Causality in the subjective world

[octelcogopod]

My apologies. I didn't read your posts properly. I now realize you were not saying what I thought you were saying. I agree with you that the existence of the hard problem does not mean we cannot explain consciousness. (If we oneday prove otherwise then we will have proved that mysticism is nonsense).

Mmm.

As far as it goes I agree. However, you have not yet shown that consciousness is a quale and so have not shown that sensory experiences are necessary to consciousness.

But let's say, for arguments sake, that a quale is anything that a living thing thinks, or experiences, because, not taking into account microphenomalism, if this were true, then qualia would be the exact opposite of that which is not alive.
THat would also mean that we could define that which is alive, as that which experiences qualia.
To do this we would need a definition of qualia, where I propose the following;
Qualia is defined as a phenomena in an agent where the agent has a response to external stimuli, where the response can either be instinctual, conscious, or plain emotional.
If we say that small animals or even insects, start out with very basic qualia systems, where they basically have a very tiny brain and some basic sensory systems, then qualia can be defined as the experience these systems create.
What this "proves" is that the more sensory systems (like eyes, ears, nerves) the agent has, the more conscious it becomes.
My reasoning behind this is that, even a pure emotion like pain, which most animals feel, is a sort of consciousness, I'm basically saying that any sensory system that absorbs stimuli, is a sort of consciousness, and that the more embellished these sensory systems are, the more aware, and the more complex the conscious experience becomes.

IMO of course.

I'd say the first statement is an assumption. The second seems true, but this has no bearing on the truth or falsity of microphenomenalism, the modern term for hylozoism, a doctrine or theory in which electrons are conscious.

Unfortunately I know very little to nothing about microphenomenalism.
I've heard of the idea before, but actually wrote it off as nonsense before thinking any further about it.
I will read up in later though.

Hang on a moment. How did what feel? The qualia? In this case who felt it? And who wants to know? If you study these questions carefully, whether by logic or introspectively, I think you'll find that that there is more to consciousness than qualia.

Well, if we define qualia as "how did it feel?" it was meant more in the way that it doesn't really matter who felt it, or who is asking, it's a hypothetical question where anyone who is experiencing consciousness can ask themselves.
For instance, qualia doesn't exist and cannot be understood fully by anyone who doesn't experience it themselves (imo.)
Thus, my point was that if we were to find out if a mouse experiences qualia, we could simply use the test "does it feel it?"
Seeing as we have no idea if anyone but just yourself experiences qualia(even other humans), I think the test is valid.

Again, this seems true, but it says nothing about why there is something that it is like to experience a quale. (Darn silly word that, imo, sounds like something one might do grouse shooting on the Scottish moors).

Well, if you want to talk about WHAT a quale feels like, then the obvious answer is that you have to feel it for yourself.
Although you might now think "aha! but that means we aren't able to explain it empirically!", I ask you 1. Nobody knows that for sure. And 2. There's basically two possibilities here;
Either qualia is something that somehow lies outside of the physical realm, along with consciousness, or, we have to rethink how we see the physical realm, and how matter and energy works, if qualia even has anything to do with those things.
I don't have all the answers man, I'm just trying to type my way to one:P

Peace
- ocp

 

[octelcogopod]

Why do u 'refuse this', what is this based on? U said that u need to "see proof that consciousness is excluded from physics", but isn't it really supposed to work the other way around? We need to see proof that it is included in physics, otherwise that's also magic!

Well you have a point there man.
But let me ask you this; What's the more sane explanation for consciousness:
1. It is not included in physics, and thus we cannot explain it in any way with current methods or
2. It is included in the physical realm, but we need to rethink how we see the physical realm, maybe to include a new realm? :P

Yes this has been done, and i would say every child in non-religious schools gets taught this assumption (at least i did). But when discussing these matters, we should also reconsider this assumption itself. Personally i have troubly really believing any of the options (because they both boil down to magic like i said), but still i tend to go in the opposite direction that u go in. I see no reason why physicalism could explain consciousness without seriously altering the insight into (and definition of) what is physical in the proces.

I agree, after some hard thinking.
Seems like we have come very far in explaining a lot, but have come no fuirther in explaining what consciousness actually is.
But I don't know, I have a gut feeling that tells me there's a very simple solution.

 

[Canute]

But let's say, for arguments sake, that a quale is anything that a living thing thinks, or experiences,

If you make this assumption then I agree that most of what you say follows. But is it true? I think the truth is a little more subtle. Unless you say that qualia are all there is to consciousness then there is something else to explain besides qualia. Bear in mind that many people have tried to argue that in the absence of qualia there is no consciousness, without success. It is for this reason that some researchers suggest we need to take experience as fundamental in our theories of mind and brain.

Regards
Canute

 

[octelcogopod]

If you make this assumption then I agree that most of what you say follows. But is it true? I think the truth is a little more subtle. Unless you say that qualia are all there is to consciousness then there is something else to explain besides qualia. Bear in mind that many people have tried to argue that in the absence of qualia there is no consciousness, without success. It is for this reason that some researchers suggest we need to take experience as fundamental in our theories of mind and brain.

Regards
Canute

Well, the problem as I see it, is that we are unable to research this experience objectively.

