance, mostly what we hear is mundane mechanistic perspectives. People committed a priori to 100% mechanical explanations don't seem to reason well outside of mechanical issues (which, IMO, is why they want to reduce everything to mechanics), so I don't think you'll never get anywhere with him or others here who prefer machines to humanity.

 

[StatusX]

Somehow I just don't believe you. It seems much more reasonable that your response was a totally emotional reaction to your impression that my comment implied you had nothing of value to say. If you take the trouble to examine what I said you will discover nothing circular there at all.
Now, it becomes circular if you add the idea that "real" is the basis of your world view; but that squat is in your head, not mine. I think the real trouble here is that you don't have the intellectual wherewithal to differentiate between squat and thought.

So you believe that all that is real is what is necessary to explain what you believe is real (or "the basis of your world view" if you want to slightly obscure your faulty logic with synonyms)? Ok, let's pretend for a second that that isn't circular, and that you're just a run of the mill physicalist who believes only the extrinsic is real. Now, why do you believe that? Please, if you can "think" of a reason that has to be true, I'd love to hear it. But I suspect you're just as much of a "squatter" as you seem to believe everyone else is. You have yet to provide any arguments for why qualia can't be real, other than "they aren't necessary to my world view."

 

[Doctordick]

StatusX, I will give you credit. It appears that you are trying to understand what I am saying; which is considerably more thought than Les Sleeth or Tournesol seem prepared to commit. I admit I am a rather strange person and am not surprised at all by the difficulty people have understanding me. I made a serious effort to express my opinion that the mechanisms by which we achieve our opinions should be divided into two very different categories. The only decent response I obtained was honestrosewater's squink comment which, although it really gives little hard evidence of understanding, can be taken to imply the existence of two modes was understood. It is quite clear that Tournesol completely missed the entire issue of my presentation.

I am saying that two people who employ logic can still disagree.

There definitely exists a very important circumstance where they cannot disagree. That particular circumstance is the case when they agree on the axioms behind the logical proposition. That is exactly the central issue of my presentation. What I was pointing out was that it is very valuable to separate the two mechanisms so that we can always be aware of exactly what is being argued and when the arguments are specious. Axioms are, for the most part, undefendable propositions (that is why they are called "axioms" and not facts). Likewise, anyone who thinks that it is necessary to believe an axiom is "true" in order to discover its logical consequences just doesn't understand logic.

And that gets me to your first comment:

So you believe that all that is real is what is necessary to explain what you believe is real

You bring up the issue of "belief". Belief is without a doubt arrived at via squat, not thought and has no place in a logical discussion. As I said in my response, "it becomes circular if you add the idea that "real" is the basis of your world view; but that squat is in your head, not mine" and that is exactly what you are doing here. The issue is that you have not seriously thought about what you mean when you use the word "real". It is a concept which you have arrived at via squinking and you thus presume you know what you mean; however, if you are going to communicate your ideas, you have to be more circumspect than that. Essentially, you are presuming that "real" means the same thing to everyone else that it means to you without making any effort to clarify the issue.

The general definition of "real" seems to be that it labels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid (and I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective).

I put that forward as a very serious contender for the definition of "real". Under it, what is real is no more than an opinion the speaker has squinked up: to a schizophrenic, the voices he hears are real; to the pope, the god he speaks to is real; to an modern physicist, black holes are real; to a scientist a few hundred years ago phlogiston was real.

As I said, I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective, but I certainly won't pay any attention to someone who says they know what is really "real".

You have yet to provide any arguments for why qualia can't be real, other than "they aren't necessary to my world view."

What you seem to be missing is the idea that "qualia" is being put forth as an answer and, as such, it serves no purpose unless it explains something.

