Medical EM fields: a plausible correlate of consciousness?

[cotarded]

http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/pdfs/cemi_theory_paper.pdf

I approached this initially with extreme skepticism, especially since it seemed impossible considering the myriad em fields we're immersed in without any perceptible effect on our consciousness, but I ultimately walked away viewing this hypothesis as an actual contender, and one of the most interesting at that. Unfortunately, I can't really be confident in my impression. Hopefully you all can help me determine the plausibility of this thing.

lates,
cotarded.
edit: deleted uncertainty concerning ability of brain to be nonresponsive to powerful magnetic fields such as MRI but sensitive to it's own endogenous fields of far lesser magnitude, after thinking about transcranial magnetic stimulation.

 

[cotarded]

It's probably taboo to reply to your own posts, but I hope I will earn a special dispensation since it provides a sort of back-of-the-movie peek into the idea to help potential readers decide whether they're up for reading the whole 28 pages (well, 25 if you don't count the references, and it's damn well worth it).

The reason I personally find this so compelling is three-fold:
1. First and foremost, it would resolve the conscious/unconscious serial/parallel dichotomies elegantly, explaining unconscious parallel activity through neuron systems, and conscious serial activity through interactions of the field generated by the whole of the brain (biased strongly towards areas that exhibit synchrony - maybe an evolved way of passing information to the "processor") with specialized, field sensitive groups of neurons.
2. It's a correlate that doesn't portray consciousness as a epiphenomenon, a byproduct without effect on the system. (although sometimes I feel that my own consciousness is much like that - if it does have control, it's the type that is described in this paper, a very slight sort of tuning or bias effect, no hands on calculation or deduction)
3. It's vague enough to cater to idle and farfetched armchair neuroscience on my behalf :). But really, with his mention of studies showing how em fields have influenced (and not insubstantially either) LTP in vivo, my imagination is set racing, thinking up elegant (mistaking oversimplification for intrinsic simplicity ;) ) explanations for problems like memory which seemed intractable to me before.

Example Conjecture:
The idea of encoding through a localized system a headspace that is repersented by the state of many discrete neuronal systems seemed totally absurd - it didn't make sense to me that it'd be localized (and it seems to be, with the hippocampus at least playing a role in the encoding, if not the final storage). Wouldn't you have to disrupt the system, or incorporate overcomplicated and bulky monitoring systems, to transfer its value to the encoding region? I had given the idea of non-local LTP the benefit of a doubt, but I couldn't reconcile it with the hippocampus' necessity. But with EM fields, it all makes sense to me. There is the so-called "inverse problem" with trying to derive the source of EEG input: there are a multitude of possible arrangements of smaller fields of different magnitudes that could sum to the final field. It seems possible to me that neurons in the hippocampus (which the paper claims as an aside have structure conducive to em sensitivity) could encode a repersentation of the current EM field, instead of some summarization of the state of the constituent circuits. Later by somehow generating a copy of the field, the neurons that generated the original field would resonate and that state of mind would be recalled. The fact that multiple inputs could generate the same field, has a converse that is equally correct, would be consistent with how some memories create a lot of interference, evoking unrelated thought processes and other memories.
Of course that whole idea is riddled with holes. And it's far from parsimonious concerning the final mention of memory conflict (which is more simply explained in the context of a neural network). And how does one regenerate the field? Maybe the inverse problem's complications in this context could be resolved with a combination of distributed LTP and EM regeneration. It also isn't consistent with many cases of hippocampal damage causing only anterograde memory loss.
Maybe through some synthesis of these concepts (neural network type memory vs. em resonance) there's a viable idea... or maybe not.

lates,
cotarded.

 

[somasimple]

hmmm,

there is electrical fields in brain since there is free ions moved/stuck around neurons membranes. But there is no clue/fact showing how consciousness will be enabled by such fields.

Some years ago Sir John Eccles, a Nobel prized, said that emeotions where nonmaterial because a friend told him that quantum physics made the thing possible. mind/brain split again! But I prefer the Occam chainsaw.

 

[cotarded]

"But there is no clue/fact showing how consciousness will be enabled by such fields."
Note I posted to a paper that cited a number of in vivo studies to further its point, as opposed to a homepage for someone's unfounded speculation. Not to be short, but obviously you haven't read the paper and I find it somewhat irritating that without doing so you dismiss the idea. As I said earlier, I was far more skeptical before reading than after; he makes a compelling case. As far as Occam's chainsaw goes, this theory actually simplifies some matters as opposed to being overcomplex.

To reiterate, I didn't come on here just asking for an offhand opinion on the question posed in the title, I was asking what you all thought of the paper which manages to make a case for it.

lates,
cotarded.

 

[zoobyshoe]

To reiterate, I didn't come on here just asking for an offhand opinion on the question posed in the title, I was asking what you all thought of the paper which manages to make a case for it.

Risking your ire, since I also haven't read the paper you linked to, I just want to say that if we start out with the premise that whatever is happening, physically, in the brain is somehow adding up to consciousness, then the dynamics of the constantly fluctuating tiny EM fields there have to be where we should first look. I'm glad you're exited about this. I don't think enough people are.

(I apologize for not having read the paper. I still haven't gotten to something hypnagogue wanted me to read a while ago about the study of consciousness.)

 

[somasimple]

Cotarded,
Before I gave my response I read the paper but it didn't change my opinion.

Conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory: Digital information within neurones is pooled and integrated to form an electromagnetic information field in the brain. Consciousness is the component of the brain’s electromagnetic information field that is transmitted to motor neurones and is thereby capable of communicating its state to the outside world.

nothing new there

• information is stored.
• neurons creates em while firing.
• some neural networks work in synchronous way via gap junctions.
• does actually an artificial recorded em field will create an emotion, just no!
• em activity is a reflexion of firing cells. (bidirectional)

http://www.somasimple.com/forums/showthread.php?t=1127
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/...ed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=1502142&query_hl=6

 

[Q_Goest]

Very quick question

Just skimming through the paper right now. Had a quick question.
On page 31 under "C. The cemi field theory of consciousness", McFadden says:

... the brain's em field holds precisely the same information as neurone firing patterns and may be involved in transmission and processing of that information. ... whereas information in neurones is digital, discrete and spatially localized, information in em fields is analogue, integrated and distributed.

Is this to say that it might be possible for all the information one is aware of (ie: all the information needed for the phenomenon of unity) is available in the EM field to all neurons? Or is this simply saying the field has a characteristic shape or configuration in which the information is spread out and related to the local action of the neurons? In other words, is the em field in the brain analogous to an em field created by a TV or radio station in which all information is present in the entire field, or is each bit of information in the field localized to the individual neurons?

 

[-Job-]

I think this idea has potential (get it? potential? ), I've read the first 14 pages and looking forward to the discussion.
I liked it the first time i heard of it because it provides a mechanism under which all the components of the human brain can come together with minimum delay. I liked the idea of having different sequences of neuron firing generating similar cemi fields, and the correlation between awareness and synchronous firing seems to be strong based on the given evidence. It also makes sense, synchronous firing really should generate much stronger EM fields because of wave interference. On the other hand i think this requires some neurons to be pretty sensitive to EM variations, i don't know if it's enough to have only already depolarized/hyperpolarized neurons be sensitive to these variations because it implies that these neurons have already been pre-stimulated, either excited or inhibited, leading me to think that the cemi field has only the ability to induce already likely neuron firing (which might well happen without impact of the EM field).
In my opinion, another thing that goes against this theory is thermal noise. I think the author realized this and made some attempts of minimizing the effects of thermal noise, and at one point these attempts are somewhat contradictory. For example in the beginning he argues that, generally, variations in the brain's endogenous EM field are of a higher magnitude than those produced by thermal noise. Later on, in his evidence he cites how some neurons from some animals are extremely sensitive to very small electric field variatios. Of this he says:

"The finding that fields that are weaker than electrical noise caused by thermal
fluctuations are still capable of modulating neurone firing could be accounted for
by a number of possible mechanisms. Stochastic resonance, whereby optimized
random noise enhances the detection of weak signals in a noisy environment, has
been proposed to be involved in neuronal signalling"

... which, in my opinion, is kind of a weak argument. There's also the possible problem of thermal noise wave interference which i would think has the potential of generating some significant variations in the brain's EM field, though i may be wrong there.

