Is Quantum Mechanics the Real Problem in Understanding Nature?

[reilly]

QM -- What's the problem?

As I have indicated time-after-time I am no fan of alternative approaches to QM. I've been very critical in some cases, as only a retired physics professor can be; sometimes my civility has gone out the door. So , enough. What I propose is a series of questions that, I hope, will stimulate discussion on the efficacy, or lack thereof, of QM.

1. Is QM odd because nature is odd?

2. Does the measurement problem show up in classical systems?

3. What's wrong with a probabilistic theory?

4. Why should we be able to understand Nature in "classical terms" when we go past our normal spheres of perception?

5. Why focus so much on the two slit experimet, at the expense of other phenomena?

6. How can anyone who does not have at least a few years of experience with QM, after school, be a legitimate critic of QM?

7. What's to complain about QM's extraordinary and manifold agreement with Nature?

So, there they are.

Regards,
Reilly Atkinson

 

[koantum]

As I have indicated time-after-time I am no fan of alternative approaches to QM.

There are alternatives to the standard quantum formalism and then there are alternatives to what Redhead called the "minimal instrumentalist interpretation" (MII) of the standard formalism. Alternatives of the former kind are, for instance, the spontaneous collapse theories of GRW and Pearle. Every interpretation that tries to go beyond the MII is an alternative of the latter kind.

1. Is QM odd because nature is odd?

Yes, odd in terms of common sense, which is adapted to the macroworld. But if one wants a theory of the microworld to explain the features of the macroworld, one cannot expect the microworld to possesses the features of the macroworld. Otherwise one only gets out of the theory what one has put in. So the oddness is to be expected. This was pointed out by Heisenberg. (I would be glad if someone could find the reference for me.)

2. Does the measurement problem show up in classical systems?

No.

3. What's wrong with a probabilistic theory?

Nothing.

4. Why should we be able to understand Nature in "classical terms" when we go past our normal spheres of perception?

Why indeed.

5. Why focus so much on the two slit experiment, at the expense of other phenomena?

Because Feynman said it has in it the heart of quantum mechanics? There are indeed other experiments that are of equal importance for the physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics: a simple http://thisquantumworld.com/scat.htm" of Elitzur and Vaidman, etc.

6. How can anyone who does not have at least a few years of experience with QM, after school, be a legitimate critic of QM?

I wonder.

7. What's to complain about QM's extraordinary and manifold agreement with Nature?

Nothing. The general complaint is that it doesn’t readily yield a sensible ontology. (Sensible doesn’t have to mean classical, whatever that means.)

 

[zekise]

Is it fair to say that the bomb testing experiment is a logical consequence of the superposition principle? So in this sense, it represents the same phenomena that a double slit experiment does, and further evidence of the physicality of superposition?

 

[koantum]

Is it fair to say that the bomb testing experiment is a logical consequence of the superposition principle? So in this sense, it represents the same phenomena that a double slit experiment does, and further evidence of the physicality of superposition?

In http://thisquantumworld.com/ev.htm" ": calculate the probability of detection by taking the absolute square of the sum of two amplitudes.

 

[eljose]

the "problem" is that a Probabilistic version without classical concepts such a force, momentum, and so on..can,t deal with a pure geometrical theory like Gravitations or Kaluza-Klein theories..but why should it be probabilistic?..makethe change t*---->it and you get that all your QM equations become similar to the equations that appear in Statistical Physics and Brownian motion

 

[Schrodinger's Dog]

OP: What if your wrong though

Actually QM is very robust as far as my limited experience has been able to determine, if a little bit fuzzy.

I do think though that looking into other alternatives isn't a bad idea, after all who knows what they may find to either support or cast doubt on QM?

6. How can anyone who does not have at least a few years of experience with QM, after school, be a legitimate critic of QM?

You could ask that of most critics, where's the harm in questioning scientific mainstream even if it is misinformed(out of the mouths of babes) That which does not kill science makes it stronger.

Didn't Einstein once say I looked in the mirror for ten years and that's the only theoretical physisist I saw? Perhaps he should of stuck to the mainstream too?

 

[vanesch]

Hi reilly,

I don't think there's anything wrong with QM (except its potential problem with GR maybe). It certainly is odd! But I don't mind nature to be odd. I don't think there's anything wrong with a probabilistic theory either.

