Exploring Metzinger's Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness and Selfhood

[moving finger]

If it were described as "pro-consciousness" or "pre-consciousness" perhaps you would find it more convincing?

Perhaps

 

[moving finger]

This is a clear and easy to understand recipe. Any competent programmer could easily implement it. The virtual "observer" could be any conceivable combination of machine states and or processes, and the virtual "observed" could also be any conceivable combination of machine states, including information accessed from the outside world via transducers.

There is also no problem in defining this configuration, or any part of it you wish, as 'consciousness'. It is, or could easily be made to be, a unified process.

Correct. In this sense, we should in principle be able to make “conscious machines” already. But before we can recognise these machines as being conscious we also need to be able to communicate with them, to be able to ask them to report on their conscious experiences.

(How do we know that any other agent is “conscious”? The only test that we have is to ask them. This also applies to other humans.)

Nowhere, however, in this thought experiment, does the notion of consciousness as I experience it appear

Agreed. But where is the law of nature which says that all forms of consciousness must be as you experience it?

How do you know that consciousness as I experience it is the same as consciousness as you experience it?

You could implement the program in such a way as to have it adamantly declare that it has conscious experience, and even have it pound a metallic fist on a table, but it would not convince me.

Why would you disbelieve it? Would you think it is deliberately lying to you about it’s internal experiences and perceptions?

Presumably you believe that other humans apart from yourself can also be conscious? Is there a rational source for this belief? Could you perhaps tell us what is the reason for believing that other humans are conscious?

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

The feeling of self dissapears if we strip away the notion of “self” (since the advanced possibility to reflect on itself is gone), but a sort of actual self, that you could call the experience itself, remains.

“a sort of actual self…. remains”? But what is this supposed to be, the homunculus?
With respect it seems to me that you cannot let go of dualism, of the cartesian theatre illusion.

The reason I believe this is that existence doesn’t necessarily equal experience.

Whereas I believe that (conscious) existence is nothing but experience.

To suggest that a conscious entity can exist in absence of any experience at all seems like dualism to me.

We can imagine a robot without any phenomenal experiences. It would be able to interact with others as if it had a consciousness, but those actions would just be results of information prosessing - this particularly robot wouldn't experience.

Agreed. But this is not the same as saying that “no robot can have experiences”. In order to “have experiences” the robot needs to process information is a very particular way, a way that generates a virtual self.

Conscious experience (as in experience where a relfecting process is happening), would be possible without the feeling of self, much like the experience a child would have before discovering a “self”.

How do you know that a child has any “experiences” before discovering (I would say creating) a “self”? In order to “have an experience”, the mind needs to relate that experience to “something having the experience”, and this is what creates the idea of self. To me it just seems nonsensical to suggest that an agent can consciously think that it is “having experiences” in the absence of the notion of “self’ which is having those experiences. They both get created together.

But, a center of experience has to be there already, just as you suggest, but not only after a certain awareness has occured.

We are perhaps more in agreement that we think. To me, the “creation of awareness” creates the idea of the virtual self at the same time as creating the experience.

There is no reason to believe that a center of experience just magically appear within information that are processed in the right way.

There is every reason to believe it. The alternative is to suggest that the “self” really exists, quite independent of experience, as some kind of homunculus. Is this what you are suggesting? Dualism?

Again, phenomenal experience (or the possibility for conscious phenomenal experience) is not necessarily a part of information, or at least not the information itself. Stating that bare consciousness originates in an information process, is like saying that milk occurs in a jar.

I fail to see the analogy with milk in a bottle (unless you are possibly suggesting that consciousness is something physical, which can be weighed and photographed?)
A better analogy would be between “consciousness running on brain hardware” is analogous to “a program running on computer hardware”. The running program is simply a form of information processing.

Claiming that phenomenal experience is the process, has no meaning, since an information process is simply a job happening to information, and phenomenal experience is not the same as either information or job, or the both put together.

What rational argument do you have to support this claim?
Why should it not be the case that phenomenal experience is a process?
If you think it is not a process, what are you suggesting that it is? Something concrete and physical like milk in a bottle?

Also, arguing against qualia by stating that dualism is not possible, is setting a premis without first proving it.

I have never said that dualism is “not possible”. But the premise of dualism creates more questions than it answers, it simply “passes the buck” of explanation onto another level, it is explanatorily inadequate.

I also suspect that many avoid dualism in fear of being labeled as religious.

