I Classicality and the Correspondence Principle

[jlcd]

Correspondence Principle states that the behavior of systems described by the theory of quantum mechanics (or by the old quantum theory) reproduces classical physics in the limit of large quantum numbers. In other words, it says that for large orbits and for large energies, quantum calculations must agree with classical calculations."

But is it applied for only one system (say a single atom or single system like the quantum oscillator), or is it also correct to say that the human body is not quantum because of the correspondence principle? Or a bicycle is not quantum because of the correspondence principle?

 

[PeterDonis]

Correspondence Principle states that the behavior of systems described by the theory of quantum mechanics (or by the old quantum theory) reproduces classical physics in the limit of large quantum numbers.

Basically, yes. But note that this is not the same as saying that macroscopic objects (objects with large quantum numbers) are not quantum objects.

is it applied for only one system (say a single atom or single system like the quantum oscillator)

It can't be applied to such a system, because such a system does not have large quantum numbers.

is it also correct to say that the human body is not quantum because of the correspondence principle? Or a bicycle is not quantum because of the correspondence principle?

No. See above.

 

[jlcd]

Basically, yes. But note that this is not the same as saying that macroscopic objects (objects with large quantum numbers) are not quantum objects.
It can't be applied to such a system, because such a system does not have large quantum numbers.
No. See above.

Human body has zillions and zillions of atoms and molecules. Can't you considered it as having large quantum numbers?

I mean does correspondence principle apply to the human body or not?

 

[jlcd]

Basically, yes. But note that this is not the same as saying that macroscopic objects (objects with large quantum numbers) are not quantum objects.
It can't be applied to such a system, because such a system does not have large quantum numbers.
No. See above.

To reword it. The human body is ruled by classical physics and also quantum? But if it is ruled by classical physics. It shouldn't have quantum effects. Or maybe you are saying macroscopic body is quantum yet doesn't have quantum effects due to the correspondence principle?

Also the human body atomic numbers were scattered in different atoms. They are not continuously. So technically. why does the correspondence principle apply in the human body? It's not like this closely spaced oscillator here http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/quantum/hosc6.html which produces classical physics. What parts of the human body atoms have large quantum numbers or identical to it?

 

[PeterDonis]

Human body has zillions and zillions of atoms and molecules. Can't you considered it as having large quantum numbers?

Yes. But that doesn't mean the human body is not a quantum object.

does correspondence principle apply to the human body or not?

It does.

The human body is ruled by classical physics and also quantum?

No. The human body is a quantum object, which, because it has large quantum numbers, exhibits classical-like behavior (i.e., behavior similar to that which would be predicted by classical physics) due to the correspondence principle. In other words, the correspondence principle says, as you say in your OP:

for large orbits and for large energies, quantum calculations must agree with classical calculations.

Again, that is not the same as saying objects stop being quantum when they have large quantum numbers.

the human body atomic numbers were scattered in different atoms

So what? The correspondence principle doesn't say the large quantum numbers have to be in a single atom.

If you're bothered by the term "large quantum numbers", just use "large number of degrees of freedom" instead. That's really a better way of describing what differentiates macroscopic objects which act "classically" from microscopic ones which act "quantum".

 

[jlcd]

Yes. But that doesn't mean the human body is not a quantum object.
It does.
No. The human body is a quantum object, which, because it has large quantum numbers, exhibits classical-like behavior (i.e., behavior similar to that which would be predicted by classical physics) due to the correspondence principle. In other words, the correspondence principle says, as you say in your OP:
Again, that is not the same as saying objects stop being quantum when they have large quantum numbers.
So what? The correspondence principle doesn't say the large quantum numbers have to be in a single atom.

If you're bothered by the term "large quantum numbers", just use "large number of degrees of freedom" instead. That's really a better way of describing what differentiates macroscopic objects which act "classically" from microscopic ones which act "quantum".

Thank you.

Say, does correspondence principle exist because of the existence of the born rule? In the oscillator with close spacing, it produces the classical one because of born rule. Can you give one example where there is no born rule but the correspondence principle still apply?

 

[PeterDonis]

does correspondence principle exist because of the existence of the born rule?

Meaning, do objects with large numbers of degrees of freedom behave classically because of the Born rule? I'm not sure, because the Born rule is not clear about what a "measurement" is, so it's not clear about when to apply it.

In the oscillator with close spacing, it produces the classical one because of born rule.

How so? There is no mention of the Born rule in the article you linked to. Nor does the argument it makes depend on the Born rule; the argument describes the shape of the quantum wave function and notes that it is similar to the shape of the classical probability curve for the particle's location. None of that requires applying the Born rule.

 

[jlcd]

Meaning, do objects with large numbers of degrees of freedom behave classically because of the Born rule? I'm not sure, because the Born rule is not clear about what a "measurement" is, so it's not clear about when to apply it.
How so? There is no mention of the Born rule in the article you linked to. Nor does the argument it makes depend on the Born rule; the argument describes the shape of the quantum wave function and notes that it is similar to the shape of the classical probability curve for the particle's location. None of that requires applying the Born rule.