Gee guys, when I look at a rainbow, I see it as stripes of various colors. When I measure the wave lengths of the light, I get a smooth continuous transition. Now how do I explain that? Is it reasonable to suggest that associations with certain colors are important to our survival: red with blood and berries, green with vegetables, yellow with heat. And that our interest and concern with different colors has evolutionarily produced a striking awareness of specific colors? (I point out that, decision wise, that donkey halfway between two bales is an exceedingly rare event: the brain is an organ devoted to making decisions on whatever information it has.) Or perhaps this should be taken as evidence of the "reality" of "qualia".

Again, what I am preaching against is naming something in order to acquire the emotional feeling that you understand it, a very dangerous anti scientific illusion.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[selfAdjoint]

Doc, I am with you all the way here. The heterophenomenological stance would require me to take utterly seriously the fact that some one else believes X is real. That is a verifiable datum about that person. But I am under no obligation to believe that X is real because of taking that belief seriously.

 

[StatusX]

We don't believe in qualia just because other people do, we believe in them because we have access to them ourselves. It is likely they won't be necessary to explain anything (except maybe why we talk about them), but we have to decide whether that is a necessary condition for something to exist. As I explained before, the intrinsic basis of the physical likely exists, and yet exactly what it is (we could be in a computer program for all we know) can't be known. And as long as all the extrinsic properties are as we observe them, physics need not be concerned with it. Yet, to believe that if something doesn't have a functional role, it doesn't exist is to believe there is no intrinsic basis, and that the universe is nothing but an extrinsic, causal flux. That may be true, but it is an unsupported belief, no more logical than the belief that it isn't.

Speaking of the intrinsic base of the physical, it has a couple of properties in common with qualia that I think should be explored. First, if we take the view that rules cannot exist by themselves, but must act on something, then we know that there is an intrinsic basis, even though we can't observe it. However, we can't say exactly what it is. Similarly, we know qualia exist, but we can't describe them. Does anyone see any significance to this parallel?

 

[loseyourname]

We don't believe in qualia just because other people do, we believe in them because we have access to them ourselves.

That is not true according to the definition of "qualia" that you gave me in your second post to this thread. "As the quote mentions, qualia are by defintion unknowable except by direct experience. In other words, if those states you talk about do turn out to be nothing more than quantifiable brain events, then they are not qualia, and qualia don't exist." As such, the only event that you have direct access to is the occurence of a given sensation. Whether this sensation is simply a brain event or a quale is not yet known. There is no pretheoretical way to directly apprehend the truth of either claim. You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale. If this was indeed a pretheoretical fact and not an inference drawn from within a theoretical (in this case, antiphysicalist) framework, then there would be no disagreement.

 

[learningphysics]

You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale.

I'm finding this thread confusing. I thought the "sensation" was qualia. Which would make its existence indubitable. Or is the existence of "sensations" in question?

Can someone post what the definition of "qualia" is, as used in this thread?

 

[StatusX]

That is not true according to the definition of "qualia" that you gave me in your second post to this thread. "As the quote mentions, qualia are by defintion unknowable except by direct experience. In other words, if those states you talk about do turn out to be nothing more than quantifiable brain events, then they are not qualia, and qualia don't exist." As such, the only event that you have direct access to is the occurence of a given sensation. Whether this sensation is simply a brain event or a quale is not yet known. There is no pretheoretical way to directly apprehend the truth of either claim. You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale. If this was indeed a pretheoretical fact and not an inference drawn from within a theoretical (in this case, antiphysicalist) framework, then there would be no disagreement.

It may have been misleading to talk about what they might "turn out to be." I was just referring to how you aren't taking a stand now, but would rather wait until there's more evidence. I was saying that this stand on qualia is too indecisive, because believing in them is believing that whatever we might find out about physical brain states, they can't completely account for qualia (of course, that renders the second option in the poll inconsistent, but this is just my understanding of qualia). Maybe I should have said that if you are open to the possibility that brain states could explain all there is to qualia, then you really don't believe in qualia as defined above.

 

[StatusX]

Can someone post what the definition of "qualia" is, as used in this thread?