I find that the EM field certainly must have an effect on brain activity, which may very well be the framework for consciousness, but i think the author is too anxious to make that claim in a somewhat early stage. He talks about the CEMI field as containing the same information as the neurons themselves which is not unreasonable, but of course, it leaves the problem of consciousness the same. I need to see what he says in the discussion.

 

[-Job-]

In other words, is the em field in the brain analogous to an em field created by a TV or radio station in which all information is present in the entire field, or is each bit of information in the field localized to the individual neurons?

Generally, the only significant EM variations come from synchronous firing which can effect some EM field variations within a pretty big radius. Because of EM wave interference, it's impossible to determine which neurons are responsible for the EM field at any given time. This would be non-localization, especially since many such processes and chain reactions may spread and move these fluctuations around quite a bit.
So even though the information within neurons is present within the cemi field, i don't see how the brain can make sense of it, or put it to use in a non-random manner.

 

[johnjoe]

cemi field theory

hi
david kindly invited me to respond to comments on the forum re' the cemi field theory.

if we accept that consciousness is a product of brain activity then it must have some kind of physical substrate. proposing that the substrate is the matter of the brain immediately leads to the problem of understanding how discrete lumps of matter (neurons) can give rise to a unified conscious experience (the famous binding problem). But neural firing creates an em field that encodes precisely the same info as in the neurons. but unlike matter, fields are unified, so there is no binding problem.
accepting that awareness is located in the brain's em field not only solves the binding problem but it explains why synchronous firing is so strongly correlated with consciousness.
It is also allows consciousness brain activity to be mechanistically distinct from unconscious activity
and it proposes that conscious minds possesses an extra capability - field information processing - lacking in unconscious minds. McClennan and others have demonstrated that information processing through fields has many of the capabilities of quantum computing:
http://www.cs.utk.edu/~mclennan/fieldcomp.html

In answer to some criticisms posted by somasimple:
NOTHING NEW THERE

INFORMATION IS STORED.
NEURONS CREATES EM WHILE FIRING.
SOME NEURAL NETWORKS WORK IN SYNCHRONOUS WAY VIA GAP JUNCTIONS.
DOES ACTUALLY AN ARTIFICIAL RECORDED EM FIELD WILL CREATE AN EMOTION, JUST NO!
EM ACTIVITY IS A REFLEXION OF FIRING CELLS. (BIDIRECTIONAL)

first, the theory that awareness is located in the brain's em field is new, as is the proposal that the brain's em field is a component of neural computing (for conscious brain activity).
I don't consider gap juntions as being essential to the process
the question of what an artificial field 'feels' is philosophy not science. since it can't communicate we can't know. the only fields that have sufficient complexity to encode complex information (such as language) and are capable of communicating (because they have access to a motor system) are those made by human brains.
I agree with the last point. there is bidirectional communication between the neurons and the cemi field.

you can find more info at my website:
http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/cemi.htm
where you can download my two published papers on the cemi field theory

johnjoe

 

[Moonbear]

I haven't read the paper yet...just haven't had time, but I don't understand what this "binding problem" is that you refer to? There are vast neural networks within the brain, and communication occurs over long distances via synapses, gap junctions, and diffusible signals. Why would someone think consciousness would be restricted to just single neurons? And how would something as generalized as an EM field be able to convey any sort of useful information?

 

[somasimple]

Johnjoe,
I read again the paper and have some comments to add.
Certainly my first response was imprecise and didn't take the full aspect of the paper.
Electric field: the resting potential of a neuron is around -70mv and the membrane thickness around 50 nm => the E field is then around 1,400,000 Vm-1. It creates a very good immunity to noises of every kind.
Of course, a field may ne perturbed by another one and I agree that cemi field may smooths the brain activity.
I agree also to the fact that a cemi field amplitude may reflect awareness since it's a result of a synchronous firing. It is for sure integrated but not distributed, IMHO.
Not distributed because the strength of the electric field and the nature of action potential (ionic flows). I believe to gap junctions since they are known and found as the synchronisers of brain activity. Rejecting this valuable information (more than 50% of brain connections are gap junctions) is your point of view that I can't understand at the moment.
I will careffuly read the papers ans site taht you cited but already found some words I couldn't take/agree!

The neurons in our brain transmit electrical signals along and between nerve fibres. It is always assumed that the electrons...
However, all electrical circuits - and that’s basically all neurones are

Just no!

 

[somasimple]

Prog Brain Res. 2005;149:41-57.
Connexon connexions in the thalamocortical system.

Cruikshank SJ, Landisman CE, Mancilla JG, Connors BW.

Department of Neuroscience, Division of Biology & Medicine, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA.

Electrical synapses are composed of gap junction channels that interconnect neurons. They occur throughout the mammalian brain, although this has been appreciated only recently. Gap junction channels, which are made of proteins called connexins, allow ionic current and small organic molecules to pass directly between cells, usually with symmetrical ease. Here we review evidence that electrical synapses are a major feature of the inhibitory circuitry in the thalamocortical system. In the neocortex, pairs of neighboring inhibitory interneurons are often electrically coupled, and these electrical connections are remarkably specific. To date, there is evidence that five distinct subtypes of inhibitory interneurons in the cortex make electrical interconnections selectively with interneurons of the same subtype. Excitatory neurons (i.e., pyramidal and spiny stellate cells) of the mature cortex do not appear to make electrical synapses. Within the thalamus, electrical coupling is observed in the reticular nucleus, which is composed entirely of GABAergic neurons. Some pairs of inhibitory neurons in the cortex and reticular thalamus have mixed synaptic connections: chemical (GABAergic) inhibitory synapses operating in parallel with electrical synapses. Inhibitory neurons of the thalamus and cortex express the gap junction protein connexin36 (Cx36), and knocking out its gene abolishes nearly all of their electrical synapses. The electrical synapses of the thalamocortical system are strong enough to mediate robust interactions between inhibitory neurons. When pairs or groups of electrically coupled cells are excited by synaptic input, receptor agonists, or injected current, they typically display strong synchrony of both subthreshold voltage fluctuations and spikes. For example, activating metabotropic glutamate receptors on coupled pairs of cortical interneurons or on thalamic reticular neurons can induce rhythmic action potentials that are synchronized with millisecond precision. Electrical synapses offer a uniquely fast, bidirectional mechanism for coordinating local neural activity. Their widespread distribution in the thalamocortical system suggests that they serve myriad functions. We are far from a complete understanding of those functions, but recent experiments suggest that electrical synapses help to coordinate the temporal and spatial features of various forms of neural activity.

PMID: 16226575 [PubMed - in process]

 

[gerben]

I haven't read the paper yet...just haven't had time, but I don't understand what this "binding problem" is that you refer to? ...

http://www.dartmouth.edu/~adinar/publications/binding.pdf

 

[johnjoe]

cemi and gap junction

i have no problem with gap junctions being involved in neural actiivty and indeed being one of the routes by which the cemi field might influence neural firing. I just don't think they are necessary. All neurons are depolarised (and thereby fire) through the opening (and closing) of voltage-gated ion channels in their membranes. These ion channels will inevitably be sensitive the surrounding EM field. Although that influnce will generally be weak compared to the synaptic input, when the neurons are already close to the firing threshold, then the surrounding em field may provide an extra push or pull towards or against firing. As William James described it more than a century ago "if consciousness can load the dice, can exert a constant pressure in the right direction, can feel what nerve processes are leading to the goal, can reinforce and strengthen these & at the same time inhibit those that threaten to lead astray, why, consciousness will be of invaluable service”.