If you will look at the hyperphysics link again. There is the psi^2 besides the graphics. It is the born rule. Born rule states that the probability density of finding the particle at a given point is proportional to the square of the magnitude of the particle's wavefunction at that point. So psi^2 is direclty related to born rule. Unless you can state psi^2 is valid even without born rule? If you can't find the psi^2 in the graphics. I'll share the graphics later.

 

[PeterDonis]

There is the psi^2 besides the graphics.

Ah, yes, sorry, I missed that.

 

[A. Neumaier]

But is it applied for only one system (say a single atom or single system like the quantum oscillator)

It can't be applied to such a system, because such a system does not have large quantum numbers.

If you're bothered by the term "large quantum numbers", just use "large number of degrees of freedom" instead.

This is not the same.

The correspondence principle dates back to Niels Bohr 1920 (i.e., even before the advent of modern quantum mechanics 1925). He applied it to single electrons (of hydrogen atoms) with high angular momentum quantum numbers.

 

[PeterDonis]

This is not the same.

Not for single electrons in hydrogen atoms, no. But nobody has ever observed a hydrogen atom with an electron that has quantum numbers large enough for Bohr's argument to apply to them. So if you limit yourself to Bohr's original argument, you're making the correspondence principle irrelevant in any practical sense.

If, OTOH, you want to apply the correspondence principle to macroscopic objects, then you have to think about large numbers of degrees of freedom, not just large quantum numbers for individual quantum systems (since, as you note, there generally will not be any individual quantum systems in such an object that have large quantum numbers by themselves). That is, as I understand it, implicitly what is being done in any discussion of the correspondence principle that claims to apply it to macroscopic objects.

In a practical sense, I'm not sure how much of a role the correspondence principle actually plays in modern QM. In the early days of QM it was a useful guide to finding quantum models of systems, but all of the systems for which it was a useful guide back then have been well understood for decades and nobody actually appeals to the correspondence principle to justify the quantum models of them, since those models have extensive experimental confirmation by now.

 

[jlcd]

Ah, yes, sorry, I missed that.

About the born rule. For simple system or even molecules where it is only the system and apparatus. The probability amplitudes or density can range a lot like you see in normal quantum chemistry (where the wave is largest or highest, you get more probability by squaring it).

However, when the apparatus has entangled with the environment causing decoherence. The mixed states don't form probabily densities that have large amplitude differences akin to the Gerlach experiment with only Up and Down branches? I mean. Let us say the position preferred basis is chosen in the apparatus-environment decoherence. It is just positions and doesn't form any probability amplitude with huge differences in the probability? Does it make sense one location has higher probability than another in zillions of apparatus-environment superpositions? Although in energy basis, it can happen. But not in position? (I'm aware that technically position eigenstates aren't actually states since they aren't normalizable, and one has to do a fair bit of mathematical work to make all this rigorous, but we'll ignore that here)

Can you please give example where the probability density of different position mixed states (apparatus-environement, not system-apparaturs where it is more obvious) have large differences to one another (like top of the wave function compare to near the zero axis?)

This is related to this thread becuse it's about how classicality is derived from the quantum. Correspondence principle seems to involve system and apparatus per Bohr specification. But to model apparatus and environmental decoherence and emergence of classicality. Here I want to understand the behavior of wave function amplitudes in such apparatus-environment setup (let's use this in place of Born Rule to just focus on the math of it and not the interpretations).

 

[PeterDonis]

when the apparatus has entangled with the environment causing decoherence. The mixed states don't form probabily densities that have large amplitude differences akin to the Gerlach experiment with only Up and Down branches?

I'm sorry, I don't understand what you're trying to say here or asking in the rest of your post. Decoherence just means that there is no interference between the different branches. It doesn't place any limitations on the relative probabilities of the different branches.

I also don't understand the distinction you're trying to draw between "system and apparatus" and "apparatus and environment". You seem to be using the Stern-Gerlach experiment as an example of "system and apparatus", as contrasted with "apparatus and environment"; but the way you detect the result of the Stern-Gerlach experiment is by seeing where a spot appears on the detector, which involves an "environment" since the detector has many degrees of freedom which are not kept track of.

 

[PeterDonis]

nobody has ever observed a hydrogen atom with an electron that has quantum numbers large enough for Bohr's argument to apply to them.

Actually, this isn't quite true:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rydberg_atom
But these cases are still rare, and require specially controlled methods to produce. They certainly are nothing like the states of ordinary atoms in macroscopic objects.

 

[jlcd]

I'm sorry, I don't understand what you're trying to say here or asking in the rest of your post. Decoherence just means that there is no interference between the different branches. It doesn't place any limitations on the relative probabilities of the different branches.

I also don't understand the distinction you're trying to draw between "system and apparatus" and "apparatus and environment". You seem to be using the Stern-Gerlach experiment as an example of "system and apparatus", as contrasted with "apparatus and environment"; but the way you detect the result of the Stern-Gerlach experiment is by seeing where a spot appears on the detector, which involves an "environment" since the detector has many degrees of freedom which are not kept track of.

For simple quantum system. I can understand how there can be say 15% probability, 60% probability, 25% probability (that equals 100%). But in decoherence. I can't think of a scenerio where there is 30% probability, 70% probability in the different branches. Can you give an example?

