Defining Physicalness: Inviting Physicalists to Weigh In

[selfAdjoint]

Ok, matter is better than mass. But it still isn't precise what you mean by matter. If you mean all fermions and bosons as they appear in the standard model, then you're getting closer to something I can agree with. But the problem remains: Such a defintion would have been impossible a hundred years ago. So how do we know such a defintion will be applicable a hundred years from now? That is why I offered my orignal definition, that it depends on what we can explain with our current model of the universe. If you want something more concrete, come back in a hundred years (maybe more, maybe less) when we have a final theory of physics. This may just consist of the same particles the standard model does, but it is just as likely that there will be more. One likely possibility is the theoretically predicted supersymmetric partners of the current particles, such as selectrons and photinos. Another, more speculative possibility is some fundamental particle that explains consciousness. You and I would probably disagree as to whether this will be incorporated in the final theory of physics, but we really won't know until we get there.

Note my post way above, where I point out that the physicalism debate has outlasted many previous ideas of what constituted physical forces or matter. The only thing we can do today is to try to argue honestly in terms of what we "know" today. The basic point of any physicalist argument is that there shall be one standard of truth, not two, and the structured community activity of coordinating theory with experiment be the one left standing.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Ok, matter is better than mass. But it still isn't precise what you mean by matter. If you mean all fermions and bosons as they appear in the standard model, then you're getting closer to something I can agree with.

That's what I mean (when I originally said "mass," I thought everyone would think I meant the mass of atoms). But for the next part of my answer, keep in mind the entire definition of what I am suggesting.

But the problem remains: Such a defintion would have been impossible a hundred years ago. So how do we know such a defintion will be ( applicable a hundred years from now?

Not so. 300 hundred-plus years ago after defining the nature of mass, weight, force, inertia and acceleration, Newton might have said "Physicalness is matter, its effects, and its offspring.

That is why I offered my orignal definition, that it depends on what we can explain with our current model of the universe.

I still say our current model, as different as it is from Newton's, can be said to be the result of "matter, its effects, and its offspring."

If you want something more concrete, come back in a hundred years (maybe more, maybe less) when we have a final theory of physics. This may just consist of the same particles the standard model does, but it is just as likely that there will be more. One likely possibility is the theoretically predicted supersymmetric partners of the current particles, such as selectrons and photinos. Another, more speculative possibility is some fundamental particle that explains consciousness. You and I would probably disagree as to whether this will be incorporated in the final theory of physics, but we really won't know until we get there.

And don't forget the Higgs boson (a little mass joke). But see, none of those developments would undermine the definition of physical as " "matter, its effects, and its offspring." Do you see this, or am I really that off base? No matter what we discover, if it is derived from or caused by matter, then the definition holds. That's why I think it is a good one.

 

[Rybo]

Seems perfetly reasonable to me

And don't forget the Higgs boson (a little mass joke). But see, none of those developments would undermine the definition of physical as " "matter, its effects, and its offspring." Do you see this, or am I really that off base? No matter what we discover, if it is derived from or caused by matter, then the definition holds. That's why I think it is a good one.

Fermionic matter particles and bosonic force particles are in eternal complementation to the each other ergo one being the offspring/resultant of the other may be incorrect.

I say that 5-fold icosahedral gravity is a pulling-in force-- into as matter -- that results in all pushing-out radiational forces. Here too I may be incorrect in so stating it that way, however, the diffrrence is that without the the tensegral pulling-in force of gravity all forms of energy of all of physcial Unvierse would become totaly dissipated/dispersed and we would have the "heat death" sometimes theorized as one large very flat photon or set of photons and and infintiely expanding into an entropic nothingess of no energy at all, without hope of recollapse. Ugh!

Whose to say that isn't what fate awaits the Universe but I don't believe that will be the case. Call me optimsitic but really this is just derived from geometrical principles I've gleaned and extrapolated from Fullers Syn. 1 & 2.

This is why I believe gravity exists as a integral-set 5-fold icosahedral systemic-structures that I call the "the fabric of space" and that appears to us over time as the retarded, double-valenced(bonded) 4-fold octahedral leptons and the 4-fold qudra-valenced(bonded) tetrahedral hadrons.

Rybo

 

[StatusX]

Note my post way above, where I point out that the physicalism debate has outlasted many previous ideas of what constituted physical forces or matter. The only thing we can do today is to try to argue honestly in terms of what we "know" today. The basic point of any physicalist argument is that there shall be one standard of truth, not two, and the structured community activity of coordinating theory with experiment be the one left standing.

I agree, but the point of getting a defintion here is for the question "Can consciousness be explained as a physical property?" Obviously it cannot if we restrict ourselves to today's physics, but the more important question is whether physics will ever be able to explain it.

That's what I mean (when I originally said "mass," I thought everyone would think I meant the mass of atoms).

But see, none of those developments would undermine the definition of physical as " "matter, its effects, and its offspring." Do you see this, or am I really that off base? No matter what we discover, if it is derived from or caused by matter, then the definition holds. That's why I think it is a good one.

I don't mean any offense, but this misunderstanding might just be because you haven't studied that much of modern physics. Matter is a sort of ambiguous term, but I would say it generally refers to that which has mass. When you made the clarification in your last post that you had moved from "things that have mass" to "matter," I assumed you were using a different definition of matter, one that meant, as I guessed, the fermions and bosons in the standard model. Again, I don't know how much you know about this stuff, so I don't mean to be condescending if you already know this, but fermions are things like quarks, neutrinos, and electons. Things that probably (not certainly in the case of neutrinos) all have mass, and would generally all be considered matter. Bosons are photons and the other messenger particles that transmit the strong and weak (and maybe in a later theory, gravitational) forces. The bosons are more complicated, and can't be thought of simply as "resulting from things with mass." That is why a defintion of physical in terms of the traditional definition of matter is unsatisfactory.

My point was that even if you extend to the latter defintion of matter, the current fermions and bosons are just the contents of today's theory. Calling anything else that might crop up in tomorrow's theory "unphysical" is not justified. Getting back to the point I think you're really trying to make with this thread, it is not inconceivable that the final phyiscal model has fermions, bosons, maybe some other classes, and "qualions" that interact with these other particles in a quantifiable way and are responsible for conscious experience.

I don't know if this is going to happen. If it does, they probably wouldn't be particles in the traditional sense, since they probably wouldn't have specific positions in space. In fact, if you really insist on excluding such a thing from a defintion of physical, you might want change your defintion to something like "that which exists within space and time." But I would consider such a thing physical (because of the "quantifiable" part), and a disagreement on this would only be a matter of semantics.

There is a chance that your proposal will turn out to be identical to mine in the end. The reason I don't like it is a) it is inelegant, as it gives mass a priority it does not deserve, since it is just another number we assign to particles like charge and spin number, and b) it doesn't account for unforseeable discoveries in physics.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The reason I don't like it is a) it is inelegant, as it gives mass a priority it does not deserve, since it is just another number we assign to particles like charge and spin number, and b) it doesn't account for unforseeable discoveries in physics.