Gap junctions are unlikely to be necessary for consciousness. The connexin-36 (Cx36) knock-out (KO) mouse (Guldenagel et al., 2001; Buhl et al., 2003) lacks gap junctions but “showed no obvious behavioural abnormalities” (Guldenagel et al., 2001). Although the question of whether mice are conscious is obviously a matter of conjecture i find it hard to believe that a function for gap jucntions in man could be completely lacking in mice.
This finding, by the way, poses major problems for the microtubule-based quantum theories of consciosuness since they propose that quantum mechanical coherence between neurons is maintained through microtubules connecting via gap junctions.

johnjoe

 

[johnjoe]

cemi and the binding problem

The binding problem, from my first paper

"As Valerie Hardcastle (Hardcastle, 1994) put it, “given what we know about the segregated nature of the brain and the relative absence of multi-modal association areas in the cortex, how [do] conscious percepts become unified into single perceptual units?” Considering, as an example, the experience of a visualising a complex scene. Information from the retina is processed by independent groups of neurones in the retina and visual cortex specialised to detect, colour, orientation, movement, texture, shape, etc. These groups of neurones are located in distinct areas of the cortex so that the information describing each item is smeared over a large area of the visual cortex. As described above, there is considerable evidence that the neurones that recognise aspects of a single object that is the subject of selective attention, such as an apple, fire synchronously. At a neuronal level, the information representing the apple will therefore be represented as a particular pattern, or assembly, of (synchronous) neurone firing. The problem is to understand how the (simultaneous firing) of a cluster of physically separated neurones could give rise to the single unified sensation of seeing an apple. John Searle (Searle, 1980) noted that neuronal-level information could be realized by “a sequence of water pipes, or a set of wind-machines” and questioned whether the unity of perception could be maintained within a system connected by water or airflow. If not, what is special about electrochemical fluctuation traveling at 100 metres per second between neurones that is able to maintain that unity? " ...

as another way of considering the problem, it is often imagined that the complexity of the brain could be simulated by some other complex system - say the the entire population of China. Again, from my paper:

"Each Chinese person exchanges information with many hundreds or thousands of other Chinese via vibrations in air (speech) together with messages encoded on paper, electronically and visually. The entire population of China is therefore engaged in processing huge amounts of information concerning the ‘body’ of China and its environment, that is functionally similar (if not equivalent) to that performed within a human brain. Yet there is of course no evidence of any ‘higher-level consciousness’ for the population of China and it would be preposterous to propose that there are any qualia associated with the entire Chinese nation. In the cemi field theory the absence of qualia is entirely explained because the information that is being exchanged within the Chinese population is discrete and scattered amongst the many carriers of information. There is no higher-level field representation where information is integrated to generate awareness."

The entire population of China might be able to perform complex computations but the information would not be bound so there would be nothing to correspond to our conscious awareness. No one would "know" what was bing computed. But imagine instead that they were using mobile (cellular) phones for their communication. Then the information they transmit would indeed be bound into a unified physcial system - the em fields that transmit their phone signals. If awarness was located in that field then that field would "know" what was being computed.

In passing, this analysis also explains why digital computers aren't conscious. Like the entire population of China, or the unconscious neural brain (not considering the EM field), the processed information incomputers is scattered amongst a billion circuits. It never gets unified. If we wanted to make a conscious machine, we would have to process information in fields.

johnjoe

 

[somasimple]

Johnjoe,

You're coming to my side with your example.

a sequence of water pipes, or a set of wind-machines

Gap junctions are water pipes for sure!

allow ionic current and small organic molecules to pass directly between cells, usually with symmetrical ease.

And I do not understand why you're rejecting the key issue of the riddle.

BTW, we aren't speaking about free will but only awareness. A mouse is aware and consciousness is not limited to human brains.
Some people think/thought that we were superior but I'm convinced that often we are just evil animals, unconscious of the bad we create and share!

 

[Q_Goest]

Johnjoe, thanks for stopping by. I just finished reading your first paper, will read the follow up paper shortly. Just a few questions to start off with,

- What is the conventional view of the EM field in the brain? Is this field generally considered a byproduct of the neurons' activity, or only something slightly more?

- I'd like to know if you're suggesting that the em field within the brain contains the information we use for conscious experience everywhere within the brain analogous to a television or radio em field, or if the information within the field is local to each neuron. Trying to understand your paper, it seems as if you're suggesting the em field, regardless of where it is within the brain, contains all the information we are consciously aware of, though I'm not sure I understand if you're also suggesting that it contains ONLY the information we're aware of. Can you please elaborate on what information the em field holds and if all information is contained at all points or if the information within the field is local to each neuron. If you can also point out what experimental evidence there is for your conclusion, that would be great!

- On page 33, you say: "Interestingly, in Freeman's studies the em field contour maps were shown to correlate, not only with the identity of a particular odour, but with its meaning to the animal."
Could you elaborate? When I think of contour maps I think of a 2 dimensional sheet but a map of the brain must be 3 dimensional. What are these contour maps a map of? And what did the maps say about the odour having meaning?

- Toward the end of page 39 you mention something which looks like the Libet's delay: "For instance, consciousness will be associated with only the later phases of evoked responses (+250 msec), when em field disturbances have reached sufficient amplitude to influence neuron firing." Are you suggesting something to do with the Libet's delay? Can you please expand?

Thanks again for your time.

 

[johnjoe]

cemi field theory

In response to Q_Ghest's questions

- WHAT IS THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF THE EM FIELD IN THE BRAIN? IS THIS FIELD GENERALLY CONSIDERED A BYPRODUCT OF THE NEURONS' ACTIVITY, OR ONLY SOMETHING SLIGHTLY MORE?

Most neurobiologists take the view that the brain's em field is purely a product of neural firing with no relevance to its function. However, it is generally admitted that, the em field may play a role in some circumstances, such as epilepsy where an excess of synchronisation generates big EM field distrurbances in the brain.

- I'D LIKE TO KNOW IF YOU'RE SUGGESTING THAT THE EM FIELD WITHIN THE BRAIN CONTAINS THE INFORMATION WE USE FOR CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE EVERYWHERE WITHIN THE BRAIN ANALOGOUS TO A TELEVISION OR RADIO EM FIELD, OR IF THE INFORMATION WITHIN THE FIELD IS LOCAL TO EACH NEURON. TRYING TO UNDERSTAND YOUR PAPER, IT SEEMS AS IF YOU'RE SUGGESTING THE EM FIELD, REGARDLESS OF WHERE IT IS WITHIN THE BRAIN, CONTAINS ALL THE INFORMATION WE ARE CONSCIOUSLY AWARE OF, THOUGH I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND IF YOU'RE ALSO SUGGESTING THAT IT CONTAINS ONLY THE INFORMATION WE'RE AWARE OF. CAN YOU PLEASE ELABORATE ON WHAT INFORMATION THE EM FIELD HOLDS AND IF ALL INFORMATION IS CONTAINED AT ALL POINTS OR IF THE INFORMATION WITHIN THE FIELD IS LOCAL TO EACH NEURON. IF YOU CAN ALSO POINT OUT WHAT EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE THERE IS FOR YOUR CONCLUSION, THAT WOULD BE GREAT!

Here I have to rely on my biologist's imperfect understanding of EM fields (or indeed any field). As i understand things, the information in em fields is delocalised so that the entire informational content of an em field can be downloaded from any point in the field - radio antenae surely make use of this property. You could even follow Einstein in taking an imaginary ride on a photon in the brain. Because it travels at the speed of light, it is everywhere in the brain at the same instant of time. So, from the reference point of a photon in the brain’s em field (if there is such a reference point) there is no time or space between any of the information in that field – it is unified with the same level of unity as a single photon (but packed with information). Now if awareness is located in that photon then the photon would be ‘aware’ of all the information that it is causally connected to. But not all of that information may be downloaded to neurons. And only that informational component of the brain’s em field that is able to affect neural firing patterns can communicate. So reportable consciousness will be limited to the informational content of the brain’s em field that influences neural firing patterns.
There is experimental evidence that em fields influence brain activity – from the use of TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) to change behaviour. The fields generated by TMS are similar in magnitude to endogenous fields so if the TMS fields can change behaviour then so can the endogenous fields.