About the second paragraph. But if the Stern-Gerlach apparatus is also entangled with the environment. What produced the up and down when the apparatus is entangled in all sorts of ways with the environment. It should also produce Up-down-up states and all combinations. This is why I thought the apparatus is isolated from environmental decoherence.

 

[jlcd]

For simple quantum system. I can understand how there can be say 15% probability, 60% probability, 25% probability (that equals 100%). But in decoherence. I can't think of a scenerio where there is 30% probability, 70% probability in the different branches. Can you give an example?

About the second paragraph. But if the Stern-Gerlach apparatus is also entangled with the environment. What produced the up and down when the apparatus is entangled in all sorts of ways with the environment. It should also produce Up-down-up states and all combinations. This is why I thought the apparatus is isolated from environmental decoherence.

Here are more details of the latter.

In a controlled measurement in the lab, where we can write down the explicit Hamiltonian and its eigenstates of say the Stern-Gerlach apparatus for measuring spin. The basis up and down are clear.

However, in apparatus-environmental decoherence, we don't control the interaction between the apparatus and the environment that determines which states of the apparatus they are in.

So if the Stern-Gerlach experiment is exposed to the environment. Why doesn't it produce Up and Down basis ambiguity of the pointer states we commonly find in macroscopic apparatus environment decoherence?

 

[PeterDonis]

It should also produce Up-down-up states and all combinations.

No, that's what decoherence eliminates. You seem to have decoherence backwards. It doesn't cause interference between pointer states like "up" and "down". It eliminates it.

ambiguity of the pointer states we commonly find in macroscopic apparatus environment decoherence?

I have no idea what you're talking about here. Decoherence eliminates ambiguity of the pointer states.

 

[charters]

Can you please give example where the probability density of different position mixed states (apparatus-environement, not system-apparaturs where it is more obvious) have large differences to one another (like top of the wave function compare to near the zero axis?)

Take a well localized macroscopic object A and isolate it in a large vacuum chamber but where its center of mass is prepared in a very small finite region R, where the volume/extension of A >>> R. Now let A evolve freely for a trillion years. The center of mass wavefunction will now have spread to have, say, 99% probability of still being in R, 1% outside it. (I am ignoring issues with permanent tails, but the same point works for Newton-Wigner-esque effectively localized states). Now, pump the chamber full of air. The air will quickly decohere A such that it is now an improper mixture, weighted 99% in R and 1% outside R.

The same thing happens for realistic macro objects but instead of a trillion years, its only for the briefest of moments between collisions/photon absorbtions&emissions/any other decohering interactions, so you have even less spreading off the initial state, and possibly Zeno type suppression on top.

So if the Stern-Gerlach experiment is exposed to the environment. Why doesn't it produce Up and Down basis ambiguity of the pointer states we commonly find in macroscopic apparatus environment decoherence?

The preferred/stable basis for the SG device is essentially the position basis. The up/down basis of its spin measurement is the relative position of its exit ports, versus whatever filters you used to preselect your particle's spin axis. So, the SG's (stable against decoherence) position eigenstate fixes the basis for the spin measurement.

 

[PeterDonis]

The preferred/stable basis for the SG device is essentially the position basis.

No, actually it's the momentum basis; the SG magnetic field entangles the electron's momentum with its spin. The detector is what converts the momentum to a position (because where on the detector the spot appears depends on the direction in which the electron's momentum points when it exits the SG magnetic field).

 

[charters]

No, actually it's the momentum basis; the SG magnetic field entangles the electron's momentum with its spin. The detector is what converts the momentum to a position (because where on the detector the spot appears depends on the direction in which the electron's momentum points when it exits the SG magnetic field).

Isn't this what I said? By device I meant detector.

 

[jlcd]

No, that's what decoherence eliminates. You seem to have decoherence backwards. It doesn't cause interference between pointer states like "up" and "down". It eliminates it.
I have no idea what you're talking about here. Decoherence eliminates ambiguity of the pointer states.

I mean. Right now. In the case of the cat, we don't know what pick out the alive/dead basis as the one that is physically relevant. We don't know how the quantum interaction between the cat and its environment picks out the alive/dead basis as the one that gets decohered, so that all observers will agree that the cat is either alive (in one branch) or dead (in the other branch).

But in the case of spin up and down in the Stern Gerlach experiment. Why do we know how to do it?

 

[A. Neumaier]

Here I want to understand the behavior of wave function amplitudes in such apparatus-environment setup

The apparatus is usually described by a density matrix (as it is decohered by its environmnt). Thus no wave function picture applies.

But in decoherence. I can't think of a scenerio where there is 30% probability, 70% probability in the different branches. Can you give an example?

The reduced density matrix may have quite arbitrary diagonal entries; decoherence only let's the off-diagonal part decay to zero. Thus uou can easily have diagonal enties 0.7 and 0.3.

 

[PeterDonis]

By device I meant detector.

But you talked about the position basis being defined by the "exit ports", which would be exit ports of the magnetic field source, not the detector. You say it's the "relative position" of those ports, but really that's not the case; it's the orientation of the magnetic field. There don't even have to be "ports" in the apparatus: the magnetic field could be in empty space, and it would still entangle the electron's momentum with its spin and split one input beam into two output beams. None of this involves any decoherence or any selection of a preferred position basis; as I said, if there's a preferred basis after the electron-magnet interaction, it's momentum, not position, since that's what gets entangled with the spin.

