Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

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The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is facing significant challenges following the earthquake, with reports indicating that reactor pressure has reached dangerous levels, potentially 2.1 times capacity. TEPCO has lost control of pressure at a second unit, raising concerns about safety and management accountability. The reactor is currently off but continues to produce decay heat, necessitating cooling to prevent a meltdown. There are conflicting reports about an explosion, with indications that it may have originated from a buildup of hydrogen around the containment vessel. The situation remains serious, and TEPCO plans to flood the containment vessel with seawater as a cooling measure.
  • #13,921
ronaldkr said:
And physics? "No water equals no criticality", he writes. Tell that to the victims of Little Boy. Oops.

I thought he adequately backed his statement.
The fuel is so dilute in U-235 and Pu-239 isotopes (the only ones that undergo the chain reaction) that it is imperative for the bundles to be immersed in water for criticality to occur.

Do you know what is "enrichment" ? (hint - un-dilution)

Do you know how un-dilute reactor fuel is?
Do you know how un-dilute Little Boy was?
 
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  • #13,922
gnasch said:
Interesting comment on the water flow:


http://www.hiroshimasyndrome.com/fukushima-commentary.html
entry of 20130327

best, gnasch

He says "Unit #2’s torus room is dry" but this is wrong. Unit 2 torus room water level is OP 3270 (mm) , which is a little below mid-basement (OP 4000). The water surface is seen in the stairs on the picture on http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120607_02-e.pdf page 2/5 (water level measurements are provided on page 5/5).

He says "all the observed water levels are below penetrations through the walls" but Tepco provided the following diagram showing the penetrations are at 0.3 m and 3.1 m above torus room bottom, which are lower than the 3.8 m water level :

attachment.php?attachmentid=45688&stc=1&d=1333061209.png


Diagram from my translation at https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3840717#post3840717
 
  • #13,923
However, in the reactor building 4 is also standing water in the torus room.
Why?
 
  • #13,924
tsutsuji said:

Tsutsuji, I've been missing something important until you reposted that link.

The drawing shows a pipe penetration directly from the torus room to the turbinge building basement. Further it shows a sleeve around the pipe which is not water tight, much less air tight.

In US BWR3 and BWR4 plants such a configuration would seem to degrade secondary containment and the ability to create a negative pressure in the reactor building with the SBGT system. Is there any information about what system is aassociated with those penetrations? Is this a Japanese design difference or am I misremembering the US plant design (OTD)?

Only thing I can think of is that these penetrations were originally sealed and failed during the accident. Does anyone else with US BWR experience know what those penetrations could be? I don't remember any lessons learned about this.
 
  • #13,925
NUCENG said:
Tsutsuji, I've been missing something important until you reposted that link.

The drawing shows a pipe penetration directly from the torus room to the turbinge building basement. Further it shows a sleeve around the pipe which is not water tight, much less air tight.

In US BWR3 and BWR4 plants such a configuration would seem to degrade secondary containment and the ability to create a negative pressure in the reactor building with the SBGT system. Is there any information about what system is aassociated with those penetrations? Is this a Japanese design difference or am I misremembering the US plant design (OTD)?

Only thing I can think of is that these penetrations were originally sealed and failed during the accident. Does anyone else with US BWR experience know what those penetrations could be? I don't remember any lessons learned about this.

Could it be a penetration for the condensate storage system to fill/drain the torus? Or something else related (CST line to RCIC/HPCI?). I know the older plant designs tend to have their CST feed both RCIC/HPCI and act as a condensate overflow tank. I'm not sure though, my experience with Mark Is is limited.
 
  • #13,926
NUCENG said:
Possible explanation or contributing factor:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1224790_5130.html

From TEPCO Daily status report:

"-At 12:35 PM on February 15, Unit 2 reactor injection water amount was adjusted as follows since the amount had fluctuated. Feed water system: Increased from approx. 1.8m3/h to approx. 2.0m3/h, Reactor core spray system: Increased from approx. 3.4m3/h to approx. 3.5m3/h."

