Undergrad Confused by nonlocal models and relativity

[bhobba]

but given that the most interesting (namely all realistic and causal) interpretations depend on the forbidden interpretation of relativity, this is nothing but a quite naive hope.

That's wrong. There are all sorts of interpretations about eg Primary State Diffusion:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9508021.pdf
To be fair though that one may have been experimentally disproved.

BTW I know of no interpretation that requires LET. I do know some people think DBB may require a preferred frame - but LET is more than that.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

Except that if gravity is considered, we have no such things as inertial frames and they survive only as local approximations. So, given the empirical evidence for GR, SR has already been found incorrect.

Whats your point? Notice I said 'The physics lies in the many experiments that show, to a high degree of accuracy, such frames exist.' They exist to very good approximation when gravity is weak. That would be on the Earth where it takes very sensitive equipment to show its not inertial. I saw an experiment where a clock was lifted a foot and it showed a difference when returned - but that was not a normal clock. For most purposes the Earth is inertial as has been demonstrated many times.

Thanks
Bill

 

[Elias1960]

Whats your point?

Showing the inaccuracies in your text. Conceptually, given that the theory that inertial frames exist is already falsified, it does not make much sense to use this existence as a base for derivations.

That's wrong. There are all sorts of interpretations about eg Primary State Diffusion:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9508021.pdf

Whatever, once I use "realistic" in the way of EPR and "causal" as containing Reichenbach's principle of common cause and no causal loops it is proven that interpretations which are realistic or causal but have no preferred frame cannot recover QM predictions.

BTW I know of no interpretation that requires LET. I do know some people think DBB may require a preferred frame - but LET is more than that.

The "more than that" part is uninteresting. But, ok, that means that I'm free to discuss theories with preferred frames, and following some other post to say "aether" is not forbidden too, but saying "LET" is forbidden? Why such hatred against one of the greatest scientists?

LET is an established modern interpretation?

Given your criteria of modernity, which names aspects of the Erlangen program of 1872 modern, certainly.

It has been well and truly superseded. It is on topic to discuss the history of why that is but these days to put it mildly it is very backwater.

Why do you provoke discussions which would be illegal here making false claims which cannot be questioned? If it is only allowed to discuss LET (or the preferred frame, which is that really matters) historically, this would exclude the consequences of Bell's theorem, as well as published generalizations of the anathema to gravity and the SM.

However, the reason, history wise, should be obvious - we have a justification in SR that requires no interpretation - it's simply a consequence of very well verified symmetries.

No, the historical reason is much more trivial, namely that nobody has extended to Lorentz ether to gravity at that time. A legitimate reason, except that it vanishes into thin air once such a generalization appears.

These symmetries determine the geometry of space-time.

That these symmetries are also the symmetries of that construction named "space-time" is fine, but nothing follows from this without interpretation. The symmetry is also simply the symmetry of the wave equation. You can use it to construct new, Doppler-shifted solutions out of a given solution of the wave equation. This works for sound waves too, using the speed of sound instead of c. Thus, the same symmetry group plays some (however minor) role in completely different physical situations too. To claim that something follows from the symmetry group alone makes no sense.

Its like asking what is the interpretation of Euclidean Geometry - there is no interpretation. Its just a consequence of Euclid's axioms that may be true or false.

Euclidean symmetry requires interpretation too. The GR interpretation - that it is simply an approximate symmetry applicable locally, for small speeds, and if the rulers are not too much distorted by gravity - certainly differs from Kant's interpretation as a necessity of thought.

 

[PeterDonis]

If it is only allowed to discuss LET (or the preferred frame, which is that really matters) historically, this would exclude the consequences of Bell's theorem

Huh? Bell's theorem says nothing about a preferred frame.

 

[Elias1960]

Huh? Bell's theorem says nothing about a preferred frame.

The choice left by Bell's theorem is between giving up realism (EPR criterion of reality) as well as causality (Reichenbach's principle of common cause), or accepting a preferred frame.

 

[PeterDonis]

The choice left by Bell's theorem is between giving up realism (EPR criterion of reality) as well as causality (Reichenbach's principle of common cause), or accepting a preferred frame.

Again, huh? Bell's theorem says nothing about a preferred frame. I have no idea where you are getting this from.

 

[atyy]

Huh? Bell's theorem says nothing about a preferred frame.

The choice left by Bell's theorem is between giving up realism (EPR criterion of reality) as well as causality (Reichenbach's principle of common cause), or accepting a preferred frame.