 

[charters]

But you talked about the position basis being defined by the "exit ports", which would be exit ports of the magnetic field source, not the detector

I am just thinking of the whole SG as one piece, as in https://ds055uzetaobb.cloudfront.net/brioche/uploads/wPEXhoGgui-q2p2.svg?width=300

I wasn't dividing it into the "field source" and "detector", just treating it as one contraption.

There don't even have to be "ports" in the apparatus: the magnetic field could be in empty space, and it would still entangle the electron's momentum with its spin and split one input beam into two output beams

But this is part of the process is not even a decohering interaction anyway. You can still recombine the electron paths after the magnet, and they will interfere/unitarily restore the initial state. This portion of the SG is akin to the MZI after the beamsplitters, which is not decoherence either. There's no decoherence until the electron is detected at the exit ports or whatever you want to call them. So I don't see why we are talking about this. If there are no exit ports, there's no decoherence, and actually not even an experiment.

 

[PeterDonis]

am just thinking of the whole SG as one piece

If there are no exit ports, there's no decoherence

The detector is not "exit ports", it's a screen of some kind (in the original SG experiment it was photographic film) that shows spots when electrons (or whatever particles you're using; in the original SG experiment it was silver atoms with one unpaired electron) hit it. The screen has a large number of degrees of freedom that can't be kept track of, which is why it produces decoherence. Just exiting the magnetic field area, whether it's through "exit ports" or just traveling through empty space, does not, as you point out, decohere anything or even constitute a measurement.

 

[charters]

The detector is not "exit ports", it's a screen of some kind (in the original SG experiment it was photographic film) that shows spots when electrons (or whatever particles you're using; in the original SG experiment it was silver atoms with one unpaired electron) hit it. The screen has a large number of degrees of freedom that can't be kept track of, which is why it produces decoherence. Just exiting the magnetic field area, whether it's through "exit ports" or just traveling through empty space, does not, as you point out, decohere anything or even constitute a measurement.

Ok, when I said exit ports I was picturing them having two little screens that capture the electron like in the image I just linked, so I think we agree and this is just semantics. I can see what you mean from other images.

 

[jlcd]

Peterdonis. Neumaier and i sent replies at exactly the same time so you might have missed my reply. It happened to me. This is a question of vital import.

Right now. In the case of the cat, we don't know what pick out the alive/dead basis as the one that is physically relevant. We don't know how the quantum interaction between the cat and its environment picks out the alive/dead basis as the one that gets decohered, so that all observers will agree that the cat is either alive (in one branch) or dead (in the other branch). But in the case of spin up and down in the Stern Gerlach experiment. Why do we know how to do it?

 

[A. Neumaier]

In the case of the cat, we don't know what pick out the alive/dead basis as the one that is physically relevant [...] But in the case of spin up and down in the Stern Gerlach experiment. Why do we know how to do it?

In both cases, Nature picks and we describe the statistics of what it picks. Nobody knows how.

 

[PeterDonis]

We don't know how the quantum interaction between the cat and its environment picks out the alive/dead basis as the one that gets decohered

There doesn't even have to be any interaction between the cat and its environment; the cat is its own "environment". The cat, all by itself, has a huge number of degrees of freedom which will decohere each other. So the cat's own internal structure is what picks out the alive/dead basis. We can't write down in detail how that works because there are way too many degrees of freedom.

In fact, even stating the cat's "preferred basis" as alive/dead is misleading. The cat's state at the classical level, i.e., after decoherence, can be specified much more precisely than just "alive" or "dead", and whether it is in fact alive or dead is assessed based on observations of multiple pieces of information at the classical level. Otherwise nobody would have been able to tell whether a cat was alive or dead until QM was discovered. In other words, "alive" and "dead" are not really orthogonal quantum states of the cat; they're names for two disjoint subspaces of the set of classical cat states, where the classical state space has many more than two degrees of freedom (but many fewer than the quantum state space).

in the case of spin up and down in the Stern Gerlach experiment. Why do we know how to do it?

We only know how to do part of it for the SG experiment, because for that part of it the number of degrees of freedom is so small. The SG magnetic field entangles spin with momentum; it's easy to write down and easy to understand. But if you ask why the detector (photographic film or whatever) decoheres in the position basis, we don't have a good answer, because, just as with the cat above, the detector has way too many degrees of freedom and we can't write down in detail how it works.

 

[jlcd]

There doesn't even have to be any interaction between the cat and its environment; the cat is its own "environment". The cat, all by itself, has a huge number of degrees of freedom which will decohere each other. So the cat's own internal structure is what picks out the alive/dead basis. We can't write down in detail how that works because there are way too many degrees of freedom.