However, I do have a problem with the "orthodox" views on quantum theory (although, I often said this, the standard, orthodox view is by far the best to LEARN quantum theory). My problem with the orthodox view does not reside in oddness, or the fact that it is probabilistic or whatever ; it resides essentially in the fact that I have to switch descriptions between "myself", "apparatus" and "microscopic" things. Now, I know the whole story about how you should not extrapolate your daily experience to microscopic or whatever extravagant situations, but that's not the point. The fundamentalist reductionist in me requires that *everything* should be eaten with the same sauce. That might be an odd way or not, but I cannot accept that one should treat certain things in nature fundamentally differently than others. Everything should be equal for the law. No matter what strange law.
And *this* is what goes wrong with the orthodox view (and which inspires me to consider at first sight crazy ideas such as MWI): the fact that one sets apart certain phenomena wrt to others. The fact that my voltmeter should be described in a *fundamentally* different language than an electron. I can accept that a voltmeter is a system which is quite different than an electron, but, at the bottom, both should be fundamentally be described in the same way. It might be *practical* to use certain *approximations* in certain cases. But we're not talking about approximations here. We're talking about incompatible descriptions. If it's a wave function, then a wavefunction for everybody. If it is a classical description, then a classical description for everybody. But not, one thing described in *this* formalism, and another thing described in *that* formalism - unless one can show that "that" formalism is a good approximation for "this" formalism in some peculiar cases - which is NOT the case with the relationship quantum-classical in the orthodox view.

I have difficulties defining "measurement" as something different than "interaction", and I have difficulties defining a "measurement apparatus" as something different than "a physical system". Especially when you study the physics of measurement apparatus!

Now, I agree that this is a purely reductionist worry. If you are a holder of the view that "every level of complexity its own theory" and that the "underlying layer has nothing to say about the theory of the next layer", then there's no difficulty in saying that some things are governed by quantum theory, and other things are governed by classical physics.
But I'm a reductionist, and as such, I require a serious theory to be applicable - at least in principle - to everything within its scope. And as the scope of quantum theory is supposed to encompass everything (quantum theory is not known to be *an approximation* to a better theory as far as I know), then its fundamental description should apply to everything. Myself and my voltmeter included.
This has always been the case: until we knew better, when we had classical physics, it was to be applied to everything, our bodies and measurement apparatus included. Thermodynamics is supposed to apply as well to the "system" as to the apparatus and our bodies.
This should be the case with quantum theory too, and this is contradicted by the orthodox approach to quantum theory, where there is a FUNDAMENTAL difference between the lab apparatus (setting up the state and measuring the state) - which is classical - and the "system under study" which is quantum mechanical.

So again, I have no difficulties with QM per se. It is a highly successful theory. And I have no difficulties with the orthodox view *as an algorithm*. It's a perfectly good way to use quantum theory.
But I have a difficulty with the "metaphysical" picture it tries to create, and I prefer another one, namely the MWI view - because I find that a much more coherent (although admittedly very strange) picture for the reductionist in me.
With MWI-QM I have _certainly_ no difficulties (except trying to explain to people that it is not totally absurd )... apart from the still apparent incompatibility with GR.

As I have indicated time-after-time I am no fan of alternative approaches to QM. I've been very critical in some cases, as only a retired physics professor can be; sometimes my civility has gone out the door. So , enough. What I propose is a series of questions that, I hope, will stimulate discussion on the efficacy, or lack thereof, of QM.

1. Is QM odd because nature is odd?

2. Does the measurement problem show up in classical systems?

3. What's wrong with a probabilistic theory?

4. Why should we be able to understand Nature in "classical terms" when we go past our normal spheres of perception?

5. Why focus so much on the two slit experimet, at the expense of other phenomena?

6. How can anyone who does not have at least a few years of experience with QM, after school, be a legitimate critic of QM?

7. What's to complain about QM's extraordinary and manifold agreement with Nature?

So, there they are.

Regards,
Reilly Atkinson

 

[DrChinese]

3. What's wrong with a probabilistic theory?

Nothing, in my mind.

There is bias towards assuming that cause-and-effect controls everything. This traces back at least as far as David Hume, ("An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", 1748). You can see my defense of the probabilistic viewpoint .[/URL]

It seems to me that most people will do just about anything to restore causality to theory... even though the world around us is filled with chance events. Does causality ultimately explain anything more than chance does?

In the end, a useful theory trumps. And QM is certainly useful!

 

[pmb_phy]

Hi Rielly my good man. How's it going?