To say that Bell's theorem plus quantum mechanics implies a choice between realism, causality and a preferred frame is taking an additional step, which is reasonable but not strictly justified. In the final part of this discussion by Bell, it seems that violation of a Bell inequality does not exclude a Lorentz covariant theory (no preferred frame) that is nonlocal (due to violation of the Bell inequalities): https://m.tau.ac.il/~quantum/Vaidman/IQM/BellAM.pdf

An example of an attempt to construct a nonlocal Lorentz covariant hidden variable theory is https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.1425

Of course, as Bell himself proposed (building on earlier work), it may be possible to construct hidden variables consistent with standard relativistic quantum field theory, in which the hidden variable theory does have a preferred frame: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/bell/Beables_for_QFT.pdf

Furthermore, whether orthodox relativistic quantum field theory with collapse has a preferred frame or not is a matter of definition: https://arxiv.org/abs/0706.1232"1. Collapse cannot be described covariantly in a relativistic theory at the level of the state-description, only at the level of probabilities. This thereby precludes progress on questions such as “Why God plays dice.”

2. As first pointed out by Bell [48, 47, 9], Lorentz-covariance in the state-description can be preserved in a theory like TSQM [32] (§2.4). In addition, we believe it to be the most fruitful approach to probe deeper quantum realities beyond probabilities, thereby providing insight toquestions like “Why God plays dice.”"

 

[vanhees71]

The choice left by Bell's theorem is between giving up realism (EPR criterion of reality) as well as causality (Reichenbach's principle of common cause), or accepting a preferred frame.

The other choice is to simply accept standard relativistic QFT, which is Poincare invariant and causal though, as any QT, indeterministic. There's by construction no need for any preferred frame. Preferred frames come into the game only when having many-body systems, e.g., in thermal equilibrium, but even this case can be formulated in Poincare-invariant form. The only thing that appears are frames preferred by the physical situation, the local rest frame of the "heat bath".

 

[DarMM]

The other choice is to simply accept standard relativistic QFT, which is Poincare invariant and causal though, as any QT, indeterministic. There's by construction no need for any preferred frame. Preferred frames come into the game only when having many-body systems, e.g., in thermal equilibrium, but even this case can be formulated in Poincare-invariant form. The only thing that appears are frames preferred by the physical situation, the local rest frame of the "heat bath".

QFT is microcausal and Poincaré covariant, but it doesn't obey EPR realism and Decorrelating explanations (a part of Reichenbach's common cause principle).

The first is nothing more than what is implied by the Kochen-Specker theorem (i.e. no values pre-exist the measurement/the measurement creates values) and the latter is just the multiple sample spaces point we've spoken of before.

 

[Elias1960]

Again, huh? Bell's theorem says nothing about a preferred frame. I have no idea where you are getting this from.

If you have between two events A and B there is a violation of the Bell inequalities, but assume EPR realism or Reichenbach's common cause, then there are only two explanations for such a correlation: Either $A\to B$ (the decision what to measure at A has causally influenced the outcome at B), or, reverse, $B \to A$.

QT predicts the possibility of violations of Bell inequalities for every pair of events. If we assume causality without causal loops, then there cannot be both $A\to B$ and $B \to A$, but one has to be. But this allows to define a preferred contemporaneity. The event contemporary to A is the event on the worldline B(t) where $B(t) \to A$ switches to $A\to B(t)$.

It is, of course, hidden, because we don't know if $A\to B$ or $B \to A$ is true.

 

[vanhees71]

QFT is microcausal and Poincaré covariant, but it doesn't obey EPR realism and Decorrelating explanations (a part of Reichenbach's common cause principle).

The first is nothing more than what is implied by the Kochen-Specker theorem (i.e. no values pre-exist the measurement/the measurement creates values) and the latter is just the multiple sample spaces point we've spoken of before.

But isn't EPR realism ruled out by the results of the Bell tests? The ironic point is that EPR realism isn't realistic at all, but Q(F)T is!

 

[Heikki Tuuri]

I recall @Demystifier saying that one can extend the Bohm model to relativistic theories.

Since quantum mechanics is a wave phenomenon, and we need to know the entire wave function to do calculations, a local realistic theory which just has N particles at sharply defined positions and velocities is hopeless. Newtonian mechanics is not a wave, and there local realism is successful.

 

[Elias1960]

But isn't EPR realism ruled out by the results of the Bell tests? The ironic point is that EPR realism isn't realistic at all, but Q(F)T is!