Or perhaps because they see the notion of dualism as being incoherent.
(and the same people may also see religion as being incoherent)

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

Originally Posted by Lars Laborious
The feeling of self dissapears if we strip away the notion of “self” (since the advanced possibility to reflect on itself is gone), but a sort of actual self, that you could call the experience itself, remains.

Originally Posted by moving finger
“a sort of actual self…. remains”? But what is this supposed to be, the homunculus?

It is not a homunculus, but the single sensation itself.
Sensations need to be sensed to exist. I understand that this sounds like the idea of an agent doing the sencing, and hence it is dualism. But I see the sensations as self-experiencing properties that might or might not be the presentation of the physical. Yes, you could call this dualism, since it suggests two worlds, but I’m not all sure there really is a another, physical world outside the “phenomenal presentation” of it. Anyhow, the main point is: Sensations are not just an abstract term to describe certain physical processes. It’s the only stuff which existence we can be certain of, since sensations are the only thing that we are in contact with (I would say, the thing that we are made of). Sensations are raw experience – the building blocks for conciousness, and perhaps, the world.

Originally Posted by moving finger
Whereas I believe that (conscious) existence is nothing but experience.

Does this mean that you believe that raw sensations are fundamental properties of the physical? Or, do you define experience as something else?

Originally Posted by Lars Laborious
We can imagine a robot without any phenomenal experiences [...]

Originally Posted by moving finger
Agreed. But this is not the same as saying that “no robot can have experiences”.

Agreed. I too believe that robots can be conscious. But you can still imagine robots that do not have phenomenal experience. The same goes for a world without phenomenal experiences. In such a world it’s hard to see how raw phenomenal experience/sensations could arise through physical movements (or a process, if you want).

How do you know that a child has any “experiences” before discovering (I would say creating) a “self”?

Because I remember when I first ”realised” that I have a “self”. Up to that point I had simply experienced the world without relating the experience to a “me”. It was all just sensations. I had an experiencing center, but not the feeling of “self”.

To me, the “creation of awareness” creates the idea of the virtual self at the same time as creating the experience.

It sounds to me that you either see experience as something else than phenomenal sensation (perhaps just physical reactions), or that you in fact think that physical movements that lack sensations can create sensations that are being sensed. I find it hard to believe the latter on the grounds that sensations and the physical differ in that sensations are presentations of the physical. The “presentation-substance” would have to be there allready.

Originally Posted by Lars Laborious
There is no reason to believe that a center of experience just magically appear within information that are processed in the right way.

Originally Posted by moving finger
There is every reason to believe it. The alternative is to suggest that the “self” really exists, quite independent of experience, as some kind of homunculus. Is this what you are suggesting? Dualism?

Self-experiencing sensations.

I fail to see the analogy with milk in a bottle (unless you are possibly suggesting that consciousness is something physical, which can be weighed and photographed?)
A better analogy would be between “consciousness running on brain hardware” is analogous to “a program running on computer hardware”. The running program is simply a form of information processing.

In a world where phenomenal sensations/experience were fundamental properties, I would agree to your analogy. But I suspect that you believe that phenomenal sensations are not real, only physical reactions. In that case, this would be as if I were having a discussion with a non-experiencing robot;-)

Originally Posted by Lars Laborious
Claiming that phenomenal experience is the process, has no meaning, since an information process is simply a job happening to information, and phenomenal experience is not the same as either information or job, or the both put together.

Originally Posted by moving finger
If you think it is not a process, what are you suggesting that it is? Something concrete and physical like milk in a bottle?

I can’t prove that a real physical world exists outside qualia, but if it does, how can you avoid seeing that a physical job is different from phenomenal experience? Yes, the experience would be concrete, but not physical in the normal sense. The “physical” would be implemented in/sensed through phenomenal experience. The physical are a set of properties that follows categorical rules within phenomenal experience/qualia.

I have never said that dualism is “not possible”. But the premise of dualism creates more questions than it answers, it simply “passes the buck” of explanation onto another level, it is explanatorily inadequate.

I agree. But saying that sensations aren’t being experienced - that they are just physical processes - is equally explanatorily inadequate, since we base all our knowledge on phenomenal experiences. A self-experiencing sensation would stop the buck from being passed, but of course it raises other questions. “How is it possible?” “What does it mean?”