In fact, even stating the cat's "preferred basis" as alive/dead is misleading. The cat's state at the classical level, i.e., after decoherence, can be specified much more precisely than just "alive" or "dead", and whether it is in fact alive or dead is assessed based on observations of multiple pieces of information at the classical level. Otherwise nobody would have been able to tell whether a cat was alive or dead until QM was discovered. In other words, "alive" and "dead" are not really orthogonal quantum states of the cat; they're names for two disjoint subspaces of the set of classical cat states, where the classical state space has many more than two degrees of freedom (but many fewer than the quantum state space).
We only know how to do part of it for the SG experiment, because for that part of it the number of degrees of freedom is so small. The SG magnetic field entangles spin with momentum; it's easy to write down and easy to understand. But if you ask why the detector (photographic film or whatever) decoheres in the position basis, we don't have a good answer, because, just as with the cat above, the detector has way too many degrees of freedom and we can't write down in detail how it works.

But if you express|LIVE⟩ and |DEAD⟩ as products of a state of the cat ("live" or "dead") and a state of the cat's environment ("observed to be live, etc." or "observed to be dead, etc."). So now the state of the overall system is a sum of products of states of two subsystems, i.e., an entangled state.
But those definitions depend on being able to separate the system into the two disjoint subsystems "cat" and "cat's environment". That is what we don't know how to do in the general case using just the information in the overall system's wave function.

By the arguements above. Isn't "alive" and "dead" really orthogonal quantum states of the cat. And not as you described "they're names for two disjoint subspaces of the set of classical cat states, where the classical state space has many more than two degrees of freedom (but many fewer than the quantum state space)."

Or is the truth we really don't know if alive and dead are orthogonal quantum states of the cat or classical state space due to lack of information?

 

[PeterDonis]

if you express|LIVE⟩ and |DEAD⟩ as products of a state of the cat ("live" or "dead") and a state of the cat's environment ("observed to be live, etc." or "observed to be dead, etc."). So now the state of the overall system is a sum of products of states of two subsystems, i.e., an entangled state.

You don't even need the environment; that's the point. The cat has so many degrees of freedom all by itself, which can't possibly remain coherent with each other, that the cat states "alive" and "dead" are already decohered. Or, to put it another way, the parts of the cat are already entangled with each other in a way that separates the "alive" and "dead" states--each of them is really one of two terms in an incredibly complicated entangled state involving all of the cat's degrees of freedom.

And given all that, any extra entanglement with degrees of freedom in an "environment" outside the cat is trivial, and thinking of the cat as only being decohered into "alive" or "dead" states by becoming entangled with an "environment" outside the cat is wrong. All of the decoherence has already happened long before any degrees of freedom outside the cat become involved.

those definitions depend on being able to separate the system into the two disjoint subsystems "cat" and "cat's environment".

Yes, that's true.

That is what we don't know how to do in the general case using just the information in the overall system's wave function.

Yes, that's true in the general case. But I think it's quite possible that in any special case of actual practical interest--like a cat or a human or even a table or a rock--separating out the objects of interest as systems can be done to a good enough approximation. The cases where the split is not sufficiently clear might just be edge cases that don't need to be dealt with in practice.

Isn't "alive" and "dead" really orthogonal quantum states of the cat.

No. They are orthogonal subspaces of the state space of the cat, as I said. Neither one is a single state or anything close to it, since the cat has so many degrees of freedom that there are a huge number of microstates it can have that are equivalent from the standpoint of it being alive or dead.

Or is the truth we really don't know if alive and dead are orthogonal quantum states of the cat or classical state space due to lack of information?

The "classical state space" is just a coarse-graining of the quantum state space--basically you ignore interference between decohered alternatives. It's not something separate. So the distinction you are trying to make here doesn't really exist.

 

[jlcd]

You don't even need the environment; that's the point. The cat has so many degrees of freedom all by itself, which can't possibly remain coherent with each other, that the cat states "alive" and "dead" are already decohered. Or, to put it another way, the parts of the cat are already entangled with each other in a way that separates the "alive" and "dead" states--each of them is really one of two terms in an incredibly complicated entangled state involving all of the cat's degrees of freedom.

But the argument is still valid even if the cat is its own environment. If |psi> is all there is. What created or produced the cat own decoherence in the first place? This was my context.

And given all that, any extra entanglement with degrees of freedom in an "environment" outside the cat is trivial, and thinking of the cat as only being decohered into "alive" or "dead" states by becoming entangled with an "environment" outside the cat is wrong. All of the decoherence has already happened long before any degrees of freedom outside the cat become involved.
Yes, that's true.
Yes, that's true in the general case. But I think it's quite possible that in any special case of actual practical interest--like a cat or a human or even a table or a rock--separating out the objects of interest as systems can be done to a good enough approximation. The cases where the split is not sufficiently clear might just be edge cases that don't need to be dealt with in practice.
No. They are orthogonal subspaces of the state space of the cat, as I said. Neither one is a single state or anything close to it, since the cat has so many degrees of freedom that there are a huge number of microstates it can have that are equivalent from the standpoint of it being alive or dead.
The "classical state space" is just a coarse-graining of the quantum state space--basically you ignore interference between decohered alternatives. It's not something separate. So the distinction you are trying to make here doesn't really exist.

 

[PeterDonis]

If |psi> is all there is. What created or produced the cat own decoherence in the first place?