Honestly, I typed out a long message, but then deleted it, I simply don't have any reasonable theories that can not be categorized as anything but assumptions.

 

[Canute]

I agree that only our experiences cannot be investigated intra-subjectively, but I'm not sure that means they cannot be researched objectively. I suppose it depends on what we mean by 'objectively'.

 

[moving finger]

It is generally accepted that states of consciousness are correlated with brain-states. If someone sticks a pin in your foot then signals are sent up your leg and into your brain and a state of consciousness corresponding with a feeling of pain is caused. Most scientists and philosophers feel that there is nothing mysterious about most of this process, and that it can be explained without calling into question the assumption that brains give rise rise consciousness. However, it is argued by many, and the argument has not been successfully refuted as yet, that we cannot explain the existence of phenomenal consciousness in this way. We can explain all the neurophysiological states which lead to the feeling of pain, but not why there is such a feeling.

Explaining the functional aspects of mind is therefore considered an 'easy' problem. However, explaing the 'what it is like' of consciousness, e.g. the fact that there is something that it is like to feel pain, cannot be explained so easily. David Chalmers, who christened the hard problem, suggest that there are in principle reasons that prevent us from explaining it in terms of brain functions. The evidence suggests he is right, since nobody has yet come up with any such explanation (if we ignore the mystical explanation). There are a number of hypotheses doing the rounds, but each has only a few adherents.

Chalmers therefore speaks of psychological consciousness, which is 'easy' to explain (relatively) and phenomenal consciousnes, which seems inexplicable once one assumes that either mind causes brain or brain causes mind (in an ontological sense). It is explaing the 'what it is like' of consciousness that is called 'the hard problem'. By 'hard' is meant intractable. (Just as if it were a metaphysical question, which it is in my view).

I don’t see where there is a problem. Metzinger’s account of consciousness is (imho) a perfectly rational and reasonable explanation of how consciousness arises.

“What it is like for individual Y to feel X”, the phenomenal feeling of X by Y, is something unique to that individual Y in the process of feeling X – it corresponds to a particular and unique configuration of neurophysiological states within individual Y which is correlated with a particular set of stimuli. There is no reason to think that such states will be identical to those found in any other individual – though the fact that we are all genetically similar does suggest that we may be able to assume our phenomenal feelings may also be “somewhat similar”.

What more needs to be explained? Where is the problem?

This is from Chalmers' paper 'Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness'

"We have seen that there are systematic reasons why the usual methods of cognitive science and neuroscience fail to account for conscious experience. These are simply the wrong sort of methods: we need an extra ingredient in the explanation. This makes for a challenge to those who are serious about the hard problem of consciousness: What is your extra ingredient, and why should that account for conscious experience?"

If by “fail to account for conscious experience” Chalmers means that we cannot explain exactly why the feeling of X is what it is for individual Y, then he is right – but why is this a problem? The feeling is unique to that individual, in the same way that any given random real number is unique. We do not try to explain why a random real number “is what it is” – we do not classify this as a “problem” - we simply accept that it is a random real number.

Of course, some researchers do not agree that this problem is hard in the way Chalmers suggests, but many do, and nobody has shown it is not.

What does it take to show that it is not a problem? It seems to me that Chalmers is seeing a problem where there is no problem. You claim that nobody has shown that it is not a problem – I could equally claim that nobody has shown that it is a problem (in the same sense that “explaining why a random real number is what it is” is not a “problem” – it’s a meaningless question).

But to show there is no hard problem one would have to solve it, and unless one can solve it then the evidence suggests that Chalmers is right, it cannot be solved by our usual method, nor in line with our usual assumptions about it.

I disagree. How can one solve a problem which does not exist?

What I'm saying is that there needs to be a mechanism of response, it doesn't have to be a conscious response, we can simply define qualia by asking the following question: "How did it feel?"

Exactly – and we can ask the same question of a machine, once we build a machine which can report “how it feels”. Qualia are just elements of “how it feels”.

Hang on a moment. How did what feel? The qualia? In this case who felt it? And who wants to know? If you study these questions carefully, whether by logic or introspectively, I think you'll find that that there is more to consciousness than qualia.

“Who felt it” simply requires an agent able to register phenomenal experience and able to make a report of that experience (based on comparisons with stored data from other phenomenal experiences).
“Who wants to know” simply requires an agent asking for reports.

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

I don't think the problem of consciousness can be solved so easily. Nor do most other people. If Metzinger's explanation is good enough then why do so few people accept it? The fact is that nobody has yet come up with a plausible naturalistic-reductive theory of mind and brain that has any widespread support.

The problem is much more difficult than you are assuming according to most professional researchers.

For example. You say that for a feeling all that is required is an 'agent' able to register phenomenal experiences and able to report these experiences. But this is an arbitrary re-definition of consciousness. All that is required is an 'agent' able to have phenomenal experiences. Reports are irrelevant, as has so often been pointed out by Chalmers, Searle and others.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I don't think the problem of consciousness can be solved so easily. Nor do most other people. If Metzinger's explanation is good enough then why do so few people accept it? The fact is that nobody has yet come up with a plausible naturalistic-reductive theory of mind and brain that has any widespread support.

