One of those consciousness threads

[octelcogopod]

Ok so let's have a focused thread on consciousness, both in general and specific areas..

I will propose some questions, and the known speculations on them, along with my personal opinions.

First off this is a tough area, one where we don't yet have a solution, so this thread might not give any insight into the science part of things, but it may be able to let people grow individually, and teach them to think in new ways, subjectielly.

The main question will always be What is consciousness?
However since that is too broad of a topic to discuss, I will divide this main question into several small ones.

1. Can we really define consciousness?
As it is, a definition is created after we know most of what there is to know about something.
Since this issue is so broad and diverse, defining consciousness will be difficult, but I will try.

Definition 1: A Materialist view;
Consciousness is simply reactions in the brain and body, created by external stimuli to the sensory system, along with memories and a very complex neuralnet that cross checks this information for relevance to the stimuli.

Pros of this theory: If everything is physical, then surely this must be the solution, all there is to consciousness is its physical parts, as such wem ust study the brain and its workings until we figure out how everything works. Quantify, calculate, predict.

Cons: Not many cons at this point, read later on.

Definition 2; A more solipsistic view;

Only the self can be verified. We can never quantify and predict the emotion of happiness with math or science.
Even if we knew everything about the brain, there is still something there beyond the veil, that cannot be predicted.
Qualia is a good example; you can never measure or predict the subjective qualia state.

Pros: Well, it is true that solipsism is true, nobody can prove otherwise.
Cons: Some materialists say that qualia is just "magical."
It has no relevance because if it can't be observed in a lab, or predicted with math, then it by default doesn't exist.

Conclusion for part 1 and some more opinions;

I firmly believe that there is more to consciousness than just its physical parts.
Take for instance the image you see with your eyes, or the music you hear with your ears. Typical qualia experience;
Now, the image you see is not inherently represented in the physical world as anything physical.
The only thing others will have to do is trust you on your word that you are seeing that image or hearing that sound.

The only reason they do trust you is because they can also see that image and hear that sound.
But if a scientist were to go completely neutral and logical, like materalists claim to do, then they would even have to drop this assumption that anyone is actually seeing anything or hearing anything.
Because as it stands now, qualia does not exist in the physical world, it only appears to do so.

We can only observe its after effects, these living organisms seem to react to their environment, so they must be at least sensing something.
But do they see an image? I don't think so, I can't seem to find this image on any mr scans, nor can I find any images on my elite Electron Neuralnet Analyzer.

Keep in mind, this image you are seeing with your eyes, the combined "big picture" that your eyes and brain creates, is not stored anywhere explicitly, we can only see its after effects in the brain.

Comments?
Oh yeah and part 2 will be added to the thread soon.

 

[moving finger]

First off this is a tough area, one where we don't yet have a solution,

Not sure I agree with your remark here. I think we DO have a “solution” (it’s just that not everyone is happy with the implications of that “solution”). But before we can discuss possible “solutions”, we need to be clear just what we think the “problem” is………. What is the problem? (and please don’t say “the Hard Problem”, because that begs the question : “What IS the Hard Problem exactly?”)

The main question will always be What is consciousness?

My answer : A particular complex dynamical arrangement of temporally extended (but usually spatially localised) self-representational neurophysiological states based on some form of information exchange with the “external” world.

1. Can we really define consciousness?

With respect, your suggestions of definitions seem to lean more towards defining “what consciousness consists of” rather than defining what we mean by the word “consciousness”.

How about this for a definition of (the meaning of) consciousness :
Consciousness is defined as the ability of an agent to form a temporally extended and detailed self-representation, and to relate this self-representation to information gathered from (exchanged with) the “external” world.

(I’m not suggesting this is the best definition for a “meaning of consciousness”, but it’s a start.)

I firmly believe that there is more to consciousness than just its physical parts.

Maybe so, but “firmly believe” does not unfortunately carry much weight in scientific or philosophical discussion.

Take for instance the image you see with your eyes, or the music you hear with your ears. Typical qualia experience;
Now, the image you see is not inherently represented in the physical world as anything physical.

What makes you think that the “image you see” exists at all as an entity in its own right? Remember that the “image you see” is NOT actually an “image” that is being “seen” by anyone, much less yourself. This is the mistake of the Cartesian Theatre view of conscious experience. There is no movie projector in the brain which is projecting images for you to see. Rather, it is the case that “you”, “the image” and “you in the act of seeing the image” are all inextricably linked into one complex dynamic series of neurophysiological states in your brain – there is no separate and well-defined “you” experiencing a separate and well-defined “image” – they are both part and parcel of the same thing (which you mistakenly interpret as “you” seeing an “image” – this is the illusion created by conscious experience).

The only thing others will have to do is trust you on your word that you are seeing that image or hearing that sound.

The only reason they do trust you is because they can also see that image and hear that sound.

You have no idea whether they are hearing the “same” sound or not. In fact, in the view I am presenting here it makes no sense to ask whether two people hear the same “sound”, because the “sound” that is “heard” does not exist as an entity in its own right – it only exists as part and parcel of the experience of consciousness. The only commonality between two people exposed to a common source of noise is that the source is (approximately) the same for both of them; the actual “sound they hear” is locked up inside their own conscious experiences.

But if a scientist were to go completely neutral and logical, like materalists claim to do, then they would even have to drop this assumption that anyone is actually seeing anything or hearing anything.
Because as it stands now, qualia does not exist in the physical world, it only appears to do so.

Exactly right. “Qualia” are a shorthand invention to “explain” something which does not need explanation. Qualia simply do not exist, nor do they need to exist in order to explain conscious experience.

We can only observe its after effects, these living organisms seem to react to their environment, so they must be at least sensing something.
But do they see an image? I don't think so, I can't seem to find this image on any mr scans, nor can I find any images on my elite Electron Neuralnet Analyzer.

No, they don’t see an “image” in the sense of an agent viewing an image – again this is the “Cartesian Theatre” illusion

Keep in mind, this image you are seeing with your eyes, the combined "big picture" that your eyes and brain creates, is not stored anywhere explicitly, we can only see its after effects in the brain.

We do not “see an image with our eyes” (the eyes just act as dumb photoreceptors), instead we create the impression that we are viewing an image inside our brains. But in fact there is no separate “image” and no separate “viewer”, both are inextricably bound up together in the conscious illusion of a “self seeing an image”.

Note : I am NOT suggesting that consciousness is an “illusion” (just as Dennett does not). What I am suggesting is that the notion that a conscious agent has of “seeing” and “image”, with the idea that the “image” exists as an entity in its own right, being viewed by some homunculus inside the brain, is an illusion. This is the Cartesian Theatre illusion.

Best Regards

MF

 

[eggman]

Can we really define consciousness?

Yes...

If I fall down...You would say I have lost consciousness...

If I got up and revived...You would say I have regained consciousness...

: )

Here is a standard model for philosophy and the 'me'

http://faculty.virginia.edu/consciousness/home.html

The dellusion is understandable...

Enjoy

 

[moving finger]

Can we really define consciousness?

Yes...

If I fall down...You would say I have lost consciousness...

If I got up and revived...You would say I have regained consciousness...

This is not a definition!