This is still an open question. But it's just as much of an open question for the SG experiment as for a cat, because we can't observe the result of an SG experiment without a detector, and the detector raises all of the same questions.

 

[jlcd]

This is still an open question. But it's just as much of an open question for the SG experiment as for a cat, because we can't observe the result of an SG experiment without a detector, and the detector raises all of the same questions.

In this argument that |psi> is all there is. Is the dead and alive the orthogonal subspaces of the classical state space of the cat, or quantum states of the cat?

 

[PeterDonis]

In this argument that |psi> is all there is. Is the dead and alive the orthogonal subspaces of the classical state space of the cat, or quantum states of the cat?

There is only one state space, the quantum state space. Dead and alive are orthogonal subspaces of it. The "classical state space", as I said, is just a coarse-graining of the quantum state space; "dead" and "alive" would belong to different classical states, i.e., different sets of quantum states in the coarse-graining.

 

[jlcd]

There is only one state space, the quantum state space. Dead and alive are orthogonal subspaces of it. The "classical state space", as I said, is just a coarse-graining of the quantum state space; "dead" and "alive" would belong to different classical states, i.e., different sets of quantum states in the coarse-graining.

Oh. So the mere fact there is even a cat means |psi> is not all there is. Fine.

Say, Is it possible to mention in for example a book or article that quantum mechanics is about the |psi> and it's still a great mystery how the position, energy basis even existed? Like I want to not mention the entire Copenhagen interpretation at all .. which is simply accepting there is result and doesn't even offer a mechanism and telling the generations to just "shut up and calculate". Or explaining one has alternative way to think of the quantum without Copenhagen interpretation?

I will mention the math and state "then the wand is waved and the position, momentum, spin basis appeared"? This is a good alternative way to present the quantum without mentioning Copenhagen right? Just theoretically asking. Of course serious students will be introduced to all. But just asking if it can be presented the way I described above?

 

[PeterDonis]

the mere fact there is even a cat means |psi> is not all there is.

I'm not sure how you're reaching that conclusion. Nothing I have said picks out any particular interpretation of QM; it is all consistent with, for example, the MWI, which says that psi is all there is. (Well, strictly speaking, psi plus the Hilbert space plus the Hamiltonian, which determines the time evolution of psi.) Unless I'm misunderstanding what you mean by "psi is all there is".

But just asking if it can be presented the way I described above?

I would not undertake to write a book or article at all on this subject without spending a lot of time reading the literature--textbooks and peer-reviewed papers--making sure to cover as wide a selection as possible in order to get presentations of many different QM interpretations. Once you've taken the time to do that, you will be able to make up your own mind about presentation.

 

[jlcd]

I'm not sure how you're reaching that conclusion. Nothing I have said picks out any particular interpretation of QM; it is all consistent with, for example, the MWI, which says that psi is all there is. (Well, strictly speaking, psi plus the Hilbert space plus the Hamiltonian, which determines the time evolution of psi.) Unless I'm misunderstanding what you mean by "psi is all there is".

Oh, i just referring to the nothing happens in many worlds thread. I understood it.

I would not undertake to write a book or article at all on this subject without spending a lot of time reading the literature--textbooks and peer-reviewed papers--making sure to cover as wide a selection as possible in order to get presentations of many different QM interpretations. Once you've taken the time to do that, you will be able to make up your own mind about presentation.

I spent a lot of time reading the literature - textbooks and peer-reviewed papers and wil do so for decades to come. I have some query with regards to Zurek's paper

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.5206.pdf
"Repeatability leads to branch-like states, Eq. (13), suggesting Everettian ‘relative states’ [19]. There is no need to attribute reality to all the branches. Quantum states are part information. As we have seen, objective reality is an emergent property. Unobserved branches can be regarded as events potentially consistent with the initially available information that did not happen. Information we gather can be used to advantage—it can lead to actions conditioned on measurement outcomes [5]."

Some anti-realists believe that the properties we ascribe to atoms and elementary particles are not inherent in those objects, but are created only by our interactions with them, and exist only at the time when we measure them.

While realists believe that matter have a stable set of properties in and of itself, without regard to our perceptions and knowledge.

In Zurek's view that the quantum states are part information and "There is no need to attribute reality to all the branches". Is it anti-realist or realist viewpoints? What do you think?

 

[PeterDonis]

Is it anti-realist or realist viewpoints?

I'm not sure. Zurek's position seems to me to be a mixture of pointing out particular aspects of the basic math of QM, which are independent of any particular interpretation, and trying to construct a new interpretation of QM.

Personally, I don't think "realist" or "anti-realist" are very useful terms, because they don't have precise definitions and their function in discussions ends up being nothing more than labels for the two sides.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Some anti-realists believe that the properties we ascribe to atoms and elementary particles are not inherent in those objects, but are created only by our interactions with them, and exist only at the time when we measure them.

While realists believe that matter have a stable set of properties in and of itself, without regard to our perceptions and knowledge.

Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science are merely different approaches regarding the meaning of physical theories. As Massimo Pigliucci puts it on http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2012/08/surprise-naturalistic-metaphysics.html:

“To put it very briefly, a realist is someone who thinks that scientific theories aim at describing the world as it is (of course, within the limits of human epistemic access to reality), while an anti-realist is someone who takes scientific theories to aim at empirical adequacy, not truth. So, for instance, for a realist there truly are electrons out there, while for an anti-realist “electrons” are a convenient theoretical construct to make sense of certain kinds of data from fundamental physics, but the term need not refer to actual “particles.” It goes without saying that most scientists are realists, but not all. Interestingly, some physicists working on quantum mechanics belong to what is informally known as the “shut up and calculate” school, which eschews “interpretations” of quantum mechanics in favor of a pragmatic deployment of the theory to solve computational problems.”

 

[jlcd]

I'm not sure. Zurek's position seems to me to be a mixture of pointing out particular aspects of the basic math of QM, which are independent of any particular interpretation, and trying to construct a new interpretation of QM.

Personally, I don't think "realist" or "anti-realist" are very useful terms, because they don't have precise definitions and their function in discussions ends up being nothing more than labels for the two sides.

Now to connect classicality, correspondence principle and decoherence. The latter says macroscopic superposition is not possible due to decoherence, the correspondence principle is classical physics is restored for large quantum numbers or degrees of freedom.

But is the above a solid rule or can be written in a formal proof or theorem that say the human body being macroscopic doesn't have quantum effects?

However what would happen if quantum mechanics or even QFT is just emergent. Then the formal proof instantly vaporized?

It's like the von Neumann impossible proof of No Hidden Variables that Bohm challenged.

 

[PeterDonis]

is the above a solid rule or can be written in a formal proof or theorem that say the human body being macroscopic doesn't have quantum effects?

No. Nobody has any formal proofs or theorems that show this.

 

[jlcd]

No. Nobody has any formal proofs or theorems that show this.

All look at any coherence but because decoherent time scale is so fast. Biology is said to be ruled by classical mechanics. Maybe the fact decoherent time is so fast as computed is the formal proof itself? Why can't it be made a theorem?

Do you know of other mechanisms they explore for any quantum effects?

About the predictibility sieve where the hilbert space is sorted for pointer states that are most classical. It can't help too because at the end of the day we were dealing with only one pointer state or branch for our classical object. Right?

I'm exploring beyond Zurek. Do you know (or anyone else) who are other good researchers like Zurek besides Smolin researching the same lines in quantum foundations and has good results?

 

[jlcd]

I'm not sure. Zurek's position seems to me to be a mixture of pointing out particular aspects of the basic math of QM, which are independent of any particular interpretation, and trying to construct a new interpretation of QM.

Just a clarification about the pointer states. When one pointer state of the cat classicality was chosen (by the predictivity sieve which sorts the hilbert space for the most classical state). How long the pointer state remains that way before it reprepares again? Or is the pointer state permanent? Remember Decoherence doesn't choose one of the outcomes. So how the outcome of one of the pointer states was chosen depends on interpretation. But speaking of the math. Collapse or being in eigenstate doesn't mean it remains that way forever. It can reprepare. So how long before the pointer state of the cat reprepares? In micro seconds? or 1 sec?

 

[PeterDonis]

How long the pointer state remains that way before it reprepares again? Or is the pointer state permanent?

If the pointer state is "cat alive", it will stay that way until the cat dies. If the pointer state is "cat dead", as far as we know, that's permanent.

Of course, this just reflects the fact that "cat alive"and "cat dead" are not single quantum states of the cat; they are huge subspaces of the cat's state space. This will be true for any "pointer state" since any such state will involve a macroscopic object and any macroscopically distinguishable state of a macroscopic object (which is pretty much what "pointer state" means) will be some subspace of the object's full state space that contains a huge number of microstates. And the pointer states behave classically to a very, very good approximation, so the way to answer your question is to look at classical-type dynamics of typical macroscopic objects. And such objects don't "re-prepare" themselves.

 

[jlcd]

If the pointer state is "cat alive", it will stay that way until the cat dies. If the pointer state is "cat dead", as far as we know, that's permanent.

Of course, this just reflects the fact that "cat alive"and "cat dead" are not single quantum states of the cat; they are huge subspaces of the cat's state space. This will be true for any "pointer state" since any such state will involve a macroscopic object and any macroscopically distinguishable state of a macroscopic object (which is pretty much what "pointer state" means) will be some subspace of the object's full state space that contains a huge number of microstates. And the pointer states behave classically to a very, very good approximation, so the way to answer your question is to look at classical-type dynamics of typical macroscopic objects. And such objects don't "re-prepare" themselves.

Let's distinguish between microscopic and macroscopic cat-states. Macroscopic cat-states are in principle pointer states, however, they describe a higher level of organisation than the pointer-states of individual cat cells or dna or even lower levels.

So if the microstates (micro pointer states) can be influenced. It can affect the microstates (the main pointer state)?

It may not be possible to raise the dead cat because the microstates were already so altered. But for an alive cat. Different microstates can be realized that can affect the macro pointer state, right?

So seconds by seconds, the macro pointer state can be altered by different possibiities or outcome in the cat microstates pointer states causing sick cat, healthy cat, etc, right?

 

[SFXMan]

It may not be possible to raise the dead cat because the microstates were already so altered. But for an alive cat. Different microstates can be realized that can affect the macro pointer state, right?