Widespread among what community? Metzinger's theory was featured on Psyche[/quote] a respected site frequented by both philosophers and neuroscientists. Modulo some details, the general tenor of his acount is practically universal among neuroscientists, and philosophers who dissent are mostly doing so based on higher order concerns, not experience of union.

 

[moving finger]

I don't think the problem of consciousness can be solved so easily. Nor do most other people.

“Most other people”?

At the start of the 20th century, most other people (who were interested enough to hold opinions on such things) believed Newton’s laws of motion were the final word in mechanics. They were wrong. Neither scientific nor philsophical truth is decided democratically.

I would agree that there are a large number of people who today have entrenched (dare I say irrational?) beliefs about human consciousness which forces them to reject all physicalist explanations “out of hand”, and there are also a large number of people who probably don’t really care one way or another. I would also agree that most people have probably never thought very deeply about the issue, and very few people would have taken the time or trouble to read Metzinger’s paper. But so what? None of this shows that Metzinger’s ideas are incorrect.

If Metzinger's explanation is good enough then why do so few people accept it? The fact is that nobody has yet come up with a plausible naturalistic-reductive theory of mind and brain that has any widespread support.

Widespread support is not a criterion for truth, it is a criterion only for popularity. The fact is that there is at least one plausible physicalist account of consciousness which fits the facts, and which is falsifiable. That is all that is required from a sceintific theory.

The problem is much more difficult than you are assuming according to most professional researchers.

That depends on whom you consult. Many physicalists and functionalists would deny that there is a “hard problem”.

For example. You say that for a feeling all that is required is an 'agent' able to register phenomenal experiences and able to report these experiences. But this is an arbitrary re-definition of consciousness. All that is required is an 'agent' able to have phenomenal experiences.

I did not offer that as a “definition of consciousness”, thus to call it an arbitrary definition of consciousness is incorrect.

Reports are irrelevant, as has so often been pointed out by Chalmers, Searle and others.

Reports, in the context of this question, are fundamental. The full context of the exchange was :

we can simply define qualia by asking the following question: "How did it feel?"

How did what feel? The qualia? In this case who felt it? And who wants to know?

“Who felt it” simply requires an agent able to register phenomenal experience and able to make a report of that experience (based on comparisons with stored data from other phenomenal experiences).

In other words, octelcogopod was suggesting that we ask the agent a question “How did it feel?” – what is the purpose of asking the agent “How did it feel?” unless the agent is able to provide a report?

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

Metzinger's theory was featured on Psyche a respected site frequented by both philosophers and neuroscientists. Modulo some details, the general tenor of his acount is practically universal among neuroscientists, and philosophers who dissent are mostly doing so based on higher order concerns, not experience of union.

This is true. But the general consensus is that the hard problem has not yet been solved. When it has been solved the solution will no doubt be announced in the professional literature. As a subscriber to the Journal of Consciousness Studies I've seen no such announcement.

 

[Canute]

At the start of the 20th century, most other people (who were interested enough to hold opinions on such things) believed Newton’s laws of motion were the final word in mechanics. They were wrong. Neither scientific nor philsophical truth is decided democratically.

Quite so.

I would agree that there are a large number of people who today have entrenched (dare I say irrational?) beliefs about human consciousness which forces them to reject all physicalist explanations “out of hand”, and there are also a large number of people who probably don’t really care one way or another. I would also agree that most people have probably never thought very deeply about the issue, and very few people would have taken the time or trouble to read Metzinger’s paper. But so what? None of this shows that Metzinger’s ideas are incorrect.

All this seems true. It is also true that a large number of people have entrenched (dare I say irrational?) beliefs about human consciousness that forces then to reject all non-physicalist explanations out of hand. This seems rather odd to me given that the existence of consciousness cannot be established by physicalist methods.

Widespread support is not a criterion for truth, it is a criterion only for popularity. The fact is that there is at least one plausible physicalist account of consciousness which fits the facts, and which is falsifiable. That is all that is required from a sceintific theory.

In my opinion the lack of acceptance of any of the current strictly physicalist explanations of consciousness suggests that they are not considered plausible by many people. Of course, this does not make them false, just as the implausibility of a non-physicalist explanation to physicalists and functionalists would not make it false.

That depends on whom you consult. Many physicalists and functionalists would deny that there is a “hard problem”.

Yes, this seems to me the only tenable position for a physicalist or functionalist. However, saying a problem does not exist does not necessarily make it go away, as Watson and Skinner discovered.

I did not offer that as a “definition of consciousness”, thus to call it an arbitrary definition of consciousness is incorrect.

If you define consciousness as the ability of a conscious being to make reports then of course consciousness can be explained as the ability to make reports. Dennett tried this approach but it did not work. If it had worked his book would have been acknowledged as a break-through. In consciousness studies consciousness is generally defined as 'what it is like', after Nagel. This definition carefully and deliberately avoids any assumptions about reports.

Reports, in the context of this question, are fundamental... In other words, octelcogopod was suggesting that we ask the agent a question “How did it feel?” – what is the purpose of asking the agent “How did it feel?” unless the agent is able to provide a report?

The question 'how did it feel' is here equivalent to the question 'are you conscious'. If the agent is not conscious then clearly the question is pointless. The agent won't know what you talking about. Indeed, the agent won't even know that you're talking. The thing is, how can you provide a report on a feeling until after you have experienced the feeling? It seems to me you would not be able to, in which case feelings are not reports.