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1224861_5130.html"

looking at the chart, the change started on about the 8th or 9th
so, no, at least on the face of it
 
  • #13,927
I found the following document dated 16 December 2012. I don't know if it hast been posted in this forum yet. It's in English :

Severe Accident Analyses of Fukushima-Daiichi Units 1 to 3
Harutaka Hoshi and Masashi Hirano, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)
Masashi Iijima and Toshimitsu Homma, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)
Side Event “Updated activities about TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS accident” At Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety on 16 December 2012

http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/data/dai-ichi_NPS_handouts2.pdf

pages 18 and 19 show "Detonation analysis with AUTODYN" for the unit 1 and unit 3 hydrogen explosions.
 
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  • #13,928
zapperzero said:
I wonder how optimistic the assumption that the SFPs will remain intact for the duration really is.

Awhile back I was looking at this handout from TEPCO on the new fuel handling building for Unit 4 and looking at the graphic on the left, it "appears" that they are cantilevering the new structure over the Unit 4 reactor building. To me, this could explain the apparent "overbuilding" of the structure. I also believe this could be a statement about their confidence in the structural integrity of the remnants of Unit 4.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130313_01-e.pdf

Or I could just be making too much out of the graphic.
 
  • #13,929
zapperzero said:
looking at the chart, the change started on about the 8th or 9th
so, no, at least on the face of it

I agree, the temperature began to increase. earlier. but the dates of adjustments in flow are consistent with beginning to cool it back down and then reducing flow after the cooldown returned to the previous value. The beginning or the heatup on the 8th or 9th could be the start of the flow fluctuation they describe on the status report on the 15th. I can't immediately explain why only a few of the sensors responded, but it does match the timing of two physical changes in flow rates.

Of course, sleeping dragons are much more fanciful. :approve:
 
  • #13,930
NUCENG said:
Of course, sleeping dragons are much more fanciful. :approve:

aren't they, though?:redface:

But you see, the entire thing reminds me of what doctors call symptomatic treatment
which is generally good at keeping people alive, not so much at curing them. I worry about reactivity. I worry about corium flows. I worry about new cracks in the piping. TEPCO is seemingly unconcerned and just dumps more water in when the "patient" gets too hot.
 
  • #13,931
NUCENG said:
Only thing I can think of is that these penetrations were originally sealed and failed during the accident.

I think you are correct.

I have not found anything like a blueprint showing the detailed structure of those penetrations, but here is what I found :

On the Hitachi-GE website, a robot specification dated 9 November 2012 :

2.1.1 Objectives of the equipment and general system
(1) The first objective of the equipment to be developed consists of checking for any leaks from
the penetration areas of the wall surfaces of the torus rooms and triangular corners in the
basement of the nuclear reactor building.
(2) The second objective of the equipment to be developed consists of monitoring the remotely
operated vehicle underwater that is used to visually inspect the torus rooms and triangular
corners in the basement of the nuclear reactor building.


http://www.hitachi-hgne.co.jp/download/2012/20121109_28-e.pdf page 1/7 (English)

On the NRA website, a document distributed at the 7th meeting, dated 29 March 2013 of the Special atomic facility monitoring and assessment study group meeting :

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_04.pdf page 20/36 (translation)
attachment.php?attachmentid=57462&stc=1&d=1365070612.png
 

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  • #13,932
NRA Special atomic facility monitoring and assessment study group, 7th meeting, 29 March 2013 (http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/20130329.html )

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_99.pdf Agenda
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_01.pdf Equipment stop due to blackout at Tepco Fuksuhima Daiichi NPP
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_02.pdf Units 1 to 4 internal electric power source blackout incident (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_03.pdf Reply to comments on unit 4 SFP fuel removal safety (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_04.pdf Status of verifications concerning unit 4 SFP fuel removal (draft)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_05.pdf Radiation assessment in plant premises surroundings (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_06.pdf Observations about unit 1 torus room radiation measurement results (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_07.pdf Waterproofing countermeasures against ground water seeping in (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_08.pdf Partial revision of "Special atomic facility executive plan" (22 March release) (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_09.pdf Verification status of each remark
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_10.pdf Status of the study group's past deliberations etc. on executive plan