It is indeed inelegant. It is also simple (and to you probably simplistic) but seems safe and comprehesive enough to use (for now) when physicalists and nonphysicalists get into debates about what physical is and isn't. It terms of giving mass a priority, I don't know why you'd resist that since if the BB was the result of a singularity, then physicists already believe an occurance of infinite density was the first event of creation. I am simply pointing out that mass seems to be causing and the basis of a lot of physicalness.

 

[loseyourname]

It is indeed inelegant. It is also simple (and to you probably simplistic) but seems safe and comprehesive enough to use (for now) when physicalists and nonphysicalists get into debates about what physical is and isn't.

Well, it doesn't seem that safe to me, since you are still leaving open the possibility that physics will eventually be able to explain things that are not considered physical by your definition, whether they be Status' qualions or anything else that behaves in a predictable manner but is not derived from material substance.

Either way, as long as we each know what the other means when we use a certain word, isn't that what's important? Does it really make a difference whether different parties agree or not?

 

[Rybo]

Consciousness needs a particular particle or set of particles?

I agree, but the point of getting a defintion here is for the question "Can consciousness be explained as a physical property?" Obviously it cannot if we restrict ourselves to today's physics, but the more important question is whether physics will ever be able to explain it.
Calling anything else that might crop up in tomorrow's theory "unphysical" is not justified. Getting back to the point I think you're really trying to make with this thread, it is not inconceivable that the final phyiscal model has fermions, bosons, maybe some other classes, and "qualions" that interact with these other particles in a quantifiable way and are responsible for conscious experience.

Consciouness ergo awarness is explained by the relationships between all phyiscal particles that interact to create a conscious biologic and interact with that biologic as its sensoral experience ergo what I am phyiscally.

If you need a specific particle then perhaps it is the most elusive graviton or or some set of virtual particles or combinations of both and not neccessarily a new unknow particle.

Conscious awareness does not exist witout the physical. "I think about something(s)-- say my finger -- with somethings(s)-- neurons/brain -- ergo I am.

Rybo

 

[StatusX]

If you need a specific particle then perhaps it is the most elusive graviton or or some set of virtual particles or combinations of both and not neccessarily a new unknow particle.

Let me be more specific. I certainly don't think there is a particle in space that floats around and causes experience. So "qualions," with the particle suffix might have been misleading. I was only contrasting it with fermions and bosons in that it could be a new part of the theory, separate from these, but still related to them in a mathematically modellable way. (And I didn't mean it would have something like spin 3/4, if that's what anyone was thinking)

I should just point out the oxymoron in that word. "Qualia" was coined to describe how these experiences are qualitative things, where as particles are quantitative. A word like this is vulnerable to being used to demonstrate how physicalists like me don't really understand the problem. I agree there is an unquantifiable aspect to consciousness, but that will, as far as I can see, always remain a mystery. What a physical theory could do is categorize the experiences and predict if and when they will arise in certain systems. Most aspects of physics are relational, but they rest on a few qualitative ideas, like spacetime and the very concept of a "law." These aspects are probably beyond science to explain, and if consciousness can be modeled at all, its qualititative aspects will likely be elusive as well. But maybe science will go beyond this and, by incorporating consciousness, start to explain the intrinsic aspects of physics as well. Who knows? It's clear from past experience that we're not very good at guessing how science will evolve.

 

[hypnagogue]

Les, you insist that physicalness be defined in terms of some kind of intrinsic property (what it 'is'), but the key point (as has been mentioned) is that physical things are just not defined this way in the first place. In any physical theory, all you will find are quantities and rules that relate these quantities. In physical theory, there is nothing to mass (or any other quantity described in physics) other than the functional relationships it engages in. Mass is just the functional propensity to resist a force, or warp spacetime, or whatever. There is nothing to it beyond what it does.

You object that "Matter, its products, and its effects can be experienced, they can be measured, they can be predicted," but this is not going against the grain at all. That which can be measured is simply that which changes the measuring device in a systematic way by entering into some sort of functional relationship with it. That which can be predicted is just that which changes measuring devices in a reproducible pattern. That which can be experienced (in an objective sense) is that which can be detected by an organism's measuring device, the nervous system. We can account for measurability, predictability, and experience-ability (again, in an objective sense) just by appealing to extrinsic, relational properties. You are looking for some sort of essence (intrinsic propery) of the physical, but you shouldn't be frustrated not to find it, because essence simply has no place in physical theory.

 

[Les Sleeth]

That which can be measured is simply that which changes the measuring device in a systematic way by entering into some sort of functional relationship with it. That which can be predicted is just that which changes measuring devices in a reproducible pattern. That which can be experienced (in an objective sense) is that which can be detected by an organism's measuring device, the nervous system. We can account for measurability, predictability, and experience-ability (again, in an objective sense) just by appealing to extrinsic, relational properties.

That which changes the measuring devise has mass, and the measuring device itself has and relies on mass. Any predictable pattern you can cite has mass, came from mass, or was caused by mass. The nervous system is mass, it detects mass. All the "relational" properties you want to measure, predict, and experience (with physical senses) are, again, mass, products of mass, or effects of mass. How much of a common trait does physicalness have to have before we say something is universal to it?

You are looking for some sort of essence (intrinsic propery) of the physical, but you shouldn't be frustrated not to find it, because essence simply has no place in physical theory.

To the contrary. I am looking for the most basic structure, not the essence. I am attempting to argue it is manifested in mass. Personally I think essence and physicalness are incompatible concepts.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Well, it doesn't seem that safe to me, since you are still leaving open the possibility that physics will eventually be able to explain things that are not considered physical by your definition, whether they be Status' qualions or anything else that behaves in a predictable manner but is not derived from material substance.

Either way, as long as we each know what the other means when we use a certain word, isn't that what's important? Does it really make a difference whether different parties agree or not?

Let me see if I can be clear about why I see your definition leads to problems in a philosophical debate, for me anyway.

But first, I am confused about your concern. How have I left open the possibility that "physics will eventually be able to explain things that are not considered physical by [my] definition"? It seems to me you are the one, by wanting to base physicalness on the presence of any sort of order, who is leaving the door open. I will get back to this "order" point in a second.

However, the thing is, I actually do want to leave the door open for a physical explanation. That is what physicalists claim is the basis of life and consciousness, and so in a fair debate they should be able to use every relevant fact and argument to make their case. What I don't want to see is someone claiming something has come about through physical means, but which really didn't, by expanding the meaning of physical to include whatever we discover to be true.

If you review the physicalist side participating in this thread, you should be able to notice a certain approach. Look at, for example, selfAdjoint's definition of physical (and you'd probably agree his view represents the science perspective better than anyone else commenting in this thread). He said "Today physicality pretty much means consistence with the Standard Model of particle interactions or with General Relativity (locally GR looks like Special Relativity so that is included too). Those theories are accepted by physicists as 'effective,' matching all experiments we know how to do now, and there is enormous experimental support for their predictions at all energy scales likely to be relevant to the human body."

What's included there is a realm of laws that extends from particles and gravity right through biology. They represent the most important principles which support physicalist theory.

Now consider StatusX's statement, "All we know that is absolute is that there is a universe. . . . And time . . . is part of the universe. If you are moving or in a gravitational field, time slows down. It is taking intuition too far to assume time existed before the big bang. The big bang is where spacetime originated."

