Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

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The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is facing significant challenges following the earthquake, with reports indicating that reactor pressure has reached dangerous levels, potentially 2.1 times capacity. TEPCO has lost control of pressure at a second unit, raising concerns about safety and management accountability. The reactor is currently off but continues to produce decay heat, necessitating cooling to prevent a meltdown. There are conflicting reports about an explosion, with indications that it may have originated from a buildup of hydrogen around the containment vessel. The situation remains serious, and TEPCO plans to flood the containment vessel with seawater as a cooling measure.
  • #13,951
Thank you, Tsutsuji-san, for this most informative summary.
With a chloride ion concentration at the 0.1-1.0% level, the RO concentrate is still much less salty than sea water. This begs for additional concentration.
If the dissolved solids in the concentrate could be separately sequestrated, it would drastically improve the storage situation. I am surprised that TEPCO does not appear to be pursuing this option. Is the residual radioactivity in the RO water such that further concentration is too risky?
 
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  • #13,952
I seem to recall 2 Sv/h beta and 22 mSv gamma?
 
  • #13,956
zapperzero said:
I seem to recall 2 Sv/h beta and 22 mSv gamma?

No argument the residues would be seriously radioactive.
Afaik, the Kurion zeolites were much more contaminated still.
The priority here is concentrating the contaminated solution to avoid slopping the radioactivity all over the place because the storage tanks are leaking.
 
  • #13,957
LabratSR said:
Tsutsuji, Would you mind taking a look at this press release from today.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1226375_5130.html

Thanks,

It is very big. Over 1000 pages. I can't even find a table of contents in that press release.

This press release covers a number of revisions to this huge book, first made available on 7 December. The revision is explained in http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130412_03-j.pdf (5 pages)

This big book is what I was referring to as "operation plan" a few days ago in a comment on the "special atomic facility" legal framework :

tsutsuji said:
Yes. According to http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201211070747.html Tepco is legally bound under this designation, to submit its operation plan (including reactor monitoring, fuel storage, worker radiation exposure management, etc.) for approval to the NRA.

It sounds like it gives the NRA more power than it has on the other nuclear power plants.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130412_03-j.pdf page 2/5 emphasizes that the "special atomic facility" (I think Tepco's translation translating 特定 by "specified" instead of "special" in the 12 April English press release sounds a bit strange) status was granted to Fukushima Daiichi as a facility where emergency measures are being conceived after a nuclear plant accident occurred.

The present revision is the 6th revision, releasing the 7th version :

1) Original version, 7 December 2012 : http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1223529_1870.html (http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2012/1223522_1834.html Japanese - providing a table of contents)
2) 25 December 2012 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2012/1223836_1870.html
3) 11 January 2013 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1224161_5130.html
4) 7 February 2013 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1224626_5130.html
5) 22 March 2013 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1225784_5130.html
6) 29 March 2013 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1225978_5130.html
7) 12 April 2013 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1225978_5130.html

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130412_03-j.pdf page 4/5 says Most of the changes have already been publicly released in documents such as the presentations at the NRA's Special atomic facility monitoring and assessment study group.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130412_03-j.pdf page 5/5 : Examples of revisions performed in each chapter :

◯ Long term storage plan regarding solid radioactive waste
◯ Specification for the units 1,2,3 reactor injection line via CST, reflecting design progress
◯ (about contaminated water treatment and liquid radioactive waste storage) Additions and corrections to structural strength and earthquake resistance assessment
◯ Additions on Philosophy of safety inspections, operation management and conservation management based on the consequences of units 5 and 6's accumulated water
◯ Updating of the data concerning estimated releases and gas waste radiation estimates
◯ Text adjustments (on fuel debris removal and decommissioning)

Now there is something I don't fully understand, which is the difference between the "Implementation of measures" book and the other book called "Facility Management Plan for Units 1-4" (mentioned for example at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1225467_5130.html ).

One very simple difference between the two is that the "Implementation of measures" book is also covering units 5 and 6.
 