(reference)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0007_11.pdf List of measures demanded for Fukushima Daichi NPP in line with the special atomic facility designation [7 November 2012]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpwa2TCPxts
NRA Special atomic facility monitoring and assessment study group, 7th meeting, 29 March 2013
 
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  • #13,933
zapperzero said:
aren't they, though?:redface:

But you see, the entire thing reminds me of what doctors call symptomatic treatment
which is generally good at keeping people alive, not so much at curing them. I worry about reactivity. I worry about corium flows. I worry about new cracks in the piping. TEPCO is seemingly unconcerned and just dumps more water in when the "patient" gets too hot.

And their alternatives are what? Are there any indications that corium can still be in a molten state after 2 years? Has any radiological evidence of reactivity changes indicated an impending recriticality? They are injecting water through both feedwater and spray piping. Adjustments in these flows seem to demonstrate that at least some of the flow from both paths is getting where it belongs. Operating pressures of piping systems still in use are significantly lower that design conditions. Leaks or additional cracks are possible or even probable due to damage, corrosion, and poor chemistry, but required flows are fairly small and there are additional paths available. Time to respond is in terms of days, not hours as it was in 2011.

You are absolutely justified in your concerns about potential additional problems. Keep watching and questioning.
 
  • #13,934
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130404/index.html A little after 05:20 AM on 4 April the multinuclide facility stopped suddenly. As there was no abnormalty or leakage, it was found that an operator had mistakenly pushed a button. The facility was started again one hour later. The problem was not disclosed to national or local governments or mass media until 3 hours after it happened.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130405/1715_teishi.html Unit 3 SFP cooling stopped at around 2:30 PM on 5 April. An alarm signal was generated on a "power board". Tepco said it plans to restart the system today. Without cooling the pool heats at 0.15°C/hour and it would take 2 weeks without cooling to reach 65°C. There are 566 assemblies in the pool, including 52 fresh fuel ones.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130405/index.html Unit 3 SFP cooling was restarted at around 5:20 PM.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130405/1254_hanei.html There was a deliberation on energy and nuclear power at the national diet today. Prime Minister Abe said concerning the accident investigation "Some points that need study are remaining. As the government changed, we want to revise from zero, and resolutely conduct the research of the causes". NRA president Shunichi Tanaka said : "In order to find out if the SBO is due to the earthquake or to the tsunami, one needs to enter the site whose radiation is too high, and our investigation shall include such considerations. The research of causes is an important duty, and as the members in charge of the investigation were selected on March 27, we want to make things clear as quickly as possible".
 
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  • #13,935
NUCENG said:
And their alternatives are what?
You are absolutely justified in your concerns about potential additional problems. Keep watching and questioning.

Alternatives... I am concerned that the site is still not instrumented properly. We should know most everything by now, or at least all that matters. Water flows, state of piping. Thanks for the encouragement, there is not much I can do from the sidelines, except ask questions.

Are there any indications that corium can still be in a molten state after 2 years?

At one point a few months ago there have been some changes - thermometers failing mostly - that suggested new paths for the water, or corium shifting, or both. We don't know. Just looking at the thermal power that it can still make, there shouldn't be any of it that is still molten though, no? I mean, barring odd situations, such as a hot bubble in a very efficiently insulating ceramic foam or something? When I said "corium flows" I mostly meant in the past - the paths it took are assumed, not known.
Has any radiological evidence of reactivity changes indicated an impending recriticality?
We don't know. There are to my knowledge no neutron detectors anywhere near the reactor buildings. I haven't read any mention of anything like that. The (enormous amount) of assorted metallic debris that has already been removed has not been checked for neutron activation. And so on.

They are injecting water through both feedwater and spray piping. Adjustments in these flows seem to demonstrate that at least some of the flow from both paths is getting where it belongs.

I am not disputing that, evidently there is some water (a lot actually). We don't know how exactly it gets to where it is and we don't really know where it goes when it goes (well, to the sea eventually but...) and so the cooling loop is not really closed. That should be a cause of great concern, due to contamination issues. Yet it somehow isn't.