That too is classic physicalism. All that exists, all that came into being, did so with the advent of this universe.

I attempted to put things in perspective with my story of the first moments after the Big Bang. I said, "According to the commonly accepted theory, 10 -43 seconds after the Big Bang was the so-called GUT epoch . . . At 10 -20 seconds after inflation, most of what would be required to form matter existed; EM and weak forces separate, quarks form protons and neutrons. But a mere 3 minutes after the Big Bang the first nuclei were synthesized. Since expansion and cooling were going to continue, the rest of the matter of the universe was virtually guaranteed to develop."

Also I pointed out, ". . . if the BB was the result of a singularity, then physicists already believe an occurrence of infinite density was the first event of creation."

Okay, now let's consider that input together. We have a universe that is believed to have started with an event of infinite density. We have the basis of mass particles forming in well under a second, and actual nuclei within minutes. We have physicalists who believe all existence began with that event. Today we have science, whose primary principles (the Standard Model of particle interactions and General Relativity) "are accepted by physicists as 'effective,' matching all experiments we know how to do now, and there is enormous experimental support for their predictions at all energy scales likely to be relevant to the human body."

As I've pointed out, the universe's first significant act (the Big Bang) followed the high mass condition of a singularity, the Standard Model of particle interactions is the rules of matter (add: products and effects of matter to most of this list), relativity would not exist (or be observable) without mass, energy is derived from matter, energy is only detectable because it moves mass, our body is matter, our brains are matter, the electro-chemical aspects of the brain result from matter. What can we point to that science actually observes and studies which isn’t mass, mass derived, are an effect of mass?

Let’s get back to the issue of the physicalist versus nonphysicalist debate about consciousness. For the physicalist, the cause of consciousness is brain physiology. What is the basis of that physiology? It is 15 billion years of material change that took place in an “evolutive corridor” that stretches from the Big Bang to homo sapiens sapiens. One thing you are absolutely correct about is that the change in that evolutive corridor exhibits an incredible level of order. Also, consciousness itself has quite the organized/organizing nature.

Now here’s where I think we need to distinguish between order and physicalness. What is the origin of the universe’s order? Is it matter or physicalness itself? Or did consciousness develop before the physical universe, and provide the ordering aspect of creation? Did consciousness emerge from physicalness (i.e., Big Bang to now purely mechanical ordering), or did physicalness emerge from conscious ordering. Right now physicalist theory clearly has consciousness emerging from the organization of matter, which is why I am attempting to say physicalness is matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter.

If conscious is independent of matter, then its fundamental existence has not come about in anyway from that physical development. However, I would agree it seems fairly apparent that brain physiology is helping to structure and organize aspects of human consciousness, plus I believe the brain helps to individuate consciousness.

Anyway, my main point is wanting to leave the issue of which developed first open to debate. What if part of the very nature of consciousness is order? Then we are attributing to physicalness something it is incapable of without the ordering principle consciousness provides.

 

[Locrian]

That which changes the measuring devise has mass

Not necessarily; just momentum. I find it strange this issue keeps coming up.

How are you defining mass?

 

[Locrian]

If you review the physicalist side participating in this thread, you should be able to notice a certain approach. Look at, for example, selfAdjoint's definition of physical (and you'd probably agree his view represents the science perspective better than anyone else commenting in this thread).

No, I wouldn't agree that his view represents the science perspective at all. It is both temporary and circular for reasons I've already given. I'm beginning to think you are hanging onto some of the definitions because they are easy to deconstruct, not because they are particularly useful.

 

[Rybo]

(And I didn't mean it would have something like spin 3/4, if that's what anyone was thinking)
I should just point out the oxymoron in that word. "Qualia" was coined to describe how these experiences are qualitative things, where as particles are quantitative. Who knows? It's clear from past experience that we're not very good at guessing how science will evolve.

SX, I think telepathy may be a rare phyiscal phenomena that we even more rarely consicously aware of and is incoprated via whole body-- or nearly whole body, brain whatever --physcial (EMR)/gravitational(qausi--physical) resonance between two or mor biologics.

If gravity is even a fraction faster than our accepterd speed-of-radiation then it would remain a mystery forever/eternally. Maybe slight less so as our current understanding of harnessing enough power to quantify any alledgged spin-2 graviton is perhaps millions of years beyond such feasible practical consideration now or later.

Many human planetary civilizations may have and will, ignorantly and unintentinally, kill themselves off, long before they even come close to ever harnesing a solar system size accelartor lab for such gravtionic experiements :) I dunno.

I think we need to always go back to the most generalized/comprehensive and complex and begin there in our subcatgaorization methods and conceptual de-evolution of Universe i.e. from complex to simple.

These following three are on same level as the first subcatgoriaztioon of Universe

1) Finite physical Universe ( all possible quantizisable particles, directly or indiectly, even if forever beyond the the scope of practical feasibility)

2) Metaphysical Universe ( qualitative, subjective, concepts, laws, energyuless, sizeless, tempertuareless etc...as mind or as the infnite nothingness outside of fintie physical Universe)

3) Quasi-physical gravity ( speculatived by me as the faster than of accepted speed-of-radiation, buffer-zone, between the physical and the metaphysical)

#1 Physical can be represented as that finite volumectric area inside of a polyhedron or multiple-dimensiona(hyper) concentric polyhedra curled inisde one polyhedron as the finite physical Universe.

#2 Metaphysical can be reprsented by inifnite nothing ouside of the finite polyhedron or polyhedra.

#3 Quasi-physical gravity is the itesy bitsy very thin/small surface structure area/edges/ of the polyhedron or polyhedra that sperates the physical Universe from the metaphyscial Universe.

My home page if interested.
http://home.usit.net/~rybo6/rybo/index.html

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

Not necessarily; just momentum. I find it strange this issue keeps coming up.

I think you are talking about rest mass.

 

[Locrian]

Not really; how are you defining mass? This is the third time I've asked that question. I am sincerely sorry if you did and I missed it, I really have been reading. Can you repeat yourself once more?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Not really; how are you defining mass? This is the third time I've asked that question. I am sincerely sorry if you did and I missed it, I really have been reading. Can you repeat yourself once more?

Anything with non-zero energy. Try this link

 

[Locrian]

Heh, well since energy is a construct humans have created for mathematically defining a system, and it is completely based on the concept of measuring the system and defining energy based on those measurements,

We might very well say your definition of physical that you proposed could be reworded to say something is physical if it can be mathematically conceptualized by those who measured it.

I wonder if that's what you are looking for? Something makes me doubt it.

Edit: By the way, that is absolutely not how I would define the word mass; however, I'm more than happy to use your definition. That's why I asked back on page...3 or so.

 

[StatusX]

What is the origin of the universe’s order? Is it matter or physicalness itself? Or did consciousness develop before the physical universe, and provide the ordering aspect of creation? Did consciousness emerge from physicalness (i.e., Big Bang to now purely mechanical ordering), or did physicalness emerge from conscious ordering. Right now physicalist theory clearly has consciousness emerging from the organization of matter, which is why I am attempting to say physicalness is matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter.