- ON PAGE 33, YOU SAY: "INTERESTINGLY, IN FREEMAN'S STUDIES THE EM FIELD CONTOUR MAPS WERE SHOWN TO CORRELATE, NOT ONLY WITH THE IDENTITY OF A PARTICULAR ODOUR, BUT WITH ITS MEANING TO THE ANIMAL."
COULD YOU ELABORATE? WHEN I THINK OF CONTOUR MAPS I THINK OF A 2 DIMENSIONAL SHEET BUT A MAP OF THE BRAIN MUST BE 3 DIMENSIONAL. WHAT ARE THESE CONTOUR MAPS A MAP OF? AND WHAT DID THE MAPS SAY ABOUT THE ODOUR HAVING MEANING?

Firstly the maps are simply three dimensional representation of the two dimensional surface of the brain with the third dimension being the electrical potential at each point. What Freeman meant by “meaning” was that the maps correlated not with the unprocessed information (presence of odour) but its significance to the animal (whether it’s presence was a good or bad thing)
-

- TOWARD THE END OF PAGE 39 YOU MENTION SOMETHING WHICH LOOKS LIKE THE LIBET'S DELAY: "FOR INSTANCE, CONSCIOUSNESS WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH ONLY THE LATER PHASES OF EVOKED RESPONSES (+250 MSEC), WHEN EM FIELD DISTURBANCES HAVE REACHED SUFFICIENT AMPLITUDE TO INFLUENCE NEURON FIRING." ARE YOU SUGGESTING SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE LIBET'S DELAY? CAN YOU PLEASE EXPAND?

I’ve never seen the problem with Libet’s experiments demonstrating the existence of neural activity that predicts an action before awareness of the intention to perform that action. Of course it does. Anything else would violate causality.
Interpreted in the cemi field theory, neural activity is associated with reiterating circuits that create waves of synchronously-firing neurons. As these circuits recruit more and more neurons the waves become deeper and the em field disturbances associated with them become stronger. The information in those circuits, though initially unconscious (because the em fields were too weak to influence neural firing patterns) will gradually build up and invade our conscious mind (the brain’s em field) until they are of sufficient strength for us to be able to report our intention to act (the em field disturbances become sufficiently strong to influence neural firing patterns and thereby download their informational content into say speech).
Thus our awareness of our intention to act will always be preceded by unconscious neural activity.


re' somasimple's point. I'm not rejecting gap jucntions as being involved in conciousness but the mouse experiemtns demosntrate that they are crucial to it (at least if you accept that mice are conscious, which apprently you do)


johnjoe

 

[Q_Goest]

As i understand things, the information in em fields is delocalised so that the entire informational content of an em field can be downloaded from any point in the field - radio antenae surely make use of this property.

It's this aspect of the theory I find the most compelling. Very briefly, a brain in a vat should maintain all phenomena such as unity that a brain in a human does as long as the vat brain is provided with equivalent inputs and outputs. From an engineering perspective, control volume theory (my own work) indicates that disassembling the brain into it's constituent neurons and putting each of those into a vat while maintaining the inputs/outputs to each neuron, should similarly maintain the sensation of unity. I don't know if that's possible, but if it is, the only way of maintaining unity in such a case is to have all information available to the consciously aware neurons such as one might find in a field theory. Control volume theory also rules out the possibility of unity in conventional computers. So what I find most interesting is that cemi field theory attempts to demonstrate just this kind of interaction between neuron and field because without the field, control volume theory seems to prove that unity is impossible.

If we assume all the information is in the em field, then just like a radio or TV, we should expect that a device capable of deciphering these fields would be able to output exactly what we are consciously aware of. I didn't notice that as a prediction in your first paper, and I'm curious to know why you didn't make this a prediction. Perhaps one of the difficulties is the em field also contains a lot of other noise unrelated to consciousness?

You also mention that cemi field theory is the proposal that consciousness corresponds to only that component of the brain's em field that impacts on motor activity, the most likely being neurons in the cerebral cortex involved in initiating motor actions. However, it is my understanding that those neurons whose activity can be corrolated with consciousness are called "neural corrolates of consciousness" and primarily include the thalamus. I don't know enough about the brain to know exactly what the differences are, but it seems there is a difference of opinion here regarding the 'location' of consciousness. Why does cemi field theory require that em fields interact with the cerebral cortex as opposed to the thalamus?

(Minor gramatical edit)

 

[-Job-]

Just to clarify, is JohnJoe the author of the posted paper?

 

[Q_Goest]

Just to clarify, is JohnJoe the author of the posted paper?

Yes. I emailed him an invitation to join us in this discussion. Johnjoe is a well known molecular biologist. From his web site:

He obtained his PhD at Imperial College London and went on to work on human genetic diseases and then infectious diseases, at the University of Surrey in Guildford, UK. For more than a decade, Professor McFadden has specialised in examining the genetics of microbes such as the agents of tuberculosis and meningitis. He has published more than 100 articles in scientific journals on subjects as wide-ranging as bacterial genetics, tuberculosis, idiopathic diseases and computer modelling of evolution and has edited a book on the genetics of mycobacteria. He has lectured extensively in the UK, Europe, the USA and Japan and his work has been featured in radio, television and national newspaper articles. His present post is Professor of Molecular Genetics at the University of Surrey. He lives in London and is married with a young son.

Ref: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/

 

[Q_Goest]

I've started reading http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/pdfs/mcfadden_JCS2002b.pdf" , published 5 months later in the same journal (J of CS). The first paper discusses the theory, but the second really addresses various comments and criticisms, and it is this paper which really seems to help explain the theory. I'd suggest reading it if you're interested in cemi field theory.

In my previous post I asked:

If we assume all the information is in the em field, then just like a radio or TV, we should expect that a device capable of deciphering these fields would be able to output exactly what we are consciously aware of. I didn't notice that as a prediction in your first paper, and I'm curious to know why you didn't make this a prediction. Perhaps one of the difficulties is the em field also contains a lot of other noise unrelated to consciousness?

I see this question is addressed in the follow on paper under the heading "Pockett's difficulty 2" (pg 48) The point is that "there actually is no one-to-one correspondence between electromagnetic patterns measurable at the scalp or surface of the brain and the conscious sensations experienced by the "owner" of the brain." It is pointed out that only a tiny component of the information held in the field can correspond to consciousness.

"The defining feature is rather the informational content and its ability to be communicated (downloaded) to motor neurons."

I believe the way field information is intended to be communicated or downloaded is per the neurons being in a state which is highly sensitive to field fluctuations.

… information in the em field is communicated to neurons via the influence of electromagnetic induction on voltage-gated ion channels.

On this point, there is actually some (I think) very interesting information. Apparently, a "field-sensitive electronic circuit" was developed, albeit accidentally. Page 53 provides the following regarding an experiment performed on this circuit by the School of Cognitive & Computing Sciences (COGS) group at Sussex University:

The group used a silicon chip known as a field-programmable gate array, comprised of an array of cells. Electronic switches distributed through the array allow the behavior and connections of the cells to be reconfigured from software. Starting from a population of random configurations, the hardware was evolved to perform a task, in this case, distinguishing between two tones. After about 5,000 generations the network could efficiently perform its task. When the group examined the evolved network they discovered that it utilized only 32 of the 100 FPGA cells. The remaining cells could be disconnected from the network without affecting performance. However, when the circuit diagram of the critical network was examined it was found that some of the essential cells, although apparently necessary for network performance (if disconnected, the network failed), were not connected by wires to the rest of the circuit. According to the researchers, the most likely explanation seems to be that these cells were contributing to the network through electromagnetic coupling - filed effects - between components in the circuit. It is very intriguing that evolution of an artificial neural network appeared to capture field effects spontaneously as a way of optimizing computational performance. This suggests that natural evolution of neural networks in the brain would similarly capture field effects, precisely as proposed in the cemi field theory.