It reminds me of one of Searle's definitions of consciousness that I read somewhere, which went something like "consciousness is the state that we experience when we are not unconscious"

Gobbledigook!

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

[...] What makes you think that the “image you see” exists at all as an entity in its own right? Remember that the “image you see” is NOT actually an “image” that is being “seen” by anyone, much less yourself [...] “Qualia” are a shorthand invention to “explain” something which does not need explanation. Qualia simply do not exist, nor do they need to exist in order to explain conscious experience ...

All though there might not be a single “you” in the act of seeing an "image”, that doesn't stop something from seeing the image. One can doubt Cartesian dualism, but even though different parts of the brain trick themselves into believing that they er one, something do have the notions that constitute the whole experiences. After all, you know the world through observations. Take away qualia, and we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.

 

[selfAdjoint]

All though there might not be a single “you” in the act of seeing an "image”, that doesn't stop something from seeing the image. One can doubt Cartesian dualism, but even though different parts of the brain trick themselves into believing that they er one, something do have the notions that constitute the whole experiences. After all, you know the world through observations. Take away qualia, and we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.

This is still way over simplified. There is nothing correspopnding to an "image" in your brain and nothing corresponding to a "viewer". Not one, not many, not any. What there is is a tremendously complex collection of neuron/synapse interactions which form a process updating your working memory and at a high level this is integrated into a memory stream which appears in your consciousness as an image. Many many psychology experiments demostrate that your "image" is, as moving finger puts it, virtual. Just as a rainbow isn't really a thing in the sky, so your image isn't really there in your head.

 

[Lars Laborious]

[...]Many many psychology experiments demostrate that your "image" is, as moving finger puts it, virtual. Just as a rainbow isn't really a thing in the sky, so your image isn't really there in your head.

I agree that the image of a rainbow is an illusion in a way that it's just made up of innumerable notions. But still, at the bottom of it all, notions do exist. Rejecting simple qualia on the basis that our "brain images" doesn't match the "real physical world", is incoherent. The "images", or at least the notions of different parts of the "images", doesn't go away just because one call it an illusion. All we see is just bundles of sense-data, also called qualia. It's harder to prove the physical world.
To state it in an extreme form: Qualia are like paint on a canvas. When different colors are mixed together in different ways they become various paintings. The physical facts (as we have learned to know it), on the other hand, are what the painting represent. From this one might conclude that there is a real physical world outside the qualia, maybe even causing the qualia, but all we know for sure by experiencing, is qualia (since experiencing is qualia). We only see/experience a mixture of what might be the effects of something physical.

 

[moving finger]

Take away qualia, and we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.

Look upon qualia and the self as "conceptual products" of consciousness.
Without the concept of qualia we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.
Without the concept of self we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.
But if both qualia and self arise from consciousness, all we are saying is that without consciousness we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.
None of this means that the concepts of either qualia or self have any independent existence.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

To state it in an extreme form: Qualia are like paint on a canvas. When different colors are mixed together in different ways they become various paintings. The physical facts (as we have learned to know it), on the other hand, are what the painting represent. From this one might conclude that there is a real physical world outside the qualia, maybe even causing the qualia, but all we know for sure by experiencing, is qualia (since experiencing is qualia). We only see/experience a mixture of what might be the effects of something physical.

But don't make the mistake (as Chalmers does) of thinking that these so-called qualia have any kind of independent physical or other form of existence (ie independent of the conscious experience which is generating them as a virtual phenomenon) - because once you take that road you are on the way to the illusion of Chalmers' "Hard Problem" and the need for a "whole new physics".

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

Look upon qualia and the self as "conceptual products" of consciousness. [...] But don't make the mistake (as Chalmers does) of thinking that these so-called qualia have any kind of independent physical or other form of existence [...]

Maybe we operate with different definitions of what qualia is, but what I'm talking about is the raw experience that our consciousness has to have in order to be conscious. It comes before consciousness. A computer can store information, but for it to be conscious it needs some sort of experience. The experience itself doesn't necessary have any influence on anything, but it's there and doesn't turn into an illusion just because we find it handy. I know physicists would prefer not to think about qualia since it doesn't match physical observations yet, but that doesn't mean it's an illusion. Unlike Chalmers, I think qualia are intrinsic properties within the physical world, or rather physical properties are a part of a qualia field. Crazy, huh?

 

[moving finger]

Maybe we operate with different definitions of what qualia is, but what I'm talking about is the raw experience that our consciousness has to have in order to be conscious. It comes before consciousness.

These raw materials (inputs) are the combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states. The brain constructs consciousness by information processing these raw materials. But I don't think most qualia-buffs would argue that the raw incoming sensory data (sensory signals from the eyes, ears etc) are the actual qualia.

A computer can store information, but for it to be conscious it needs some sort of experience. The experience itself doesn't necessary have any influence on anything, but it's there and doesn't turn into an illusion just because we find it handy.

I have not said that the “conscious experience” itself is an illusion (and I don’t think Dennett does this either). But the conscious experience is a unity, an entirety or a “one” which cannot be reduced to separate physical components of “quale” and “self”. These latter constructs are not physical, but virtual constructs produced by the very real conscious experience.

I know physicists would prefer not to think about qualia since it doesn't match physical observations yet, but that doesn't mean it's an illusion.

I don’t think it’s so much that physicists don’t like to “think about qualia”, I think it’s more that (many of those who study this field) recognise that qualia are not real, existing artefacts, but instead are virtual entities created within conscious experience.

I quite happily “think about qualia” – the term is a very useful shorthand term for referring to the virtual entities created within my conscious experience. But I have absolutely no evidence, and no reason, to think that qualia exist as some kind of physical object.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

I'm sorry I don't have time right now to get involved in this most interesting discussion, but I couldn't let this pass without comment:

The brain constructs consciousness by information processing these raw materials.

You seem to make this categorical assertion as if you believe it to be absolutely true. Do you not think there is a possibility that the brain does not, or even cannot, construct consciousness? If you are so sure that it can, and does, can you describe how the brain does it? You indicated once that you think Metzinger has described the method, but I think he has not. We need to talk more, but for now are you absolutely sure that the brain constructs consciousness?

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Hi MF,

I'm sorry I don't have time right now to get involved in this most interesting discussion, but I couldn't let this pass without comment:You seem to make this categorical assertion as if you believe it to be absolutely true. Do you not think there is a possibility that the brain does not, or even cannot, construct consciousness? If you are so sure that it can, and does, can you describe how the brain does it? You indicated once that you think Metzinger has described the method, but I think he has not. We need to talk more, but for now are you absolutely sure that the brain constructs consciousness?

Paul

Come now, Paul, I think we both know the idea of "absolute truth" is a chimera.

Sure, there is a possibility that the brain does/can not construct consciousness (severe brain damage would do it for one).

Hehehe, if I could describe exactly how the brain does it then I wouldn't be wasting my time here, I would be stepping up for my Nobel Prize. I think Metzinger's ideas are a step in the right direction however.