Operating pressures of piping systems still in use are significantly lower that design conditions.
There's that at least, yes.

Leaks or additional cracks are possible or even probable due to damage, corrosion, and poor chemistry, but required flows are fairly small and there are additional paths available. Time to respond is in terms of days, not hours as it was in 2011.
Small blessings.

I can think of at least one practical reason to FINALLY do a thorough check of the piping system - the water processing/storage facility is overloaded as it is, flows could probably be reduced even further, much further in fact if we (TEPCO really) actually knew where the water is needed and how to get it there.
 
  • #13,936
Special atomic facility monitoring and assessment study group, 6th meeting, 8 March 2013 (http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/20130308.html )

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_99.pdf Agenda
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_01.pdf Reply to comments on multinuclide removal facility (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_02.pdf Multinuclide removal facility (line A) hot test evaluation (draft)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_03.pdf Special atomic facility risk assessment, etc. (reply to comments) (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_04.pdf Mid and long term process toward fuel debris removal (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_05.pdf Radiation assessment in plant premises surroundings (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_06.pdf Structural strength and antiseismic strength of unit 3 cover for fuel removal (reply to comments) (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_07.pdf Verification status of each remark
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_08.pdf Status of the study group's past deliberations etc. on executive plan

(References)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_09.pdf List of measures demanded for Fukushima Daichi NPP in line with the special atomic facility designation [7 November 2012]
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_10.pdf NRA's awareness of issues
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_11.pdf Opinions raised by outside expert at the last meeting
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0006_12.pdf Unit 3 cover for fuel removal structural strength and antiseismic strength

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gqg54W9x6j4
 
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  • #13,937
tsutsuji said:
Special atomic facility

What does this mean please? Is it some new classification? A new legal framework?
 
  • #13,938
zapperzero said:
What does this mean please? Is it some new classification? A new legal framework?

Yes. According to http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201211070747.html Tepco is legally bound under this designation, to submit its operation plan (including reactor monitoring, fuel storage, worker radiation exposure management, etc.) for approval to the NRA.

It sounds like it gives the NRA more power than it has on the other nuclear power plants.
 
  • #13,939
tsutsuji said:
Yes.
It sounds like it gives the NRA more power than it has on the other nuclear power plants.

Thank you.
This seems reasonable.
 
  • #13,940
http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1226107_5117.html About 6.0X10³ Bq/cm³ was found on 5 April between the outermost sheet and the middle sheet (bentonite sheets) at underground storage tank No 2. Additional water analysis will be performed on 6 April.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1226108_5117.html We are holding an extraordinary press conference about the underground storage tank No 2 at Tepco's main office [in Tokyo], at 01:30 AM, 6 April 2013 (or Fukushima press club room, Fukushima prefecture prefectoral office main building 2nd floor, Fukushima City).

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1226111_5117.html At present, underground storage tank No 2 contains 13,000 m³ of water. We plan to transfer 11,500 m³ of water from underground storage tank No 2 to underground water tank No 1 (which is at present empty). 11,500 m³ is the maximum operational volume of underground water tank No 1. As there is no ditch nearby, there is little probability that water flowed to the sea.

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0406/TKY201304050526.html The underground water tank stores water after it has undergone decontaminating treatment.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130406/index.html Although cesium has been removed, radioactive strontium remains in the water stored at the underground tank. Strontium was found between the [bentonite] sheets and also very small quantities of strontium were found in the ground outside the tank. Tepco suspects the water is leaking from the underground tank into the ground. As the underground tank is 800 m away from the sea, and as there is no water ditch nearby, Tepco thinks the water has not leaked directly into the sea.
 
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  • #13,941
What I wrote above contains a mistake. See the top left diagram on http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130406_03-j.pdf page 4/22. Only the outermost sheet (black) is a bentonite sheet. The other two (red sheets) are HDPE sheets. There is also a layer of concrete (gray) on the inner side. There are also long fiber non woven sheets (dot dash lines) between those sheets.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130406/index.html Tepco plans to transfer the water into the other underground tank using four pumps with a flow rate of approximately 100 tons/day, so that it will take more than 5 days.
 