Well then we've really been arguing over a meaningless difference in terms. I agree consciousness is separate from matter. And I see your point now, that there is an orginization in both consciousness and the material universe, and we need to determine which caused which.

I believe the rules are the rules, and we can never know where they came from. These rules allowed the formation of complex brains, and it is because of these brains that our experiences are so complex.

One other thing. If you insist on defining physical as "the effects of matter," consciousness still fits in. Obviously matter effects your experiences.

 

[loseyourname]

Heh, well since energy is a construct humans have created for mathematically defining a system, and it is completely based on the concept of measuring the system and defining energy based on those measurements,

We might very well say your definition of physical that you proposed could be reworded to say something is physical if it can be mathematically conceptualized by those who measured it.

I wonder if that's what you are looking for? Something makes me doubt it.

Edit: By the way, that is absolutely not how I would define the word mass; however, I'm more than happy to use your definition. That's why I asked back on page...3 or so.

So can we see yet how it is possible to reduce all physical descriptions to mathematical descriptions? Does that still not seem of significance to anyone but me? If all physical things have this in common, how can it not be a defining property?

Now here’s where I think we need to distinguish between order and physicalness. What is the origin of the universe’s order? Is it matter or physicalness itself? Or did consciousness develop before the physical universe, and provide the ordering aspect of creation? Did consciousness emerge from physicalness (i.e., Big Bang to now purely mechanical ordering), or did physicalness emerge from conscious ordering. Right now physicalist theory clearly has consciousness emerging from the organization of matter, which is why I am attempting to say physicalness is matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter.

So basically you're fitting a definition to your conception of the consciousness debate. I'm trying to find a definition that stands alone, that has utility to all discussions and that identifies the one thing that all things must have to be studied physically. If this overturns your conception of the consciousness debate, so be it. You're making my case for me that you're attempting to derive a definition with the sole end in mind of excluding consciousness from physicalness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

So can we see yet how it is possible to reduce all physical descriptions to mathematical descriptions? Does that still not seem of significance to anyone but me? If all physical things have this in common, how can it not be a defining property?

But see, math is a not property; the order that math symbolizes is. Math is an invention of consciousness, and so represents a potential of consciousness, not matter. Yet even if you want to make order the most basic property, if you read my response to you then you should see why I don't think order alone defines physicalness (order doesn't describe raw mass, for example).

However, I think there is another problem. If we could find just one single instance of when math cannot exactly represent physicality, then wouldn't you admit math is the wrong bottom line? Well, uncertainty is such an example (and I don't think it is the only one . . . why, for example, would there even exist "chaos theory" if there weren't other examples of unpredictability?). Since the "particleness" that the most substantial aspects of the universe is based on cannot be precisely represented mathematically, how can we select order as the most defining feature of physicalness?

So basically you're fitting a definition to your conception of the consciousness debate. I'm trying to find a definition that stands alone, that has utility to all discussions and that identifies the one thing that all things must have to be studied physically. If this overturns your conception of the consciousness debate, so be it. You're making my case for me that you're attempting to derive a definition with the sole end in mind of excluding consciousness from physicalness.

Well, consciousness is the big dispute isn't it? I'm not sure what else we can actually observe in this universe we can label non-physical (though I include "livingness"). I've argued in detail to you why the debate about consciousness boils down to if it emerges from the properties of matter or if it might develop apart from matter. None of the major physicalist players in the consciousness debate cares one iota if it comes from order; even if we say it does, the issue once more becomes, "where does order come from?" Physicalists will say, in the case of consciousness, that order comes from matter (the brain).

But I argue that order could develop first, out of the same raw potentiality that we say matter came from (i.e., the cause of the Big Bang). So I want be able to assert that the development of order preceded the advent of the universe. Once you define the order in the universe as "physical," you've eliminated the distinction of what comes first.

That's the real problem for me. I do see order as (nearly) universal. The question is, however, is there anything more distinquishing about physicality. I say there is, and that is mass, the effects of mass, and the products of mass.

While putting mass first covers the order and lack of it in the universe (simply by saying "this is how mass behaves"), putting order first cannot account for all the properties of mass. Therefore, mass is a more defining quality.

 

[honestrosewater]

So can we see yet how it is possible to reduce all physical descriptions to mathematical descriptions? Does that still not seem of significance to anyone but me? If all physical things have this in common, how can it not be a defining property?

I may not be of much help yet, but I see that it's possible and significant. And I suspect qualia will be the next domino to fall.

 

[StatusX]

Yet even if you want to make order the most basic property, if you read my response to you then you should see why I don't think order alone defines physicalness (order doesn't describe raw mass, for example).

This has been said again and again, but you don't seem to be understanding it. Mass is not "raw" in any sense. The ratio of the (inertial) masses of two objects is defined as the ratio of their accelerations when they interact. The unit of mass is defined arbitrarily. This abstract mathematical defintion is all there is to mass, period.

However, I think there is another problem. If we could find just one single instance of when math cannot exactly represent physicality, then wouldn't you admit math is the wrong bottom line? Well, uncertainty is such an example (and I don't think it is the only one . . . why, for example, would there even exist "chaos theory" if there weren't other examples of unpredictability?). Since the "particleness" that the most substantial aspects of the universe is based on cannot be precisely represented mathematically, how can we select order as the most defining feature of physicalness?

Uncertainty is mathematically well-founded. According to QM, there is a way to determine the probability of certain events precisely, and then the particular alternative the system chooses is completely random within the constraints of the probabilities. Chaos is a result of computational limits, nothing intrinsic about the universe. Not to mention chaos theory is a branch of mathematics.

Math is not something we do for fun that happens to fit the universe. It was developed precisely becase it helps us describe it. (some might argue this, but it's at least the overarching motivation) As I'm sure you've heard, many physicists believe that math is "the language nature speaks." If there is a property of the universe that we find that can't be studied by anything resembling math (and consequently, anything resembling science), then I think we'd all agree it isn't physical.

 

[Rybo]

Metaphysical math is invented or discovered

But see, math is a not property; the order that math symbolizes is. Math is an invention of consciousness, and so represents a potential of consciousness, not matter. Yet even if you want to make order the most basic property, if you read my response to you then you should see why I don't think order alone defines physicalness (order doesn't describe raw mass, for example).
.

I agree with Les mostly here. Metaphysical math is the disovery of sets of relationships within the vast sets of dynamical interrelationships of phyiscal Univierse.

Mathematics is language that preceeded other languages because it is operationally the prime metaphysical complementation to the physcial Unvierse of events, interrelationships, etc...

Words are of the metaphysical mind ergo concepts reprsenting or definnng while also complemeting the dynamic over time and in space physical.

I.e. whole numerical and patterned sets, that complement the physical Universe, can be ascertained, as these physical things move over time and in space.

Hmmm, its getting late...mind is disintegrating...coherent concepts..
...dribbling off...
...into the abyss...
...of nothingness...
...furhter and further...
.... from reality of...
...physical Universe...

...Ry...bo.......

 

[Les Sleeth]

This has been said again and again, but you don't seem to be understanding it. Mass is not "raw" in any sense. The ratio of the (inertial) masses of two objects is defined as the ratio of their accelerations when they interact. The unit of mass is defined arbitrarily. This abstract mathematical defintion is all there is to mass, period.