I cannot be absolutely sure of anything - certain knowledge (as we started to discuss on another thread) is unattainable. All I can ever do is to evaluate different possible explanations and choose what (to me) seems the most rational.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

These raw materials (inputs) are the combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states.The brain constructs consciousness by information processing these raw materials.
[...]
I have not said that the “conscious experience” itself is an illusion (and I don’t think Dennett does this either). But the conscious experience is a unity, an entirety or a “one” which cannot be reduced to separate physical components of “quale” and “self”
[...]
I quite happily “think about qualia” – the term is a very useful shorthand term for referring to the virtual entities created within my conscious experience. But I have absolutely no evidence, and no reason, to think that qualia exist as some kind of physical object.

I agree to the idea that combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states are things that an “upper consciusness”, with it’s personality and feeling of self, needs for coming into existence. But it also needs the possibility for experience (which you agreed to not beeing an illusion), and that is the basis for all consciousness – experience and raw conciousness are the same.

Dennet, Metzinger, Blackmore and other qualia-opponents fail to explain how phenomenally represented information gets to be experienced in the first place. They only have theories on how already experienced information accumulate and creates an illusion of a self.

Now, whether qualia are separated from the experience (conscious unit) itself, or actually is the experience, is a tuff question. But just as you can compare qualia with an organization, and state that “an organization is only a concept or illusion - it’s actually just a bunch of people”, you can say that yes, consciousness might only be a concept or illusion, but it’s components are just as real as that bunch of people.

Consciousness consists not of data, but of phenomenal information, since it’s experiencable. Again, that information might be experience itself, but still the components are real since experiencing is real. So, why can’t we locate qualia in the brain? Because qualia are the instruments through which "we" (the experiences) examine the world. We would have to leave experiencing to be able to find qualia, but then of course we wouldn’t be able to experience the finding of qualia. In this sense you might be right when you say that qualia are not physical objects. But I would rather say that physical objects are properties of a qualia field.

 

[moving finger]

I agree to the idea that combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states are things that an “upper consciusness”, with it’s personality and feeling of self, needs for coming into existence...

...I would rather say that physical objects are properties of a qualia field.

Hi Lars

This looks like the same post that you placed in the Metzinger thread. Rather than copy my reply here, I'll just redirect you to the Metzinger thread.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=997305#post997305

Best Regards

MF

 

[Rade]

...there is no separate and well-defined “you” experiencing a separate and well-defined “image” – they are both part and parcel of the same thing (which you mistakenly interpret as “you” seeing an “image” – this is the illusion created by conscious experience)...

I have a question. What exactly do you call the "thing" you mention above--e.g., what name do you give to this thing ? Is it a real "thing" that exists, or an illusion ? How do you claim to have such knowledge ? If there is not a "separate you" what type of "you" are you talking about -- that is, how do you know that you are not a separate and well-defined entity that exists ? Are you then saying that you know that you do not exist as a well-defined entity ? Sorry for so many questions--but when someone makes the comment "there is no..." as you do above--my first question is "how do you know", where is your evidence that your philosophic bent holds absolute truth ?

 

[moving finger]

What exactly do you call the "thing" you mention above--e.g., what name do you give to this thing ?

Consciousness

Is it a real "thing" that exists, or an illusion ?

Consciousness is very real, just as real as the software program that is currently running on my computer

How do you claim to have such knowledge ?

Just the same way anyone else does. This is (to my mind) the best rational explanation of consciousness which avoids metaphysical dualism.

If there is not a "separate you" what type of "you" are you talking about -- that is, how do you know that you are not a separate and well-defined entity that exists ?

In the sense that “I” am the physical body that supports my conscious experience, I do exist. Without that physical body, I would not exist.

Are you then saying that you know that you do not exist as a well-defined entity ?

I am saying that the notion that there is a separate metaphysical “self” somewhere within the brain which is somehow “observing” the world through consciousness is an illusion – this is the “cartesian theatre illusion” (read Dennett’s consciousness explained for more details).

Sorry for so many questions--but when someone makes the comment "there is no..." as you do above--my first question is "how do you know", where is your evidence that your philosophic bent holds absolute truth ?

The first rule of philosophy is there no access to absolute truth. We each make sense of the world in more or less rational ways. To me, the dualism inherent in the cartesian theatre illusion is an irrational intuition. The better rational explanation, which avoids metaphysical dualism, is that the conscious self is created as a virtual self as part of the process of consciousness.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

Consciousness is very real, just as real as the software program that is currently running on my computer

Agreed.

To me, the dualism inherent in the cartesian theatre illusion is an irrational intuition.

Since I'm not sure what baggage comes along with the "cartesian theatre illusion", I would prefer to skip the labeling. What do you think is irrational about dualism?

In your example, is it not useful to distinguish between the software program running in your computer and the actual hardware made of atoms? After all, there is no such "real" distinction; the computer and its "software" is simply a single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics. What we think of "software" is nothing but a conceptual pattern of some specific states of parts of the machine. Is it irrational to think of the "software" as somehow existing independently of the hardware?

In the sense that “I” am the physical body that supports my conscious experience, I do exist. Without that physical body, I would not exist.

To paraphrase, using your example again, "In the sense that your computer is the physical entity that supports the software execution, your computer does exist. Without that computer, the computer would not exist." True enough.

But you have switched the identification of "I". At least you have in my opinion. You claim that ""I" am the physical body", and then proceed to ignore consciousness, which you identified with the software in your computer. In my opinion, it is the software which should be identified with the "I" in your example. In my humble opinion, "I" am my consciousness, not my chemical body. When you talk to me, my body may be doing the reporting, but it is my consciousness that is providing the answers and opinions.

So, if we take my perspective, for the moment, we can paraphrase your example differently: "In the sense that "I" am the software that is running in the computer, I do exist (which you seem to acknowledge in your first quote above). Without the computer hardware (physical body), "I", the software could very well exist." In fact, software typically exists independently of hardware before, during, and after the hardware might be built, operated, and destroyed.

To push your excellent example just a little further, no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind. All software begins as a collection of general and rather vague concepts in a mind. From there, the concepts get refined, and expressed symbolically. Those symbols are further refined and transformed with considerable interest, involvement, and intervention by additional conscious thought, and eventually the software attains a form that is useful in the computer hardware. From that point on, and only then, it can operate without conscious attention.

The first rule of philosophy is there no access to absolute truth.

So, of course, I take your statement that, "Without that physical body, I would not exist." to be only a belief or conjecture on your part and not a claim to absolute truth.

We each make sense of the world in more or less rational ways.

Agreed. Now, to me it makes sense to interpret the phenomenon of consciousness along the lines of your software/hardware example. In doing so, we can see that a sort of "dualism", i.e. the hardware/software dichotomy, makes sense whether or not we acknowledge that any such dichotomy exists in physical reality.

Where does that interpretation not make sense to you? Where is it irrational?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[selfAdjoint]

In your example, is it not useful to distinguish between the software program running in your computer and the actual hardware made of atoms? After all, there is no such "real" distinction; the computer and its "software" is simply a single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics. What we think of "software" is nothing but a conceptual pattern of some specific states of parts of the machine. Is it irrational to think of the "software" as somehow existing independently of the hardware?

The instances of the software apart from the computer are finite and clearly known. Copies on disk or on paper, partial instances in the memories of its programmers, descriptions in manuals, etc. The instance of "consciousness" apart from the body is neither clear nor understood, so to postulate it when you don't have to, in order to account for the objective phenomena, is irrational.