I feel that you're not making the proper distinction between psychological/functional consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

Cheers
Canute

 

[moving finger]

This is true. But the general consensus is that the hard problem has not yet been solved.

Truth is not decided by "general consensus".

How can one solve a problem which does not exist?

This is not new - Dennett, amongst others, has been saying pretty much the same thing for many years.

When it has been solved the solution will no doubt be announced in the professional literature. As a subscriber to the Journal of Consciousness Studies I've seen no such announcement

Ahhhh, then no doubt you will have seen Patricia Churchland's paper on "The Hornswoggle Problem" in Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 402-8, 1996 :

http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/EPL/hornswoggle.html

Patricia Churchland does not go so far as to say the problem does not exist, but she (like many others) doesn't see what people like Chalmers is getting so worked up about.

Best Regards

 

[PIT2]

This is not new - Dennett, amongst others, has been saying pretty much the same thing for many years.

What Dennett has been offering is his view that one day the problem will turn out not to be a problem. Is this view not based on faith?

Also seen in Churchlands paper:

Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of "I-cannot-imagine" arguments is a related flaw.

I would add that similarly, and more importantly, the "I-cán-imagine" argument is even more flawed. Sorry to introduce the pope again, but he probably can imagine lots of things. For him, there may not exist any problems about the way reality works. God simply did all of it. The pope might well say that anyone who thinks there are problems with producing a theory of everything is wrong. There are no problems, and we will all find out that god is the answer.

 

[Canute]

Good point.

Can we agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable? If so then it is impossible to demonstrate that consciousness has a materialist explanation even if it does have one. I'm not sure why so many researchers ignore this problem.

However, modern physicalism is a slightly more subtle doctrine. For instance, Colin McGinn (who characterises himself as a strictly 'rational' or 'Western' philosopher) proposes that consciousness may originate in a pre-spatial reality 'prior' to the BB. But I get the impression he feels this idea does not contradict physicalism.

MF

I agree, of course, that questions like the one we are discussing cannot be decided by a show of hands. However, the fact that there is so much opposition to the view you are supporting does at least show that there is as yet no convincing evidence that is correct. It is over ten years since Chalmers christened the 'hard' problem and nothing has changed in the meantime. A while ago JCS carried an excellent article proposing relative phenomenalism, an alternative term for the doctrine of dependent existence. As this is a refereed journal then clearly there is no evidence showing this view to be false. In this case if we agree with Churchland, Dennett etc this is simply a matter of personal preference.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Ahhhh, then no doubt you will have seen Patricia Churchland's paper on "The Hornswoggle Problem" in Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 402-8, 1996 :

http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/EPL/hornswoggle.html

Patricia Churchland does not go so far as to say the problem does not exist, but she (like many others) doesn't see what people like Chalmers is getting so worked up about.

Best Regards

Thanks so much for this link! I was especially struck by this paragraph:

Suppose someone claims that she can imagine the mechanisms for sensorimotor integration in the human brain but cannot imagine the mechanisms for consciousness. What exactly does this difference amount to? Can she imagine the former in detail? No, because the details are not known. What is it, precisely, that she can imagine? Suppose she answers that in a very general way she imagines that sensory neurons interact with interneurons that interact with motor neurons, and via these interactions, sensorimotor integration is achieved. Now if that is all "being able to imagine" takes, one might as well say one can imagine the mechanisms underlying consciousness. Thus: "The interneurons do it." The point is this: if you want to contrast being able to imagine brain mechanisms for attention, short term memory, planning etc., with being unable to imagine mechanisms for consciousness, you have to do more that say you can imagine neurons doing one but cannot imagine neurons doing the other. Otherwise one simply begs the question.

In my opinion this kind of "argument by imagination" is the besetting fault of threads on these PF philosophy forums.

 

[Canute]

I don't think the issue is so simple. The mechanisms for functional consciousness are imaginable precisely because a mechanism performs a function. However, there is no evidence that phenomenal consciousness is functional in this sense. It is not a matter of lack of imagination, it is a matter of how we can imagine a functional mechanism giving rise to to something that is usually defined as non-functional ('what it is like' or whatever). In other words, it is not an inability to imagine the mechanism that sceptics appeal to, it is inability to imagine that functional (psychological) consciousness is the same thing as phenomenal consciousness.

 

[selfAdjoint]

In other words, it is not an inability to imagine the mechanism that sceptics appeal to, it is inability to imagine that functional (psychological) consciousness is the same thing as phenomenal consciousness.

Just exactly what I was talking about in the previous post. You can't imagine it, but others can. There's no force in the statement "I can't imagine that."

 

[-Job-]

Addition, a very basic operation, when combined, in successive steps, gives rise to a number of operations and identities. This knowledge base may grow large and aid us in explaining many things, but one thing it won't allow us to explain is addition itself.
Consider all the mathematics that are derived from addition. Any attempt, through the use of such mathematics, to explain addition is void of meaning as it is equivalent to an explanation of addition that reduces completely to addition. We would find ourselves using the very thing we want to explain, in our explanation.
It's somewhat equivalent to an explanation of the creation of one's body which makes use of one's arms and legs, or an explanation of the origin of consciousness which makes use of thought.