Insofar as the quantum time-evolution of the microstate is a more complete description than the approximately classical time-evolution of the macrostate, yes.

 

[PeterDonis]

Let's distinguish between microscopic and macroscopic cat-states.

That's not the right distinction. The right distinction is between individual microstates of the cat, which we can't possibly measure since there are way too many degrees of freedom, and huge sets of microstates that all have certain macroscopic properties in common (for example, the macroscopic property that the cat is alive). The sets of microstates are what we have been calling "macroscopic cat states" or "pointer states".

So if the microstates (micro pointer states) can be influenced.

There is no such thing as "micro pointer states". Pointer states (which is really a misnomer, these are huge sets of states, not single states) are macroscopically distinguishable.

It can affect the microstates (the main pointer state)?

You mean affect the macrostates. The vast majority of changes in the microstate do not change the main pointer state, because they don't change whether the cat is alive or dead. Only a very, very small fraction of changes in the microstate will change whether the cat is alive or dead and thereby change the main pointer state.

It may not be possible to raise the dead cat because the microstates were already so altered. But for an alive cat. Different microstates can be realized that can affect the macro pointer state, right?

What I said just above is true regardless of whether the cat is currently alive or dead. From the standpoint of the microstate and its time evolution there is no difference between these two main pointer states. The fact that we don't know how to raise dead cats whereas we do know how to kill live cats is not because it's "easier" for a microstate to evolve one way vs. the other. It's just due to our vast ignorance about the details of how cats and other living things actually work.

 

[jlcd]

That's not the right distinction. The right distinction is between individual microstates of the cat, which we can't possibly measure since there are way too many degrees of freedom, and huge sets of microstates that all have certain macroscopic properties in common (for example, the macroscopic property that the cat is alive). The sets of microstates are what we have been calling "macroscopic cat states" or "pointer states".
There is no such thing as "micro pointer states". Pointer states (which is really a misnomer, these are huge sets of states, not single states) are macroscopically distinguishable.
You mean affect the macrostates. The vast majority of changes in the microstate do not change the main pointer state, because they don't change whether the cat is alive or dead. Only a very, very small fraction of changes in the microstate will change whether the cat is alive or dead and thereby change the main pointer state.
What I said just above is true regardless of whether the cat is currently alive or dead. From the standpoint of the microstate and its time evolution there is no difference between these two main pointer states. The fact that we don't know how to raise dead cats whereas we do know how to kill live cats is not because it's "easier" for a microstate to evolve one way vs. the other. It's just due to our vast ignorance about the details of how cats and other living things actually work.

I wrote: "If |psi> is all there is. What created or produced the cat own decoherence in the first place?" Your reply was:

This is still an open question. But it's just as much of an open question for the SG experiment as for a cat, because we can't observe the result of an SG experiment without a detector, and the detector raises all of the same questions.

In this paper https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0509174.pdf

Concept for predictability sieves and pointer states were used for simple systems such as an underdamped harmonic oscillator, for which coherent states are unanimously chosen by all criteria, and a free particle undergoing quantum Brownian motion.

The environment-induced super selection (einselection) are quantified using four different criteria:

1. predictability sieve (which selects states that produce least entropy),
2. purification time (which looks for states that are the easiest to find out from the imprint they leave on the environment),
3. efficiency threshold (which finds states that can be deduced from measurements on a smallest fraction of the environment), and
4. purity loss time (that looks for states for which it takes the longest to lose a set fraction of their initial purity)

These are only used for pure quantum systems and not the cat. The reason is i think because the cat has already decohered. Now for sake of discussion. If |psi> is all there is (in second type of MWI interpretation where there are no inherent position basis). And the cat has no inherent positions.. meaning it doesn't reflect light.. has no shape. Not yet decohered. This "inherent cat" state vector can have the predictability sieves, purification time applied to it? Or even with intact cat with position basis, the predictability sieves can likewise apply to it? Zurek only not using it because of the complexity of cat, hence using just simple example of underdamped harmonic oscillator or free particle undergoing quantum Brownian motion?

 

[PeterDonis]

the cat has no inherent positions.. meaning it doesn't reflect light.. has no shape. Not yet decohered.

A cat that has not yet decohered is an impossibility in any practical sense. A cat has so many degrees of freedom that there is no way to keep it from decohering on a timescale much, much shorter than any timescale we can work with in experiments now or in the foreseeable future.

What that means is that we have no experimental basis for assuming that we can model something like a cat using a non-decohered pure quantum state at all. It could be that, on a short enough time scale, we can model cats that way, and if we were ever able to do, say, a double slit experiment on a time scale of $10^{-40}$ seconds or something like that, we might be able to see quantum interference effects in a cat. Or it could be that, long before we get to that short a time scale, we find that there is other physics coming into play--for example, a time scale that short corresponds to an energy per particle close to the Planck scale, which means that quantum gravity effects might be significant, and might completely change the dynamics on that scale.

Or even with intact cat with position basis, the predictability sieves can likewise apply to it?

I am not familiar enough with Zurek's argument to say whether it could be applied to a real, decohered cat. Given the examples he uses, it certainly doesn't seem like anyone has tried to do so.