QFT does not even claim to define an ontology, thus, is certainly not realistic.

And EPR realism is, of course, not ruled out. Only together with Einstein causality. The idea to reject EPR realism is, of course, quite natural for all those who think questioning Einstein causality is anathema. They prefer giving up realism as well as causality itself (reducing Einstein causality to signal causality) to prevent a preferred frame.

The reference for relativistic Bohmian field theory is

Bohm.D., Hiley, B.J., Kaloyerou, P.N. (1987). An ontological basis for the quantum theory, Phys. Reports 144(6), 321-375

In fact, the Bohmian version of QED was already part of Bohm's original paper.

 

[DarMM]

But isn't EPR realism ruled out by the results of the Bell tests? The ironic point is that EPR realism isn't realistic at all, but Q(F)T is!

Yes it is ruled out. This is part of why I wish "real" wasn't in the name of these things, because as you're essentially saying then we end up saying the most accurate theory we have is "not real" or some nonsense like that.

EPR realism should be "device independent certain value attribution" or something.

 

[bhobba]

Good old EPR again. The theorem is of course true but what you think it is telling us is 'discussed' a lot. I agree with Vanhee's - its rather difficult to accommodate the usual views with QFT - such is even suggested by one of its founding principles - the Cluster Decomposition Property (it is unnatural to apply it to correlated systems ):
https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/cluster-decomposition-in-qft.547574/
I do not strictly think its actually impossible but I have no idea how you would do it. I simply take it at face value - QM is a Generalized Probability theory so it is not surprising it has probabilistic features different than standard probability theory. I think it simply shows in QM correlations have different statistical properties than ordinary probability theory and leave it at that. But I do strongly object to people saying it shows QM is non-local. It 100% for sure does not.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

This is part of why I wish "real" wasn't in the name of these things, because as you're essentially saying then we end up saying the most accurate theory we have is "not real" or some nonsense like that.

I think I may have posted Wienberg's paper before in this thread but in case I haven't here it is again:
https://www.physics.utah.edu/~detar/phys4910/readings/fundamentals/weinberg.html
Here is the part I want to highlight:
'I remarked in a recent article in The New York Review of Books that for me as a physicist the laws of nature are real in the same sense (whatever that is) as the rocks on the ground. A few months after the publication of my article I was attacked for this remark by Richard Rorty. He accused me of thinking that as a physicist I can easily clear up questions about reality and truth that have engaged philosophers for millennia. But that is not my position. I know that it is terribly hard to say precisely what we mean when we use words like "real" and "true." That is why, when I said that the laws of nature and the rocks on the ground are real in the same sense, I added in parentheses "whatever that is." I respect the efforts of philosophers to clarify these concepts, but I'm sure that even Kuhn and Rorty have used words like "truth" and "reality" in everyday life, and had no trouble with them. I don't see any reason why we cannot also use them in some of our statements about the history of science. Certainly philosophers can do us a great service in their attempts to clarify what we mean by truth and reality. But for Kuhn to say that as a philosopher he has trouble understanding what is meant by truth or reality proves nothing beyond the fact that he has trouble understanding what is meant by truth or reality.'

It is strange that we have no problem about using concepts like truth and reality in everyday language - even those deeply involved with trying to figure out what they mean do it. But scientists also use it in the way everyday language does. Occasionally they are careful about using it, but for the most part do not worry about it. Science has made enormous progress doing this. Perhaps not worrying too much about it is the better strategy. Some things just seem so fundamental precisely pinning them down may be impossible and perhaps not leading anywhere.

Technically counterfactual definiteness is the right term to use in discussions about EPR, but if you use real does it matter that much? It seems to me to be just a way of fobbing off those concerned about such terms, which IMHO shouldn't really be worried about by scientists anyway. That said when people challenge me on things like that I sometimes resort to counterfactual definiteness type answers.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

QFT does not even claim to define an ontology, thus, is certainly not realistic.

I think the author of the bible on QFT, Weinberg, might not agree with you on that.

Personally I think it is similar to the discussions on if the quantum state is real or not. This is related to similar discussions on is probability real or not. Those that use probability, such as Actuaries, simply accept the Kolmogorov Axioms and human beings using abstraction can connect them to actual applications. Its a view you will find in more detail in the beginning pages of Fellers classic on probability. But then again we have rigorous probability theory that simply looks at what the axioms imply. Its like Euclidean Geometry - it speaks of lines, points etc, but how do we know what a line or a point is when we see it. Students proving geometric theorems seem to have no problem. I think its all simply part of a humans ability to abstract away inessentials in applying a theory. Using that view I think such issues are rather meaningless.