1. Is QM odd because nature is odd?

Yes.

2. Does the measurement problem show up in classical systems?

Yes.

3. What's wrong with a probabilistic theory?

Nothing that I can see. I like it since it allows for free will and I've always hoped my will was free. But if not then I can blame some of my faults on someone else, right?

4. Why should we be able to understand Nature in "classical terms" when we go past our normal spheres of perception?

I see no reason for it myself.

5. Why focus so much on the two slit experimet, at the expense of other phenomena?

Its a simple barrier which one must analyze and put some thought into so that they may understand the ideas of QM. Some can say "Okay. I got the picture you're peddaling, let's move on to the next example." Unfortunately people don't tend to think that way.

6. How can anyone who does not have at least a few years of experience with QM, after school, be a legitimate critic of QM?

I suppose its arrogance that allows for this.

7. What's to complain about QM's extraordinary and manifold agreement with Nature?

No complains here dude.

So, there they are.

Regards,
Reilly Atkinson

Thanks Reilly

Pete

 

[koantum]

I like it since it allows for free will

How? Your decisions are motivated, goal-directed. They are not random, are they? Measurement outcomes in quantum mechanics are. Free will does not act through the loopholes of quantum-mechanical indeterminism. This was pointed out long ago by Schrödinger. I have given a more detailed argument in http://thisquantumworld.com/PDF/pi.pdf" , which appeared in Journal of Consciousness Studies.

 

[pmb_phy]

How?

You've never heard of this? Its a famous deduction in QM. Reilly will tell you more about this I'm sure. If mechanics were deterministic then we'd be just objects which have a definite future since, for a practical example, out bodies would be just like clocks and we'd be interacting with other clocks like other people or with weather of falling leafs etc. An incredibly complex clock, yes, but still a clock and it has only one outcome.

Your decisions are motivated, goal-directed.

They occur in the mind which is a machine working.

They are not random, are they?

Are the signals inside a computer random? Are they predetermined after it receives input?

Free will does not act through the loopholes of quantum-mechanical indeterminism.

I fail to see why you call it a loophole.

This was pointed out long ago by Schrödinger.

Reference please.

Pete

 

[selfAdjoint]

Pmb_phy, the idea that quantum uncertainty rescues free will is to say the least controversial among physicists as well as philosophers. You say it was "pointed out" by Schroedinger; I would rather put it that he devoutly believed that, but that you cannot derive it rigorously. I note that your explanations are all over the lot in scale, from quantum level, to clocks and computers, to our brains, but it's all hand waving. How does QM act in our brains that is DIFFERENT from the way it operates in clocks and computers? How can it provide free will to us and not to them?

 

[pmb_phy]

Pmb_phy, the idea that quantum uncertainty rescues free will is to say the least controversial among physicists as well as philosophers.

Thanks

You say it was "pointed out" by Schroedinger;

No I didn't. Someone else did and I asked for a reference.

I would rather put it that he devoutly believed that, but that you cannot derive it rigorously. I note that your explanations are all over the lot in scale, from quantum level, to clocks and computers, to our brains, but it's all hand waving. How does QM act in our brains that is DIFFERENT from the way it operates in clocks and computers? How can it provide free will to us and not to them?

I got past free-will into another topic he brought up, i.e. randomness (Although I'm not sure why he brought it up.

Pete

 

[koantum]

You've never heard of this?

I've heard too much of it, as you should have gathered from my post. I suggest you read the whole before you begin replying.

If mechanics were deterministic...

I never said it was.

Reference please.

Schrödinger in Quantum Questions, edited by Ken Wilber (Boulder & London: Shambala, 1984) p. 80:

Could perhaps the declared indeterminacy allow free will to step into the gap in the way that free will determines those events which the Law of Nature leaves undetermined? This hope is, at first sight, obvious and understandable.

In this crude form the attempt was made, and the idea, to a certain extent, worked out by the German physicist Pascual Jordan. I believe it to be both physically and morally an impossible solution. As regards the first: according to our present view, the quantum laws, though they leave the single event undetermined, predict a quite definite statistics of events when the same situation occurs again and again. If these statistics are interfered with by any agent, this agent violates the laws of quantum mechanics just as objectionably as if it interfered - in pre-quantum physics - with a strictly causal mechanical law. Now we know that there are no statistics in the reaction of the same person to precisely the same moral situation [just as there is nothing statistical in the causal relation between the intention to act and the action intended] - the rule is that the same individual in the same situation acts again precisely in the same manner. (Mind you, in precisely the same situation; this does not mean that a criminal or addict cannot be converted or healed by persuasion and example or whatnot - by strong external influence. But this, of course, means that the situation is changed.) The inference is that Jordan's assumption - the direct stepping in of free will to fill the gap of indeterminacy - does amount to an interference with the laws of nature, even in their form accepted in quantum theory.​

 

[rewebster]

reilly---I agree with you; and, I think QM (and/or one of it's sub-theories) holds the most possibilities of getting the answers.