The defintion is in the first post. You can go to the wikipedia article on qualia for more detail.

 

[learningphysics]

The defintion is in the first post. You can go to the wikipedia article on qualia for more detail.

Thanks.

Wikipedia:
"Qualia (singular: "quale", pronounced KWAHL-ay) are most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them"

So ok... redness is not qualia, but "what it is like to see red"... that is qualia?

If we admit that there is "seeing of red"... how can there be any doubt that there is "something it is like to see red".

The fact that we remember and can refer to a particular sensation as redness, shows that there is "something it is like to see red". The property of "what it is like to see red" is incommunicable, but it certainly exists.

Wikipedia
"The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind."

I strongly question the above statement in Wikipedia. Either I'm still misunderstanding what if being referred to by qualia, or wikipedia is wrong here.

 

[StatusX]

So ok... redness is not qualia, but "what it is like to see red"... that is qualia?

If we admit that there is "seeing of red"... how can there be any doubt that there is "something it is like to see red".

The fact that we remember and can refer to a particular sensation as redness, shows that there is "something it is like to see red". The property of "what it is like to see red" is incommunicable, but it certainly exists.

Wikipedia
"The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind."

I strongly question the above statement in Wikipedia. Either I'm still misunderstanding what if being referred to by qualia, or wikipedia is wrong here.

It is true, it seems pretty obvious that red looks like something. If this fact could be easily reconciled with physicalism, I doubt anyone would question the existence of qualia. But it can't be, so many people go against their intuition to protect their metaphysical doctrine.

The reason physicalism can't account for qualia (of course, this is also debatable) is that physics only deals with functional roles. Mass is nothing more than how any object responds to a force. Charge is how it responds to an electric or magnetic field. Everything in physics is relationships like this. But a qualia, say, the experience of the color red, is absolute. It is intrinsic, and is not just described by functional roles. Some argue that this "experience" is nothing more than a physical state in which we are more inclined to say things like "that apple is red" and "I am experiencing a red qualia." Physics undoubtedly could explain such a state, but I think we all know that there is more to it than that. There is something it is like to be seeing red, something that red looks like to us. The stand you take just depends on what you value more highly: preserving physicalism or describing how the universe truly is.

 

[Tournesol]

There definitely exists a very important circumstance where they cannot disagree. That particular circumstance is the case when they agree on the axioms behind the logical proposition.

grandmother.

egg.

suck.

Under it, what is real is no more than an opinion the speaker has squinked up:

Which now means we have another way of saying "personal opinion" ...
and no way of saying "really real". Great.

As I said, I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective, but I certainly won't pay any attention to someone who says they know what is really "real".

Does that mean we should't pay any attention to you when you claim
to know what is really real ? Well, yes, it does.

What you seem to be missing is the idea that "qualia" is being put forth as an answer

Nope. I have already explained that they are not: "The point of 'qualia' is to put a problem on the table."

Gee guys, when I look at a rainbow, I see it as stripes of various colors. When I measure the wave lengths of the light, I get a smooth continuous transition. Now how do I explain that? Is it reasonable to suggest that associations with certain colors are important to our survival: red with blood and berries, green with vegetables, yellow with heat. And that our interest and concern with different colors has evolutionarily produced a striking awareness of specific colors? (I point out that, decision wise, that donkey halfway between two bales is an exceedingly rare event: the brain is an organ devoted to making decisions on whatever information it has.) Or perhaps this should be taken as evidence of the "reality" of "qualia".

That is the Easy Problem. Now: what about the relationship of of those
"strinking" colours to brain-states ?

Again, what I am preaching against is naming something in order to acquire the emotional feeling that you understand it, a very dangerous anti scientific illusion.

No one is doing that.

 

[loseyourname]

I was saying that this stand on qualia is too indecisive, because believing in them is believing that whatever we might find out about physical brain states, they can't completely account for qualia (of course, that renders the second option in the poll inconsistent, but this is just my understanding of qualia).