Thanks
Bill

 

[Elias1960]

Technically counterfactual definiteness is the right term to use in discussions about EPR,

No. Counterfactual definiteness only follows from EPR realism taken together with Einstein causality. Without Einstein causality, you have no base assuming that there is no causal influence of the choice of measurement at A on the situation in B. But the absense of such influences is a precondition which is explicit in the EPR criterion.

It is strange that we have no problem about using concepts like truth and reality in everyday language - even those deeply involved with trying to figure out what they mean do it. But scientists also use it in the way everyday language does. Occasionally they are careful about using it, but for the most part do not worry about it. Science has made enormous progress doing this.

In particular, it is worth not to worry about what philosophers like Rorty who are deeply confused about theories of truth think. The standard common-sense theory of truth - correspondence with reality - is fine for science, except for those who propose to reject realism.

I simply take it at face value - QM is a Generalized Probability theory so it is not surprising it has probabilistic features different than standard probability theory. I think it simply shows in QM correlations have different statistical properties than ordinary probability theory and leave it at that. But I do strongly object to people saying it shows QM is non-local. It 100% for sure does not.

To repeat myself: In the objective Bayesian interpretation, the rules of probability theory are simply rules of consistent logical thinking in a situation where we have insufficient information. Probability is simply part of logic, the logic of plausible reasoning. Such laws of reasoning are the base for evaluating scientific theories, thus, they have to hold in scientific theories, and if they don't, the theory should be rejected as logically inconsistent.

So, whenever you hear that the rules of classical probability do not hold in quantum theory, you follow a logically inconsistent interpretation of quantum theory. There is no "quantum logic", and there is also no "quantum logic of plausible reasoning". There is only logically inconsistent confusion. This may be a misinterpretation of some different mathematical structures describing something completely different. This may be a confusion of the meaning of words in common language used to formulate logical claims. Whatever it is, it is not a new logic. Logic is what we use to think about nature, it is not an empirical theory which could be falsified by some experiment, but is what we have to use to find out that some experiment really falsifies a theory.

If quantum theory would be really in conflict with the logic of plausible reasoning, it should be simply rejected as logically inconsistent. It isn't. Interpretations that have no conflict with classical logic and probability theory, as well as with classical realism and classical causality, exist so that there is no such internal inconsistency of QT or QFT.

But nothing prevents interpretations of QT as well as of QFT from being logically inconsistent. Peer-review does no longer help, given that there are a lot of publications about not even well-formulated interpretations like many worlds.

 

[DarMM]

Technically counterfactual definiteness is the right term to use in discussions about EPR, but if you use real does it matter that much? It seems to me to be just a way of fobbing off those concerned about such terms, which IMHO shouldn't really be worried about by scientists anyway. That said when people challenge me on things like that I sometimes resort to counterfactual definiteness type answers

Counterfactual definiteness is strictly weaker than EPR realism. This is part of the difference between EPR realism and KS noncontextuality, the former being the stronger assumption.

My dislike for the use of "real" is nothing to do with a reluctance to use it with QM, it's literally the exact opposite. It's because when we say we reject "realism" it makes it sound as if we are rejecting QM being "real" in the everyday sense of the word rather than the highly technical sense meant by EPR realism.

The reason I wished it was called something else is because I want to use "real" for QM. As I said above:

because as you're essentially saying then we end up saying the most accurate theory we have is "not real" or some nonsense like that

 

[martinbn]

QFT does not even claim to define an ontology, thus, is certainly not realistic.

And EPR realism is, of course, not ruled out. Only together with Einstein causality. The idea to reject EPR realism is, of course, quite natural for all those who think questioning Einstein causality is anathema. They prefer giving up realism as well as causality itself (reducing Einstein causality to signal causality) to prevent a preferred frame.

The reference for relativistic Bohmian field theory is

Bohm.D., Hiley, B.J., Kaloyerou, P.N. (1987). An ontological basis for the quantum theory, Phys. Reports 144(6), 321-375

In fact, the Bohmian version of QED was already part of Bohm's original paper.

Slitely off topic, but can you explain the difference between Einstein causality and signal causality.

