- #1
Blue Scallop
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Did you notice MWI assumes the brain is classical and when we watched the double slit, "that observer will "split" as well--one version of him for each way the double slit experiment came out."
MWI assumes the so called easy problems only. Before I proceed. Please read short paragraph of :https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
"The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes.[1] David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem" of consciousness,[2] contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc. Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. That is, their proposed solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena. Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set, and he argues that the problem of experience will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".[3]"
Here is a logical question.
If the Hard Problem will involve a new field.. like the conscious field. In MWI, will your brain and the conscious field split as well when you watch the double slit experiment? Or will it turn MWI into say Consistent Histories where the conscious field guide the histories?
All right. I need papers or references regarding this. I didn't start this thread for us to speculate which is against forums rule. I mentioned all this just to ask what physicists have discussed this and what they say. It's important as MWI assume the Soft Problem. You need to take into account the Hard Problem too.
MWI assumes the so called easy problems only. Before I proceed. Please read short paragraph of :https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
"The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes.[1] David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem" of consciousness,[2] contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc. Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. That is, their proposed solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena. Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set, and he argues that the problem of experience will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".[3]"
Here is a logical question.
If the Hard Problem will involve a new field.. like the conscious field. In MWI, will your brain and the conscious field split as well when you watch the double slit experiment? Or will it turn MWI into say Consistent Histories where the conscious field guide the histories?
All right. I need papers or references regarding this. I didn't start this thread for us to speculate which is against forums rule. I mentioned all this just to ask what physicists have discussed this and what they say. It's important as MWI assume the Soft Problem. You need to take into account the Hard Problem too.