 

[Lars Laborious]

The instances of the software apart from the computer are finite and clearly known. Copies on disk or on paper, partial instances in the memories of its programmers, descriptions in manuals, etc. The instance of "consciousness" apart from the body is neither clear nor understood, so to postulate it when you don't have to, in order to account for the objective phenomena, is irrational.

Software is just hardware as long as it's not beeing experienced. A computer program that translates data from one form to another, is just physical equipment exchanging physical signals. The experienced "concept of software" (the nature of software), on the other hand, is qualia - phenomenal experience. Comparing consciousness with a software program is actually saying that consciousness equals qualia, which of course don’t explain how consciousness arise.

 

[Paul Martin]

The instance of "consciousness" apart from the body is neither clear nor understood, so to postulate it when you don't have to, in order to account for the objective phenomena, is irrational.

The key here is, "when you don't have to". Except for disinterest, the only reason one would not "have to" would be that there is a satisfactory alternative explanation. I have not seen or heard a satisfactory physical-based explanation for consciousness. Until I do, I consider it rational to consider any premise that might lead to a consistent and understandable explanation. In my view, the premise that consciousness is seated outside the physical world can lead to a consistent, satisfactory, explanation for consciousness. I have not heard a reasonable rebuttal of the inferences I have drawn from this premise. Dismissals such as, "Can you say 'Inverse square law?'", for example, are not rational arguments in my opinion.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Lars Laborious]

I am saying that the notion that there is a separate metaphysical “self” somewhere within the brain which is somehow “observing” the world through consciousness is an illusion – this is the “cartesian theatre illusion” (read Dennett’s consciousness explained for more details).

Coining a term like the Cartesian theatre, is easy. In fact, I will coin one myself. It’s called the Process illusion (Ok, it's not as catchy as Cartesian theatre), and it refers to the belief that qualia is just information being processed. The Process illusion is the deceit caused by detecting physical activity near phenomenal presentations. This apparent connection leads to the illusion that they are in fact the same, and so, many theorists are misled to believe that a process – by the power of just existing - can be something more than just physical movements; that it equals a phenomenal presentation of itself, albeit it is illusory.
(Feel free to make it a world traveling meme ;-)

 

[octelcogopod]

The software/hardware analog is a fallacy because the programming of the software is inherent in how the monitor views it.
It's kind of like, the monitor is analogous to the image we see with our eyes, and the reason it's a fallacy is because every step from the circuit boards to the pixels in the monitor can be explained physically.
We can't say the same for consciousness.

Also you might say that "yes, but we can't SEE the software by just analyzing the hard drive." and this is true, but you can easily do so with a mouse, keyboard and a monitor.
The step from hard drive and circuit boards to the image we see on the monitor is not magical, but the step from our neurons in the brain to the image we see with our eyes is.

And not only that, but the image we see with our eyes cannot be quantified and predicted with math/physics.
Like, ever.
The image you see with your eyes represent more than just pixels on a monitor, it also represents emotions, forms, structure and meaning.
You can mathematically calculate th forms and structure the eyes see, but the meaning and emotion of those forms is lost.

When I see a beautiful woman on the street, I see more than just a mere bag of bones and flesh, I also see beauty, sexual tension, memories, nervousness etc.
This is of course because of how my brain works.
For qualia to exist, you need a complete set of physical prerequisites.
You need a brain, a body, a sensory system and memories stored in that brain for cross checking stimuli.
The kicker of it is that we can't quantify qualia with math/physics.

 

[selfAdjoint]

The software/hardware analog is a fallacy because the programming of the software is inherent in how the monitor views it.
It's kind of like, the monitor is analogous to the image we see with our eyes, and the reason it's a fallacy is because every step from the circuit boards to the pixels in the monitor can be explained physically.
We can't say the same for consciousness.

Also you might say that "yes, but we can't SEE the software by just analyzing the hard drive." and this is true, but you can easily do so with a mouse, keyboard and a monitor.
The step from hard drive and circuit boards to the image we see on the monitor is not magical, but the step from our neurons in the brain to the image we see with our eyes is.

And not only that, but the image we see with our eyes cannot be quantified and predicted with math/physics.
Like, ever.
The image you see with your eyes represent more than just pixels on a monitor, it also represents emotions, forms, structure and meaning.
You can mathematically calculate th forms and structure the eyes see, but the meaning and emotion of those forms is lost.

When I see a beautiful woman on the street, I see more than just a mere bag of bones and flesh, I also see beauty, sexual tension, memories, nervousness etc.
This is of course because of how my brain works.
For qualia to exist, you need a complete set of physical prerequisites.
You need a brain, a body, a sensory system and memories stored in that brain for cross checking stimuli.
The kicker of it is that we can't quantify qualia with math/physics.

Well YOUR qualia, which just seem to be associated emotions and memories, can be studied, and in principle quantified. This would be a fiercely complex undertaking and science is not ready to even begin it yet, but there is no firm non-contingent obstacle to doing so.

 

[moving finger]

What do you think is irrational about dualism?

I’m not being evasive here, but there are many different notions of dualism, just like there are many different notions of free will. I could explain what I think is irrational about one particular concept of dualism, only to find out that you have a completely different concept in mind. If you would care to explain your particular concept of dualism I’ll tell you why I think it is irrational.

In your example, is it not useful to distinguish between the software program running in your computer and the actual hardware made of atoms? After all, there is no such "real" distinction; the computer and its "software" is simply a single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics.

Agreed, but there are “states” where there is no program running, and “states” where there is a program running. Each state is a “single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics”, but the states are very different in their content and behaviour.

What we think of "software" is nothing but a conceptual pattern of some specific states of parts of the machine. Is it irrational to think of the "software" as somehow existing independently of the hardware?

The “idea of the program” can exist as an idea, without substance, in the same way as Plato’s world of forms “exists”, wherein there is a perfect circle. Plato’s world of forms would also contain “copies” of every possible program. But such a program would be totally ineffectual as far as our world is concerned. The program can only be effectual (in our world) if it exists as the patterns connected with some form of physical substrate on which it can run; the program can certainly not interact with our world (in the sense of inputs and outputs) in the absence of such a substrate.

But you have switched the identification of "I". At least you have in my opinion. You claim that ""I" am the physical body", and then proceed to ignore consciousness, which you identified with the software in your computer.

I recognise that there is more than one possible meaing of “I”.

It could mean (a) “I in the sense of the virtual conscious self which thinks that it inhabits my physical body” or it could mean (b) “I in the sense of the physical body”.

(a) is a virtual “I”, whereas (b) is a physical “I”.

In my humble opinion, "I" am my consciousness, not my chemical body. When you talk to me, my body may be doing the reporting, but it is my consciousness that is providing the answers and opinions.

I don’t think everyone sees it as clear-cut as that, which is why we need to be clear about whether, when we refer to “I”, “my” or “mine”, we are referring to only the conscious experience, or to the physical body as well.

Example : If I say “I can run fast”, I don’t mean “my conscious experience can run fast”, I mean “my physical body can run fast”.