 

[Lars Laborious]

During my existential moment many years ago my consciousness as a thing experienced the I of me as a thing, and during the process all melted into each other as one such that I knew that I existed. So, my experience would appear to falsify your belief, unless I do not understand your comment above.

I’m not sure, but I think we agree on this one. If all melted into each other as one during the process, then you don’t have dualism since it’s all the same. Perhaps you thought I was saying that such a “melted one" could not be, while I in fact believe that one could not separate experience from the experiencer.

 

[Rade]

I’m not sure, but I think we agree on this one. If all melted into each other as one during the process, then you don’t have dualism since it’s all the same. Perhaps you thought I was saying that such a “melted one" could not be, while I in fact believe that one could not separate experience from the experience.

I was responding to this statement you made--

Originally Posted by Lars Laborious...I actually mean I don’t believe that something can experience something else, because the connection point between an observer and the observed would have to melt into each other and so be one.

What I am saying is that during my existential moment "something" that exists [e.g. my consciousness] did experience "something else" that exists [e.g., the holistic me], and during the process a "unity" emerged from the interaction [e.g., my knowledge of my existence--that is, epistemology and metaphysics merged into the oneness of me]. Thus, while I agree with your statement that one cannot "separate" experience (object) from experiencer (subject), I find that each has veiled identity within a dialectic reality formed by their correspondence. My philosophy is not of dualism (the poles), nor of monism (the middle), but of dialectics, of the reality of the transcendence of opposites that emerges from the union of things that exist with identity <A> and <not-A>.

 

[moving finger]

It is not a homunculus, but the single sensation itself.

A sensation needs both the subject and object of experience in order to “exist”. How can one have an “experiencer” who experiences nothing at all; and how can one have an “experience” which is not being experienced by someone?

Sensations need to be sensed to exist.

I agree that “sensations need to be sensed to exist”. This is precisely why I think it makes no sense (it is irrational) to suggest that a “sensation” can exist in absence of “something doing the sensing”, just as much as it is irrational to suggest that “something which is doing any sensing” exists in absence of a “sensation”. It’s like the “heads” and “tails” of a coin, one cannot have one without the other.

Now there are two ways to solve this problem. Either one posits that both “sensations” and “something which senses” can indeed exist independently of each other (but this leads to Chalmers’ problems in trying to deal with with “raw experiences” and qualia, and opens the door to dualism), or one accepts (like Metzinger) that the two are inextricably bound up together, and one cannot exist without the other.

Does this mean that you believe that raw sensations are fundamental properties of the physical? Or, do you define experience as something else?

“raw sensations” (qualia) are virtual entities which have no objective existence outside of the virtual world created inside consciousness. The information processing that is consciousness creates a virtual subject (the conscious self) and a virtual object (the raw sensations as you call them) which exist as entities only in relation to each other, within the information processing of consciousness.

Agreed. I too believe that robots can be conscious. But you can still imagine robots that do not have phenomenal experience. The same goes for a world without phenomenal experiences.

Agreed. A world in which there are no conscious agents would be a world without phenomenal experiences (no qualia, no self, no experiences).

In such a world it’s hard to see how raw phenomenal experience/sensations could arise through physical movements (or a process, if you want).

I don’t see that at all.
Imagine we create a robot with visual colour receptors, linked to an image processing unit, a memory where it can store information about images it has previously processed, a developed sense of “conscious self” within it’s processing routines (so that it thinks it is an agent which is actually “looking” at images via it’s visual colour receptors), an ability to form subjective impressions based on the quality of images, and the ability to interpret and report on the images that it is processing. All of this is purely physical, and given that you agree that robots can be conscious, you should have no trouble imagining this.

Now we ask the robot : What does it “feel like” when you look at a red object? And a green object?

Why should its answers be any different to a human answering the same questions?

Where does “raw phenomenal experience” come into it?

Because I remember when I first ”realised” that I have a “self”. Up to that point I had simply experienced the world without relating the experience to a “me”. It was all just sensations. I had an experiencing center, but not the feeling of “self”.

I think it comes down to a definition of terms.
You may not have been consciously aware that you were creating a “self” (how could you be consciously aware of creating a self until you have done so anyway, in some kind of bootstrap process), but to me the mere fact of “having experiences” creates automatically something like a “centre of virtual gravity” to which these experiences relate. I think that what very young children probably lack is a well-defined conscious notion of “who they are”, but this does not mean that there is no “self” that is created within their minds (its just that they haven’t consciously acknowledged it as a “self” yet, because their consciousness has not fully developed).