I understand it. You just want to act like your opinion is authoritative instead of nothing more than an opinion.

Mass is: any nonzero (energy) entity. And I say, all that we have measured and detected empirically is either mass, a product of mass, or an effect of mass (as defined). Know of anything else?

"Raw" was used as a metaphor, it isn't my fault if you are so literal YOU don't get it.

"The ratio of the (inertial) masses of two objects is defined as the ratio of their accelerations when they interact" is how it is measured, it isn't what mass is.

The "unit" may be defined arbitrarily, but again that is a measurement issue, not the fact that there is something there to measure to begin with!

If mass is abstract math, then exactly what is that wall you run into?

You mental giants who want reality to be just in your head (math) are as bad as airy fairy idealists who think the same thing. Measurement and calculation and the ability to sense is not what makes something real. All that is what allows us to work with it, or predict it, or detect it in the first place. I am sorry to have to inform you that reality isn't dependent your understanding or detection of it.

Uncertainty is mathematically well-founded. According to QM, there is a way to determine the probability of certain events precisely, and then the particular alternative the system chooses is completely random within the constraints of the probabilities. Chaos is a result of computational limits, nothing intrinsic about the universe. Not to mention chaos theory is a branch of mathematics.

Pure crap. You can "determine . . . probability . . . precisely"? Give me a break!

"Chaos . . . nothing intrinsic about the universe," more opinion stated as fact. You have no idea if it reflects anything intrinsic or not. Why don't you stop talking like God and admit you don't know? I am sure you WISH the universe had no chaotic aspects, but if you know for certain, then please publish your paper proving it or stop acting like a know-it-all.

Math is not something we do for fun that happens to fit the universe. It was developed precisely becase it helps us describe it. (some might argue this, but is at least the overarching motivation) As I'm sure you've heard, many physicists believe that math is "the language nature speaks."

Math is the language that the orderly parts of nature speaks. Neither you nor anyone else can describe every bit of the universe mathematically and confirm your math model is correct.

If there are properties of the universe that we find that can't be studied by anything resembling math (and consequently, anything resembling science), then I think we'd all agree it isn't physical.

Sorry, but no. I've given my reasons. You assuming the stance of an all-knowing intellect doesn't change my mind.

 

[StatusX]

Les,
I had originally typed a long reply where I addressed each of your points in detail, but it got erased by POS internet explorer. But it's probably for the best, because all thoses words would have clouded my main point.

We are currently only in possession of a theory of the universe called physics. This theory defines terms such as mass, energy, length, etc, and then specifies mathematical relations among these terms. We encode our observations with these terms and then use the theory to make predictions, which we then interpret back into observables. I'm not trying to talk to you like a child (as I never have intended to do), I'm just making this crystal clear so our disagreements aren't the result of ambiguities.

We know nothing about how the universe really works. It is possible, as you seem to be suggesting, that there are actually particles of mass floating around in space, and that's that as far as intrinsicness. Another possibility is that there's nothing at the bottom, as I discussed here without any replies. Physics makes no claims in this area. But what you've done is taken terms from physics, taken their meanings farther than they were ever intended to be taken, and then claimed we're the ones making assumptions when we tell you that's not what they mean. You're claiming to have solved deep ontological problems which are probably impossible to solve in principle.

Now the central point pertaining to this discussion is this: It is true that everything we observe, directly or indirectly, has energy. This is due to the fact that energy is required to cause a physical event, and our senses are physical processes. You limit the physical to things with energy, things that can cause other physical events. I allow it to include anything that can be explained with physics (or equivalently, modeled mathematically). What's the difference? I believe consciousness is affected by energy, but cannot itself instantiate physical events. It does not affect energy, and so it is not itself energy. But I believe it can be mathematically modeled, and so I believe it is physical. I would equate your definiton of physical to mine of matter, and agree that conscisousness isn't material.

 

[Les Sleeth]

We are currently only in possession of a theory of the universe called physics. This theory defines terms such as mass, energy, length, etc, and then specifies mathematical relations among these terms. We encode our observations with these terms and then use the theory to make predictions, which we then interpret back into observables. I'm not trying to talk to you like a child (as I never have intended to do), I'm just making this crystal clear so our disagreements aren't the result of ambiguities.

But see, this is exactly why I didn't want to debate you. I've understood everything you have said. I didn't need instruction about bosons and fermions (or leptons either if you decided to include them). In the past I've endured lectures from Loseyourname too (and quite a few before him) about the facts of biology and other science issues. It seems like physicalists believe if you don't agree with them, then it is just because you don't understand how physical reality works.

I am not so deluded as to believe I have the physics expertise of a professional. I do my best to learn and keep abreast of things. But you aren't expert in my field either. How much effort have you made to understand things outside your beliefs?

In any case, we are left with trying to find a middle ground were we can trade concepts. It isn't going to work if you constantly translate everything I say into your frame of reference! From your responses, I haven't seen that you have grasped much of what I've been saying. So for me, this debate just becomes mostly your point of view.

I explain a little more as I answer the rest of your post.

We know nothing about how the universe really works.

There is another one of those statements which you assert as a truth, when really it is just your opinion. I believe we really do know lots about how the universe works. That is why we are able to produce so much great technology, for example . . . because we understand things about the universe.

It is possible, as you seem to be suggesting, that there are actually particles of mass floating around in space, and that's that as far as intrinsicness.

Is there a word "particle"? Is there a term "mass"? Do they represent something that exists in reality or not? This is not only a basic question of epistomology, it is fundamental to empiricism; that is, we attempt correspondence between concepts and reality, and believe that when sufficient facts are present we can get close for working purposes. Of course, one isn't supposed to confuse the conceptual representatons with what they are supposed to correspond to in reality.

But what you've done is taken terms from physics, taken their meanings farther than they were ever intended to be taken, and then claimed we're the ones making assumptions when we tell you that's not what they mean.

This is not a physics class. It is philosophy. So I am not bound by the same rules. We are, as you suggest in the next part of your post, debating ontology. This is what I mean about you trying to translate everything into your perspective. It will never work unless you debating someone who fully agrees with you. We are looking at reality with two different sets of metaphysical assumptions; I'm not abandoning mine to participate in nothing but physicalist metaphysics.

You're claiming to have solved deep ontological problems which are probably impossible to solve in principle.

This is just ridiculous. I have claimed no such thing. We are having a discussion. I am suggesting a basis for the ontology of physicalness which I am still waiting for someone to properly refute. That's how philosophical debates work. If you refute it, then I'll change my mind. So far the only person to directly speak to my proposal has been selfAdjoint. True, he didn't like it, but since then I've been trying to refine my idea so it fits.

You, however, keep talking like a textbook. If you could put that aside for awhile, maybe we might be able to toss this idea around and see what comes of it.

I have suggested a relativistic definition of mass so it fits all possible circumstances (I still think atomic mass is most influential in terms of effects and products). I have suggested that everything we have ever observed about the universe was due to the presence of mass, something derived from mass, or an effect of mass. Now tell me, do you know of anything that's been observed outside of that definition? Would you say gravity? No way. If it weren't for mass, you would never know gravity exists. Would you say c? No way, if it weren't for mass you'd never know. Would you say relativity, same deal. So what would you say?