So, if we take my perspective, for the moment, we can paraphrase your example differently: "In the sense that "I" am the software that is running in the computer, I do exist (which you seem to acknowledge in your first quote above).

I would phrase it differently. “In the sense that I am the virtual conscious self which thinks that it inhabits my physical body, I exist as a virtual entity”

Without the computer hardware (physical body), "I", the software could very well exist."

Without the computer hardware (physical body), the program could not run (the virtual conscious self, the “I”, could not exist).

In fact, software typically exists independently of hardware before, during, and after the hardware might be built, operated, and destroyed.

No. The “idea” of the software may exist independently of the hardware, in the same way that the “idea” of a circle exists before anyone has ever drawn a circle (see my reference to Plato’s world of forms above). But such “idea” of program is totally ineffectual (in our world) in absence of any physical substrate.

To push your excellent example just a little further, no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind.

I would have to ask you to clarify your definition of “software” first.

I take your statement that, "Without that physical body, I would not exist." to be only a belief or conjecture on your part and not a claim to absolute truth.

Did you ever think otherwise?
Show me a man who claims to possesses access to absolute truth and I’ll show you a fool.

Now, to me it makes sense to interpret the phenomenon of consciousness along the lines of your software/hardware example. In doing so, we can see that a sort of "dualism", i.e. the hardware/software dichotomy, makes sense whether or not we acknowledge that any such dichotomy exists in physical reality.

In what sense is this dualism? Sorry, but I don’t see it. As I pointed out above, we need to distinguish between the “idea” of a program (in Plato’s sense, which would be ineffectual in the real world), and the “actual running program” (which can be effectual in the real world only as part of the properties of a hardware substrate). How is this dualism?

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

The software/hardware analog is a fallacy because the programming of the software is inherent in how the monitor views it.
It's kind of like, the monitor is analogous to the image we see with our eyes, and the reason it's a fallacy is because every step from the circuit boards to the pixels in the monitor can be explained physically.
We can't say the same for consciousness.

What is it exactly that you think we cannot explain about consciousness?

Also you might say that "yes, but we can't SEE the software by just analyzing the hard drive." and this is true, but you can easily do so with a mouse, keyboard and a monitor.

No. All you see is a either the physical output of the software, or a “description of the software” (ie a listing of the program instructions), don’t confuse this with the actual running program.

The step from hard drive and circuit boards to the image we see on the monitor is not magical, but the step from our neurons in the brain to the image we see with our eyes is.

You are confusing “the external appearance of the effects of the running software” with “the internal sense-perceptions of the mind”, these are completely different things. There is nothing magical about conscious experience (except that some people have to believe it is magical because they refuse to accept the rational explanation).

And not only that, but the image we see with our eyes cannot be quantified and predicted with math/physics.

And….. what does this prove? If I build a robot with visual sense-receptors and the ability to describe what it feels like when it “sees” with those receptors, and then ask it to describe to me what it “feels like” to see the colour red, do you think I could necessarily predict exactly what “it feels like” for the robot to see the colour red?

The image you see with your eyes represent more than just pixels on a monitor, it also represents emotions, forms, structure and meaning.

And what are these, but correlations between various internal neurophysiological states? There is no “magic” here (except, as mentioned, a magical explanation is the only way out for anyone who rejects the rational)

You can mathematically calculate th forms and structure the eyes see, but the meaning and emotion of those forms is lost.

Because conscious experience is subjective. How can anyone calculate, using objective methods, what a subjective experience is like? The two concepts are incompatible. It’s like asking “if I tell you the square root of 16 is 4, what is the capital of China?”

When I see a beautiful woman on the street, I see more than just a mere bag of bones and flesh, I also see beauty, sexual tension, memories, nervousness etc.

Again, what are these but correlations between various internal neurophysiological states? There is no “magic” here (except, as mentioned, a magical explanation is the only way out for anyone who rejects the rational)

For qualia to exist, you need a complete set of physical prerequisites.
You need a brain, a body, a sensory system and memories stored in that brain for cross checking stimuli.

But you don’t need magic.

Best Regards

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

And….. what does this prove? If I build a robot with visual sense-receptors and the ability to describe what it feels like when it “sees” with those receptors, and then ask it to describe to me what it “feels like” to see the colour red, do you think I could necessarily predict exactly what “it feels like” for the robot to see the colour red?

Back when I was in IT, I used to have fantasies about doing just this; a dedicated color perceiver. Its whole world would be nothing but different instances of colors presented to its sensor. I could almost see how to program it. It's important to have the processing behind a Metzinger style wall, so the program won't attribute its internal inputs to processes but see them as pseudo perceptions. Then behind the wall you have every color-precept generating a partly directed partly random learnable (Hebbian) association with records of past encounters with that color-precept. You also need pleasure/pain capabilities so the program has something to remember about each color-precept. I think you could generate with this toy system a very convincing color perceiver and discusser.

 

[octelcogopod]

moving finger and selfadjoint;
I'm interested in your answer to this "problem."
You say "because they can't accept the truth", well tell us, what is the truth?

Also, I think the whole "image seen with your eyes" example is too non specific for there to come a point out of it, so I will use another example.

Simply, color.
The whole problem I am having with this consciousness deal is that, if the universe is all physical, where is this subjective qualia represented in its unabridged and original form in the physical universe?
A color seemingly doesn't exist unless it is perceived, it only exists as a visible portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, but only a receptor, like an eye or other (maybe electronic) device can detect the lightwave.
So, my problem does not lie with this, my problem lies with the fact that a color is perceived differently depending on the receptor, and that means that the color red as it were, does not exist anywhere other than the qualia of a human brain or other device that works similar to the human brain.

If the universe is indeed only a moving mass of energy and mass, where in this mass is the color red stored as it is seen by the human eye?

 

[moving finger]

moving finger and selfadjoint;
I'm interested in your answer to this "problem."
You say "because they can't accept the truth", well tell us, what is the truth?

Sorry, but I’m not sure where either of us said “they can’t accept the truth”. Can you perhaps point out where this statement comes from?

What I did say above is “Show me a man who claims to possesses access to absolute truth and I’ll show you a fool.”

The whole problem I am having with this consciousness deal is that, if the universe is all physical, where is this subjective qualia represented in its unabridged and original form in the physical universe?

You are assuming there is such a thing as an “unabridged and original form” of a quale. Why should that necessarily be the case?
To me, a quale stands in relation to the virtual self in a similar way that the outside of a box stands in relation to the inside of a box. Neither “outside the box” nor “inside the box” exists as standalone entities in their own right, they are brought into existence by the phenomenon of the box. Take away the box, and it makes no sense to talk of “inside” or “outside” the box, these concepts have meaning only as relational concepts, ie in relation to the box. With “quale” and “self’ it is just the same, these concepts have meaning only as relational concepts, ie in relation to consciousness. Take away the consciousness, and it makes no sense to talk of “quale” or ‘self”.

The reason you are having a problem, therefore, is because you are assuming that a quale is some kind of stand-alone pre-existing entity which somehow exists in the physical world in absence of consciousness. Try to let go of this false intuition.

A color seemingly doesn't exist unless it is perceived, it only exists as a visible portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, but only a receptor, like an eye or other (maybe electronic) device can detect the lightwave.