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  • #13,958
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisory/2013/ma201309.html "An IAEA expert team will visit Japan this month at the request of the Japanese government"

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130413/index.html The 13 member inspector team will visit Fukushima Daiichi from 17 to 19 April. Team leader Juan Carlos Lentijo said "water processing is going to be the focus of the present inspection. We are going to survey in detail if workforce and organization, etc. are suitable".

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130413/2325_osen.html With 7.2 Bq/cm³, the ground water sample taken on 13 April outside underground water tank No 1 is 5 times more contaminated than the one taken on 12 April, so that it is thought that leakage is going on. Tepco will start transferring the water from underground tank No. 1 to above ground tanks on 14 April.
 
  • #13,959
Tsutsuji, Thank you very much. I was just curious if there was anything interesting in there.
 
  • #13,960
etudiant said:
No argument the residues would be seriously radioactive.
Afaik, the Kurion zeolites were much more contaminated still.
The priority here is concentrating the contaminated solution to avoid slopping the radioactivity all over the place because the storage tanks are leaking.

Umm... isn't this "RO concentrate" with its 2 Sv/h beta and 22 mSv/h gamma surface level actually "[pre-]purified water" and "contaminated solution" at the same time, too?

See here for example.
Maybe this is to confuse people?

Actual "SARRY concentrate" slurry is much more radioactive, several sieverts gamma, as Tepco had to admit unintentionally, see here.
 
  • #13,961
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130419/2045_hairo.html The Fukushima Daiichi decommissioning countermeasure promoting conference (composed of Tepco, government, etc.) had a meeting on 19 April where it was decided to create a new panel whose task it to make proposals for drastic revisions of the decommissioning plan in order to reduce the production of contaminated water. At present, about 400 tons of contaminated water are produced every day, and leaks are occurring one after another. The panel will be chaired by professor Yuzo Onishi of Kansai university who is a civil engineering and ground water expert. NRA president Shuichi Tanaka is also a panel member. The panel will submit a report by the middle of next month.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130419/index.html In response to the fact that 14 subcontractor workers involved in the underground tank water transfer between April 6 and April 8, were not carrying dosimeters as required, the labour ministry instructed Tepco to perform suitable radiation exposure management. The workers are required to carry two different kinds of dosimeters. The 14 workers failed to carry the badge-type dosimeter on their fingers, and among them 6 workers carried on their breast a different type of dosimeter instead of the required electronic dosimeter.
 
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  • #13,962
At TMI it all ended up with all water filtered to a pretty low concentration (below regulatory limits for releases), but then distillated anyway, and discharged into the river. The distillation residue was stored as low-level waste.

This method basically releases only tritium.

I wonder why TEPCO isn't doing that. Holding up all this water until tritium decays would not be practical anyway, so why wait?
 
  • #13,963
Fukushima Daiichi decommissioning countermeasure promoting conference, 3rd meeting, 19 April 2013 ( http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20130419_01.html )

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130419/130419_01a.pdf Agenda
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130419/130419_01b.pdf Participants

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130419/130419_01c.pdf Creation of Contaminated water treatment countermeasure committee (draft)

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130419/130419_01d.pdf Orientations for problems and solutions regarding contaminated water treatment countermeasures (draft)

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130419/130419_01e.pdf Orientations for problems and solutions regarding contaminated water treatment countermeasures (summary)

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130419/130419_01f.pdf Document distributed by Fukushima Prefecture (observer)
 
  • #13,964
tsutsuji said:
Fukushima Daiichi decommissioning countermeasure promoting conference, 3rd meeting, 19 April 2013

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130419/130419_01e.pdf Orientations for problems and solutions regarding contaminated water treatment countermeasures (summary)

On page 7/7 they say they will survey the existing technologies in Japan and abroad concerning tritium removal. They want to "promptly study" their feasibility.
 
  • #13,965
nikkkom said:
At TMI it all ended up with all water filtered to a pretty low concentration (below regulatory limits for releases), but then distillated anyway, and discharged into the river. The distillation residue was stored as low-level waste.

This method basically releases only tritium.

I wonder why TEPCO isn't doing that. Holding up all this water until tritium decays would not be practical anyway, so why wait?