It sounds to me that you either see experience as something else than phenomenal sensation (perhaps just physical reactions), or that you in fact think that physical movements that lack sensations can create sensations that are being sensed. I find it hard to believe the latter on the grounds that sensations and the physical differ in that sensations are presentations of the physical. The “presentation-substance” would have to be there allready.

I see qualia as being a virtual creation within an information processing system, a system which simultaneously also creates a virtual self.

Self-experiencing sensations.

That is precisely what Metzinger’s paper is all about.
The question is whether the “conscious self” exists independently of any “conscious experience”. I believe it does not. And you?

In a world where phenomenal sensations/experience were fundamental properties, I would agree to your analogy. But I suspect that you believe that phenomenal sensations are not real, only physical reactions. In that case, this would be as if I were having a discussion with a non-experiencing robot;-)

I do not believe they are physical reactions. Phenomenal sensations (can we please try to agree on one name for these things – either phenomenal sensations, or qualia, or raw phenomenal experience?) are virtual entities, just as real or unreal as the virtual objects in a computer game. This does not mean that consciousness is virtual, and it does not mean that “I” am not having experiences of “qualia” (because “I” and the “experiences” and the “qualia” are together part of the creation of my consciousness).

I can’t prove that a real physical world exists outside qualia, but if it does, how can you avoid seeing that a physical job is different from phenomenal experience?

I would suggest that you cannot even prove (to anyone else except yourself) that qualia exist. But think about it - Isn’t this exactly what one would expect if “you” (ie your conscious idea of self) were a “virtual” entity experiencing “virtual qualia” within your brain? It would look just as you have described – the qualia would “seem” real to you, and you would think that there is nothing else apart from qualia which you could prove existed, but at the same time other agents would deny that your so-called qualia have any physical existence and insist instead on using the so-called objectively real world as a basis for communication.

Yes, the experience would be concrete, but not physical in the normal sense. The “physical” would be implemented in/sensed through phenomenal experience. The physical are a set of properties that follows categorical rules within phenomenal experience/qualia.

Whereas I think it is just the other way around.

I agree. But saying that sensations aren’t being experienced - that they are just physical processes - is equally explanatorily inadequate, since we base all our knowledge on phenomenal experiences. A self-experiencing sensation would stop the buck from being passed, but of course it raises other questions.

I am not saying that sensations are not being experienced.
I am saying that consciousness is an information processing phenomenon which creates within itself virtual entities of “qualia” and “self”. The consciousness (information processing) is very real, but the virtual self is simply experiencing virtual qualia within that consciousness. This IS a “self-experiencing sensation” – so I think you and I are closer to agreement than we perhaps recognise.

“How is it possible?”

“How is it possible” is a question which can be asked about anything and everything, and it is a question to which ultimately we have no answer.

“What does it mean?”

Need it "mean" anything?

Meaning is an attribution made by an observer. We can have observers within the system who attribute meaning to parts of the system based on other parts of the system. But there can be meaning in the "system as a whole" only if there is an outside observer.

I in fact believe that one could not separate experience from the experiencer.

This is precisely what I am also saying….

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

[...] can we please try to agree on one name for these things [...]

I'll call it qualia. But I do not just refer to phenomenal experience, but also the experiencer. I believe it's the same thing.

A sensation needs both the subject and object of experience in order to “exist”. How can one have an “experiencer” who experiences nothing at all; and how can one have an “experience” which is not being experienced by someone?

They are united.

Originally Posted by Lars Laborious
I in fact believe that one could not separate experience from the experiencer

Originally Posted by moving finger
This is precisely what I am also saying….

No, you believe that it’s possible to separate them, but then they would both go away. Whilst I believe you simply can’t separate them because they are the same.

“raw sensations” (qualia) are virtual entities which have no objective existence outside of the virtual world created inside consciousness.

Claiming that qualia are virtual entities is not solving the problem. Here’s why: Virtual entities are mental, and mental is qualia. Virtual entities do not exist without an experience of them. So saying that qualia are virtual entities is saying qualia is qualia. That doesn't entail any new knowledge.

All virtual entities exist only within already experiencing minds. Dissecting a virtual entity would leave only the physical processing equipment, but the qualia in which a virtual entity can exist, still remains.