Detection and (conscious) perception are not the same thing. You are right in thinking that a colour does not exist unless it is (consciously) perceived – this fits precisely with what I have said above.

So, my problem does not lie with this, my problem lies with the fact that a color is perceived differently depending on the receptor, and that means that the color red as it were, does not exist anywhere other than the qualia of a human brain or other device that works similar to the human brain.

Exactly. But why do you think this is a problem?

If the universe is indeed only a moving mass of energy and mass, where in this mass is the color red stored as it is seen by the human eye?

Simplistically : The brain stores memories of previous neurophysiological states. Some of these states will be states when you previously perceived red objects. Each time you consciously perceive an object, the brain compares the information coming from your eyes with the information stored in memory, and if it finds a match or series of matches, a “light-bulb” clicks in your consciousness and you say “aha, that is a red object”. Not because there is a “red quale” stored anywhere in memory, but simply because there are in your memory parts of previous neurophysiological states which you have labelled “this is a red object” with which the brain can compare present neurophysiological states. If you did not have these memories with which to compare your present state of awareness, you would be unable to say “aha, this is a red object”.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

In what sense is this dualism? Sorry, but I don’t see it. As I pointed out above, we need to distinguish between the “idea” of a program (in Plato’s sense, which would be ineffectual in the real world), and the “actual running program” (which can be effectual in the real world only as part of the properties of a hardware substrate). How is this dualism?

As you pointed out, there are many connotations of 'dualism'. And, as I mentioned, I am not very much interested in labels, especially those which end in 'ism'. So let me withdraw my question about why you think dualism is irrational. What I am interested in is what, exactly, you think is irrational. You said:

To me, the dualism inherent in the cartesian theatre illusion is an irrational intuition.

And more recently, you said:

There is nothing magical about conscious experience (except that some people have to believe it is magical because they refuse to accept the rational explanation).

First, I am interested in what "the rational explanation" is. I'm guessing you buy into Metzinger's or Dennett's explanation, neither of which I accept. We can discuss my reasons further if you like.

Second, I take it that by 'magical' you mean 'irrational'. I'm trying to categorize my own ideas according to your usage here but I am going to need some of your help. You said you would tell me whether my idea of dualism was irrational if I told you what it is. Let's just discuss it without referring to the label of 'dualism' and you just tell me if it is rational or not.

I'll try to explain my ideas using your computer example. As we have done before, I'll talk only about an abstract conscious agent and not confuse things by using personal pronouns.

Without the computer hardware (physical body), the program could not run (the virtual conscious self, the “I”, could not exist).

Forgetting the reference to "I", you are saying that if we consider consciousness to be analogous to a running program, then consciousness cannot exist without a physical body, just as a running program cannot exist without a computer. Agreed.

The “idea of the program” can exist as an idea, without substance, in the same way as Plato’s world of forms “exists”, wherein there is a perfect circle. Plato’s world of forms would also contain “copies” of every possible program.

I'm not sure how to take this. Are you a Platonist who believes in the real existence of Plato's world of forms? If so, we might be able to come to a quick and easy agreement. If not, then the "idea of the program" does not exist in the same way as Plato's forms; the "idea of the program" really does exist independently of the computer both as a purely mental idea and also as a symbolic representation of those ideas in some physical medium. Which is it?

But such “idea” of program is totally ineffectual (in our world) in absence of any physical substrate.

I agree with this. But if the "idea" exists (which you seem to agree "can exist as an idea") and then the physical substrate somehow shows up, the "idea" can be loaded into the substrate whereupon it can become effectual (in the world of the substrate).

Now to continue the analogy between running programs/computers and consciousness/brains I claimed that "no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind" and you asked me to clarify my definition of "software" before you would comment. By 'software' I simply mean any and all computer programs. The kicker here is its "ultimate origin". Certainly there are programs that have been generated by other running programs. But the ultimate origin is not the generating program, but instead it is the programmer who designed the generating program. It is this fact that does not seem to have an analog in the consciousness/brain system if consciousness is nothing more than a brain process.

In my view, the analogy works because I don't think consciousness originates in the brain, just as the ideas which lead to the existence of programs don't originate in computers.

It doesn't seem to me that the analogy works for you even if you equate consciousness with a running instance of a program and not with the set of symbols representing the program.

It seems to me that my interpretation is more rational. What do you think?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Hi Paul

I am interested in what "the rational explanation" is.

An explanation along the lines of Metzinger’s paper. I'm not suggesting this is the "only" rational explanation, but explanations along these lines are the only rational ones that I have seen so far.

I'm guessing you buy into Metzinger's or Dennett's explanation, neither of which I accept. We can discuss my reasons further if you like.

Yup. I would be interested to know your reasons for rejecting Metzinger’s explanation.

I take it that by 'magical' you mean 'irrational'.

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X, when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts. In other words, suggesting that "X gives rise to Y" is not very useful if (a) it leaves unanswered the question of what gives rise to X, and (b) X is not needed to explain anything else.

For example, the medieval idea that wandering stars (planets) are pushed around the sky by angels may not have seemed magical at the time (because a more rational explanation was not available), but we can see now (with the benefit of a more rational explanation based on mechanics) that this angel idea is a "magical" concept.

The current idea that our feeling of free will is explained by the fact that we are genuinely free agents (in the libertarian sense) is also what I would call a magical explanation, because the mechanism of libertarian free will is itself unexplained (in fact I believe unexplainable), positing libertarian free will does not actually explain anything that we observe empirically apart from our subjective feeling of free will, and there is a perfectly rational alternative explanation for the subjective feeling of free will based on a purely deterministic model which does not need the magical premise of libertarian free will.

We need parsimony in our fundamental concepts, we need to resist the desire to multiply fundamental concepts needlessly.

you are saying that if we consider consciousness to be analogous to a running program, then consciousness cannot exist without a physical body, just as a running program cannot exist without a computer. Agreed.

Good.

Are you a Platonist who believes in the real existence of Plato's world of forms?

It depends what you mean by “real existence”. I believe in Plato’s world of forms only in the sense of an idealistic representation. In the “universal set of ideas” there is the idea of a perfect circle. This does not mean that the universal set of ideas has any kind of material, physical existence. Similarly, in the “universal set of mathematical equations” there is every conceivable mathematical function, but this does not mean the universe of mathematical equations has any kind of material, physical existence. It’s an ideal, not a reality. Similary, there is a “universal set of computer programs”.

the "idea of the program" really does exist independently of the computer both as a purely mental idea and also as a symbolic representation of those ideas in some physical medium.

In the same way the “idea of the perfect circle” really does exist (in the real world) in the form of a mathematical equation describing that circle, independently of any real circles ever created in the physical world.

I do believe that mathematicians discover mathematical truths and proofs rather than invent them, but this belief does not entail that these truths have any "material existence" prior to their discovery (although of course it all comes down to how one defines "existence").

But such “idea” of program is totally ineffectual (in our world) in absence of any physical substrate.

I agree with this. But if the "idea" exists (which you seem to agree "can exist as an idea") and then the physical substrate somehow shows up, the "idea" can be loaded into the substrate whereupon it can become effectual (in the world of the substrate).