 

[Canute]

Just exactly what I was talking about in the previous post. You can't imagine it, but others can. There's no force in the statement "I can't imagine that."

The point I was trying to make is that it is difficult (for any of us) to imagine a possibility that seems logically incoherent. Therefore, I'd rather say that to you the idea of functional processes giving rise to phenomenal consciousness is logically coherent and to others it is not, rather than saying it is a matter of how imaginative we are.

 

[selfAdjoint]

The point I was trying to make is that it is difficult (for any of us) to imagine a possibility that seems logically incoherent. Therefore, I'd rather say that to you the idea of functional processes giving rise to phenomenal consciousness is logically coherent and to others it is not, rather than saying it is a matter of how imaginative we are.

Well as to logical coherence, any logical argument has to rest on specific clear premises. Then you do logical algebra on these premises to come up with conclusions. And the accusation of incoherence is that your conclusions don't in fact follow from your premises, or else that your premises somehow contradict each other.

Now as far as physical processes producing consciousness, what I see is that partisans of the hard problem have constructed a straw-man theory they call physicalism, which they can show to be inconsistent in this way. But the opponents of the hard problem deny that that physicalism is a correct picture of their beliefs, because they say it includes premises that are plausible to the partisans but not to the opponents.

If you want to discuss this issue, maybe we could start a thread; I don't think it was ever adequately discussed on any of the old threads I remember.

 

[Paul Martin]

But the opponents of the hard problem deny that that physicalism is a correct picture of their beliefs, because they say it includes premises that are plausible to the partisans but not to the opponents.

Premises such as?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[selfAdjoint]

Premises such as?

Warm regards,

Paul

Well, suppose Canute specifies what he means by logically incoherent and we can discuss. Some, in my view inconclusive, discussion of related issues took place in the subforum devoted to Rosenberg's book, A Place for Consciousness, but I'm not going to go looking for them.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi selfAdjoint,

I gather that you are an opponent of the hard problem, so I take it that you were speaking for yourself when you said that the opponents "deny that that physicalism is a correct picture of their beliefs" because it contains implausible premises. Are you now saying that you have forgotten how "that phsicalism" was incorrectly described?

Since I believe there is a Hard Problem, I would characterize physicalism as a belief that the early (pre-life) evolution of the physical universe did not involve conscious action. Is this a fair characterization in your opinion? Or is it incorrectly described?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[selfAdjoint]

Hi selfAdjoint,

I gather that you are an opponent of the hard problem, so I take it that you were speaking for yourself when you said that the opponents "deny that that physicalism is a correct picture of their beliefs" because it contains implausible premises. Are you now saying that you have forgotten how "that phsicalism" was incorrectly described?

The definitions of physicalism in Rosenberg's book and the arguments about them in the subforum where it was studied were what I had in mind. But I have seen discussions about this issue elsewhere. I tend to be 90% against the hard problem and 10% undecided. And I was not talking primarily about myself because I have not participated to any real degree in such discussions before.

Since I believe there is a Hard Problem, I would characterize physicalism as a belief that the early (pre-life) evolution of the physical universe did not involve conscious action. Is this a fair characterization in your opinion? Or is it incorrectly described?[/quoter

Warm regards,

Paul

You are correct. I believe consciousness is a feature of human beings and possibly of some other members of the animal kingdom (dolphins, chimps, maybe squids?). But it is not an essential feature of the universe anymore than an elephant's tusks are. It was evolved in those animals and is a feature of their biology.

What I understand the hard problem to be is somewhere between accounting for consciousness through biological processes and accounting for qualia through biological processes. Even the 10% of me that is undecided about whether there is a hard problem does not believe in ontological consciousness. Existence of a problem, however hard, does not mean there is no solution.

 

[Paul Martin]

Thanks, selfAdjoint,

After a rather long discussion with MF on the question of the Hard Problem, and after having read Johathan Shear's compilation of rebuttals and comments on David Chalmers' "The Conscious Mind", I am convinced that there will be precious few conversions in either direction on the issue for a while. Since it will be pretty hard to prove who's right one way or the other, we may have to wait a while before the debate is settled. It should be fun to watch anyway.

Thanks for your comments and insight.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

apologies that my posts are often "time-delayed" compared to the rest of the thread. Where I am at the moment I cannot get frequent access to the forum, hence I tend to download sections of threads, compose replies offline, and then post the replies a couple of days later whan I get access again. Hope this is not too disconcerting for people.

All this seems true. It is also true that a large number of people have entrenched (dare I say irrational?) beliefs about human consciousness that forces then to reject all non-physicalist explanations out of hand.

Agreed. The question thus comes down to : What criteria should one use for accepting or rejecting alternative explanations?

This seems rather odd to me given that the existence of consciousness cannot be established by physicalist methods.

Sure it can. Agents report conscious experiences. Such reports can be accepted as input data for physicalist treatments of the phenomenon, just as any measurement of the world may be used as input data for physicalist treatment of phenomena.

In my opinion the lack of acceptance of any of the current strictly physicalist explanations of consciousness suggests that they are not considered plausible by many people. Of course, this does not make them false, just as the implausibility of a non-physicalist explanation to physicalists and functionalists would not make it false.

Agreed. The question thus comes down to : What criteria should one use for accepting or rejecting alternative explanations?