 

[DarMM]

To repeat myself: In the objective Bayesian interpretation, the rules of probability theory are simply rules of consistent logical thinking in a situation where we have insufficient information. Probability is simply part of logic, the logic of plausible reasoning. Such laws of reasoning are the base for evaluating scientific theories, thus, they have to hold in scientific theories, and if they don't, the theory should be rejected as logically inconsistent

This is a claim you've made before, that rejecting Kolmogorov's axioms is "logically impossible" or something like that.

We have now constructed generalized probability theories, not just QM such as PR box probabilities, so this just is not true. Your contention that classical probability is the only logically possible such theory is contradicted by the literature.

Other probability theories simply reject some of Cox's assumptions.

 

[vanhees71]

QFT does not even claim to define an ontology, thus, is certainly not realistic.

And EPR realism is, of course, not ruled out. Only together with Einstein causality. The idea to reject EPR realism is, of course, quite natural for all those who think questioning Einstein causality is anathema. They prefer giving up realism as well as causality itself (reducing Einstein causality to signal causality) to prevent a preferred frame.

The reference for relativistic Bohmian field theory is

Bohm.D., Hiley, B.J., Kaloyerou, P.N. (1987). An ontological basis for the quantum theory, Phys. Reports 144(6), 321-375

In fact, the Bohmian version of QED was already part of Bohm's original paper.

Theoretical physics is about describing what we objectively observe in nature, and relativistic QFT is the most comprehensive model we have today about how nature behaves on the most microscopic scale we have hitherto observed, no more no less. Whether or not this provides and "ontology" is irrelevant as far as physics is concerned.

EPR realism is ruled out by the highly accurate observations of the violation of Bell's inequality, while Einstein causality is very well confirmed by all observations.

I like the de Broglie/Bohm theory as a non-local alternative interpretation of non-relativistic QM. It's, however, neither needed to describe the corresponding observations in atomic and solid-state physics, where the non-relativistic QM approximation of relativistic QFT is valid, nor has it been convincingly extended to relativistic QT.

 

[atyy]

But I do strongly object to people saying it shows QM is non-local. It 100% for sure does not.

Standard textbook QM is nonlocal if the quantum state is real: https://arxiv.org/abs/0706.2661

Whether the quantum state is real is a matter of interpretation, so one cannot say that 100% for sure QM is not nonlocal.

 

[DarMM]

Standard textbook QM is nonlocal if the quantum state is real: https://arxiv.org/abs/0706.2661

Whether the quantum state is real is a matter of interpretation, so one cannot say that 100% for sure QM is not nonlocal.

Textbook QM with $\psi$ real is inconsistent though. If you want $\psi$ to be real you need MWI or hidden variables.

 

[Demystifier]

Newtonian mechanics is not a wave, and there local realism is successful.

Newtonian gravity is nonlocal.

 

[atyy]

Textbook QM with $\psi$ real is inconsistent though. If you want $\psi$ to be real you need MWI or hidden variables.

Why is textbook QM with a real quantum state inconsistent? It has a measurement problem, but once the classical/quantum cut is chosen, it is consistent, as far as I know.

 

[DarMM]

Why is textbook QM with a real quantum state inconsistent? It has a measurement problem, but once the classical/quantum cut is chosen, it is consistent, as far as I know.

You can exploit level inconsistency between observers to derive a contradiction in extended Wigner's Friend scenarios.

Now neither Bohr, Heisenberg or several others viewed $\psi$ as a physical degree of freedom, so the extended Wigner's Friend set ups don't affect interpretations people actually hold like Copenhagen.

 

[martinbn]

Why is textbook QM with a real quantum state inconsistent? It has a measurement problem, but once the classical/quantum cut is chosen, it is consistent, as far as I know.

What does real quantum state mean?

 

[atyy]

You can exploit level inconsistency between observers to derive a contradiction in extended Wigner's Friend scenarios.

Now neither Bohr, Heisenberg or several others viewed $\psi$ as a physical degree of freedom, so the extended Wigner's Friend set ups don't affect interpretations people actually hold like Copenhagen.

The cut prevents you from having the inconsistency. In a sense it is just observer dependent reality. The wave function is real for the observer who is using it. To that observer, there cannot be any other observers in the quantum part of the cut.

 

[DarMM]

The cut prevents you from having the inconsistency. In a sense it is just observer dependent reality. The wave function is real for the observer who is using it. To that observer, there cannot be any other observers in the quantum part of the cut.

Are you saying there is a single objective cut defined over all of space? Different observers aren't permitted to have different cuts?