The Senate Intelligence Committee report has left open the question of whether Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Niger. Margaret Warner discusses Iraq's alleged desire for "yellowcake" uranium with former Ambassador Joseph Wilson and Sen. Christopher Bond, R-Mo.
MARGARET WARNER: Ever since President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address, these 16 words have been the fodder for fierce debate over the intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq.
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.
MARGARET WARNER: …Wilson said he spent eight days there meeting with current and former government officials and uranium business people Afterwards, he wrote, he reported to the CIA, "It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place."
Three days after Wilson's article appeared, Secretary of State Colin Powell said President Bush should not have made the Iraq-Niger assertion.
COLIN POWELL: At the time it was put into the state of the union, my best understanding of this is that it had been seen by the intelligence community and vetted. But on subsequent examination, it didn't hold up, and we have acknowledged that.
MARGARET WARNER: …The Niger controversy re-erupted ten days ago with publication of the Senate Intelligence Committee report on the CIA's prewar intelligence on Iraq.
The unanimous report said different U.S. intelligence agencies had disagreed over whether Saddam was trying to buy uranium in Niger. On balance, the report concluded, "The October 2002 national intelligence estimate that 'Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellow cake' overstated what the intelligence community knew about Iraq's possible procurement attempts."
But three committee Republicans issued a separate statement attacking Wilson's credibility.
MARGARET WARNER: And we pick up the debate now with former Ambassador Joseph Wilson-- and Republican Sen. Kit Bond of Missouri, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, he was one of the Republicans who signed a supplementary statement questioning Wilson's credibility.
MARGARET WARNER: Do you agree with that, that there was adequate basis for the president to say that at least the British intelligence had concluded this?
JOSEPH WILSON: Sure. With all due respect to senator bond, the day after my opinion piece appeared in the New York Times, the president's spokesman came out and said that the 16 words did not merit inclusion in the state of the union.
The secretary of state said it should never have been in there, in addition to that in the body of the Senate report there are a number of references to differences between the U.S. and British intelligence on this specific issue-- in particular on Oct. 2, 2002, three months before the state of the union address, in which the assertion was made, the deputy director of central intelligence testified to the Senate Select Committee that one of the areas where we think that the British stretched beyond where we would stretch is on the points where Iraq is seeking uranium from various African locations.
In addition, on Oct. 6, George Tenet called the deputy national security advisor and said that he did not want the president to be a fact witness on this issue, because his analysts had told him the reporting was weak.
MARGARET WARNER: Let me just interrupt you. Your point is that because U.S. intelligence had doubts about the credibility, the president should not have been citing British intelligence?
JOSEPH WILSON: Well, absolutely. The U.S. intelligence budget is roughly 20 times the size of British intelligence. The British, at the very highest level of corporate intelligence community, the director of Central Intelligence, was clearly saying on several occasions, both in written form and by telephone, the president should not be a witness of fact on this particular assertion.
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MARGARET WARNER: All right. Let me ask you one final question, and then get Ambassador Wilson to respond. You also signed a separate statement that really questioned Ambassador Wilson's credibility. What was your evidence for that?
SEN. KIT BOND:
The fact that he made a major... he made a major point of calling the president a liar when the CIA had approved the language which Ambassador Wilson claims at the time was a lie, and there was not such evidence.
The ambassador has said that his wife had nothing to do with recommending him. And when we interviewed... our committee interviewed his wife, she then... she was asked specifically if she had... who had recommended the ambassador go. And she said that "I can't remember exactly whether I recommended him or my boss did." And other people... other agents reported that it was on her recommendation that the ambassador was sent.[This part does not sound bias, or struggling to tell the truth at all.
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MARGARET WARNER: And briefly, Ambassador Wilson, there was a memo cited by her or written by her in which she basically, to her boss, touted your contacts in Niger. …You don't consider that memo a suggestion?
JOSEPH WILSON: I have not seen the memo. I don't know what transpired, if her supervisor asked her to list my qualifications. My bona fides were well established, having made a trip out to Niger in 1999, in addition to 23 years service for my country, most of which was in Africa, including a stint at the National Security Council, where I helped the Niger government work through two military dictatorships back to civilian government.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. We have to leave it there. Ambassador Wilson, Sen. Bond, thank you both.