*

On another topic, it seems one of the fundamental arguments Johnjoe has for dismissing conventional approaches is given on page 55. The analogy of replacing neurons with people is used. Signaling between people is done strictly by person to person transfers of information. The question then is, how can unity come about?

At this point, neural identity theorists generally claim that the percept is some kind of emergent property of the entire network ('it is the whole network that knows') . . .

Although I'd fully agree and would add that "emergence" (ie: strong emergence as defined as being irreducible) is a rather mystical concept that I can't agree with. It smacks of an almost religious requirement to believe or have faith in a concept which although it may have causal properties, it is irreducible.

The problem I see with this is the same problem I see with the counter argument which Chalmers makes regarding the replacement of a neuron with a computer chip thought experiment. Both of these are analogies, and as such analogies will never be accepted as proof. If one can't prove their own theory, it seems an alternative might be to disprove a competing one, but analogies can't be used as proof IMHO. The paper would be much stronger if the analogy provided were instead a solid, provable argument.

 

[somasimple]

Hi,

There is experimental evidence that em fields influence brain activity – from the use of TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) to change behaviour. The fields generated by TMS are similar in magnitude to endogenous fields so if the TMS fields can change behaviour then so can the endogenous fields.

This sentence doesn't bring a proof about anything.
Many neurons may fire with many means.
We can actually stimulate an axon with light but I can't conclude that brain is a photonic unit/computer.

The Chinese metaphor is weak since people haven't any inner vision of the other. Gap junction is a direct tube that creates giant networks and enhance drammatically the function of thse networks. It creates super-cells.
More, you forget the importance of glial cells.

 

[johnjoe]

cemi theory, proof and artifical consciousness

proving a theory/hypothesis re' consciousness is always going to be a tall order but in my first paper i provide 7 predictions based on the theory:
1. Stimuli that reach conscious awareness will be associated with em field modulations that are strong enough to directly influence the firing of motor neurones.
2. Stimuli that do not reach conscious awareness will not be associated with em field modulations that affect motor neurone firing.
3. The cemi field theory claims that consciousness represents a stream of information passing through the brain’s em field. Increased complexity of conscious thinking should therefore correlate with increased complexity of the brain’s em field.
4. Agents that disrupt the interaction between the brain’s em field and neurones will induce unconsciousness.
5. Arousal and alertness will correlate with conditions in which em field fluctuations are most likely to influence neurone firing; conversely, low arousal and unconsciousness will correlate with conditions when em fields are least likely to influence neurone firing.
6. The brain’s em field should be relatively insulated to perturbation from exogenous em fields encountered in normal environments.
7. The evolution of consciousness in animals should correlate with an increasing level of electrical coupling between the brain’s endogenous em field and (receiver) neurone firing.
8. Consciousness should demonstrate field-level dynamics.

As discussed in the paper, where we already have information it does indeed correspond to the predictions. The unknowns (eg. 7 and 8) remain to be tested.

I believe the only way to really prove the theory would be to create an artificial intelligence (computer) with the same processing capability as the human brain but with the capability of switching ON of OFF EM field sensitivity for its processing. I would predict that only the ON state would be associated with consciosness. But how to test for consciousness?

I make a negative prediction here, that those activities we can only perform consciously (such as holding a intelligent conversation) actually require consciousness so they will never be emulated successfully in an (unconscious) digital system. So i predict that no digital computer will ever pass the Turing test. If a digital computer can prove that it is conscious then I would accept the cemi field theory is wrong.
So the theory is refutable - probably in our lifetime. And it points to a novel route towards artificial consciousness - make field-sensitive computers!

I don't really understand somasimple's point. The TMS findings clearly demonstrate that the brain's em field (of similar strength to the TMS fields) is very likely to impact on neural activity. So the brain's em field has an impact on phenotype and, like the em-sensitive circuits discussed b G-Quest, woudl have been subject to (natural) selection. That natural selection, I claim, resulted in the evolution of consciousness.
I have no problems with gap junctions but the mouse experiments I discussed in earlier emails suggest that at least mice can do without them. So i don't see how you can continue to argue that are are essential for either neural computation or consciosness?

johnjoe

 

[somasimple]

Johnjoe,

A mouse is not an human and I agree with many scientists that the consciousness of a mouse is 0.1 when we are 10. See Damasio works and you'll understand that it is an old thing, very old in fact, in term of evolution and certainly located in brainstem/thalamus. Strangely these structures have the greatest loops that go to cortices.

Reading these three books just bring some light on the complexity of the problems and show there are more than one consciouness.

Secondly the delays that exist between all the incoming stimuli exclude that they may be recalled without creating these delays. Thus, an unitary field may have problems to creates these intervalls.

 

[Q_Goest]

Somasimple wrote: The Chinese metaphor is weak since people haven't any inner vision of the other. Gap junction is a direct tube that creates giant networks and enhance drammatically the function of thse networks. It creates super-cells.

I wouldn't call the Chinese metaphor weak, it's simply an analogy and not a proof. What I question is, how is a gap junction analogous to a direct tube or super-cell and what are these things anyway? Are these additional metaphors? And what do you mean by the people haven't any inner vision of the other? They may have sight of the persons they are connected to for example, just as neurons might exchange information with the neurons they are connected to (the conventional concept of how neurons interact).

Certainly from the perspective of computationalism, a neuron is a switching unit capable of only acting on what inputs and outputs it receives from those neurons with which it is connected. From that perspective, the analogy to a person receiving inputs and outputs directly from immediate contacts with other people is straightforward. If for example, one receives a handshake from person A, they have no idea where person A got the instruction to give you a handshake from or what it means. In addition, a computer made of properly programmed (ie: connected) humans exchanging handshakes is equal to and is capable of performing any mathematical computation that a computer with an equal number of switches and connections is capable of. If neurons in the brain act as if they are nothing more than mechanical switches interacting with each other, then one is hard pressed to point out any significant difference between a group of people trading handshakes and neurons trading ions.

The whole point of the analogy is to point out that no where within the group of people, and by analogy the group of neurons, where one can find any integrated information to form a unified perception of the world, hence the binding problem. To explain this problem, computationalists rely on "emergence" which is something of a hand waving exercise that says the phenomenon of unity is a property of all the interactions and not single or small group of them. Unfortunately, emergence has only ever been seriously considered in science at the molecular level, far below the level of switches in a computer. At the level of a computer, emergence is only a philosophical concept, not a scientific one.

I'd agree with you that the hand shaking analogy is weak, but then I'd also have to point out that Chalmers analogy of replacing a neuron with a computer chip is weak. They are both analogies and can't be used as proof. What makes the cemi field theory interesting is it provides a mechanism which might be used to create or otherwise explain the phenomenon of unity. It also provides specific predictions which are debatable by others more familiar with the details than I.

 

[-Job-]

One thing that seems to go against this theory is the fact that some people who have undergone brain surgery while conscious report feeling normal even though the brain is exposed. In the link below it is stated that the patient said he felt fine during the opration, with the only visible effect in his behavior coming from an electrical pulse. We might say that though a little muddled at the end, the patient was conscious throughout the process. Seeing as his brain was directly exposed to the environment, if the brain's em field plays a key role in consciousness, then i would expect either the patient to go unconscious or perform involuntary actions (not induced by an electrical pulse or "poking") since variations in em fields in his environment would now be able to directly interact with the cemi field. Or perhaps your prediction #6 may not be necessary.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3542331.stm

Throughout the surgery, Adrian was asked to identify a series of pictures, such as a tripod, a compass and an accordion.

He could see his opened brain on a large television screen beside him.

"I feel fine, absolutely fine," he told the surgical team, halfway through the operation. "I want you to get as much out as you can."

 

[hypnagogue]

However, it is my understanding that those neurons whose activity can be corrolated with consciousness are called "neural corrolates of consciousness" and primarily include the thalamus.

The proper functioning of the thalamus is a necessary condition for consciousness, but when we talk about NCCs, we are more interested in those neural systems that provide minimally sufficient conditions for consciousness or various features thereof, given some background conditions. The thalamus seems to fall more in the "background condition" category than the one of primary interest, although it perhaps could turn out that the thalamus itself presents some sufficient conditions for consciousness in some very general and basic sense.