Yes, this seems to me the only tenable position for a physicalist or functionalist. However, saying a problem does not exist does not necessarily make it go away, as Watson and Skinner discovered.

And it is all too easy to create a humdinger of a “problem” by simply denying the rational explanation – there are plenty of examples around : Reject the heliocentric explanation of the solar system (as most people did before Galileo) and one has the horrendously complex “Ptolemaic epicycles” problem to solve; reject the Darwinian explanation of evolution (as many do today), and one has loads of problems to solve in terms of how complex entities arose ( = evidence for intelligent design!); or reject the relativistic explanation of spacetime (as many do), and one has the “absence of aether drift” problem as well as many others to solve; or reject the Big Bang explanation (as many still do today) and one has the redshift/expanding universe (and other) problems to solve; or reject the deterministic explanation of the subjective feeling of free will and one has the “how does free will work?” problem to solve. All real humdingers of problems with apparently no easy solution, and yet not one of them is a problem in the first place if one accepts the obvious rational explanation.

The onus is on the one claiming that there is a problem to demonstrate just what the problem is supposed to be, and why the existing rational explanation that solves the problem is incorrect.

If you define consciousness as the ability of a conscious being to make reports then of course consciousness can be explained as the ability to make reports. Dennett tried this approach but it did not work.

I did not define consciousness as simply the ability to make reports, and neither did Dennett – thus to suggest such a thing is a misrepresentation or misunderstanding both of my views and Dennett’s.

The question 'how did it feel' is here equivalent to the question 'are you conscious'. If the agent is not conscious then clearly the question is pointless. The agent won't know what you talking about. Indeed, the agent won't even know that you're talking. The thing is, how can you provide a report on a feeling until after you have experienced the feeling? It seems to me you would not be able to, in which case feelings are not reports.

I have never claimed that “feelings are reports” – where did you get this idea from?

If we are to ask how did it feel then it follows that we expect a report about how it did feel. You seem to be misreading the simplest of posts. Once again, octelcogopod was suggesting that we ask the agent a question “How did it feel?” – what is the purpose of asking the agent “How did it feel?” unless the agent is able to provide a report?

I feel that you're not making the proper distinction between psychological/functional consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

And I feel that you are confusing the issue by misreading the posts.

Once again for the avoidance of doubt : “ask the agent how did it feel” implies that one expects a REPORT about “how it did feel”; but nothing in this suggests that “feelings are reports”.

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

You are correct. I believe consciousness is a feature of human beings and possibly of some other members of the animal kingdom (dolphins, chimps, maybe squids?). But it is not an essential feature of the universe anymore than an elephant's tusks are. It was evolved in those animals and is a feature of their biology.

Ok. You are entitled to your assumption. But to me it is this assumption that gives rise to the hard problem.

Existence of a problem, however hard, does not mean there is no solution.

I agree completely. To me the hard problem is an artefact of false assumptions. In fact, unless the universe itself is logically incoherent then it must derive from false assumptions. The false assumption, in my opinion, is that either mind or matter are fundamental. We've always known that idealism and materialism are not entirely reasonable doctrines. As a result they are both undecidable metaphysical positions. Attempting to show that one of them is true is bound to lead to hard problems, barriers to knowledge, ignoramibuses, contradictions, paradoxes etc.

Perhaps I should mention that to me physicalism (as distinct from traditional materialism) is very nearly correct.

Canute

 

[Canute]

The question thus comes down to : What criteria should one use for accepting or rejecting alternative explanations?

I'd say empiricism.

Agents report conscious experiences. Such reports can be accepted as input data for physicalist treatments of the phenomenon, just as any measurement of the world may be used as input data for physicalist treatment of phenomena.

This is true. But Behaviourism is a discredited doctrine imo.

And it is all too easy to create a humdinger of a “problem” by simply denying the rational explanation

It sure is. In my opinion there is no 'hard' problem.

reject the Darwinian explanation of evolution (as many do today), and one has loads of problems to solve in terms of how complex entities arose ( = evidence for intelligent design!);

Actually I feel that neo-Darwinists have forgotten some of what Darwin wrote. Either way, neo-Darwinism has not yet entirely solved these problems. Clearly there is a lot of truth in the theory, but it is not yet complete.

or reject the Big Bang explanation (as many still do today) and one has the redshift/expanding universe (and other) problems to solve;

Accept it and there are still problems to solve.

or reject the deterministic explanation of the subjective feeling of free will and one has the “how does free will work?” problem to solve.

Accept it and there are still problems to solve.

All real humdingers of problems with apparently no easy solution, and yet not one of them is a problem in the first place if one accepts the obvious rational explanation.

Yes, I agree. However, I do not agree with you on what constitutes the rational explanation.

The onus is on the one claiming that there is a problem to demonstrate just what the problem is supposed to be, and why the existing rational explanation that solves the problem is incorrect.

One could equally argue that the onus is on the other side to show that there is no problem.

I did not define consciousness as simply the ability to make reports, and neither did Dennett – thus to suggest such a thing is a misrepresentation or misunderstanding both of my views and Dennett’s.

I find Dennett unclear on this issue, and I am not alone in this. If consiousness is not reports then what was Consciousness Explained all about? Anyway, let's forget reports. It seems we can agree that it's consciousness that needs an explanation not reports of it.