Agreed.

I claimed that "no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind" and you asked me to clarify my definition of "software" before you would comment. By 'software' I simply mean any and all computer programs. The kicker here is its "ultimate origin". Certainly there are programs that have been generated by other running programs. But the ultimate origin is not the generating program, but instead it is the programmer who designed the generating program. It is this fact that does not seem to have an analog in the consciousness/brain system if consciousness is nothing more than a brain process.

It is correct that all instances of computer programs presently known to homo sapiens are ultimately descended from programs that were originally created by homo sapiens. But what does this prove? It is also true (if one believes in evolutionary theory) that all homo sapiens are descended from non-conscious organisms. There are only certain ways in which extremely complex systems can arise in nature, and evolution and design are two of these ways. Are you perhaps suggesting that consciousness can arise only by “pure evolution in absence of any design” and not by “evolution initiated by design”? If you are suggesting this, why do you think this is the case?

In my view, the analogy works because I don't think consciousness originates in the brain, just as the ideas which lead to the existence of programs don't originate in computers.

Understood. But if your explanation for how consciousness arises in individuals is based on something that is in turn equally unexplained, then that’s what I would call magical.

It doesn't seem to me that the analogy works for you even if you equate consciousness with a running instance of a program and not with the set of symbols representing the program.

I don’t understand what you mean here, sorry.

It seems to me that my interpretation is more rational.

To me, the more rational explanation is the one with the greater explanatory power, ie the one that accurately explains the phenomenon in question whilst relying in turn on the minimum of new unexplained concepts for that explanation. We should adhere to parsimony in concepts, only inventing new concepts if the existing ones have been demonstrated to be inadequate. Simply explaining one unexplained concept by replacing it with an additional, new and equally unexplained concept is not, to me, a rational explanation.

Best Regards

MF

 

[octelcogopod]

First I must apologize, you said "accept the rational explanation" not "truth."
Sorry.
Anyway

moving-finger, so you do agree that qualia exists, but you do not have an explanatin for consciousness?
I'm a little confused by your post at this point.

You say that conscious experience and detection are not the same.
Then you explain how the brain sees red in the consciousness, but we are no closer to knowing what consciousness IS.
What IS conscious experience?

It's quite a baffling post you made though, I never thought about it like this before.
I think your point is that a quale and conscious experience are not the same things.

Would you care to elaborate a little bit or should I go read metzingers writings?

 

[Lars Laborious]

Moving finger, a concept like “inside” or “outside” a box is a mental idea. And a mental idea consists of sensations that are processed in the right way so that the idea (the concept) is presented to itself (or for those who believe in dualism, to homunculus). Either way, a concept is secondary, whilst the nature of sensations itself is the unexplained substance we seek to understand when we (at least some of us) speek of qualia.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

I would be interested to know your reasons for rejecting Metzinger’s explanation.

See post #3 at https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=119221

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X, when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts. In other words, suggesting that "X gives rise to Y" is not very useful if (a) it leaves unanswered the question of what gives rise to X, and (b) X is not needed to explain anything else.

Thank you for this explanation. Not that it is important to define or use the term 'magical', but that it helps me understand where our differences are and maybe how to address them.

It seems to me that our difference can be summarized as follows: My view is that consciousness gives rise to physicality, while your view is that physicality gives rise to consciousness. We have reversed roles for X and Y in the proposition "X gives rise to Y".

Now, let's examine the "usefulness" of our respective positions using your criteria (a) and (b) above. I'll start with mine, where X = consciousness, and Y = physicality.

(a) Since I consider X to be primordial and ontologically fundamental, the question of what gives rise to X either does not arise or it is unanswerable. (In any system of ontology, something must be primordial and ontologically fundamental. Either the question of what gives rise to it does not arise, or the question is unanswerable in principle.) So it is a matter of opinion as to whether criterion (a) is met or not.

(b) X is needed to explain consciousness as experienced in at least one human, so criterion (b) is met.

Next, we'll consider yours, where X = physicality and Y = Consciousness.

(a) In order for X to exist, something -- call it X' -- must be primordial and ontologically fundamental in order to account for the existence of X. (I don't know what you might consider X' to be, but regardless of whether it is a false vacuum, a "true" vacuum, a Higg's Field, a set of laws, a set of principles, an endless stack of turtles, or what, it doesn't matter for the purposes of this argument.) Since X' is primordial and ontologically fundamental, the question of what gives rise to X' either does not arise or it is unanswerable. So, just as in my case, it is a matter of opinion as to whether criterion (a) is met or not.

(b) X' is needed to explain the existence of the world, so criterion (b) is met.

Our views seem to be equally magical (or rational) by these criteria.

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X,...

My X is an observed phenomenon, not new at all (we each experience consciousness beginning in childhood), and it is as directly observed as anything can be -- more directly, in fact, than anything physical can be observed. Your X', on the other hand, is to date not only an unobserved phenomenon, but as yet has not even been identified. When it is finally identified, it may not be "totally new", but in all likelihood it will be a directly unobserved concept.

My view seems much less magical than yours on this score.

...when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts.

My X is an integral part of at least my explanation of human conscious experience, which is the most in-your-face existing phenomenon there is. It is, however, not explained by our other concepts. Your X', when identified, will no doubt be a part of explanations for other existing phenomena, but it too, will not likely be explained by other concepts.

Our views seem to be about equal on this score.

We need parsimony in our fundamental concepts, we need to resist the desire to multiply fundamental concepts needlessly.

Agreed. I think my view is more parsimonious than yours since I posit nothing new; we know consciousness exists and we are pretty sure physicality exists. Those are all I ask. Yours still needs the elusive X' and it brings along The Hard Problem of how consciousness can arise from physicality.

Gotta run. Good talking with you MF,

Paul

 

[octelcogopod]

Paul I really like your post, but it leaves me with an unfulfilled feeling nonetheless.

I like both your arguments really, but I still feel a piece is missing in both.

for MF I have one question; what are your proposed ways of solving the hard problem?

For Paul I have another; Do you feel it is satisfying to know that consciousness can never be "solved?"
It seems as if you're saying that we shouldn't dig into the physicality to develop our understanding of conscious experience, but rather just say "consciousness is fundamental, so where it arises from is not a question."

However, if you are saying that yes, physicality is 100% responsible for conscious experience, but we can't answer the hard problem from within our conscious "sphere" of experience, then yes, I agree.

Do you also feel that qualia / consciousness exists seperately from the physical world? Or is this simply a subjective viewpoint / excercise in logic?

 

[selfAdjoint]

. I think my view is more parsimonious than yours since I posit nothing new; we know consciousness exists and we are pretty sure physicality exists

I do NOT know that consciousness exists. I know that I am conscious, which is not the same thing at all. I also know that I am tall, old, and digesting lunch, but that doesn't mean that tallness' oldness, and lunch digestion exist as primordial ontological substances. You are multiplying entities without sufficient reason.