You limit the physical to things with energy, things that can cause other physical events. . . . I allow it to include anything that can be explained with physics (or equivalently, modeled mathematically). What's the difference?

The difference is, you cannot observe "physics" or "math." Don't you see? Physics and math are 100% in your head. They are concepts, aspects of the intellect.

True, experience takes place inside us too, but science itself has made a clear distinction between the two. With concepts, we get to theorize, model, predict, calculate . . . but no matter how perfect theories, predictions, calculations, etc. seem, for them to be considered "true" science requires observation.

So what is observation? We assume it is a reflection of reality, and that our senses can be trusted to feed us a reasonably accurate reflection. This contrasts with mental reflections, which might make sense but may not reflect actual external reality.

The difference between our definitions, therefore, is important. I am trying to get physicalness out of the "mind" and treat it as something objective, with properties. You can't say I've been vague. I've stuck my neck out with a hardcore, concrete definition and offered to defend it. So far all I am hearing is how naive my notions about physics are. What I think is happening is that you don't like the "inelegance" of mass as the source of physicalness. It's so brilliant to do math or understand relativity. Well, yes it is, but that doesn't change the fact that those things are only possibe because mass is present. Without it, what would you have to calculate or observe?

A good way to refute my definition would be to cite an exception. And I still think uncertainty eliminates the math definition of physicalness (unless you want to admit uncertainty is the presence of God in matter ).

 

[Rybo]

interfering and non-interfering patterns operating in pure principle

The difference is, you cannot observe "physics" or "math." Don't you see? Physics and math are 100% in your head. They are concepts, aspects of the intellect.

Les, this what Fuller calls metaphysical.

"What we have is interfering and non-interfering patterns oeprating in pure principle" (Fuller)

I cannot accept the idea that there is nothingness(metaphysical) principles that interfer with each other to create somthingness(physical).

This is partly how I dveloped my theory/conjecture that there are multiple sets of partially overlapping, non-valenced, 5-fold-icosaheral, bosonic gravity, operatings at speeds of a fraction grater than our accepted "speed-of-radiation" and is the quasi-physical buffer-zone between the finite physical and infinite metaphysical.

I think that 5-fold gravity interferes with itself in specific, double, triple and quadra-valenced, 4-fold patterns operating at, speeds-of-radiation or less, and is what we observe as fermionic matter.

http://home.usit.net/~rybo6/rybo/id8.html

Rybo

 

[Fliption]

Wow how did I miss this thread? This is a big pet peeve of mine .

Les, I'm sure you've noticed that I've had a big problem with the word "physical". I'll try to explain why I have such a problem with it. Also, I think my explanation could also elude to the cause for some of the confusion in this thread.

To me the words physical and non-physical are just manmade words. Nothing more. We can draw the line of distinction between physical and nonphysical wherever we want because as human beings we invented the words physical and non-physical. Because these distinctions are drawn up by man based on what is most useful, there is no absolute wrong or right answer.

These words have come about it seems because in our past, many people have had beliefs about reality that science could not say anything about i.e. the soul, god etc. So the distinction of physical versus non-physical was useful to refer to these types of things.

I will admit that I haven't read every post in this thread but it seems as if you are comparing each suggested definition to some absolute idea of what it means to be physical and then pointing out when they fall short. Since I don't believe that definitions can ever be wrong they can only be inconsistent, this seems odd to me.

Here is what I think is going on and you can tell me if I'm off base. I believe that you see a certain distinction in reality. You have chosen to label this distinction "physical" and "non-physical". Now you are tasked with having to provide a definition of physical and non-physical in words that everyone can understand and still points to the distinction you have in mind. So when someone uses these terms differently, it appears they are making statements about the distinction that you see that is untrue.

I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Not what we label it. This is arbitrary. We can call the distinctions whatever we want. So when someone suggests that something is physical when it can be described by math and logic, then that's what it means to them and as long as the people they are communicating with have the same definition, then there is nothing wrong with that. But this says absolutely nothing about reality or it's distinctions. This is why I always have such a hard time understanding why everyone is so invested in words. I couldn't care less whether consciousness is physical or non-physical. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.

I keeping thinking of this scenario which illustrates the trickiness of semantics: Imagine that one of the participants in this thread who disagrees with your definitions actually wakes up one day and sees the distinction that you see. And they said "OHHHHH now I see what you mean. But I wouldn't call this non-physical. I would have called this x".

 

[Les Sleeth]

"What we have is interfering and non-interfering patterns operating in pure principle" (Fuller) . . . This is partly how I dveloped my theory/conjecture that there are multiple sets of partially overlapping, non-valenced, 5-fold-icosaheral, bosonic gravity, operatings at speeds of a fraction grater than our accepted "speed-of-radiation" and is the quasi-physical buffer-zone between the finite physical and infinite metaphysical.

I think that 5-fold gravity interferes with itself in specific, double, triple and quadra-valenced, 4-fold patterns operating at, speeds-of-radiation or less, and is what we observe as fermionic matter.

I read Synergetics back in the 1970s when it was published and enjoyed it very much, but I haven't thought about it too much since then. I think if you want to discuss Fuller's ideas here, and how yours are related to his, you will have to go slow because anyone not familiar with Bucky-speak and his concepts probably isn't going to follow you. You might, for instance, start threads over time and introduce ideas a step at a time, in digestable chunks, rather than try to present everything at once.

Les, this what Fuller calls metaphysical. . . . I cannot accept the idea that there is nothingness(metaphysical) principles that interfer with each other to create somthingness(physical).

What I was talking about when I said "Physics and math are 100% in your head" is how people confuse their images and concepts about reality with reality itself. I've argued that people do this with "time," for example, treating it as actual when it is, IMO, purely a mental construct. If I remember correctly Fuller refers to metaphysics in the classic way, which the meta-systems operating behind what's manifest.

I agree that "nothingness" cannot produce anything. Every time I see someone post another thread about it I can't get myself to participate because the idea is so silly to me. The reason I am commenting on it now is because of how much more significant (apparently) I see mass than my fellow debaters.

In past debates I've pointed to an irony involved in the loss of energy from a system. For the most part, after energy departs a system and disperses beyond other systems, it is gone and is no longer available for work. E=mc^2 tells us the loss of energy is the loss of mass. So the mass of the universe (especially taking into account expansion) is clearly decreasing.

If we try to describe the properties of energy, we will be told it has no existential properties, that it is just a calculating concept. But how can the departure of "nothing" result in the loss of mass? Is mass made up of nothing? Or is energy, in reality (i.e., not in the practice of physics) actually related to some sort of existential property? And is mass the manifestation of this more basic "something"?

This is not Fuller's theme of course, who was interested in geometric systems and their interactions. My interest is in modeling some sort of practical monism that would give us an essence or primordial potentiality that can manifest as all the things we see in reality. If that primordial stuff were, for instance, some sort of homogeneous vibrant luminosity, then its amassing to become matter is significant. And I also am interested to see if it could manifest as consciousness independently of matter.

 

[StatusX]

There is another one of those statements which you assert as a truth, when really it is just your opinion. I believe we really do know lots about how the universe works. That is why we are able to produce so much great technology, for example . . . because we understand things about the universe.