Once again for the avoidance of doubt : “ask the agent how did it feel” implies that one expects a REPORT about “how it did feel”; but nothing in this suggests that “feelings are reports”.

Ok. We agree on this one then.

Cheers
Canute

 

[Rade]

I was thinking that there are all these laws of nature that describe physical systems, and our senses receive input from these systems. However, once the input has been delivered, it disappears into the black hole of our consciousness, where it is manipulated by some unknown principle. Once this principle is done with the input, it produces the output (our actions), which therefore cannot be predicted with any known law of nature. That these laws do not rule over causality in a subjective world can be understood when one asks if the number 9 is pulled down by gravity, or when one hears someone tell about his experience of flying around and morphing objects in a lucid dream, or when one anticipates an event 2 weeks down the subjectively simulated road and let's it influence an event 10 minutes down the road. So how does causality work in a subjective world, if not by the known laws of nature? Or am i mistaken and do these laws still apply?

As to OP--IMO, the way causality works in the subjective world of the human mind is via two mathematical processes, first "differentiation", second "integration" (we now call this the subjective process of the calculus thanks to Newton in 1666). These two processes represent the "unknown principle" discussed above--the process by which the objective reality is linked to the subjective within conscoiusness to form a dielectic. Because mathematics, like logic, is outside the empirical laws of nature, in this way then, yes, one could say that the laws of nature do not rule over the output of causality (actions) in the subjective world. However, as to the #9 as an object within in the subjective mind, while it is logical that it is not pulled down by gravity, it is also clear that its essence is pulled together via laws of nature that describe electro-chemical physical processes. This is my answer to the OP question--so how does causality work in a subjective world ?

 

[moving finger]

Sorry to introduce the pope again, but he probably can imagine lots of things. For him, there may not exist any problems about the way reality works. God simply did all of it. The pope might well say that anyone who thinks there are problems with producing a theory of everything is wrong. There are no problems, and we will all find out that god is the answer.

Sure, that’s the simplest solution to everything isn’t it – God. That premise answers all questions. But then why do philosophy at all? What would be the point, if everything is answered by God?

The “God is the answer” solution is similar to the “solipsism is the answer” solution – neither can be logically falsified. One must simply assume their truth or falsity.

Can we agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable?

Only if we have good reason for believing it is unfalsifiable (if we don’t, it simply becomes an assumption – and I see no reason to simply assume it is true). I’ve presented an argument that is based on analytic truth. Would you agree with that argument?

If so then it is impossible to demonstrate that consciousness has a materialist explanation even if it does have one. I'm not sure why so many researchers ignore this problem.

Solipsism is always a possible answer to everything – just like PIT2’s suggestion that God is an answer to everything. If one wishes to believe either of these is true, then for the life of me I can’t understand why one would want to study philosophy?

As I keep saying, but it seems like the message doesn’t get through, one cannot make any progress in explanation or understanding unless one first makes assumptions.

Assumption 1 : Is solipsism true? If you assume “yes”, then do not pass GO, do not collect £200. (What’s the point of philosophising any further about a world which is entirely in your imagination?)

Asumption 2 : Is God the answer to everything? If you assume “yes”, then do not pass GO, do not collect £200. (What’s the point of philosophising any further about a world which is explained totally by the premise of God?)

If you answer “no” to both of the above, then you are assuming that solipsism is false, and you are also assuming that God is not the answer to everything, and it then makes sense to proceed further and ask more philosophical questions.

I agree, of course, that questions like the one we are discussing cannot be decided by a show of hands. However, the fact that there is so much opposition to the view you are supporting does at least show that there is as yet no convincing evidence that is correct.

No, it simply shows that some people have entrenched beliefs and intuitions that they find very hard to let go of, even in the face of convincing evidence. Since PIT2 brought up the subject of the Pope - I am sure that the Catholic Church at the time of Galileo would have taken a similar line to your own on the subject of the heliocentric model of the solar system – they would also presumably have said “there is no convincing evidence that the heliocentric model is correct” – and they would have done this by simply referring to the bible and the edicts of the Church (these after all were the only evidence they needed), and by ignoring the scientific evidence. They were wrong, weren’t they?

What kind of “convincing evidence” does it take? I have stated already that Metzinger’s account fits the facts – can you show that it does not? Can you show that Metzinger’s account is somehow deficient or incorrect or wrong? If you cannot, then how can you claim that Metzinger’s account is not an acceptable hypothesis for the emergence of consciousness? Simply referring all the time to “the views and opinions of other people” is similar to the Catholic Church’s insistence on referring to the bible and their own edicts and ignoring the empirical evidence of the time – it is not a logical, philosophical or scientifically sound argument.

The point I am trying to make is that one cannot settle these issues by “popular vote” or by “show of hands”, or by “so much opposition to your view” – this is neither good philosophy nor good science. One can settle these issues only by rationally and logically examining the evidence. Now, on what rational or logical basis do you reject Metzinger’s account of consciousness (which account imho denies the existence of a “hard problem”)?

It is over ten years since Chalmers christened the 'hard' problem and nothing has changed in the meantime.