Imagine we create a robot with visual colour receptors, linked to an image processing unit, a memory where it can store information about images it has previously processed, a developed sense of “conscious self” within it’s processing routines (so that it thinks it is an agent which is actually “looking” at images via it’s visual colour receptors), an ability to form subjective impressions based on the quality of images, and the ability to interpret and report on the images that it is processing.

You can make it appear conscious, but "the developed sense of 'conscious self' within it’s processing routines" would not arise if it didn't already have an experiencing mind. It cannot have subjective impressions with it's virtual self since a virtual entity doesn't exist without an experience of it.
The reason I believe robots can be conscious, is that they can be built of the same stuff that we are built of, and that way they are equipped with allready existing qualia that, put together right, can experience itself.

The question is whether the “conscious self” exists independently of any “conscious experience”. I believe it does not. And you?

Neither do I.

 

[moving finger]

you believe that it’s possible to separate them

Not at all. Where have I said this?

Read again what I have written in this thread :

To me it just seems nonsensical to suggest that an agent can consciously think that it is “having experiences” in the absence of the notion of “self’ which is having those experiences. They both get created together. (post #38)

the “creation of awareness” creates the idea of the virtual self at the same time as creating the experience. (post #38)

it makes no sense (it is irrational) to suggest that a “sensation” can exist in absence of “something doing the sensing” (post #42)

one accepts (like Metzinger) that the two are inextricably bound up together, and one cannot exist without the other. (post #42)

consciousness creates a virtual subject (the conscious self) and a virtual object (the raw sensations as you call them) which exist as entities only in relation to each other (post #42)

Where in any of this does it say that I believe it is possible to separate “qualia” and “the feeling of self”?

I believe you simply can’t separate them because they are the same.

If you believe they are the same (ie identical), why do you use two different terms to describe them (ie “experiences” and “the feeling of self”), and how is this belief that they cannot be separated consistent with your claim that as a child you had “experiences” without a feeling of “self”?

I remember when I first ”realised” that I have a “self”. Up to that point I had simply experienced the world without relating the experience to a “me”. It was all just sensations. I had an experiencing center, but not the feeling of “self”.

This latter claim implies that you do NOT believe “experiences/sensations” and “the feeling of self’ are identical.

Claiming that qualia are virtual entities is not solving the problem.

What problem?

All virtual entities exist only within already experiencing minds.

No. The relationships between virtual entities are the substance of the experience, there can be no experience without them. It is not the case that “first there is experience, and then this experience creates virtual entities within itself”.

Dissecting a virtual entity would leave only the physical processing equipment, but the qualia in which a virtual entity can exist, still remains.

Qualia are virtual entities. Virtual entities do not exist “inside qualia” as you are trying to suggest. Virtual entities are pure information, they cannot be dissected to yield more fundamental parts. Have you tried dissecting the virtual buildings that exist within a program such as SIM city?

It cannot have subjective impressions with it's virtual self since a virtual entity doesn't exist without an experience of it.

And that “a virtual entity does not exist without an experience of it” is exactly what I am saying – please read again :

To me it just seems nonsensical to suggest that an agent can consciously think that it is “having experiences” in the absence of the notion of “self’ which is having those experiences. They both get created together. (post #38)

the “creation of awareness” creates the idea of the virtual self at the same time as creating the experience. (post #38)

it makes no sense (it is irrational) to suggest that a “sensation” can exist in absence of “something doing the sensing” (post #42)

one accepts (like Metzinger) that the two are inextricably bound up together, and one cannot exist without the other. (post #42)

consciousness creates a virtual subject (the conscious self) and a virtual object (the raw sensations as you call them) which exist as entities only in relation to each other (post #42)

---

I in fact believe that one could not separate experience from the experiencer.

But this contradicts your assertion :

I remember when I first ”realised” that I have a “self”. Up to that point I had simply experienced the world without relating the experience to a “me”. It was all just sensations. I had an experiencing center, but not the feeling of “self”.

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

If you believe they are the same (ie identical), why do you use two different terms to describe them (ie “experiences” and “the feeling of self”), and how is this belief that they cannot be separated consistent with your claim that as a child you had “experiences” without a feeling of “self”?

You got it all wrong, I'm not talking about "the feeling of self", but simply the experiencer. I see the "the feeling of self" as the consciously awareness of a "self" and the experiencer as the “centre of virtual gravity”, as you call it.