I'd like to hear (read) the (your) answers to your own questions.

 

[gptejms]

How does QM act in our brains that is DIFFERENT from the way it operates in clocks and computers? How can it provide free will to us and not to them?

Well said!
But the question remains--how does free will arise from physical laws?How does consciousness arise?

 

[masudr]

Does our brain decohere with the environment as readily as every other bit of experimental equipment?

 

[vanesch]

Well said!
But the question remains--how does free will arise from physical laws?

Free will might be an illusion, in that it is the physics (deterministic or probabilistic) that tells your physical body what it will do, and your subjective experience of that is simply that you "desired" to act that way.
A bit like an apple always "desires" to fall off the tree.

How does consciousness arise?

I think that this question is impossible to answer within the realm of a physical theory which limits itself to empirical observations and predictions, given the fact that there's no behavioural or empirical indication of consciousness (in the meaning: is associated with subjective experiences). In all the cases where it is claimed to do so, the concept of "consciousness" has simply be re-defined.

 

[vanesch]

Does our brain decohere with the environment as readily as every other bit of experimental equipment?

Probably even faster, given its messy coupling to the environment (ever tried to have a brain working in ultra vacuum near 0 K ?)

 

[Schrodinger's Dog]

That's really quite odd, I've been discussing this sort of stuff at length recently on a non physics forum. If anyones actually interested in what sort of research has been done on the quantum and consciousness question. I have some data and some links for the Consciousness research centre at Colorada university. The most recent interesting although controversial results from a Scientist named Beck, show some evidence that synaptic triggers might be effected by QET in microtubials. It's all highly speculative. But I would imagine it's all pretty well known stuff or maybe not. Anyhow the question of free will and the quantum has many adherents in the philosophical world.

I came up with the idea myself independently the first time I began to look into QM, if you even have a small inkling of QM and some knowledge of philosophy as it purtains to the free will/determinism discussion the two go together like cheese and wine. I would be surprised if most people don't stumble on the ideas sooner or later themselves if left in a vacuum like I was. It's like the wheel, every society that needs it comes up with it sooner or later.

Only recently though has the philosophical been explored in scientific terms and there's plenty of papers out there, some credible some not so credible.

Enzymes "use" decoherence to more efficiently process Uracil in RNA and other protein strings in DNA replication, I'd be surprised if biological areas of the body don't also make use of it at the frighteningly small level of the human brain. Who knows though?

Don't ask me to find links to the above notion, if you can obtain papers from NASA's nanotech research areas do so, I saw an overview in NS magazine only and I can't even find that. Sorry

 

[masudr]

Is a bacteria conscious?

EDIT: That should actually be "Is a bacterium conscious?" or alternatively, "Are bacteria conscious?"

 

[rewebster]

Is a bacteria conscious?

Depends on how many prepositional phrases and qualifiers are/could be included in the sentence; such as, 'of aware of a food source' or even 'of a magnetic field' , or 'if and only if it has nerve cells'.

And, as this relates to QM (and the rest of the theories)---Which theory has the least amount of "prepositional phrases and qualifiers"? Which theory did you (anyone) choose to expend 'time' to investigate? Which one have you (anyone) invested into 'believe'? --And, why?


One 'funny' thing that passes my thoughts once in awhile,---Would the Wright brothers have been the first to fly if they would have been academically trained theoretical physicists?

 

[Schrodinger's Dog]

@ Vanesch: I just noticed free will is an illusion? Such a fad thing to say, prove it? It's no better than saying predeterminism is preposterous based on modern theoretical physics. I hear that expression so often that it's almost like everyones convinced themselves it's true despite it being a hypothesis. Since as far as I am aware no philosophers have answered the questions either way or scientists for that matter, how can you prove that it is an illusion and if you just stated that, shouldn't you have chastised yourself for saying it on a physics thread?