Christening a problem does not make it a problem. I can invent any number of Hornswoggle problems, but my doing so does not mean that these so-called problems are real problems. Certainly one can delude oneself into thinking nothing has changed if one is blind to those changes. Have you studied Metzinger’s paper? I’m pretty sure the Catholic Church would also have said that the Erath was the centre of the universe and nothing had changed in the 4,000 years since creation – were they right simply because they were deliberately blind to the truth?

Just exactly what I was talking about in the previous post. You can't imagine it, but others can. There's no force in the statement "I can't imagine that."

I agree with selfAdjoint here 101%. Inability to imagine a solution which others can imagine does not constitute a logical, philosophical or scientifically sound argument against that solution. I personally find it very hard to imagine the curvature of 3D space, but I accept that it makes sense to talk of spacetime curvature in higher dimensions (though I know that some philosophers, eg Norman Swartz, deny that such curvature has any reality for precisely the reason, imho, that he cannot imagine it).

Imagine that we could build a machine which could accumulate input data from the world, then process this data according to various internal “world models” it has about its environment. The machine has visual (colour-sensitive) receptors, it has audio receptors, it has tactile receptors, and it can assimilate all of the data from these receptors into an internalized self-consistent model of it and its environment. The machine is also able to understand the rudiments of the syntax and semantics of the English language, it can converse in English, and is able to provide reports on the information it has received and internally processed. We show the machine a red object, and we ask the machine “what is it like?”

The machine can certainly “see” the red object, it can process the visual data from the red object in terms of its existing internalized model of the world, comparing the data with other stored data from seeing many other objects in the past.

What would we expect the machine to reply? The machine certainly would not rely “its like nothing at all” – because the phenomenal experience of seeing a red object is a definite phenomenal experience for the machine. But what exactly is it like from that machine’s perspective? How could the machine possibly tell us?

Why would the machine’s answer be any different (in principle) to the answer from a conscious human being? The machine “knows internally” (ie knows to itself) what it is like when it sees that red object, but how can it describe to someone else “what it is like” when the machine sees a red object? The question “what is it like” in this context is meaningless.

This (in a nutshell) is supposed to be the “hard problem”. But what problem? The precise subjective phenomenal experience of agent X seeing red is unique to agent X – just like a random real number is unique. The only way you can know “what it is like for moving finger to see red” is if you ARE moving finger. But you AREN’T moving finger, therefore the issue is irrelevant. The question has meaning ONLY if the questioner already knows (from subjective experience) what it is like (for the questioner) to see such an object, and makes the assumption that the agent’s perceptual experience of red is somehow similar to the questioner’s. Otherwise, the question is meaningless. THIS is why the hard problem is a non-problem.

Well as to logical coherence, any logical argument has to rest on specific clear premises. Then you do logical algebra on these premises to come up with conclusions. And the accusation of incoherence is that your conclusions don't in fact follow from your premises, or else that your premises somehow contradict each other.

From a logical point of view what you have described seems (to me) to be logical validity, rather than coherence. If the premises of a logical argument are true, and the inferences valid, then the argument is sound. To me, “coherency” does not apply to arguments, it applies to concepts. A concept is coherent (to me) if it can be grounded in a rational and self-consistent description or explanation of “how it works”, which is in turn grounded in a rational and self-consistent concept of how the rest of the world works. (Thus I believe that the libertarian notion of free will is incoherent because the concept cannot be grounded in a self-consistent description or explanation of “how it works”.)

Thus it seems (imho) to boil down to whether Canute is claiming that there is something wrong with either the premises or the inferences in the “argument” that functional processes giving rise to phenomenal consciousness, or whether there is something irrational or inconsistent in the “concept” that functional processes giving rise to phenomenal consciousness. I’m not sure which one Canute is arguing against.

But simply saying “I don’t believe it, therefore it’s incoherent” is neither a rational nor a logical argument.

Now as far as physical processes producing consciousness, what I see is that partisans of the hard problem have constructed a straw-man theory they call physicalism, which they can show to be inconsistent in this way. But the opponents of the hard problem deny that that physicalism is a correct picture of their beliefs, because they say it includes premises that are plausible to the partisans but not to the opponents.

If you want to discuss this issue, maybe we could start a thread; I don't think it was ever adequately discussed on any of the old threads I remember.

Sounds like a good idea. I’m especially interested in the notion that physicalism does not answer the “hard problem” – selfAdjoint if physicalism is not the answer then what (in your opinion) is? Functionalism?

Since I believe there is a Hard Problem, I would characterize physicalism as a belief that the early (pre-life) evolution of the physical universe did not involve conscious action. Is this a fair characterization in your opinion? Or is it incorrectly described?

Imho physicalism does not entail that consciousness supervenes on evolved life-forms. I believe physicalism is silent on the precise ways in which consciousness may manifest itself, apart from saying that everything is physical.

After a rather long discussion with MF on the question of the Hard Problem, and after having read Johathan Shear's compilation of rebuttals and comments on David Chalmers' "The Conscious Mind", I am convinced that there will be precious few conversions in either direction on the issue for a while. Since it will be pretty hard to prove who's right one way or the other, we may have to wait a while before the debate is settled. It should be fun to watch anyway.

Surely this forum is a place for making things happen, rather than for being spectators and waiting for others to make things happen?

Best Regards