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  • #13,942
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130407_03-j.pdf See the diagrams page 4/15 : Tepco thinks that there is a possibility that water leaked through the detector pipe's penetration into the sheets. The leakage point is thought to be located at a high elevation, because no sudden rise of the between-sheets water level was observed. Conversely, a low elevation leakage point would have created a sudden rise, because the water pressure increases with depth.

This explains why Tepco decided to lower the water level in underground tank No. 3 :

Reduce the water level of the underground reservoir No.3 from 95% to less than 80% (by safely
transferring the water to an unused underground reservoir)
...
The water will continue to be stored in the underground reservoirs for the time being
while maintaining the water level at approx. 80% (max.) or less which is the location of the leakage
detection hole on the upper part of the reservoir (which is assumed to be the leakage location).

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130408_02-e.pdf page 3/4
 
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  • #13,943
From Asahi : leak could have been detected earlier ; unexpected consequences on the ground water bypass system can be feared:

The company also said April 7 it believes that radioactive water began leaking from the No. 2 tank around March 20.

The company has been monitoring water levels and radioactivity concentrations outside the tank. But only after the leak was detected did TEPCO find that water levels had started falling around March 20.

There were also signs of changes in radioactivity concentrations on March 20, but the company did not notice them until April 3.

[...]

TEPCO planned to pump up groundwater and release it into the sea before it enters the reactor buildings. That plan would be meaningless if the groundwater is already contaminated.

By Shunsuke Kimura http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201304080089

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130409/index.html Underground tank No. 1's leak occurred while it was only 55% full, so that the cause is presumed be different from what had been thought earlier for Underground tank No. 2 and No. 3.
 
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  • #13,945
The concern is that leaking highly radioactive water may gradually contaminate larger areas of the site.
Things are bad enough as is, working in a 50-100mSiv/hr environment would be much worse.
If that is the prospect, TEPCO will surely be forced to ocean dump this contamination.
 
  • #13,946
I was hoping Tepco would quickly translate into English the presentation shown by Tepco's president on 10 April about the countermeasures against the underground tank leaks, but at present only the Japanese version is available :

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130410_04-j.pdf As you can see on the first page, they plan to move all the water from all underground plastic sheet tanks to on-ground steel tanks : the H2 area tanks, the filtrate water tanks and the G6 area tanks. The green area on page 2/20 is a new area under study where they plan to install even more above ground tanks. The tanks at H8, G3, G4, G5, and G6 (violet) have yet to be installed. The tanks installation plan at G6 is explained on the diagram on page 3/20 which shows in pink the G6 storage capacity gradually increasing over April, May, and June 2013, while the water quantity stored in the underground tanks (in blue) gradually decreases as the water is moved into the above ground tanks. The diagram on page 7/20 explains the plan to pump contaminated water from the detector pipe and put it back into the tank, for the purpose of mitigating (preventing ?) ground water contamination. The map on page 12/20 shows (in violet) the location of the new monitoring holes that will be bored to monitor ground water contamination. The schedule on page 20/20 says the visual inspection of the detector pipe penetration at underground tank No. 2 should be completed on 17 April.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201304110054 "TEPCO to stop using underground tanks at Fukushima plant"

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130410/index.html 0.11 Bq/cm³ of strontium, etc. was found in a sample of ground water taken on 9 April near underwater tank No. 1. As the salt concentration is stable, it is impossible to judge if this is evidence that the tank is leaking.

The design of those tanks (2 PE sheets, 1 bentonite sheet) had been disclosed by Tepco at the 25 June 2012 mid and long term meeting :

tsutsuji said:
The 7th mid long term meeting was held on 25 June: http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20120625_02.html

Document 3 Study and execution of each special plan

3-2 Treatment of accumulated water
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/120625/120625_02m.pdf Progress status of construction of underground water storage tanks
 
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  • #13,947

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  • #13,948
Translation:

04/11
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05/11
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  • #13,949
Translation:

07/11
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08/11
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  • #13,950
Translation:

10/11
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11/11
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