This sounds to me like you're advocating a leap of faith. On what basis can you firmly believe that any physical explanation of consciousness cannot explain the sensations associated with brain events? You needn't repost all of the arguments that have convinced you, seeing as how we've gone over them many times, but I think I (and others) have demonstrated that none of these arguments is particularly conclusive. They all rely on at least one premise that can only be believed due to intuition, an intuition that is not even shared amongst all of the posters here.

Maybe I should have said that if you are open to the possibility that brain states could explain all there is to qualia, then you really don't believe in qualia as defined above.

Well, heck, I guess I don't believe in qualia then. I never realized that the term necessarily excluded the possibility of a physical basis. I figured a physical explanation would be a case of reduction rather than elimination.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, heck, I guess I don't believe in qualia then. I never realized that the term necessarily excluded the possibility of a physical basis

As originally (and IMO authentically defined), it doesn't:-

C.I Lewis's original definition of qualia:-

"There *are* recognizable qualitative characters of the
given, which may be repeated in different experiences,
and are thus a sort of universals; I call these "qualia."
But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being
recognized from one to another experience, they must
be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion
of these two is characteristic of many historical
conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories.
The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the
subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective."


The way not to argue for qulia is to load the ontological dice at the outset.

 

[Canute]

Speaking of the intrinsic base of the physical, it has a couple of properties in common with qualia that I think should be explored. First, if we take the view that rules cannot exist by themselves, but must act on something, then we know that there is an intrinsic basis, even though we can't observe it. However, we can't say exactly what it is. Similarly, we know qualia exist, but we can't describe them. Does anyone see any significance to this parallel?

Yes, very much so. I feel it should be treated as a highly significant fact. But it seems to be generally overlooked.

As solipsism is unfalsifiable we know that although we can be certain that our conscious sensations/qualia exist we can never show that anything else exists. Under the circumstances it seems a bit unlikely that anybody will ever manage to show that qualia do not exist but brains do. In fact it is logically impossible.

What is intrinsic to both mental phenomena and corporeal phenomena is, going strictly on the available evidence, meta-physical. While we are forced to accept that what is intrinsic to matter is 'beyond science', it seems that few yet accept that what is intrinsic to consciousness is likewise metaphysical. I suspect that we will all have to face this as a fact sooner or later.

Always there will be two things beyond science. The first is what is fundamental to the 'objective' physical universe, the second is what is fundamental to the 'subjective' mental universe. Perhaps this is a coincidence, or perhaps it is not two things.

 

[StatusX]

This sounds to me like you're advocating a leap of faith. On what basis can you firmly believe that any physical explanation of consciousness cannot explain the sensations associated with brain events? You needn't repost all of the arguments that have convinced you, seeing as how we've gone over them many times, but I think I (and others) have demonstrated that none of these arguments is particularly conclusive. They all rely on at least one premise that can only be believed due to intuition, an intuition that is not even shared amongst all of the posters here.

It isn't just intuition. The problem is that physics can only explain functions and structure. So if you are a physicalist, you believe that's all there is to the universe. The vast majority of the world is covered by physics, but consciousness is a little different.

First, what aspects of the human brain can physics explain? It seems likely that anything we say or do can be attributed to atoms interacting in our heads, since these are just functions. Qualia is the name given to those mental phenomena that can't be explained by physics, if they exist. So what are they?

When you look at a pumpkin, photons hit your retina which gives rise to electro-chemical signals that travel through your brain. All kinds of processing is done on these signals, and any number of possible actions can result. You can say "That is orange" or "I am experiencing an orange qualia, and I am certain it cannot be explained by physics" or you can throw the pumpkin out the window. All of this can, in fact, be explained by physics. So the question you have to ask yourself is "Is that all?"