Materialists are so dull. Almost as bad as secular humanists

 

[masudr]

Well, everything's a hypothesis in physics. If you're afraid of making hypothetical statements, then don't do physics. However, every statement can be held to be true under some model. For example, 1+1 \in \mathbb{R} is in fact true, given that we are talking about the real numbers. A similar thing holds in physics.

Hypothesis H1: Given enough initial conditions, the classical state of a system is indefinitely determined.

H1 is a truth in classical mechanics. Whether or not H1 holds in describing reality is equivalent to the hypothesis that classical mechanics corresponds to reality.

Now physics aside (since this applies more generally), every statement is a hypothesis. There is no truth; if some hypothesis is held to be true by a large majority of "sane" people, we often elevate that hypothesis to truth.

Hypothesis H2: The Earth is flat.

H2 was believed to be true by so many a few centuries ago, that it was elevated to the notion of truth. Of course, we all know it was a hypothesis. One that now has very little (if any) empirical support.To summarise: everything is a hypothesis; hypotheses can either have empirical support or not and this can help an individual decide if they wish to believe the hypothesis is true. Importantly, no hypothesis can be proved true in the sense of describing the universe (as we all know).

My statements above are all hypotheses too.

 

[Doc Al]

@ Vanesch: I just noticed free will is an illusion?

He just said it might be an illusion.

What I find more amusing is the appeal to quantum randomness as supporting some kind of ultimate (contra-causal) free will.

 

[rewebster]

Almost as bad as secular humanists


How many branes can dance on the head of a pin?



On the "Is a bacterium conscious?" ---I think that the magnetite particles that develop in them may be some form of ROM (computer speak)--(non-cellular memory)--just a hypothesis, though.

 

[rewebster]

Almost as bad as secular humanists



Excuse me---I thought it said secular humorists

 

[selfAdjoint]

Well said!
But the question remains--how does free will arise from physical laws?How does consciousness arise?

The question before that one is "Does free will exist?" And the question before THAT one is "Does the idea of free will even make sense?"

Note that the free will we like to dote on has to be causal in that it causes things to happen i.e. not just an epimorphism, but random in its own causation, i.e. not predetermined. Does this hang together? Does it maybe lead to an infinite regress? It seems strangely reminiscent of the unitary/irreversable issue in the measurement problem.

I find compatibilism a much more comfortable intellectual position.

 

[gptejms]

Free will might be an illusion, in that it is the physics (deterministic or probabilistic) that tells your physical body what it will do, and your subjective experience of that is simply that you "desired" to act that way.A bit like an apple always "desires" to fall off the tree.

That's possible(at one level of my 'whatever experience'),but my 'subjective experience' of what you say is :-'that's not right..not possible'!I don't know which one to believe..my 'whatever experience' or my 'subjective experience'..or some other 'damned experience'.

 

[gptejms]

Note that the free will we like to dote on has to be causal in that it causes things to happen i.e. not just an epimorphism, but random in its own causation, i.e. not predetermined. Does this hang together? Does it maybe lead to an infinite regress? It seems strangely reminiscent of the unitary/irreversable issue in the measurement problem.

It's random in causation,not in its own causation.Now what causes 'it' i.e. free will...another 'free will'?..or probabilistic physical laws?See,introducing the probabilistic aspect into the physical laws(as in quantum mechanics) gives you at least some glimmer of hope to explain the (really free) 'free will' (one fine day)...else you have to contend with 'free will is an illusion' or 'free will can not be explained by physical laws'.

 

[rewebster]

I'll go with Causality, with a hint of Probability---unless animate (living) objects are involved, at which each and every intervention by that animate object would initiate another case/scenario of causality. Animate (living) objects make decisions by choice (free will) influencing the surrounding environment. The act of free will may seem random, may be partially determined by previous behaviors and patterns, but the reaction itself to a stimuli can't be 100% predicted.

The amount of data to predict 100% of the actions/interactions/results of, let's say, two meteors hitting in space--down to gravitation, magnetic, chemical, etc. changes and interplay may be possible someday--but why, in that case, do those calculations?

There probably has been done the same (some) experiment at Fermilab one hundred times. If it was done ten thousand times, the images would probably still not be identical.

I like Causality, with Probability ---there's are just too many 'field' effects that at any given instant that differ to predict most interactions.


e.g.---gross causality with probability is dropping a rock--

but who would want to make a bet on the exact course of a bacterium for a full day.

