NUCENG said:
Iodine-131 and cesium-137 have an intial ratio of about 8-1 per one of my prvious posts. Cesium is a metal. Iodine can form particulates or emege as a gas. Cesium is a metal and non-volatile so it would normally stay in the coolant and probably inside containment. Depending on the transport path the inital ratio at the point it is being meaured could be drastially different.
After a month the total actity of Iodine shoud have dropped by about a factor of 16. Your two graphs are just over a week apart or about one half life. The logarithm of 0.5 is -0.3. So the levels on the later graph should be about 1/3 of a decade lower. That looks about right to me.
The large majority (APPROX 95%) of iodine released from damaged fresh fuel will form CsI cesium iodide. This is a particulate wthat tends to form larger clumps as particle sizes increase it woll settle out as surface contamination. It is also very soluble in water, but will plate out if the water evaporates. If boiled smaller particles of CsI can be carried with the steam or water vapor. Seawater is slightly basic. However if the pH drops below 7 (acidic) the iodine will be re-evoved as gaseous I2 and would rapidly drop the proportion of Iodine. As long as the pH is basic the CsI will stay in solution.
For further info look up NUREG-1465.
Hope that is clear. The short answer is the graphs appear to be consistent with iodine decaying faster than the cesium. If iodine suddenly increased in air samples it could indicate reevolution of iodine gas, not recriticality.
Another good source of information is NUREG/CR-5732, Iodine Chemical Forms in LWR Severe Accidents
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003726825.pdf
However, I believe the interpretation of the activity data is made murky by the use of seawater (salt water) which complicates the chemical forms and their distribution. Use of seawater in the primary system was not forseen, and as far as I know, has not been analyzed.
Determining the quantity of failed fuel is difficult because of the use of seawater - probably higher corrosion of the fuel (which is consistent with an observation that the hydrogen generation is enhanced in the presence of seawater) and the uncertainty with respect to the water level in the cores during the period March 12 - present.
New breaches would change the ratios of nuclides present. Short half-lived radionuclides continually decay away, so the ratios of short-lived to long-lived isotopes should be decreasing.
Recriticality could be possible only if sufficient fuel was configured in some volume with water (moderated), but in the absence of competing neutron absorbers, e.g., B-10. An indication of recriticality would be a sudden increase in short-lived radioisotopes, e.g., Xe-138 and Xe-135 compared to Xe-133, or increases in I-132 and I-134 compared to I-131, 133, 135.
On the other, if the recriticality event lasts on the order of seconds or minutes, then the new inventory of short-lived fission products may not be very substantial, because the time is short and the power is low (the reactor would go critical from decay heat/power conditions).