Or is there also an experience? I'm not talking about sound waves corresponding to talk about experience, or even brain waves corresponding to thought about it. I'm talking about that inner, subjective experience. It exists, so what is it? Can it be identified with the physics of firing neurons? Not a priori, certainly, but empirically? No, because all this will cover is causal relationships between physical structures. Qualia is not just relationships, it is absolute. Orange looks like something. What we say or think about orange is one thing, but the experience of it is something different. You can know everything we say and think about orange , but you can't know what it looks like until you experience it yourself. It is intrinsic, in that the experience of orange is what it is, regardless of the particular context it is presented.

I don't think anyone claims there is no inner subjective world, many just feel that this is nothing more than neurons, somehow. But neurons are defined entirely by structure and function. There is no intrinsic "neuron." There is a structure made of protein and other biological chemicals which performs certain roles, like metabolism and passing on of electric signals. This is all a neuron is. But qualia aren't defined this way. They do not have functions, and they do not have to have structure. These can't possibly be the same thing.

 

[loseyourname]

It isn't just intuition. The problem is that physics can only explain functions and structure.

You've just made a variation on the same argument. Physical facts are facts about structure and function. Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function. Therefore, facts about experience are not physical facts. Can you really not see how question begging that is? 'Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function.' Says who? If it is so evident that this is the case, then why is there still any debate? It seems to me that this is what the antiphysicalist camp is seeking to prove. You can't just presuppose it as revealed truth and then use your revelation to divorce experience from science. It isn't that easy.

You say that because orange is "like something," that it cannot be the result of anything physical? Why? How do you make the leap? Who says that physical things can't be "like something?" This just goes to the question of whether qualitative content can be entailed by physicality alone. I brought up in another thread the question of whether novels written and read only by zombies could have themes and tones and such. The answer seemed to be yes. But these are all "like something." They are all qualities that cannot be expressed in scientific language. This just means that there are multiple ways to explain things. Take this quotation from Roger Scruton from a discussion of Spinoza:

• What I look at a picture I see physical objects: patches of pigments smeared on a canvas. And I can describe these objects so thoroughly as to account for the entire picture. In doing so, I do not mention the other thing that I see: a stag hunt passing before a country house. This too I could describe so thoroughly as to give a complete account of the picture. But the two accounts are incommensurable: I cannot cross from one to the other in midstream, so to speak. I cannot describe the lead hound as frantically pursuing a patch of ochre, or the area of yellow fused with oxydised lindseed oil as resting on a huntman's knee. In some such way, Spinoza is saying, the complete description of the body described the very same thing as the complete description of the mind . . .

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts? Why do simply assume that a physical account that doesn't talk about qualia is incomplete, or vice versa? Given that Spinoza wrote his major works several hundred years ago, it's not like this is a new idea.

 

[StatusX]

You've just made a variation on the same argument. Physical facts are facts about structure and function. Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function. Therefore, facts about experience are not physical facts. Can you really not see how question begging that is?

To be fair, it isn't question begging. I really think that experiences are more than structure and function, and it is because of this that I think they are unphysical, not the other way around.

'Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function.' Says who? If it is so evident that this is the case, then why is there still any debate?

Because it means giving up physicalism, something many people don't want to do.

You say that because orange is "like something," that it cannot be the result of anything physical? Why? How do you make the leap? Who says that physical things can't be "like something?" This just goes to the question of whether qualitative content can be entailed by physicality alone. I brought up in another thread the question of whether novels written and read only by zombies could have themes and tones and such. The answer seemed to be yes. But these are all "like something." They are all qualities that cannot be expressed in scientific language. This just means that there are multiple ways to explain things. Take this quotation from Roger Scruton from a discussion of Spinoza:

• What I look at a picture I see physical objects: patches of pigments smeared on a canvas. And I can describe these objects so thoroughly as to account for the entire picture. In doing so, I do not mention the other thing that I see: a stag hunt passing before a country house. This too I could describe so thoroughly as to give a complete account of the picture. But the two accounts are incommensurable: I cannot cross from one to the other in midstream, so to speak. I cannot describe the lead hound as frantically pursuing a patch of ochre, or the area of yellow fused with oxydised lindseed oil as resting on a huntman's knee. In some such way, Spinoza is saying, the complete description of the body described the very same thing as the complete description of the mind . . .