I meant at an ontological level. What do the rules mean? What is real? That we don't know these answers is not just my opinion.

Is there a word "particle"? Is there a term "mass"? Do they represent something that exists in reality or not? This is not only a basic question of epistomology, it is fundamental to empiricism; that is, we attempt correspondence between concepts and reality, and believe that when sufficient facts are present we can get close for working purposes. Of course, one isn't supposed to confuse the conceptual representatons with what they are supposed to correspond to in reality.

Who's side are you arguing here? I agree with everything here, and thought that you didn't.

This is not a physics class. It is philosophy. So I am not bound by the same rules. We are, as you suggest in the next part of your post, debating ontology. This is what I mean about you trying to translate everything into your perspective. It will never work unless you debating someone who fully agrees with you. We are looking at reality with two different sets of metaphysical assumptions; I'm not abandoning mine to participate in nothing but physicalist metaphysics.

No one's asking you to. But when you make assumptions based a naive understanding of physics, you have to be open to corrections. Just as if someone made philosphical claims based on the notion of absolute time or Earth being the center of the universe.

This is just ridiculous. I have claimed no such thing. We are having a discussion. I am suggesting a basis for the ontology of physicalness which I am still waiting for someone to properly refute. That's how philosophical debates work. If you refute it, then I'll change my mind. So far the only person to directly speak to my proposal has been selfAdjoint. True, he didn't like it, but since then I've been trying to refine my idea so it fits.

You, however, keep talking like a textbook. If you could put that aside for awhile, maybe we might be able to toss this idea around and see what comes of it.

I have suggested a relativistic definition of mass so it fits all possible circumstances (I still think atomic mass is most influential in terms of effects and products). I have suggested that everything we have ever observed about the universe was due to the presence of mass, something derived from mass, or an effect of mass. Now tell me, do you know of anything that's been observed outside of that definition? Would you say gravity? No way. If it weren't for mass, you would never know gravity exists. Would you say c? No way, if it weren't for mass you'd never know. Would you say relativity, same deal. So what would you say?

As I explained in the last post, energy passes along causation. That is, something must be energetic to cause something we can observe. But the end of the line (consciousness, in my view), the beginning (who knows), any quantifiable processes that might be unobservable but still important in some way we can't foresee, and the possibility that this view of energy is not completely correct are left out of your defintion, and I don't want them out of mine, as long as they can be mathematically formulated. Who cares if we define the word differently? When you say physical from now on, I'll know you're talking about my definition of material, and you similarly would know what I mean. That's all that's important.

The difference is, you cannot observe "physics" or "math." Don't you see? Physics and math are 100% in your head. They are concepts, aspects of the intellect.

True, experience takes place inside us too, but science itself has made a clear distinction between the two. With concepts, we get to theorize, model, predict, calculate . . . but no matter how perfect theories, predictions, calculations, etc. seem, for them to be considered "true" science requires observation.

So what is observation? We assume it is a reflection of reality, and that our senses can be trusted to feed us a reasonably accurate reflection. This contrasts with mental reflections, which might make sense but may not reflect actual external reality.

The difference between our definitions, therefore, is important. I am trying to get physicalness out of the "mind" and treat it as something objective, with properties. You can't say I've been vague. I've stuck my neck out with a hardcore, concrete definition and offered to defend it. So far all I am hearing is how naive my notions about physics are. What I think is happening is that you don't like the "inelegance" of mass as the source of physicalness. It's so brilliant to do math or understand relativity. Well, yes it is, but that doesn't change the fact that those things are only possibe because mass is present. Without it, what would you have to calculate or observe?

I understand you. You believe there is a physical (aspect of the) world and then a non-physical one. They are concretely differentiated, not just in our heads, and so they each need a concrete definition. Do I have this right?

I, on the other hand, relate "physical" to the root word "physics", and define it as anything that can be explained by physics, ie, with math. Some words simply can't be defined concretely. For example, "mathematically describable" cannot be. You believe physical is not one of these words, I believe it is. As far as the topic of the thread, that's the end of it: we define the word differently.

A good way to refute my definition would be to cite an exception. And I still think uncertainty eliminates the math definition of physicalness (unless you want to admit uncertainty is the presence of God in matter ).

I'm not sure how to cite an example that refutes your defintion, since mine includes yours as a subset. But as for the uncertainty principle, this is a mathematically derived limitation on measurement, and it allows nature to exhibit certain intrinsic randomness. We have precise equations that govern how the wave function of a particle evolves over time. These allow us to get (theoretically) exact probabilities that certain values of position, velocity, etc will be measured when we decide to observe the particle. If we calculate, say, a 70% chance it will be here and a 30% chance it will be there, then whether it is here or there is just as random as if you picked a random number between 0 and 1 and determined if it was above or below 0.7. There is, as far as we know, nothing more behind this randomness, and if we were to perform the experiment again and again until the end of time, the outcomes would converge to exactly 70% here and 30% there. (and by the way, leptons are a subclass of fermions along with hadrons, and they are distinguished because hadrons interact strongly and leptons don't)

But the recurring point is that mass is an aspect of the current theory, and new theories may throw it out the window. (probably not completely, but maybe it is only an approximation to something deeper) Your definition is subject to change and mine isn't. Once again, if you want a "concrete" defintion in terms of words like "mass" (which, again, I don't consider concrete), then come back a little later when the final theory is done.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Wow how did I miss this thread? This is a big pet peeve of mine .

I've wondered where you've been! Your comments about physicalness "meaning nothing" were my inspiration for this thread.

Here is what I think is going on and you can tell me if I'm off base. I believe that you see a certain distinction in reality. You have chosen to label this distinction "physical" and "non-physical". Now you are tasked with having to provide a definition of physical and non-physical in words that everyone can understand and still points to the distinction you have in mind. So when someone uses these terms differently, it appears they are making statements about the distinction that you see that is untrue.

I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Not what we label it. This is arbitrary. We can call the distinctions whatever we want. So when someone suggests that something is physical when it can be described by math and logic, then that's what it means to them and as long as the people they are communicating with have the same definition, then there is nothing wrong with that. But this says absolutely nothing about reality or it's distinctions. This is why I always have such a hard time understanding why everyone is so invested in words. I couldn't care less whether consciousness is physical or non-physical. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.

I would easily agree with your liberal attitude for discussing reality with others if it weren't for one thing. This one thing is the only reason I am fighting for a definition. Here it is.

There is something called "physicalism." What does it mean? Back on page six of this thread I gave Loseyourname a long answer, and in it I did sort of a history of the universe from the Big Bang to the human body. The physicalist insists that consciousness has come about from the products of the Big Bang, not the least of which is the physicalness of matter tied up in biology. They say that is what creates consciousness.

In other words, the order of things is: first there was the BB, then there was matter, then there was abiogenesis from matter, then there was the evolution of matter, then there was the emergence of consciousness from matter. Consider this quote by noted biologists Lynn Margulis & Dorion Sagan from their book What is Life?, “Life is planetary exuberance, a solar phenomena. It is the astronomically local transmutation of Earth’s air, water, and sun into cells . . . it is matter gone wild, capable of choosing its own direction in order to forestall its own thermodynamic equilibrium . . . Life is moving, thinking matter."