In any case, many NCCs do seem to reside in various regions of the cortex (for example, conscious sensory perceptions seem to correlate best with various sensory processing regions in cortex, e.g. a visual processing stream extending from occipital to temporal lobes for visual consciousness, the temporal lobes for auditory consciousness, etc). However, it seems likely that there are subcortical NCCs as well; for instance, NCCs for various subjectively experienced emotions may be focused particularly in the limbic system and nearby subcortical structures.

 

[Moonbear]

Gap junctions are unlikely to be necessary for consciousness. The connexin-36 (Cx36) knock-out (KO) mouse (Guldenagel et al., 2001; Buhl et al., 2003) lacks gap junctions but “showed no obvious behavioural abnormalities” (Guldenagel et al., 2001). Although the question of whether mice are conscious is obviously a matter of conjecture i find it hard to believe that a function for gap jucntions in man could be completely lacking in mice.

Several problems with this interpretation. First, "no obvious behavioral abnormalities," does not mean "NO behavioral abnormalities." It means the mice appear to locomote normally, are capable of breeding, and nothing really stands out as unusual. There was no reference to any rigorous behavioral testing in the Guldanagel et al., 2001 paper. It's basically a way of saying, "we think the mice are healthy enough to not require any special care."

Second, and more importantly, they provide NO evidence that gap junctions are disrupted or non-functional following this deletion. The Guldenagel paper refers to Connexin-36 being primarily found in retina (that was the focus of their study). Another study using hippocampal slices from the Cx36 KO mice found only subtle effects, and indicate that other gap junctions are likely preserved.

The remaining ripples in CA1 of Cx36 -/- mice were largely normal, indicating that, besides Cx36, other connexins play a role in synchronisation. A possible candidate is Cx47, whose mRNA seems to be present in all principal cell layers of the hippocampus (Teubner et al. 2001).

From: Maier N, Guldenagel M, Sohl G, Siegmund H, Willecke K, Draguhn A. 2002 Reduction of high-frequency network oscillations (ripples) and pathological network discharges in hippocampal slices from connexin 36-deficient mice. J Physiol. 541(Pt 2):521-8.

Just eliminating one protein found in one type of gap junction does not mean all gap junctions were disrupted, or that there wasn't a compensatory increase in another related protein that maintained function. All this says is that Connexin 36 isn't sufficient on its own to disrupt all neural synchronization.

 

[Moonbear]

Certainly from the perspective of computationalism, a neuron is a switching unit capable of only acting on what inputs and outputs it receives from those neurons with which it is connected. From that perspective, the analogy to a person receiving inputs and outputs directly from immediate contacts with other people is straightforward. If for example, one receives a handshake from person A, they have no idea where person A got the instruction to give you a handshake from or what it means. In addition, a computer made of properly programmed (ie: connected) humans exchanging handshakes is equal to and is capable of performing any mathematical computation that a computer with an equal number of switches and connections is capable of. If neurons in the brain act as if they are nothing more than mechanical switches interacting with each other, then one is hard pressed to point out any significant difference between a group of people trading handshakes and neurons trading ions...

I'd agree with you that the hand shaking analogy is weak, but then I'd also have to point out that Chalmers analogy of replacing a neuron with a computer chip is weak. They are both analogies and can't be used as proof. What makes the cemi field theory interesting is it provides a mechanism which might be used to create or otherwise explain the phenomenon of unity. It also provides specific predictions which are debatable by others more familiar with the details than I.

Comparing a neuron to a computer chip is weak as well. The problem with the "switch" and "connection" analogy is that it also ignores diffusible signals in the brain, such as neurohormones that are released in CSF and can rapidly reach many areas of the brain without direct synaptic contacts. As somasimple pointed out, glial cells are also contributing to communication in the brain.

The most troubling part of this whole CEMI field theory to me is that I don't see how a signal that would be distorted by passing through the very substrate that produces it could have any useful function as a means of transmitting information. Wouldn't the field produced by a neuron in say the prefrontal cortex be completely degraded before it could reach the thalamus or hippocampus? The concept might work in a tiny mouse brain, but in something as large as a human brain, it just makes little sense that such a weak field could do much to synchronize function over large areas of the brain, as is proposed.

Yet another contradiction to this idea that these EM fields, detectable by local EEG recordings, are involved in consciousness is that in anesthetized rats (I'm sure we can all agree that depending on the plane of anesthesia, an anesthetized animal at least has reduced consciousness) treated with amphetamine, EEG recordings in the frontal cortex show arousal. This EEG indicator of arousal in these anesthetized rats can be blocked with noradrenergic beta-receptor antagonists.
Berridge CW, Morris MF. 2000 Amphetamine-induced activation of forebrain EEG is prevented by noradrenergic beta-receptor blockade in the halothane-anesthetized rat. Psychopharmacology 148(3):307-13.

There are some other papers I came across on a quick search that indicate similar "arousal" on an EEG recording following various treatments in anesthetized animals, but am not citing them because I don't have access to the full articles, just the abstracts at this time.

 

[somasimple]

Hi All,

About Thalamus/and sub cortical cores: Damasio explains its theory with marvelous examples of patients and shows the subtle difference it exists between the different kind of consciousness.
He start with an uncounscious man able to walk and takes a cup and drinks and walks. Marvellous. And follows some seizure problems that shows how and why, consciousness doesn't need cortices.

Chinese/gap junction.
Imagine ten people talking together (that's already a problem!). I can say that A talks to B... But A doesn't know what B thinks when A talks... B knows what A thinks because A told B...

Imagine now a world where we are interconnected with tubes directly with our circulatory system. The rule is simple. It allows to balance pressure between the connected people. If an event arrives and changes my heart rate and pressure thus my family is alerted and as a familiy we could choose a better behaviour since it is spread with speed and accuracy.

Imagine now ten people connected by their brain... That is what gap junctions create with our thinking cells.

 

[zoobyshoe]

Hi All,
About Thalamus/and sub cortical cores: Damasio explains its theory with marvelous examples of patients and shows the subtle difference it exists between the different kind of consciousness.
He start with an uncounscious man able to walk and takes a cup and drinks and walks. Marvellous. And follows some seizure problems that shows how and why, consciousness doesn't need cortices.

You're saying he shows the thalamus alone is all that is needed?

 

[somasimple]

No,

It is a master piece. And Evolution gave us consciousness for a better adaptivity. There is a NCC that needs the pre-frontal cortex to be be achieved for a consciousness as we "know" it.
There is a low level one enabled with these old brain structures.

https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0156010755/?tag=pfamazon01-20

This book shows there is many examples where we are fooled by aspect of conscious activity but there are a subconsciousone.

 

[zoobyshoe]

No,
It is a master piece. And Evolution gave us consciousness for a better adaptivity. There is a NCC that needs the pre-frontal cortex to be be achieved for a consciousness as we "know" it.
There is a low level one enabled with these old brain structures.

Which old brain structures?

 

[somasimple]

Well,

The problem with Damasio is that he is not totally clear and says that parts are mandadory and form as you said a NCC. He said with medical examples that cortices aren't necessary for consciousness neither language.
He proceeds by elimination and it seems probable that the core-consciousness which enables the extended one we are speaking is enabled by thalamus, hypo-thalamus, cingulates, brainstem. The pre-frontal is mandatory for the extended (as many other sites).

