slyboy said:
1. The way the state is updated after a measurement is NOT fixed by the quantum formalism. The projection postulate is one possibility, just like updating by Bayes rule (conditioning) is one possibility in the Kolmogorov theory. However, generally there is the same sort of freedom in how quantum states can be updated as there is in the Kolmogorov theory (I can go into more detail if you wish).
Thanks for your contribution. And I would welcome more details.
I think you are speaking about POVM and generalized measurements, aren’t you? If this is the case, you always have (my knowledge) the projection of the state embedded into a more general model of measurement with the following principle (simplified formula: pure state etc ..., there are a lot of good papers on the more general form of POVM and generalized measurements):
|in> -> projection -> |m> -> unitary evolution ->|out> (state after the generalized measurement), where |m> is the state associated with the observed measured value.
i.e. |out>=UoP|in> where U is a unitary operator and P a projector.
Therefore, we always have natively the projection postulate (we can always assume, formally, that the unitary evolution U is part of a kind of dynamical time evolution, e.g. a dirac evolution, if not time is elapsed during the measurement model).
If you say that you have, in QM, a way to build formally other types of measurements that do not include natively a projection, I am interested on. I would welcome any precisions (currently I, personally, do not know any QM “measurement” that does not involve a projection in one step of the measurement).
slyboy said:
2. Do quantum statistics conflict with Kolmogorov theory? The answer is a definite NO. Of course, it entirely depends on how you choose to set up your sample space. For example, if you choose a separate sample space for every possible observable and then just take a Cartesian product of them, you will end up with a space on which the quantum probabilities can be represented by a Kolmogorov measure. However, any way you choose to set up such a space, you will end up with some strange features.
That’s one of my questions. The projection of the QM state “after” a measurement (note that I am just speaking about the formal result, not the interpretations of this QM postulate) seems to require the update of the probability space (in the Kolgomorov axiomatization formulation) or the update of random variables.
Therefore, as you say, we may try, formally to make a Cartesian product of all these individual probability spaces (the sample spaces), however we obtain a non countable Cartesian product. The problem with non countable Cartesian products of sets is the object you obtain. This object may be very singular. I do not know the type of sigma algebra we obtain nor the probability law if it is indeed a probability law (problem of the sigma additivity on this sigma algebra). May be there is known theorems on that but I do not know them.
slyboy said:
For example, you can prove that there is no classical sample space rich enough to include the probability assignments from any quantum state (of a system with a fixed Hilbert space) such that all measures on that space correspond to probability assignments of quantum states.
Can you tell us the theorem or the result you are dealing with? This seems to underline perfectly the problem of non-countable Cartesian products of sample spaces. You obtain an object where I do not know if it is a probability space, if the individual spaces follow the probabilities of the states of a given Hilbert space (problem of the sigma additivity on this new space).
However, this does not preclude the possibility to update externally the Kolgomorov probability space. I.e. we may not require the infinite non-countable Cartesian product to be a probability space (no reason).
slyboy said:
To put it another way, there will always be classical measures on the space that are not valid in quantum mechanics.
You mean the inverse? Or may be I do not understand what you are saying.
slyboy said:
For this reason, amongst others, some people prefer to work with modified notions of sample spaces that do not obey the Kolmogorov axioms. This is called quantum logic and quantum probability. The lattice of projectors onto the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space is the simplest example of a quantum logic. The measures on this structure all correspond to probability assignments of quantum states, as was proven by Andrew Gleason.
Yes, I have read some papers on it. I really appreciate the “formal” formalism (even if I am far from understanding the whole subject). However, we still have 2 parts in this formalism:
1) how to construct formally general measures P(B,rho)=tr(M(B).rho). Where B is an event (of a given observable, M(B) is a sigma additive function into the sets of orthogonal projectors and rho the state of the QM system.
2) the new state after the measurement.
The main point that bothers me is the state after the measurement. As P(B,rho) is a probability law ([0,1], sigma additivity, etc ...), it seems that the state after the measurement is only the [possibly external] feature added by the QM probability formalism when compared with Kolgomorov formulation. In other words, can we say that QM probability minus the state after the measurement is equivalent to the Kolgomorov probability?
slyboy said:
In summary - you can't use QM to rule out the Kolmogorov formalism, but you can formulate the theory using an alternative axiomatization of probability if you choose to do so. It's a matter of taste. Personally, I quite like the quantum logic - quantum probability approach, but it has not had a big impact on physics as of yet.
Yes, but what I think interesting to know is the extra axioms added to the Kolgomorov probability to get the full compatibility with QM axioms (formal separation of the problems: probability calculation and state evolution). QM formalism or QM logic is efficient to compute many results. However, it has some drawbacks especially when we deal with the connection of discrete and continuous measures (i.e. the Hilbert space is not large enough, it requires less simple objects such as generalized Hilbert spaces to handle correctly the formulation). While in Kolgomorov formalism, it is formally evident and consistent (i.e. the probability law on discrete or continuous random variable).
Seratend.