I don't know if that answers your question, but in August 2011 we had the following information about the evaporation systems :

tsutsuji said:
http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/20110808ddm003040141000c.html Tepco decided to reduce the chemical pump's flow rate, while increasing the frequency of chemical injections. Without evaporation systems, the desalinating facility produces 1.5 times more high concentration salty water than freshwater. The two evaporation systems that were launched yesterday can bring this rate down to 30%.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110808_01-e.pdf "Diagram of Desalination System"
 
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  • #13,966
tsutsuji said:
On page 7/7 they say they will survey the existing technologies in Japan and abroad concerning tritium removal. They want to "promptly study" their feasibility.

Tritium removal on this scale (hundreds of thousands of tons of water) and low concentration is impractically costly.
 
  • #13,967
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130425/1355_daijin.html From 26 April to 3 May, Japanese Environment vice-minister Fukui will visit Chernobyl and the site at Hanford in the US state of Washington, where plutonium used to be produced, in order to learn about the latest technology and the experience of responding to the populations' needs.
 
  • #13,968
Contaminated water treatment countermeasure Committee (1st meeting), 26 April 2013 ( http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20130426_02.html )

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02a.pdf Agenda
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02b.pdf Participants

1
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02c.pdf About the Committee (draft)

2
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02d.pdf Present system toward units 1 to 4 stabilization and decommissioning etc.
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02e.pdf Water storage by tank and multinuclide facility status
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02g.pdf Contaminated water treatment status and future response

3
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02h.pdf Measures toward reduction of ground water seepage
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02j.pdf Permanent solution with clay water-insulating wall (Taisei Construction Corporation)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02k.pdf Proposal to reduce ground water seepage by frozen soil water-insulating wall (Kajima corporation)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02m.pdf Proposal concerning the ground water seepage reduction countermeasure works (Shimizu corporation)

4
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02n.pdf Tritium status at Fukushima Daiichi NPP (Tepco)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130426/130426_02p.pdf Fugen Advanced Thermal Reactor heavy water refining (tritium separation) achievements (JAEA)
 
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  • #13,972
Contaminated water treatment countermeasure Committee (2nd meeting), 16 May 2013 ( http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20130516_01.html )

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01a.pdf Agenda
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01b.pdf Participants
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01c.pdf 1- Orientations for the study of radical step to reduce ground water seepage
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01d.pdf 2-1 Estimate of the quantities leaked from underground water tanks
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01e.pdf 2-2 Units 2~4 seawater pipe trenches
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01f.pdf 2-3 Shrinking the closed loop water injection cooling into smaller loop
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01g.pdf 2-4 Maintaining integrity of contaminated water storage tanks
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01h.pdf 2-5 Replies to each remark from committee members
3-1 contaminated water quantity reduction response measures
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01j.pdf (1)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01k.pdf (2)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01m.pdf 3-2-1 Global seepage reduction countermeasure proposal (Taisei corporation)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01n.pdf 3-2-2 Ground water seepage reduction proposal using frozen-soil water-insulating wall (Kajima corporation)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01p.pdf 3-2-3 Comparison of into-building seepage reduction countermeasure works
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01q.pdf 3-2-4 Ground water seepage reduction proposal using continuous gravel wall (Hazama Ando corporation)
 
  • #13,973
Fukushima Daiichi decommissioning countermeasure promoting conference, 2nd secretariat meeting, 26 April 2013

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_01-j.pdf Agenda
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_02-j.pdf Participants

Document 1
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_03-j.pdf Plant status

Document 2
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_04-j.pdf Mid and long term roadmap progress status (summary)

Document 3 : Study and execution of each special plan
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_05-j.pdf (4.38 MB, 181 pages, Japanese)

3-1 Cooling by closed loop water injection
1/181 - 2/181 : Schedule
3/181 - 11/181 : Countermeasures against Unit 2 TIP guide tube obstructing objects and future progression methods

3-2 Treatment of accumulated water
12/181 : Schedule
13/181 - 39/181 : Multinuclide removal facility hot test
40/181 - 65/181 : Ground water bypass progress status and preparations toward start

3-3 Countermeasures to reduce environmental radiations
66/181 : Schedule
67/181 - 72/181 : Results of evaluation of additional releases from reactor buildings
73/181 - 77/181 : Specialist study group for the study of harbour seawater radioactive substance reduction

