HAYAO said:
several things are of course less hazardous than the other. Those with minor hazard probably gets ignored and I can understand that to some degree. But I don't understand when critically crucial precautions that could prevent large scale disaster gets ignored.
in US there's a concept named "Probabilistic Risk Assessment"(PRA) , a mathematical process whereby 'things' are evaluated and prioritized according to their likelihood and severity of consequence.. The PRA experts can make it look pretty esoteric to one at my level.
When Japanese archeologists found those stones way up the hill that'd been engraved "do not build below here you'll get washed away"
and historians uncovered records of huge tidal waves within a thousand years
the PRA folks should've raised their 'likelihood' number for 'Loss of All AC' to 1/1000 per year or greater
which would make their ' likelihood X consequences ' product significant enough to warrant action .
I can understand how the 'Modest Proposal' that one's Sacred Diesels(that's how we plant guys feel about them) are at extreme risk would be met with initial disbelief and take some time to percolate up through a bureaucracy .
In that bureaucracy you have competing forces - a group whose job it is to think up "What If's" and another whose job it is to assess them and recommend action or dismissal. Most warrant dismissal or minimal action.
With a bureaucracy you get all the human complications of power, prestige and personalities. . So they're prone to herd behaviors like vacillation and immobility and stampede that promulgate the mistrust you mentioned.
Tepco's bureaucracy failed them on this one. That's why i maintain that they needed somebody near the bottom and close to the facts of the matter, to bypass the bureaucracy and apprise those near the top that their company's whole net worth hung on a decades old PRA equation with a badly underestimated Likelihood term in it .. .
And that's how i see it in my 'view from the bottom'.
We like to place blame on an individual.
I suppose someplace there's a bureaucrat mid level manager who agreed to send back for further study that challenge to their tsunami likelihood assumptions . He gets my vote. But he's surely a lot wiser now and has suffered plenty already in self recrimination so why flog him? Act on the lesson and go on.
My old mentor was expert at shredding red tape.
But if you're at the bottom and decide to bypass middle management you'd better be doggone sure you're right.
It could've been done for this one. Challenger too.
Oddly, Three Mile Island was caused by bureaucratic over-reaction to a hypothetical "What If" . Proximal blame for that one lies with whatever bureaucrat issued the edict to operators "
Thou shalt not fill thy Pressurizer" , over some What-If called 'Pressurized Thermal Shock' . Not long afterward they changed their edict to "
Thou shalt overfill thy Pressurizer and let the water run out onto thy floor". That left Crystal River operators with a wet containment to clean up but proved the point.
That's how large brained mammals and large organizations learn - through our mistakes.
Progress not perfection..Wow i really rambled on that one,, eh? Old guys just do that. Thanks for reading it.
old jim