Originally Posted by Lars Laborious
Claiming that qualia are virtual entities is not solving the problem.

What problem?

The origin of qualia.

Qualia are virtual entities. Virtual entities do not exist “inside qualia” as you are trying to suggest. Virtual entities are pure information, they cannot be dissected to yield more fundamental parts. Have you tried dissecting the virtual buildings that exist within a program such as SIM city?

A computer game is not virtual without someone already experiencing it. The virtuality of the game happens in your experiencing mind. One can dissect the computer and your mind will still be, waiting for annother game experience. If no one is there to experience the game, SIM city doesn’t exist, it’s all just computer parts.

And that “a virtual entity does not exist without an experience of it” is exactly what I am saying […]

Since a virtual entity does not exist without an experience of it, comparing qualia with virtual entities is not explaining how qualia get to be. When you suggest it appears in consciousness, and that consciousness is as a process in the same way that a running computer program is, that does not tell us how qualia arise. The software of a running computer program exposes itself to already experiencing minds.

 

[moving finger]

Claiming that qualia are virtual entities is not solving the problem.

What problem?

The origin of qualia.

Qualia and self are virtual constructs within the information processing system that we call consciousness, and conscious experience is the relation of virtual qualia to virtual self within that consciousness.
What more needs to be explained?

A computer game is not virtual without someone already experiencing it.

I never suggested that “a computer game is virtual”. It seems you have an incorrect understanding of the argument.

A computer program (game) is very real. What I am suggesting is that the entities within (invoked by) the game are virtual.

In the same way, consciousness is very real. But the entities within (invoked by) consciousness (qualia and self) are virtual.

The virtuality of the game happens in your experiencing mind.

The mind has nothing to do with it, the computer game and the creation of virtual entities within that game do not rely on any external mind to bring them into being.

One can dissect the computer and your mind will still be, waiting for annother game experience. If no one is there to experience the game, SIM city doesn’t exist, it’s all just computer parts.

Again it seems you have the wrong conception. Ignore any “external mind” or “external player”, this is not required. You can dissect the computer as much as you like and you will never find the virtual buildings that the program has constructed, except as patterns of information. But a “virtual entity” within the program could “see” the “virtual buildings” from its perspective within the information. Neither the virtual entity nor the virtual buildings have any external reality except as information, they appear as virtual objects only in relation to each other, inside the running program.

Since a virtual entity does not exist without an experience of it, comparing qualia with virtual entities is not explaining how qualia get to be.

When you suggest it appears in consciousness, and that consciousness is as a process in the same way that a running computer program is, that does not tell us how qualia arise.

Virtual entities are produced as part of the information processing that takes place, either within a computer program or within a consciousness. That is how they “get to be”.

The software of a running computer program exposes itself to already experiencing minds.

Clearly you have misunderstood the analogy.
A computer program does not need an external mind in order for the program to run, it does not need an external mind to produce virtual entities within itself. Why are you invoking an observer of the computer? This is not needed, and was not suggested.

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

MF, simply saying that qualia are virtual constructs within the information processing system that we call consciousness, doesn't explain how qualia originate. Yes, it might arise within such a process, but you cannot explain how that can be by comparing it to virtual entities. "Virtual" is a potential state that is imagined to be, and you can't have (phenomenal) imagining without qualia. It's a circular problem.

A computer program (game) is very real. What I am suggesting is that the entities within (invoked by) the game are virtual.

Agreed.

In the same way, consciousness is very real. But the entities within (invoked by) consciousness (qualia and self) are virtual.

Again, "virtual" is a potential state that is imagined to be. Take away this (phenomenal) imagining, and the "virtual entities" or qualia cannot arise. So, by starting with non-experiencing equipment, it's not logical to say that qualia arise as "virtual entities" - the computer cannot imagine (Note: I'm not saying that it's impossible to make an imagining computer).

Ignore any “external mind” or “external player”, this is not required. You can dissect the computer as much as you like and you will never find the virtual buildings that the program has constructed, except as patterns of information.

Agreed.