 

[rewebster]

The idea for a 'new' idea has to come from somewhere. For someone to suggest a new idea, that person has to have some kind of 'knowledge'. From ancient China and India, to Archimedes, to Newton and his apple, and to the present day, an event (heard, seen, read) has to occur before a 'new' idea is first thought. That new thought is derived from all past knowledge of that individual relating to the event to form, at that specific time of the person's knowledge base, the most reasonable, deductive and logical conclusions to that person. Any person with any knowledge of a specific area of interest can come up with a 'new' idea. Any other person can either formulate a derivative 'new' idea from that initial idea, or dismiss it, as it relates to that person's beliefs, interest, and knowledge.

Before an experiment is started, the idea for the experiment must come first----(free will)-- then, any results add to the idea--(whether proving the idea or not doesn't matter--new knowledge is gained).


Is "Imagination is more important than knowledge"?----Depends

Depends on YOUR OWN definition of imagination, for one major aspect.



I've got an imagination, I have ideas ---are they new and of importance? maybe ---and yours may be also.

 

[masudr]

You're just my imagination anyway. As was all of Newton's work &c.

I've just got a brilliantly cohesive and inventive imagination.

 

[rewebster]

I'm not Jung like I used to be to Freud over things---I. Kant but I'll try anyway

 

[Schrodinger's Dog]

He just said it might be an illusion.

What I find more amusing is the appeal to quantum randomness as supporting some kind of ultimate (contra-causal) free will.

I was always under the impression it was true chaos that threw this idea up(Copenhagen Interpretation) Randomness does not destroy predeterminism any more than it invokes free will.

I find the idea interesting, but it is a kind of holy grail atm, your just making far too many assumptiuons based on assumptions to be credible.

The QM of consciousness, as speculative as it is isn't too bad,but the philosophy of thinking though is sometimes a bit beyond my level. I would advise people to look into it though, those who haven't done so already it's if nothing else, interesting.

My personal greivence is without knowing all there is to know or even a vague slice, people make all these judgements, like freewill may be an illusion or predeterminism is dead, there really is no answer at the moment we are a blind man looking for a candle in a dark room, etc etc etc. Still if your looking for answers in philosophy try religion.

 

[reilly]

Wow. Before I vanished for family and vacation time, I had given up on this thread's potential to foster discussions and debates. All in good time.

I've got a few things to do over the next few days, so I'll 1. thank lot's of people for making this a "happening thing," and 2. say that, in my view consciousness has nothing at all to do with QM-- other than the obvious matters of matter and the various perceptual neural-transducers. Along with many neuroscientists, Sir Francis Crick in particular, it's my view that consciousness is simply the cumulative effect of neural activity.

Until recently, notions of free will., consciousness and "brain-mind" duality were predominantly considered by philosophers -- their's was really the only game in town. My how things have changed -- science has increasingly taken over from philosophy, as it must, and as it did during Newton's time. Seems to me that philosophers are becoming less and less relevant and much less important than even 15 years ago in the area of mental phenomena -- the 19th century's approach to understanding nature is losing ground to the realities of the late 20th century.

Does anyone really believe that Searle's Chinese Room (whatever-you-call it) has anything to do with reality? Indeed it is clever, just like the idea of the economic rational man, but, to me, it's just another case of, "Ma, look no hands."

To be continued.
Regards,
Reilly Atkinson

 

[lalbatros]

Reilly,

I 'agree' with all your questions but one:

6. How can anyone who does not have at least a few years of experience with QM, after school, be a legitimate critic of QM?

The point cannot be "experience". This is close to an argument of authority.
Maybe you shoud replace this question by a statement about the scientific nature of the debate.

In addition, I could argue that too much experience maybe an obstacle to scientific discovery.
Who was the nobelist that was reluctant to read the complete bibliography on his thesis topic?
Had Einstein "a lot of experience" or a great insight when he was 25?

 

[vanesch]

Along with many neuroscientists, Sir Francis Crick in particular, it's my view that consciousness is simply the cumulative effect of neural activity.

The externally behavioural effects, yes. But it doesn't explain the experience from "within". It is this *redefinition* of consciousness which neuroscientists, AI specialists and so on apply, and they change it into something that fits a certain arbitrary descriptive or behavioural definition.