3-4 Improvement of working conditions
78/181 - 79/181 : Schedule
80/181 : Worker safety securing actions and achievements (2012) and plans (2013)
81/181 : Fiscal 2012 worker safety securing (accident table)
82/181 - 93/181 : Measures to secure fair labour conditions in subcontractor companies (survey results)

3-5 Countermeasures for spent fuels pools
94/181 - 95/181 : Schedule
96/181 : Layout map of working areas of units 3 and 4 top part debris removal work and covering work for the purpose of fuel removal
97/181 : Debris removal work, reactor building top part, unit 3
98/181 : Debris removal work, reactor building top part, unit 4
99/181 : Spent fuel storage status (as of 20 April 2013)
100/181 - 102/181 : Unit 3 reactor building top part debris removal work : equipments for spent fuel pool preservation and skimmer surge tank hatch cover preservation
103/181 - 104/181 : Unit 4 cover for spent fuel removal : steel frame construction work progress status
105/181 - 115/181 : Unit 2 reactor building operating floor gamma camera survey (analysis results report)

3-6 Preparations for fuel debris removal
116/181 - 117/181 : Schedule
118/181 125/181 : Unit 2 torus room survey results
126/181 - 135/181 : Unit 1 reactor building 1st floor personnel airlock room survey results
136/181 - 144/181 : Unit 2 reactor building 1st floor MSIV room survey results
145/181 - 163/181 : Unit 2 PCV internal survey (guide pipe removal)

3-7 Treatment and disposal of radioactive waste
164/181 : Schedule
165/181 : Debris, cut down trees management status
166/181 - 172/181 : Debris, cut down trees radiation reduction progress status
173/181 - 181/181 : Radiation analysis of accumulated water and treated water (interim report)

Document 4
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_06-j.pdf Chronology and response status of "executive plan for reliability improvement countermeasures"

Document 5
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_07-j.pdf Contaminated water leakage from underground tanks and response status

Document 6
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_08-j.pdf IAEA press release provisional translation

Document 7
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/d130426_09-j.pdf Public release of technical survey results to expand the technical catalogue for equipment and machinery development for fuel debris removal preparation
 
  • #13,974
tsutsuji said:
Contaminated water treatment countermeasure Committee (2nd meeting), 16 May 2013

3-1 contaminated water quantity reduction response measures

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130516/130516_01k.pdf (2)

Translation :

Contaminated water quantity reduction countermeasures

1) Waterproofing of penetrations
Suppress by barring the openings or gaps of penetrations of underground trenches or pipes connected to buildings

Problems/feasibility:

Prediction of seepage routes and quantities;
Selection of waterproofing target locations;
Implement worker exposure reduction measures in locations with high radiation (high air dose rates, presence of high concentration contaminated water etc.).

2) Practical use of ground water bypass
Wells are dug on the western side of building which is the ground water flow's upsteam side, and by the forced bypass of the ground water flow to the buildings, the ground water in building vicinity is controlled.

Problems/feasibility:
Accurate control of ground water level in order to prevent in-building accumulated water leakage;
Suitable water quality control.

3) Practical use of subdrain
Ground water level around buildings is lowered by pumping up water from wells in buildings' vicinity.

Problems/feasibility:
Restoring and installing new subdrains in high radiation areas or where the work interferes with other works;
Running the subdrain in ajustment to the pumping out of the accumulated water, under accurate control of ground water level in order to prevent in-building accumulated water leakage;

4) Waterproofing of the gap between buildings
Buildings are set leaving an about 50 mm gap before the neighbouring building's underground wall. Because the penetrating pipes between buildings are concentrated, we waterproof the gap thus suppress ground water seepage.

Problems/feasibility:
Implementing worker exposure reduction measures in high radiation dose areas;
Performing the work where obstacles, such as underground structural parts, are present;
Interference with other works such as fuel removal.

5) Mountain side water insulating wall
By the installation of a water insulating wall such as a slurry wall or a frozen soil wall on the mountain side of the buildings (either on the OP 10 m or on the OP 35 m layer), the ground water flow from the mountain side to the buildings is suppressed and the ground water level in building vicinity is lowered.
By the control of the in-building accumulated water water level in adjustment to the lowered ground water water level, the seepage into buildings is refrained.