But a “virtual entity” within the program could “see” the “virtual buildings” from its perspective within the information. Neither the virtual entity nor the virtual buildings have any external reality except as information, they appear as virtual objects only in relation to each other, inside the running program.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that the program can “see” the “virtual buildings” the way you and I see the “virtual buildings”. The program just is. Doing it's job. It has no perspective; nothing appears to it. Of course it doesn't need an external mind in order for the program to run, but for virtual entities to exist, it does. If the program really do have phenomenal experience, then the question still remains, how?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Again, "virtual" is a potential state that is imagined to be. Take away this (phenomenal) imagining, and the "virtual entities" or qualia cannot arise. So, by starting with non-experiencing equipment, it's not logical to say that qualia arise as "virtual entities" - the computer cannot imagine (Note: I'm not saying that it's impossible to make an imagining computer).

On the contrary I claim the interactions of a mechanical system with part of it hidden behind a Metzinger Wall (aka "horizon" or "interface") and the rest interacting through high level aggregate variables available from the wall does exhibit what we can legitimately call virtual agents. Padmanabhan has discussed this in the context of general relativity physics. Once again you resort to petitio principi, by demanding imagination, which is part of what you want to demonstrate.

 

[Lars Laborious]

On the contrary I claim the interactions of a mechanical system with part of it hidden behind a Metzinger Wall (aka "horizon" or "interface") and the rest interacting through high level aggregate variables available from the wall does exhibit what we can legitimately call virtual agents. Padmanabhan has discussed this in the context of general relativity physics. Once again you resort to petitio principi, by demanding imagination, which is part of what you want to demonstrate.

I’m not demanding imagination, but simply pointing out that virtual is imagination (qualia), (this central point is a fact by definition, therefore it’s not a petitio principi). And so the question of how qualia can originate from a non-phenomenal substance still remains. Don’t get me wrong, I’m interesting in reading Padmanabhan’s ideas, but I doubt that he can logically explain how virtuality arise from something not virtual.

Let me put it this way: You can imagine a world without qualia; a strictly physical world. In this world you could have a computer program, but it would not have any representation of its possible software – it would only contain hardware. Now, one cannot draw the conclusion that making the molecyles move in a certain manner would entail a virtual representation of anything. I think the reason some are misled to believe such a thing, is that we’re all brought up to believe that ”virtual” and “imagitive represantations” are not real, they are fantasy. But all though they are not necessarily physical, they are in fact real. A fantasy is really exposing itself in someones experience. It’s real in the world of qualia, which we all are familiar with. Comparing qualia with an idea or a concept is not helping, since an idea or a concept is qualia, and qualia is different from the physichal in a way that qualia can be compared to something visible and the physical to something not visible. You can combine the non visible things in as many ways you want, but it’s not logical to assume that you can make something visible of it.

 

[vanesch]

Also, arguing against qualia by stating that dualism is not possible, is setting a premis without first proving it. I know that many physicsists reject dualism on the grounds that we can’t observe anything that do not follow the rules of physics - like a spirit. But qualia would manage to logically escape our observations, as an observer’s instrument, (or, one could say, in disguising itself as physical projections). I also suspect that many avoid dualism in fear of being labeled as religious.
When I say I don’t believe in dualism, I actually mean I don’t believe that something can experience something else, because the connection point between an observer and the observed would have to melt into each other and so be one.

I'm 100% in agreement with your contributions here, Lars.
Actually, (as some know), this viewpoint you (and I) hold is even essential for my beloved Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum theory (oh, no, not again )

However, I don't understand your statement that you are not a dualist. I thought that stating that qualia are NOT physical in themselves (but maybe induced by physical processes) is the exactly what it means, to be a dualist, no ?

 

[Lars Laborious]

I'm 100% in agreement with your contributions here, Lars.
Actually, (as some know), this viewpoint you (and I) hold is even essential for my beloved Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum theory (oh, no, not again )

However, I don't understand your statement that you are not a dualist. I thought that stating that qualia are NOT physical in themselves (but maybe induced by physical processes) is the exactly what it means, to be a dualist, no ?

You're right, dualism has a number of uses. I do believe that it's likely that qualia differ from the physichal (all though we might find that they are connected in such a way that they can be unifed under the same rules), an so, I am a dualist. But I'm not the kind of dualist who believe that experience and experiencer are two separate things.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I think that if you and others want to explore dualism, you should start a new thread. It is completely OT from Metzinger's apprach.

 

[vanesch]

I think that if you and others want to explore dualism, you should start a new thread. It is completely OT from Metzinger's apprach.

Well, sorry, didn't mean to be OT: from the quote in the original post, and the discussion that develloped, it seemed that the content of Metzinger's message (or at least what was highlighted here), was exactly a negation of dualism, no ? So I fail to see why you say that I'm off topic...
If the central thesis is that "no selves exist", how is this different than a hard negation of dualism ?