Any physicalists care to take issue with my characterization of your position?

Assuming for now I've fairly stated the physicalist position, I want to be able to argue that consciousness (and, as you know, "livingness") has not come about solely from the products of the Big Bang. The Big Bang, I argue, provides the materials (mass/energy basically) but something else may provide the organization, "something more" which precedes the advent of our universe. I also want to be able to argue there is some sort of essential, existential "stuff" (substance monism), and that of existential "stuff" physicalness is the same existential "stuff" of consciousness.

The argument is which develped first in the primordial existential "stuff": consciousness or physicalness. I don't not believe consciousness is mass or has mass or derives from mass. It is fundamentally, essentially massless. Since physicalists believe, as Margulis and Sagan say, "Life is moving, thinking matter," then I think mass is a good way to distinguish between physical and non-physical. So far I think I've been defending my view that you can describe all of physics in terms of mass, the effects of mass, and the products of mass pretty well.

 

[Les Sleeth]

No one's asking you to. But when you make assumptions based a naive understanding of physics, you have to be open to corrections. Just as if someone made philosphical claims based on the notion of absolute time or Earth being the center of the universe.

Let's hear one of my naive assumptions backed up with facts, not just your opinion. You seem to think I am without science education and that isn't so. As far as we've gone into physics for this discussion, I am still quite comfortable. Not a single thing you or anyone has said is beyond what I already know. We'd get along better if you'd just make your case without the tired old tactic of trying to say "if you only knew better." That is entirely the reason for my expressed frustration while debating you.

But . . . any quantifiable processes that might be unobservable but still important in some way we can't foresee, and the possibility that this view of energy is not completely correct are left out of your defintion, and I don't want them out of mine. But who cares if we define the word differently? When you say physical from now on, I'll know you're talking about my definition of material, and you similarly would know what I mean. That's all that's important.

The issue only comes up when talking about life and consciousness. Outside of that I, at least, am perfectly content to let physicists define their own field. But when we start talking about what is creating life and consciousness, so far the physicalist view has been it is matter, effects of matter, and the products of matter.

I understand you. You believe there is a physical (aspect of the) world and then a non-physical one. They are concretely differentiated, not just in our heads, and so they each need a concrete definition. Do I have this right?

I would say they there are aspects of existence concretely differentiated by conditions. I personally think there is only one sort of absolute existence, some sort of existential "stuff" which takes different shapes depending on conditions. I've been saying the "physical condition" of the stuff is characterized by mass/energy. In this model, consciousness, though of the same stuff, has come about through different conditions than "physical."

I, on the other hand, relate "physical" to the root word "physics", and define it as anything that can be explained by physics, ie, with math.

We are just going to have to disagree about equating physics to math. In fact, I've seen working physicists debate mathmaticians here who vehemently resisted your definition. Math is one of the tools, but physics certainly can't be boiled down to that. If it could, then what need is there for the observational aspect of empiricism?

But as for the uncertainty principle, this is a mathematically derived limitation on measurement, and it allows nature to exhibit certain intrinsic randomness. We have precise equations that govern how the wave function of a particle evolves over time. These allow us to get (theoretically) exact probabilities that certain values of position, velocity, etc will be measured when we decide to observe the particle. If we calculate, say, a 70% chance it will be here and a 30% chance it will be there, then whether it is here or there is just as random as if you picked a random number between 0 and 1 and determined if it was above or below 0.7. There is, as far as we know, nothing more behind this randomness, and if we were to perform the experiment again and again until the end of time, the outcomes would converge to exactly 70% here and 30% there.

I understand calculating for probabilities. And that is why I know you can have perfect calculations for probability, but you cannot ever perfectly determine the position and momentum of a particle. It seems like you are trying to snowjob me. It doesn't matter what's behind the randomness, what matters is that you cannot achieve unlimited accuracy with mathematics, and that is why mathematics cannot define physicalness.

But the recurring point is that mass is an aspect of the current theory, and new theories may throw it out the window. (probably not completely, but maybe it is only an approximation to something deeper) Your definition is subject to change and mine isn't. Once again, if you want a "concrete" defintion in terms of words like "mass" (which, again, I don't consider concrete), then come back a little later when the final theory is done.

Well, I suppose if we agree that when discussing consciousness and life, physicalness means derived from matter then we will understand each other. However, in terms of your definition not being subject to change ("anything that can be explained. . . with math"), I can't see how it even covers all of physicalness now, so I don't see how it's going to in the future. Also, as I said before, I don't see why order, which math nicely models, can't be part of nonphysical conditions. So to say anything which we can model mathematically is physical doesn't do it for me.

 

[Rybo]

To me the words physical and non-physical are just manmade words.
I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.
But I wouldn't call this non-physical. I would have called this x".

Flip, it is true words are human made contstructs. Their first subcatagorziation is mathmatical language and non-mathmatical languaage.

So we are using words, to define other words, which, "other words" are used to define our finite "real"(physical/senorally apprehended) environment and the metaphysical(abstract/concpetual) and subjective qualities as ascertaaine by metaphyiscal mind overlapping interplay with the physical senses resulting as consicouness.

Both are correct as you say because ther is eternal complemetaion between the physical and metaphysical.

Non-physical is metaphysical = beyond the physical = concept = intellect =energy less/

Physical = reality --i.e. to make real, what before, was only a metaphysical concept;

--e.g. as captian Picard of Enterprise says to his Number One officer, "make it so" "make it happen as reality" = energy(energetic) = frequency over time and in space = motion = feasibly/potentially any instrumentally detectable and meterable phenomena.

Word do say something about reality. The oral/spoken word is sensoral(physical).

Written word is pattern of bits(electrons, pixels etc)

Concept of a word(concept) or concept of physical is both metaphysical concept.

Rybo

 

[Fliption]

I've wondered where you've been! Your comments about physicalness "meaning nothing" were my inspiration for this thread.

I figured as much!

The argument is which develped first in the primordial existential "stuff": consciousness or physicalness.

Ohhhhhhhhh. I had to read your post several times but I think I may know what you're trying to say. When you criticize the definitions that have been given in this thread, you are criticizing them because they are not consistent with the conclusions of physicalism. Namely, that consciousness emerges from matter. So, their definitions are wrong because they do not lead to the conclusions of physicalism. The definition that you proposed was your attempt to have a definition that is consistent with what a physicalists actually believes.

For example, Loseyourname's definition has to do with whether something can be described by math/logic. So according to this definition a person who believes that all things can be descibed this way is a physicalist. But how does this position lead one to believe that matter precedes consciousness? It doesn't as far as I can see and perhaps this is what leads you to criticize it. Having this definition doesn't exclude the possibility that consciousness came first so that can't be what physical means!

Once you can establish what it means to be physical based on the conclusions of physicalists you can show that consciousness doesn't fit that definition.

I hope I have understood you better this time. I think the first thing that needs to happen is for everyone to agree or disagree with you that a physicalist believes what you say they believe. Is it a defining characterization of a physicalist to believe that consciousness emerges from matter? Or is that just a byproduct of the bland personalities of most physicalists ?