Problems/feasibility:
If a mountain side water insulating wall is built, controlling the amount of ground water level reduction in building vicinity is difficult. Especially during the duration of the work, it is feared that the ground water level around building becomes lower than the in-building accumulated water water level, and there is a risk that accumulated water seeps out.

6) Reactor building accumulated water water level control
After waterproofing between reactor building and turbine building (or radioactive waste building), the difference between reactor building accumulated water level and ground water level is reduced so that ground water seepage diminishes. Being located on the mountain side, the surrounding ground water level is higher around the reactor building than around the turbine building. By actively controlling the reactor building's water level and reducing the water level difference, the seepage of ground water is refrained.

The items needed to implement this response are:
- Installation of reactor building water exhaust equipment
- Waterproofing between reactor building and turbine building (or radioactive waste building)
Please note that inter-building waterproofing, while being relevant to reduce contaminated water boundary, is presently being planned as a way to dry up, as part of neighbouring buildings are being removed in order to install the foundation etc. in the case where a containment covering the reactor building is built for the purpose of fuel debris removal etc..

Problems/feasibility:
Reactor building water level control
It is necessary to secure technology to control the reactor building accumulated water level while monitoring the difference with the ground water level.

7) Filling torus room with grout

Penetrations, etc. are waterproofed by injecting grout into torus room (reactor building basement), so that ground water seepage into reactor building is reduced.

The items needed to implement this response are:
- Installation of equipment to take accumulated water from PCV.

Problems/feasibility:
It is necessary to secure waterproofing technology that is effective in stopping seeping water from downstream.

8) Filling building (turbine building) basement with concrete
By filling turbine building basement with concrete, ground water seepage into turbine building is reduced.

Problems/feasibility:
Removal of existing equipments;
Removal of existing equipments such as basement pipes, ducts, etc.
Treatment of accumulated water;
Building basement accumulated water pumping out and treatment.
Radiation reduction;
Reduction of air radiation so that work, such as existing equipment removal, is possible.

9) Polymer enclosure of turbine building basement contaminated water
By enclosing turbine building basement contaminated water with polymer, ground water seepage into turbine building is reduced.
Even if ground water seeps in, it can be converted into water devoid of tritium.

Problems/feasibility:
Remaining existing equipments;
It is impossible to completely absorb the water contained inside existing basement equipments such as pipes, ducts, etc.
It is necessary to check whether absorbed water may come out due to aging, etc..
Securing polymer treatment technology;
It is necessary to secure treatment and disposal after waterproofing

10) Use of PCV fuel debris air-cooling
At present, heat removal of the fuel debris contained in units 1,2,3 reactors and PCVs is done by water cooling by water injection. but in the future, as decay heat diminishes, it is possible to reduce the generation of contaminated water by shifting from water cooling to air cooling.
As additional generation of contaminated water is annulled, contamination reduction can be expected in the buildings where flowing presently occurs (turbine buildings, etc.).

Problems/feasibility:
Securing wind ventilation method;
- For the time being, as the decay heat is high, considerable ventilation power is needed (with the present decay heat, installation is difficult).
- At the earliest, decay heat is expected to become smaller by 2018, but further study is needed so that the air is uniformly blown onto the fuel debris.
Responding to the situation while the fuel is being removed;
- If the PCV has to be filled with water for the purpose of fuel removal, it means that contaminated water has to eventually be generated again, even if temporary air-cooling could be achieved.

11) Practical use of treated water into concrete
When tritiated water is used as concrete mixing water, 180 litre of water can be used per 1 m³ of concrete.
Under the hypothesis where 700,000 tons of tritiated water are used as concrete mixing water, 3,900,000 m³ of concrete have to be made.
If concrete making unit cost is estimated between ¥ 10,000 and ¥ 15,000 per m³, the concrete making spending amounts to about between ¥ 39,000,000,000 and ¥ 58,500,000,000.
Also, if we use crushed contaminated debris as concrete aggregate, it contributes to the global reduction of the total amount of waste. If we use the flyash from Hirono thermal power plant, it can contribute to the reduction of thermal power waste.