But, as the saying goes: it is not because you know the ENTIRE neurological system of a bat, that you know "what it's like to be a bat". You will be able to predict entirely the behaviour of a bat, you will know every single neuron that will be firing when you have it flying and catching some flies, when it mates, and so on. And you'll still not know what the bat "experiences". Now of course, you could not care less about what "it is like to be a bat", and say that this is not a scientific question. If you can entirely explain the behaviour of a bat, then you KNOW all there is to know about bats. It might be seen differently from the PoV of a bat...

And then the discussion turns to your body. Others may say that one couldn't care less about what "you might experience", and if they can explain the behaviour of your body, then that's all there is to it, and there's no such thing as "you" experiencing something, that this is not a scientific question, because the behavioural part is all there is to it. And then you know there's something fishy about this, because you DO experience something. You cannot express this, because this expression itself is entirely behavioural and yes, those neurologists might say, ok, if I put this needle HERE in this foot, then a K/Na wave will propagate along THIS nerve, will then give rise to neurotransmitters at THAT neuron in the brain, will then activate THESE neurons here, which will then activate THOSE muscles there, who will contract the lungs, and the neurons THERE will send pulses to THESE muscles here, and will hear the sound "AAAHH", produced by the cavity of the torax and the tension of the vocal cords.
But there's, nowhere, a description of the subjective experience of pain. And the neurologists say: there's really no such thing as a subjective experience of pain, but we can classify certain types of neurological loops which seem to induce this "AAAAH" production, and, they seem to produce also restructurations of the brain in such a way as to produce avoidance reactions next time similar stimuli are applied.

Then you KNOW you better get out of that place !

 

[gptejms]

So vanesch,are you saying that there's a quality to a human being which can not be explained just by the material/physical laws?

 

[vanesch]

So vanesch,are you saying that there's a quality to a human being which can not be explained just by the material/physical laws?

I don't know about OTHER human beings, but to myself, yes. There is my subjective experience, which is not EXPLAINED by physical laws, and of which I know that it exists. My body's behaviour is of course explained by material/physical laws. Including all I say and type. Maybe there is a prerequisite that there first needs to be a behaviour that behaves AS IF there were also a conscious experience, before such a thing can somehow emerge. But I could fairly well imagine my body doing all these things, WITHOUT me experiencing anything. But I do. And that's the thing I'm talking about here.

I say I don't know about others, because I don't know if they have subjective experiences. As the only thing that is available to me, is behavioural information, and as that will be the same with or without a subjective experience on their side, there's no way for me to find out.

Somehow, I *assume* that they might have a subjective experience, by analogy to myself, but I only have myself and my own subjective experience and an observed analogy to motivate this from. And what concerns bats, ants, stones, computers and rooms full of books, I have no idea because the analogy becomes worse and worse.

 

[gptejms]

Your stand reminds me of Roger Penrose's stand against strong AI--though he talks of a quality of human intelligence not possessed by machines while you talk of another quality 'subjective experience'.

 

[vanesch]

Your stand reminds me of Roger Penrose's stand against strong AI--though he talks of a quality of human intelligence not possessed by machines while you talk of another quality 'subjective experience'.

Yes, I know. I have to say I think Penrose is somehow wrong there. It might be, or it might not be, that the brain is a quantum computer. I think there have been studies that show that it's hard to believe that there remains some coherence for long enough a time in a brain to achieve anything useful on purpose. But then, who knows. But if that's possible in a brain, why couldn't we build a machine based upon the same principles ?

I don't see what's fundamentally impossible in making a machine that is as intelligent as a human being. After all, intelligence is a behavioural concept (and is often confused with subjective experience!). Intelligence is the ability to solve problems. And then you can discuss about the class of problems we're talking about. 200 years ago, being able to play chess would have been considered as intelligent. But now that pocket computers can do so, we switch to other problem sets because we have a hard time admitting that a machine might solve problems better than we do (although computers do it all the time !). So we invent "human-scale", totally arbitrary, definitions, like the Turing test, which consists in tricking a human being into believing it is talking to another human being for at least, say, 20 minutes. This is a problem to be solved, which is deemed to define "human intelligence" (or shortly, intelligence). What if we turned that around, and asked for a human being to trick a computer into believing it was dealing with another computer ? We'd all quickly fail the test, because I don't see you manually working out in real time any ethernet protocol So humans seem to fail the "Turning test of machine intelligence" . We seem not to even pass the intelligence test of an ethernet card

But when I read strong AI proponents, and Penrose, it seems to me that at some point, they confuse "intelligence" with "subjective experiences". Penrose seems to think that we can use our subjective experiences to be mathematically more intelligent than any formal system (which would imply a genuine action of this subjective experience onto the physical world). And AI proponents seem to say that when a machine reaches behaviourally human-level intelligence (for instance, it passes the Turning test), then automatically goes with it some subjective experience (and hence all the ethics that goes with it).