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts? Why do simply assume that a physical account that doesn't talk about qualia is incomplete, or vice versa? Given that Spinoza wrote his major works several hundred years ago, it's not like this is a new idea.

There is a big difference between the qualitative content of a novel and that of an experience. The former can be phrased in the language of structure/function, while the latter cannot. The tones and themes of a novel can be completely described by referring to how they affect our physical brain. The way an author's words affect our emotions are quantifiable, albeit well beyond any current methods. The reason is that the whole chain of events, from photons bouncing off ink to neural signals, is physical. Once we have accounted for every possible effect a tone or theme can have on us, we have exhaustively accounted for it.

Experiences, on the other hand, are not just difficult to describe. The best poets in the world, or the best neuroscientists in the world, can only give a functional account. They can describe how an experience affects our mood, what it causes us to do or say, or relate it to other experiences to evoke similar feelings. But this does not exhaust what that experience is, because there is still something it is like to be having it.

 

[loseyourname]

To be fair, it isn't question begging. I really think that experiences are more than structure and function, and it is because of this that I think they are unphysical, not the other way around.

Thinking that experiences are more than structure and function and thinking that experiences are more than physical are exactly the same thought! "Structure and function" is just another way of saying "physical." That is exactly why it is question-begging to prove one by presupposing the other.

Because it means giving up physicalism, something many people don't want to do.

Why is it that you think this? What exactly does a physicalist give up by giving up physicalism? His science will be just as effective and useful, and still just as dictatorially in control of its realms, as it was when he was a physicalist. The reason there is debate isn't because one side or the other is being obstinate in not wanting to let go of a cherished world-view. To suggest that is simplistic and bordering on insulting. The reason there is debate is because the matter isn't as cut-and-dry obvious as you want to think.

There is a big difference between the qualitative content of a novel and that of an experience. The former can be phrased in the language of structure/function, while the latter cannot.

I disagree. A description of the qualities of a novel in neuroscientific language isn't going to do it for me, just as a neuroscientific description of the qualities of experience won't do it for you.

Experiences, on the other hand, are not just difficult to describe. The best poets in the world, or the best neuroscientists in the world, can only give a functional account. They can describe how an experience affects our mood, what it causes us to do or say, or relate it to other experiences to evoke similar feelings. But this does not exhaust what that experience is, because there is still something it is like to be having it.

Now you seem to be saying that no qualitative or physical description will do it for you, that experience is simply inexplicable by any means.

 

[StatusX]

I disagree. A description of the qualities of a novel in neuroscientific language isn't going to do it for me, just as a neuroscientific description of the qualities of experience won't do it for you.

But don't you see, that really is all there is to it. What could there possibly be to the theme or tone besides every possible reaction we might have to it? The only thing that can't be accounted for is the subjective experience of the emotions and thougts the novel gives rise to.

Now you seem to be saying that no qualitative or physical description will do it for you, that experience is simply inexplicable by any means.

That may be, but it should at least be acknowledged. The reason I think many physicalists are so stubborn is that we want to believe we can understand every facet of nautre, and consciousness is at least one area where it's not so obvious this can be done, so they deny the hard problem.

 

[Canute]

Status X

I agree with most of what you've said here. In particular I agree that it is only stubbornness or wishful thinking that keeps alive the idea that qualia can be explained scientifically.

Still, what seems obvious to you and me does not appear at all obvious to many others. Perhaps it's worth coming at this from another angle by trying to imagine what a scientific explanation of qualia would look like.