 

[johnjoe]

Several problems with this interpretation. First, "no obvious behavioral abnormalities," does not mean "NO behavioral abnormalities." It means the mice appear to locomote normally, are capable of breeding, and nothing really stands out as unusual. There was no reference to any rigorous behavioral testing in the Guldanagel et al., 2001 paper. It's basically a way of saying, "we think the mice are healthy enough to not require any special care."
Second, and more importantly, they provide NO evidence that gap junctions are disrupted or non-functional following this deletion. The Guldenagel paper refers to Connexin-36 being primarily found in retina (that was the focus of their study). Another study using hippocampal slices from the Cx36 KO mice found only subtle effects, and indicate that other gap junctions are likely preserved.
From: Maier N, Guldenagel M, Sohl G, Siegmund H, Willecke K, Draguhn A. 2002 Reduction of high-frequency network oscillations (ripples) and pathological network discharges in hippocampal slices from connexin 36-deficient mice. J Physiol. 541(Pt 2):521-8.
Just eliminating one protein found in one type of gap junction does not mean all gap junctions were disrupted, or that there wasn't a compensatory increase in another related protein that maintained function. All this says is that Connexin 36 isn't sufficient on its own to disrupt all neural synchronization.

[Johnjoe]
But connexion 36 is the major gap junction protein in the mouse brain. Subsequent have confirmed that the KO mice completely lacked ANY functional gap junctions in the brain. See for instance,

De Zeeuw, C. I. et al (2003) Deformation of Network Connectivity in the Inferior Olive of Connexin 36-Deficient Mice Is Compensated by Morphological and Electrophysiological Changes at the Single Neuron Level. The Journal of Neuroscience, June 1, 2003, 23(11):4700-4711

One of the tests the authors performed was to inject Lucifer yellow into olivary neurons. With functional gap junctions [of any kind!] in the wild-type mouse the dye spreads to adjacent neurons but “ in all Cx36-deficient mice, the injections resulted in labeling of single neurons only (n = 16), whereas those in the wild types always provided clusters of multiple neurons (n = 18, with an average of 8 ± 3.8).”
The authors go on to perform electrophysiology measurements that lead them to conclude that “no functional gap junctions exist in the homozygous mutants.”.
Similar studies have been performed by several other authors and the conclusion is firm that the KO mice lack functional gap junctions in those parts of the brain that have been investigated.
That the mice still demonstrate rhythmic oscillations in the brain is very interesting. The above study found evidence that the mice compensate for loss of gap junctions by making their neuronal membranes more electrically sensitive. This would make them more sensitive to EM fields (although that hasn’t yet been demonstrated) so it may be that EM fields are maintaining synchronicity in these mice.


johnjoe

 

[johnjoe]

The most troubling part of this whole CEMI field theory to me is that I don't see how a signal that would be distorted by passing through the very substrate that produces it could have any useful function as a means of transmitting information. Wouldn't the field produced by a neuron in say the prefrontal cortex be completely degraded before it could reach the thalamus or hippocampus? The concept might work in a tiny mouse brain, but in something as large as a human brain, it just makes little sense that such a weak field could do much to synchronize function over large areas of the brain, as is proposed.
[johnjoe]
this objection is based on a misconception that the EM signals have to be free of distortion to convey information. Distortion is irrelevant so long as the information in a signal is not degraded. If the EM field and one point can predict the neural activity at another point then useful information is transmitted. so although the EM field may be largely deformed by its passage through the brain it can still funtion to transmit information rapidly through the entire volume of the brain.

Yet another contradiction to this idea that these EM fields, detectable by local EEG recordings, are involved in consciousness is that in anesthetized rats (I'm sure we can all agree that depending on the plane of anesthesia, an anesthetized animal at least has reduced consciousness) treated with amphetamine, EEG recordings in the frontal cortex show arousal. This EEG indicator of arousal in these anesthetized rats can be blocked with noradrenergic beta-receptor antagonists.
Berridge CW, Morris MF. 2000 Amphetamine-induced activation of forebrain EEG is prevented by noradrenergic beta-receptor blockade in the halothane-anesthetized rat. Psychopharmacology 148(3):307-13.

[johnjoe]
I'm not clear on the significance of these findings. amphetamines are thought to induce arousal noradrenergic beta-receptorin the brain and this arousal can be detected by EEG. the paper showed that blocking the noradrenergic beta-receptors prevented the EEG arousal signal in anaesthetised rats. Is the point that you get EEG signals of arousal in a (presumably unconscious) anaesthetised animal? But the EEG signals are generated by neuronal firing that similarly would be an neural 'indicator' of arousal. Does that indicate that neurons aren't necessary for consciousness? The conclusion must surely be that either neuronal activity and/or EM fields are necessary but not sufficient for reportable consciousness. anaeasthetics must block some downstream processes (eg. motor and/or memory) that prevents reportable consciosuness.

johnjoe

 

[somasimple]

Johnjoe,

Supposing that I take your theory.

1/ shape of brain and orientation of pyramidal cells (they are quite ever oriented to the cortex surface).
2/ the resulting EM field will be then ever a sum/subtraction linked of firing cells.
3/ the resulting field couldn't be a legit representation of the original neural activation.
4/ we are encountering the same limitations with other modalities (RMI, PET, EEG...)

IMHO, it is like I get all characters that make a Bible and try to reconstruct it.
The unified/integrated field is just like making this huge trial.

 

[zoobyshoe]

Well,
The problem with Damasio is that he is not totally clear and says that parts are mandadory and form as you said a NCC.

Actually, I never use the term NCC.

He said with medical examples that cortices aren't necessary for consciousness neither language.
He proceeds by elimination and it seems probable that the core-consciousness which enables the extended one we are speaking is enabled by thalamus, hypo-thalamus, cingulates, brainstem. The pre-frontal is mandatory for the extended (as many other sites).

This makes sense to me in principle. When things are subtracted by disease or trauma you get a more diminished consciousness. The notion of cross referencing between patients to see what parts appear to be necessary for what level or kind of consciousness seems sound.

 

[somasimple]

Hi,

Damasio says, too, that core-consciousness is an old thing because its first goal is an enhancing of the homeostatis process. Homeostasis is governed by old brainstem structures.

Many patients who lost consciousness (seizures/kinetic automatism) lost egally the ability to shows the primary emotions. Primary emotions are located also in these old structures and many animals share the same ones.

Thus, it seems probable that core-consciousness is an enhancement of the reward system used to maintain homeostasis.

 

[zoobyshoe]

Hi,
Damasio says, too, that core-consciousness is an old thing because its first goal is an enhancing of the homeostatis process. Homeostasis is governed by old brainstem structures.

This, I can't say anything about. Never looked into it.

Many patients who lost consciousness (seizures/kinetic automatism) lost egally the ability to shows the primary emotions. Primary emotions are located also in these old structures and many animals share the same ones.

I get the impression from "kinetic automatism" that he's talking about what are called complex-partial seizures. Partial seizures are either classified as simple, which means there is no impairment of consciousness whatever, or complex, which means there is a greater or lesser defect of consciousness.
As far as they know, so long as seizure activity remains in one single hemisphere, regardless of how many lobes the activity spreads to, the seizure will remain simple: consciousness will not be impaired. The impairment of consciousness in a complex partial seems only to arise from the spreading of simple partial seizure activity across into the other hemisphere.
The defect of consciousness that results is extremely peculiar and manifests quite differently from patient to patient. It is also quite distinct from the complete loss of consciousness that you get in absense seizures ("Petite Mal"), tonic-clonic seizures ("Grand Mal") and atonic seizures ("Drop Seizures") . These latter render the person completely unconscious by interfering with the thalamus.
In the complex-partial seizure you get all kinds of levels of this "defect" of consciousness, and always amnesia for the incident after it occurs. The "average" CP renders the person about as responsive to the environment as a sleepwalker: they're still vaguely responsive to some sensory imput, but seem more focused on some compelling illusory world, or just plain stupified. This state is usually accompanied by "automatisms": repeated movements and gestures.
As for not being able to show primary emotions, I'm not sure that is generally true. It is only true that whatever emotions they show aren't going to be appropriate to the stimulus. One woman posted on an Epilepsy website saying her husband told her that during her seizures she pulled him close and whispered gibberish with a high emotional valence to him "It sounded like you were trying to tell me something really important". Another person at that site was told by relatives his seizures were screaming sessions. Also: a caution that is repeated over and over again to the loved ones of people with complex partials is to never try to move them around during a seizure, because the reaction is almost always one of hostility, and even violence:
In "The Making Of A Psychiatrist", by David Viscount, he tells of an "uncooperative" man who was brought into a psych ward where he was an intern, by police. This man was surly, and had fought them when they brought him in. He looked directly at anyone who addressed him and responded with an answer that was not gibberish, but which had nothing to do with what they'd asked. No one could figure this out. They put him in a room and left him there. Later the author happened to walk by and see the guy was having a tonic-clonic seizure. Suddenly he realized the initial behaviour was a complex-partial which had later generalized to the tonic-clonic.
People having CP's are certainly not unconscious, a term which applies to someone in a coma, but they aren't what you could properly call conscious either. That's why they've settled on speaking about this as a "defect of consciousness". And while sometimes they have a flat affect and seem stupified, I don't think this represents an inability to feel emotion. Some people with CP's get plenty emotional despite the defect of consciousness.