 

[rewebster]

The problem I see with the Turing Test (tricking a human being) is that I've met some 'human beings' that could be tricked with dog on the other side of a screen. Which is the 'best' , 'acceptable' , 'most correct' , or 'true' (a law?) are all different answers that we all 'accept' in different ways. From 'worst' , 'unacceptable' , 'improbable' , to 'etc.' are also on the scale--just on the other end. --and all have been used to describe theories (from different people) that we use today---and ones that have been dismissed.

How were you (a person/anyone) raised?---How and why did it lead you toward QM or MW 's? (little pun with the etiology of the letters)


Another way to say it is, "How much fun can you have with a piece of string?"

 

[gptejms]

I don't see what's fundamentally impossible in making a machine that is as intelligent as a human being. After all, intelligence is a behavioural concept (and is often confused with subjective experience!). Intelligence is the ability to solve problems.

Intelligence also covers discovering new things(theory of relativity,quantum mechanics etc.),creativity,imaginative thinking etc.,looking at things with wonder(e.g. looking at wave-particle duality,measurement problem with wonder(&. coming up with MWI!))---these are the kind of things a machine can not do.So,I guess 'subjective experience' is required if you wish to go beyond solving problems or playing chess.Coming up with the game of chess is something a machine can't do.

What if we turned that around, and asked for a human being to trick a computer into believing it was dealing with another computer ? We'd all quickly fail the test, because I don't see you manually working out in real time any ethernet protocol So humans seem to fail the "Turning test of machine intelligence" . We seem not to even pass the intelligence test of an ethernet card

You are right about that except that a computer would never put/'think of putting' us to a Turing test to show us how inferior we are!

 

[rewebster]

"oh---noooo,



are you losing your 'emotion chip' ---again, Data?"

 

[gptejms]

Along with many neuroscientists, Sir Francis Crick in particular, it's my view that consciousness is simply the cumulative effect of neural activity.

Neural activity is associated with consciousness--you have greater neural activity while you are conscious than when you are unconscious.But consciousness is not equal to 'neural activity'.

 

[rewebster]

Maybe I'm mistaken, but the questions in post #1 deal more with the 'qualities' why QM isn't accepted more; and why hasn't QM been more fully examined as 'THE' primal theory of 'things'.



I think QM got sidetracked when a few brick walls were hit and no reasonable, logical, and definable hypotheses lead to experimental results.

 

[masudr]

looking at things with wonder(e.g. looking at wave-particle duality

Hah! wonder at wave-particle duality? Forget that rubbish for a moment!

Wonder at the marvel of trees! Of sunshine! Of blue skies! Of a fellow human's face! Of blank verse! Oh my, oh my! Some people would think we physicists don't do anything but read our physics books!

p.s. no offence meant, just light humour

 

[Haelfix]

Yea I don't believe the orthodox position of QM's is tenable to all orders of magnitude. Many of the obvious paradoxes that everyone knows are (in various senses) quite problematic, and its why they haven't dissappeared even after decades of debate.

Decoherence in my mind solved the majority of its problems, and made it a pragmatist approach. Otoh it does sweep various issues under the rug of the 'environment'. For instance, issues with say Von Neumann ideal measuring systems and so forth, nearly always imply some sort of logical adhoc separation of prescriptions for measurer, experiment and so forth and decoherence won't save you from those thought experiments.

Worse, talking about things like 'the wavefunction of the universe' immediately hits absurdities with Hilbert space seperability issues.

Measurement in curved spacetime also has numerous problems (some of which are sort of solved, others aren't).

I don't think many physicists believe orthodox Quantum mechanics is the end of the story (eg 2000 years from now it will be unchanged everywhere), but merely a perfectly sensible calculational tool and valid within the boundaries of experiment atm.

 

[rewebster]

The idea of being 'orthodox' isn't very creative. Maybe most 'have to be' orthodox.

History shows a lot of un-orthodox ideas-----gleaning one out of the many is hard to do at the time of its christening. Most of the presently 'accepted' ideas were challenged quite exhaustively, until facets of them gained some acceptance. What if the star's image wasn't deflected like Einstein predicted?


(I'm not a fan of relativity)