Application examples:
Application 1: for the construction of a 60 m wide base, 30 m high gravity type sea-wall covering the area in front of units 1 to 6, about 1,800,000 m³ are needed.
Application 2: If the harbour is filled with concrete, from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 m³ are needed.
Application 3: If the valleys inside the plant premises are filled with concrete, the usable plant premise area is expanded. From 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 m³.
Application 4: Making concrete blocks, they can be assembled into a 230 m base, 146 m high pyramid, requiring 2,600,000 m³.

Problems/feasibility:
Environmental impact evaluation;
- Evaluation of consequences of tritium eduction after concrete coagulation
- Evaluation of consequences of mixing water vaporisation generated during concrete solidification
Increase of radioactive waste
It is possible that it becomes radioactive waste.

12) Exchange of deep layer ground water and tritiated water (proposal by committee member Maeda)
Exchange tritiated water with deep layer water so that it remains underground for the time until radiation sufficiently decreases by radioactive decay.

Problems/feasibility:
Study to be continued.

13) Manyfold barrier system construction (proposal by committee member Marui)
Construct a manyfold barrier (water insulating wall ?)

Problems/feasibility:
Study to be continued.

14) Building bottom soil freeze (proposal by committee member Maeda)
In addition to frozen soil barrier, the building's bottom is also turned into frozen soil.

Problems/feasibility:
Study to be continued.

15) water insulating wall, water pumping wells, facing, horizontal well combination (proposal by committee member Nishikaki)

(a) Perform assessment to obtain ground layer information
(b) Perform assessment to evaluate the continuity of the layer thought to be a low permeable layer. Check if that layer has about 1.0 E-6 cm/s permeability and 5 m thickness.
(c) If the low-permeable layer can sufficiently prevent the rise of ground water from downstream, the construction of a water-insulating wall near the boundary line can cut the ground water flow from upstream into the contaminated area.
(d) The ground water from above the water-insulating wall should permeate downstream making a detour around the water-insulating wall, but if it flows into the contaminated area by overflowing over the water-insulating wall, wells are dug in those locations in order to prevent upstream water level from rising.
(e) Even if the ground water percolation from upstream is cut, as cutting percolation and flow from rainfalls onto the surface is difficult, a urethane type waterproof layer or asphalt layer is installed in order to reduce percolated flow.
(f) Against ground water leaking upwards from the aquifer below the low-permeable layer, horizontal wells are installed into the lower aquifer in order to reduce ground water pressure.
(g) When the upper aquifer water level drops, there is a possibility that reactor building or turbine building accumulated water flows out, but this is addressed by the installation of a layer that waterproofs the ground around buildings.

Problems/feasibility:
Study to be continued.
 
  • #13,975
tsutsuji said:
Translation :

Contaminated water quantity reduction countermeasures
[...]
Study to be continued.

Doesn't sound like there is even one decent geotechnical engineer on this committee, except for maybe that Nishikaki fellow.

Also, I see a revival of the proposal to grout the torus rooms. Not good.
 
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  • #13,976
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130524/0430_iaea.html The IAEA released its report on 23 May in conclusion of its last inspection. They provide 17 pieces of advice. In one of them they say that instead of trying to bring the site back to how it was before building the plant, as technological and cost questions are remaining, they advise to to bring proposals as regards the final picture of the site, so that it can feed public discussion on the consequences on the surrounding society and the technical choices. They also advise to discuss the radioactive waste disposal solutions, because they fear that an absence of solution could have a negative impact on the work at the plant. They also advise to study the separation of the decommissioning function and the safety-sensitive equipment operating function. Tepco and the government said the IAEA's remarks would be reflected in next month's planning schedule.

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionreport230513.pdf IAEA report (57 pages, English)

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130524/index.html The NRA approved the launching in mid-June of the hot tests of the 2nd and 3rd lines of the multinuclide removal facility (ALPS). At an expert panel meeting on 24 May, Tepco provided a report saying that the hot test of the first line, that was launched at the end of March, is going smoothly. The facility's normal operation should start next autumn. The facility's launching incurred a long delay after it had been found that the waste containers were not strong enough. Each of the 3 lines can process 250 tons per day, while 400 tons of contaminated water are generated every day at Fukushima Daiichi.
 