 

[moving finger]

Hi Lars

MF, simply saying that qualia are virtual constructs within the information processing system that we call consciousness, doesn't explain how qualia originate.

The question “how do virtual constructs originate?” is answered by “they originate within a particular form of information processing”. Asking for a deeper explanation than this is meaningless.
If I ask “how do electrons originate?” or “how does gravity originate?”, how would you answer?
(If you answer that electrons are not fundamental but are supposed to be composed of entities called strings, I could ask the question again – how do strings originate?).

The point is that nobody has the faintest idea of “how things originate” at a fundamental level, or even “what things really are”, except insofar as we can try to explain some concepts in terms of other concepts, or we can try to approximate by analogy.

There is no fundamental answer to “how things originate” except by explaining in terms of analogies or other concepts.

What we need is not an answer to “how things originate” (because this question is ultimately unanswerable), but instead “how can some things be rationally, coherently and consistently explained in terms of other things”. This is ALL we can ultimately achieve.

And the explanation of how qualia originate is that they are virtual representations constructed within (emergent from) particular systems of information processing. That’s it. Asking for more is like asking for “where do electrons come from?”

Yes, it might arise within such a process, but you cannot explain how that can be by comparing it to virtual entities. "Virtual" is a potential state that is imagined to be, and you can't have (phenomenal) imagining without qualia. It's a circular problem.

Not circular at all. You seem to be stuck in the notion that “if it’s virtual, then there must be an external human mind which is imagining it”. This is not the case. Virtual does not entail human imagination. Virtual entails only that an entity is interpreted by an agent as directly representing some form of physical reality when it does not. Such interpretation can take place within an information processing system which represents virtual entities internally “to itself” by creating (also internally) the notion of a virtual “self”. There need be no external observer nor external mind nor human imagination involved.

Again, "virtual" is a potential state that is imagined to be. Take away this (phenomenal) imagining, and the "virtual entities" or qualia cannot arise.

I agree – but again please try to set aside the notion that virtual entities can exist only in a human mind (via imagination). Virtual entities (I am suggesting) can be created within any suitably complex information processing system which conforms to Metzinger’s conditions. The “phenomenal imagining” as you call it is then a part of the total creation, the system creates virtual self, virtual qualia, and when combined the virtual self experiences the qualia by “imagining” that the self is real and the qualia are real. No human mind is required.

So, by starting with non-experiencing equipment, it's not logical to say that qualia arise as "virtual entities" - the computer cannot imagine (Note: I'm not saying that it's impossible to make an imagining computer).

You are not suggesting that it’s impossible to make an imagining computer – good!
Then simply take this to the next level – within this imagining computer, the program constructs a virtual self and virtual qualia such that the computer imagines that it is a real “self” which is experiencing real “qualia” within it’s “mind”. There is no human observer, there is no real self, and there are no real qualia (these are constructs of the program), but the computer “imagines” (ie interprets the information) that these things do really exist as somehow physical entities.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that the program can “see” the “virtual buildings” the way you and I see the “virtual buildings”.

Within existing computer programs - I agree completely.
I perhaps was taking the analogy too far by suggesting that a program such as SIM city constructs virtual buildings – because there is no “phenomenal self” or “virtual self” within the program to interpret those virtual buildings. I apologise for this misleading notion.
My point is that there is no reason in principle why a computer could not be developed which represents internally to itself by creating virtual buildings and a virtual self which “interprets” those buildings. Such a computer could “imagine to itself” that it was viewing real physical objects within the information processing of the program, when in fact no real physical objects exist (its just information).

All I’m saying is that I believe this is the same way that the human brain does it.

The program just is. Doing it's job. It has no perspective; nothing appears to it. Of course it doesn't need an external mind in order for the program to run, but for virtual entities to exist, it does.

Yes, I agree it does. Thus the program needs to construct a “virtual self” within itself, as well as the “virtual buildings”, such that it can “think to itself” that it is seeing buildings. In just the same way, I believe the human brain “tells itself” that it is an agent which is seeing/hearing/feeling/smelling some kind of “real physical qualia” when in fact those qualia are virtual.

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

I think that if you and others want to explore dualism, you should start a new thread. It is completely OT from Metzinger's apprach.

Ok, I don't want to be a party pooper