Again, nice hypothesis, but that's all it is. It's something that sounds like it makes sense, but must be tested empirically to see if it is accurate or not. It's certainly not a well-established fact.Originally posted by Mentat
Consciousness altogether - i.e. "awareness" - is possible in some of the more rudimentary of life-forms. It's consciousness of consciousness (also referred to as self-consciousness) and the ability for analysis that requires a CPU something like ours.
This just takes us back to what I said in my last post. You're treating this MD hypothesis as if it is established fact, without having empirical justification to do so.Anyway, you need to remember that, in the intentional stance, there is no distinction between the processing and the consciousness. So, such questions as "can something follow MD processing and not be conscious" or "can something be conscious inspite of not following MD" are really non-sequitors - and would be much like asking "can something be conscious without being conscious" .
This hypothesis must be proved empirically before you go about applying its logic with certainty. Until that point, you must recognize that questions like "can something follow MD processing and not be conscious?" are valid inquiries.
Consciousness = subjective, qualitative awareness. This is the proposition we must start from, if we are to get a meaningful understanding of consciousness. If you redefine consciousness from the start to merely be these physical properties X, then I'm afraid you're not talking about the same thing everybody else is when they say "consciousness."No we wouldn't. I think there is a concept that is rather ingrained in your mind (and in most human minds) that doesn't allow for the heterophenomenological approach, but there is really nothing illogical about it. IOW, there is nothing wrong with assuming, not that "if A has physical properties X, then A is conscious", but rather "if A has physical properties X, then A has consciousness, because consciousness = X.
Again, I am not stating that the intentional stance as such is wrong. Rather, I am stating that it must be subject to empirical verification; it cannot simply be defined a priori that such and such physical property "simply is" conscious. We must demonstrate that such and such property is conscious before we can make this statement.
So, we must be able to establish a relationship such as "physical properties X = subjective, qualitative awareness." We cannot do this by redefining terms to make our lives easier. Rather, we must empirically test to see if, indeed, physical properties X always entail the subjective experience of qualia Y.
Again, this is most emphatically a question of empirically finding physical correlates of consciousness, NOT redefining consciousness to mean those physical properties that we suspect are involved in such and such subjective experience.
But you can't know a priori which "apparatus" is consciousness and which isn't. Thus, you must empirically test to see which "apparati" are consciousness and which are not.But that's the whole point, we are starting from the intentional stance. Besides, and I want to be clear on this: We are not seeking empirical verification of subjective consciousness - this would imply an "apparatus" of consciousness - we are searching merely for the "apparatus" since that is consciousness.
That's a mighty big "if," Mentat. How do we change that "if" to "since"? Only by empirically testing the hypothesis!Not true...at least, not according to the heterophenomenological approach that Dennett takes (I can't state absolute truths), since we can determine the consciousness of any physical system using knowledge of MD and question/answer processes (if Dennett is right, that is).
I am not saying that is truly a separation between subjective experience and objective physical processes. Rather I am saying there is a dissociation in our epistemic connection between the two, since we still do not have a complete picture of how objective processes map onto subjective experiences.But the dualism will always be implied when you seperate "subjective experience" from the nitty-gritty of neurological science (the electrochemical processes themselves).