 

[somasimple]

Hi,

Here is a link for some usefuls paper by Damasio
http://www.medicine.uiowa.edu/adolphs/documents.html

 

[Q_Goest]

Hypnagogue, thanks for the post on NCC's. It seems to me there must be a fairly localized portion of the brain which is responsible for consciousness, some boundry must exist within the body between neurons that support consciuosness and those that don't. One can use extreme examples as a way of proving this, obviously we can remove neurons in the limbs, and even quadrapalegics have no significant impact to consciousness. I would suspect there are neurons even in the brain which are used to interpret visual, audible, and other sensory signals which shouldn't have any significant impact on consciousness along with neurons that control various involuntary parts of the body such as the heart, breathing, etc...

I'm not suggesting there's a single group of neurons that are solely responsible, the group could even change from moment to moment, conscious experience dancing around within the brain as it were. But I have to believe that everyone recognizes there is a boundry and the only issue is where that boundry is. Saying it is the entire brain and cutting it off at the spinal cord may not correspond to reality.

 

[somasimple]

Brain. 2003 Jul;126(Pt 7):1524-36. Epub 2003 Jun 4.
Neuroanatomical correlates of brainstem coma.

Parvizi J, Damasio AR.

Department of Neurology, Division of Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Iowa College of Medicine, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA. parvizi.josef@mayo.edu

The brainstem tegmentum, including the reticular formation, contains distinct nuclei, each of which has a set of chemical, physiological and anatomical features. Damage to the brainstem tegmentum is known to cause coma, the most radical disturbance of consciousness. However, it has remained unclear which nuclei within the tegmentum are crucial for the maintenance of consciousness in humans. Accordingly, we initiated a retrospective study of MRIs obtained from 47 patients with brainstem stroke. The lesion boundaries were charted on patient MRIs and transferred onto a corresponding series of 4.7 T MRIs obtained from a control brainstem specimen that later was cut on a freezing microtome and analysed histologically. In addition, medical charts and available post-mortem materials were used to obtain relevant clinical and anatomical data to verify the MRI readings in each case. We found that in the 38 patients who did not have coma, brainstem damage either was located outside the tegmentum (n = 29) or produced a very small and unilateral compromise of the tegmentum (n = 9). In contrast, in patients who had coma (n = 9), the lesions in the tegmentum were mostly bilateral (n = 7) and were located either in the pons alone (n = 4) or in the upper pons and the midbrain (n = 5). The maximum overlap territory of the lesions coincided with the location of the rostral raphe complex, locus coeruleus, laterodorsal tegmental nucleus, nucleus pontis oralis, parabrachial nucleus and the white matter in between these nuclei. We also found that four coma subjects developed hyperthermia and died in the absence of any infections. In these cases, the maximum lesion overlap was centred in the core of pontine tegmentum. Our findings suggest that lesions confined to the upper pons can cause coma in humans even in the absence of damage to the midbrain. The findings also point to the brainstem nuclei whose lesions are likely to be associated with loss of consciousness and fatal hyperthermia in humans.

PMID: 12805123 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Job. I like your question, and thought it would be a good kick off point to some discussion around the central feature of the cemi field theory.

One thing that seems to go against this theory is the fact that some people who have undergone brain surgery while conscious report feeling normal even though the brain is exposed.

There are two ways to reduce or eliminate the impact of stray em fields and I believe both are needed for the cemi field theory and both are actually discussed in the papers.
1. Neurons must be reasonably well isolated from stray noise.
2. Neurons must be capable of filtering the noise from the fundamental signal.

This issue is discussed in the second paper under the heading "Pockett's difficulty 2". McFadden recognizes the large amount of information present in the brain's em field and suggests "only a tiny component of the information" corresponds to consciousness, so the excess information must be discarded. Em receiving devices such as radios, tv's, cell phones or other electronic devices are actually designed to accomplish these two features. One primary goal of an antenna for instance, is to provide for reception of a limited band of frequencies. The circuitry then filters out everything but the signal being tuned for.

Shouldn't neurons also accomplish the same two features? I believe so, and in fact this may lead to a more rigorous prediction for the theory. A focus on the mechanisms involved and a computational analysis on neurons' abilities to interact with specific fields may be just what is needed to help prove or disprove this theory. The field signal of interest is said to be integrated and distributed (ID) throughout the brain, but it comes along with much excess noise. If it exists, this ID information should in principal be measurable. It should also be calculable, such as is being done with the Blue Brain project, assuming they are modeling the em field in addition to the rest of the neocortical columns.

 

[somasimple]

HI,

1. Neurons must be reasonably well isolated from stray noise.
2. Neurons must be capable of filtering the noise from the fundamental signal.

Shouldn't neurons also accomplish the same two features? I believe so

1. Some neurons are inhibitors.
2. Some neurons are facilitators.

Is there a way that an EM field created by these different classes may be different?
How a distant neuron will regognize the difference?

 

[reena]

ELF or extremely low electromagnetic fields are related to human brain functions and in fact as the existence of Schuman resonance has demonstrated that there is an implied relation between human brainwave and ELF .

 

[somasimple]

reena,

We are all agreeing with this opinion. That is not the subject of the thread.

 

[Q_Goest]

The brainstem tegmentum, including the reticular formation, contains distinct nuclei, each of which has a set of chemical, physiological and anatomical features.

Hi Somasimple. Thanks for the info regarding 'seat of consciousness' or NCC's. Not sure what to call them, but unless there's a better word, I'll use NCC's.

You asked:

Is there a way that an EM field created by these different classes may be different?

From an engineering standpoint, if the cemi field theory is to have any significant predictive power, I have to believe it must predict there is a fundamental difference between neurons which provide a substrate for consciousness and those that don't. The theory must predict that the cemi field interacts in some mechanistic way with specific neurons in some specific portions of the brain and not others. If all neurons (ie: even nerves) interacted with the cemi field then our legs and fingers would be conscious too, provided they were close enough to interact. Locating a seat of consciousness and suggesting those neurons interacted directly with the cemi field seems to be a prediction of the theory. Although it is not listed as one of the eight, it seems to be implied.

These neurons that form a substrate for consciousness must also be 'tuned' to a specific field since the field has so much additional garbage in it.

Conclusion: there is a portion of neurons that interact with a portion of the em field. The portion of neurons might be called NCC's and the portion of the field is referred to as the cemi field. What sets the cemi field apart from other em noise is that it contains the information needed for a unified conscious experience. The cemi field must also be distinct from the noise such as perhaps by operating at a different frequency. (Does anyone see a problem with this conclusion given the theory provided?)

That conclusion results in a prediction. Prediction: If we locate the NCC's, then we should similarly find something unique about them which interacts with the cemi field. We should be able to model those neurons using typical finite element or control volume analysis techniques and find they have properties which are particularly receptive to em fields to the point of being able to interact with them. That analysis should also indicate a frequency or some other unique property of the field which sets it apart from the noise. Similarly, we should be able to do this type of analysis on other neurons and find they have significantly less ability to interact with em fields and the cemi field in particular. Another finding might be that NCC's are well protected from stray em fields.

I think this prediction may go counter to what is proposed by McFadden though. Thoughts? Johnjoe, are you still there? :)