BobG said:
Given that the apple doesn't generate enough visual light for a person to see, but that it reflects primarily red light while absorbing other colors, is the apple still red when it's sitting in a dark room? Is it still emitting infrared light even though a human is in the room instead of a snake? Is the apple still sitting on the table even though only the bat in the room can detect the sonar signals bouncing off of it?
Using the framework I described above (primarily Bohr's), no, an apple is not red (how it's normally meant) when sitting in a dark room. In fact, an apple is not red at all. Saying that an apple
is red is a linguistic simplification when the situation really is that an apple has the ability to manifest the sensation of a red color in the mind of a proper observer. It's extrinsic vs intrinsic. Subjective perceptions, regardless of their connection with physical events, are conceptually nonphysical things. Hot or cold, colorful or grayscale, loud or silent - these are not objective properties of things or events. They each depend absolutely on the particular nervous system of their observer (among other factors).
Is an apple red? Ask my colorblind uncle. Did the tree make a noise? Ask my deaf brother. Etc. These things are very distinct from the underlying physical situations involving relative mean kinetic energy, relative electromagnetic frequency intensities, and potential compression waves. Setting up situations where particular expected perceptions are not realized is quite easy, and I've just listed a few. I don't agree that it is ludicrous.
With regard to snakes or bats, what reason do you have to think that any snake has ever seen red? In fact, "http://www.clarku.edu/students/philosophyclub/docs/nagel.pdf" " I never claimed that a bat could not detect an apple. I claim that, given Bohr's assumptions, a bat does not see the red of an apple that I see. Red is a perception that the apple manifests in me but not the bat. It is not an intrinsic objective property of the apple but rather an ability that the apple has when I'm around.
Conceptually, the only relevant difference between colors and sounds are that colors typically belong to objects and sounds typically belong to events - that's why philosophically it's often easier to consider colors. As perceptions though, neither can exist without a subjective observer. I don't think this is where the situation gets tricky. We're simply discussing classically extrinsic properties.
Where QM comes into play is that experiments have shown us that location, momentum, polarization, etc, have no higher ontological standing than color, sound, or even meaning. Classically we have a distinction between the perception of red and the frequency of the EM waves. QM shows us that the properties of EM waves are just as context dependent and complementary as the subjective perception of color is. QM shows that position and mass are not, in fact intrinsic and persistent properties of an electron. We've proven that an electron does
not always have a defined position or mass, and that the property that manifests itself depends explicitly on the context of the measurement.
This is where the stuff hits the fan. We had no problem with extrinsic properties before, but now we realize that
every classical property is extrinsic. So we have two choices here. We can accept this fact, as Bohr did. We can say that extrinsic properties are fully real and there is no underlying intrinsic (hidden variable) level of reality. I prefer this view. It allows us to say that color, sound, and the meaning of these words are just as real as position and mass. Understanding that all properties are in fact context dependent also allows Bohr to consistently say things like "the apple
is real" with it being understood that a red apple cannot exist in a (metaphorical) vacuum and the apple is not red in all situations.
The other option is to go Bohm's route and deny that sound, color, mass, position, or polarization are basic and real properties. We can claim that there is some underlying and yet unknown explanation using properties we have no conception of. According to Bohm's view, yes a sound is made, but sound is not real, it is a macroscopic approximation of the real properties at play. Bohm went as far as to say that there is an infinite regress of deeper layers of complexity and that we cannot in principle ever truly speak of real things since they are unknowable. I prefer not to let solipsistic epistemological issues destroy any hope of a true ontology, but this is an aesthetic choice. Both options seem to be consistent with logic and experiments.
Woah, sorry for the length! Sometimes philosophy needs it, and the intelligent reply got me going

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