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  • #13,977
The 11th special atomic facility monitoring and assessment group meeting ( http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/20130524.html ), 24 May 2013

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_99.pdf Agenda
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_01.pdf Start of B and C lines of multinuclide removal facility
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_02.pdf Special atomic facility operation plan review
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_03.pdf Reply to "Risks at Fukushima Daiichi" (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_04.pdf Underground water storage tank leakage accident investigation results and investigation plan (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_05.pdf Answers to questions asked by the experts at the 10th meeting (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_06.pdf Special atomic facility operation plan review status

Reference :
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_07.pdf List of measures required following the special atomic facility designation of Fukushima Daiichi
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_08.pdf Opinions from the experts
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0011_09.pdf Multinuclide facility hot test (Tepco) (10th meeting document 2-1)
 
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  • #13,978
The 10th special atomic facility monitoring and assessment group meeting ( http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/20130517.html ), 17 May 2013

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_99.pdf Agenda
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_01.pdf Operation plan approval
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_02.pdf Multinuclide facility hot test status and future response (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_03.pdf Future progression of multinuclide facility hot test (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_04.pdf Replies to check items from the special atomic facility monitoring and assessment group (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_05.pdf Risk at Fukushima Daiichi
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_06.pdf Revision of the operation plan regarding the installation of premises entrance/exit management system (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_07.pdf Fukushima Daiichi accident analysis study group
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_08.pdf Underground water storage tank leakage accident present status and cause investigation report (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_09.pdf Revision of radiation releases at plant boundary taking into account the direct radiation and skyshine from tanks as a result of transferring the reverse osmosis concentrated water out of the underground tanks (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_10.pdf Replies to check items raised at the 9th meeting (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_11.pdf Maintaining integrity of contaminated water storage tanks (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_12.pdf Additional tank installation plan (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_13.pdf Contaminated water treatment countermeasure Committee study status (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy)

Reference :
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_14.pdf List of measures required following the special atomic facility designation of Fukushima Daiichi
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_15.pdf Partial revision of operation plan (Tepco)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_16.pdf Opinion submitted by expert after the past meeting
 
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  • #13,979
tsutsuji said:
The 10th special atomic facility monitoring and assessment group meeting
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi/data/0010_08.pdf Underground water storage tank leakage accident present status and cause investigation report (Tepco)

I had a look at the last page of this pdf (p. 28/28). I don't understand the details, but basically they want to test two scenarios in laboratory :

a) a crack in the concrete layer causes HDPE sheet break

b) an acute angle part in the concrete layer causes HDPE sheet break

Additional details on the timing of unit 1 IC valves :
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130510_09-e.pdf Progress of Investigation of the Accident and the Emergency Condenser at Unit 1 of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (English)

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20130522_01.html The location where the mock-up facility (to test robots, etc.) is to be constructed was decided by the Countermeasure Promotion Conference on 25 May, after receiving a report on the results of geotechnical survey of candidate sites. The chosen site is in Naraha Town, close to Hirono Interchange, J-Village, and Hirono thermal power plant. (map on http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130522/130522_01c.pdf page 5/10)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=j3Qxf-8-QPw FNN news report on the mock-up facility. They plan to mock-up the torus room. It is planned to start operating in fiscal year 2014.
 
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  • #13,980
general questions about the status of accident knowledge

I haven't followed this thread for more than a year now and am curious if a clearer/consensus picture has emerged about the accident.

Is it understood how/why the explosion occurred in unit 4? Was it hydrogen migration through venting systems from unit 3?

Is it understood how much damage occurred before the tsunami? Were safety systems still functional? or were the plants already doomed? (perhaps this still cannot be answered with available information)

Did TEPCO succeed in performing physical/visual inspections of reactors 1,2,&3 to determine the state of the respective cores? Or is the current knowledge based primarily on modeling from available evidence?

I see preparations are underway to remove the spent fuel from the SFPs - I assume it will be stored on site?

What is the status of units 5&6?
 

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