How would the explanation make the leap from physical and observable brain process to non-physical and unobservable qualia? Anyone who tries to sketch out such an explanation must soon discover, whatever form their explanation takes, that there is in principle no way to leap across the explanatory gap between brain functions and processes to subjective experiences. There just isn't a scientific way of doing it, however much we learn about the brain. If there was a way then by now we'd at least expect to have one or two acceptable working hypotheses as to how brain and mind are related.

Even if we knew everything there is to know about the brain states that correlate to the appearance of various qualia we would be no closer to explaining why these states give rise to qualia as opposed to just further brain functions and processes.

 

[Tournesol]

I don't think anyone claims there is no inner subjective world, many just feel that this is nothing more than neurons, somehow. But neurons are defined entirely by structure and function.

Nothing that concretely exists is 'just' structure and function...S & F are abstractions. They are a way of talking about things, not stuff tht things can be made of.

Qualia do not have functions,

Subjectively, they do have causal roles. Note that a 'causal role' is on
the concrete side of the abstract/concrete divide.

 

[loseyourname]

But don't you see, that really is all there is to it. What could there possibly be to the theme or tone besides every possible reaction we might have to it? The only thing that can't be accounted for is the subjective experience of the emotions and thougts the novel gives rise to.

Does a novel then cease to have any qualities if there aren't any people around to read it? Does the painting only contain pigments, and no hunt scene, if no person is there to view it?

That may be, but it should at least be acknowledged. The reason I think many physicalists are so stubborn is that we want to believe we can understand every facet of nautre, and consciousness is at least one area where it's not so obvious this can be done, so they deny the hard problem.

And you give no creedence whatsoever to the possibility presented by Spinoza that both descriptions are complete descriptions that are simply looking at the same thing in different ways?

 

[Tournesol]

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts?

Well, it happens to be the case that physical accounts don't capture the
what-it-seems-like aspects of experience, and if we suppose that
physical accounts are inherently extrinsic and quantative, and that
subjectivity is inhernetly intrinsic and qualiative, both of which seem
reasonable in their own right, we can see why the explanatory gap should arise. OTOH, both descriptions can account for the production of behaviour, so in that sense they overlap, and there is no danger of epiphenomenalism.

 

[StatusX]

Nothing that concretely exists is 'just' structure and function...S & F are abstractions. They are a way of talking about things, not stuff tht things can be made of.

That's true, but physics is just structure and function. Basically, physics is a very specific kind of math, with the extra axiom that "this is all real." In fact, maybe qualia is what makes physics real. The difference between a universe where the fine structure constant is 1/731 and one where it is 1/137 is that we experience the latter but not the former.

Subjectively, they do have causal roles. Note that a 'causal role' is on
the concrete side of the abstract/concrete divide.

The subjective feeling of a causal role is not a causal role. But I do agree, they must have some kind of causing power because we can talk about them. What I'm talking about when I say "non-functional" is the specifc nature of the qualia. Exactly what it is that red looks like is not related to its functional role, or at the very least, not exhaustively described by it.

 

[StatusX]

Does a novel then cease to have any qualities if there aren't any people around to read it? Does the painting only contain pigments, and no hunt scene, if no person is there to view it?

It isn't important to the general definition whether a specific instance of a painting or novel is being observed. If you're asking whether theme would still be a meaningful concept if there were no humans in the universe, yes it would. It would be described in terms of hypothetical creatures called humans and the way they would express their thoughts and emotions with language, if they existed. On the other hand, "qualia" is not a meaningful conept in a universe without experiencers, because to know what a qualia is is to experience it.

And you give no creedence whatsoever to the possibility presented by Spinoza that both descriptions are complete descriptions that are simply looking at the same thing in different ways?

Well of course they are. We experience what is in our brain. The question is how are they aspects of that thing, and what it is. The claim physicalists make is that they are the same thing looked at the same way, and that to explain how neurons work is to explain experience.