 

[Doctordick]

If one is to explain anything from an absolutely rational base, intuition must be dropped. One must fall back to the only thing which can be consciously followed: the logical chain of reasoning. Think about it, the only rational position which stands on its own is, we are trying to describe the universe under the constraint that, "the only thing we know for sure, is that we know nothing for sure"[/color]. Can any of you give me a starting point consistent with that perspective? My statement is that I can and have done so. Please note, as an aside, that I take mathematics as a unique mode of communication and not as a self evident truth. Mathematics is unique because statements in mathematics (and logic) enjoy an almost perfect definition of terms and misinterpretation is next to impossible; a quality not shared by any other human language.

I take the definition of "an explanation" as the basic starting point as understanding becomes a meaningless concept in the total absense of explanation. It is impossible for anyone to understand what I am talking about without understanding my paper, http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm . If you want to understand anything at all, it is absolutely necessary that you understand exactly why the equation I develop in that paper needs to apply directly to the fundamental elements of any explanation of anything. From that fact, it follows that any internally logical development of what one is talking about requires that one define the fundamental elements of their explanation in terms of solutions of that equation. This is a complete and total reverse of the ordinary approach and makes no resort to presumed knowledge (which every other attack on the problem of understanding anything intimately relies).

I read Dr. Metzinger's paper with interest (it is not easy reading) and I found him pointing out some aspects of the constraint on what we know which are very important to my thoughts. In particular, what he refers to as "transparency" is a particularly significant issue. As I understand it, in lay terms, he is expressing the kind of transparency seen in common communication systems: i.e., the information obtained can not be used to discover the actual function of the communication system (in his case that would be the subconscious mind). One can say the communication system is a transparent window into the actual information being presented.

It is an excellent presentation; however, he misses a very important issue (I admit it is an issue of little concern to him). That would be another idea fundamentally embedded in the word "transparency". The word "transparency" implies what is seen is what is out there; however, with human communication devices (TV signals, radio, the internet, hearing aids, audio systems, etc.) there exist other ways of obtaining the same information whereas, when it comes to the conscious mind, the only source of any information arises from the subconscious itself and the word "transparency" sort of includes an assumption that what you see is correct. That Metzinger himself has made that assumption is evident in his clear presumption that the scientific conclusions concerning reality are correct. Again, I will excuse him because that issue is really not a concern of his; however, it is a very strong concern of mine.

My point in all of this is that, if one is to explain "conscious awareness", that explanation must be based on fundamental elements obeying my equation: i.e., on some complex conglomerate consequences of entities which themselves are built of solutions to that equation. Since it is easy to show that all of known physics arises from fundamental entities which can be defined as primary solutions to that equation, I would have to come down on Metzinger's side: that the self arises from the same source.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi octelcogopod,

Do you feel it is satisfying to know that consciousness can never be "solved?"

No. On the other hand, I don't claim to know that consciousness can never be solved. I am interested in a vigorous pursuit of a complete understanding not only of consciousness, but also all aspects of physical phenomena. I am delighted that some smart people are finally looking into the question of consciousness after ignoring it for so long.

It seems as if you're saying that we shouldn't dig into the physicality to develop our understanding of conscious experience

Not at all. I think we should keep digging into physicality in order to understand its role in the conscious experience.

...but rather just say "consciousness is fundamental, so where it arises from is not a question."

Not quite. I do claim that consciousness is fundamental, but I suspect that the primordial consciousness was significantly more primitive than the consciousness we experience as humans. For one thing, there was not the rich set of physical objects in existence which provide things to be conscious of. I also suspect that information stored in physical substrates enhances conscious experience to a considerable degree.

As I see it, a primordial consciousness started out with extremely limited knowledge and experience and evolved to produce what we experience now. That includes physicality along with who knows what else. So maybe where the primordial consciousness arises from is a question we can't ever grapple with. But related questions, such as what was that limited form of primordial consciousness like, and what were the stages of evolution that led from that primordial state to what we have now, may be questions we might be able to answer some day.

However, if you are saying that yes, physicality is 100% responsible for conscious experience, but we can't answer the hard problem from within our conscious "sphere" of experience, then yes, I agree.

That is not what I am saying. I say that consciousness is 100% responsible for physicality. The Hard Problem is solved by physical structures being constructed in such a way as to provide a communication path between consciousness and physical bodies, just as a two-way radio connection allows a JPL scientist to drive a Mars rover and perceive aspects of the rover's experience on Mars. The body is the rover and the JPL scientist is the consciousness. The remote control nature of the setup gives consciousness the illusion that it is resident in the brain.

Do you also feel that qualia / consciousness exists seperately from the physical world? Or is this simply a subjective viewpoint / excercise in logic?

Now that's a good question. I don't think there is anything simple about it at all. I have some vague hunches about the question, but nothing I would be able to defend very well. In short, I think there are physical processes (in the brain) which transform certain physical stimuli in complex ways prior to transmission to consciousness, rather than the raw stimuli themselves being transmitted.

Let me try to describe what I mean by using the example of sound. We have the quale of a musical tone. We consciously experience the sound of a tone as a musical note being played. We know intellectually that this tone is made of a rather complex set of vibrations. If the pitch of the tone is low enough, we may even be able to detect and hear the vibrations in addition to hearing the tone. Think of a low note on a tuba or a bassoon.

Or, using the same example, think of a cogwheel turning slowly and each cog hitting something rather stiff as it passes. We hear the sound of those strikes as individual clicks or thumps if the frequency is less than 10 hz or so. But if the wheel turns faster, at about 15 hz we begin to hear a tone in addition to the individual vibrations. Above some other frequency, maybe 30 hz or so, we can no longer detect the individual vibrations but only hear the tone. I think that the brain constructs information that we have a repeated set of vibrations at a particular frequency (or pattern of frequencies) and transmits this information, as a quale, to consciousness, rather than transmitting information representing the actual vibrations. This is all very speculative and I can't defend it very well, but you asked so I answered.

Thanks for your thoughts,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi selfAdjoint,

I know that I am conscious

And I am skeptical. In order for you to know that, you must know what you mean by the term 'I', by the term 'am', and by the term 'conscious'. My skepticism comes from your use of the term 'I' without defining it. The term 'am' is a form of the verb 'to be' which is a synonym of the word 'exist'. So "to be conscious" IMHO means the same thing as "consciousness exists". Yet you say that

I do NOT know that consciousness exists

You seem to be inconsistent whether or not you can satisfactorily define the word 'I'.

I also know that I am tall, old, and digesting lunch, but that doesn't mean that tallness' oldness, and lunch digestion exist as primordial ontological substances.

Agreed.

You are multiplying entities without sufficient reason.

I don't understand what you mean by "multiplying entities". What entities have I multiplied? In my opinion I have drastically reduced entities. In your scheme, there are some six billion conscious entities plus maybe even more if some animals are conscious, each of which demands an accounting of how it came to be. In my scheme, there is only one conscious entity which needs to be explained.

Rather than "multiplying entities without sufficient reason" I have taken the entities which appear to exist and simply made a choice as to which of them to posit as a fundamental entity. My claim is that by making this choice, which incidentally is arbitrary, it is easier to explain everything else.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Dick,

Think about it, the only rational position which stands on its own is, we are trying to describe the universe under the constraint that, "the only thing we know for sure, is that we know nothing for sure". Can any of you give me a starting point consistent with that perspective?

Let me propose a starting point that is close. We can know some things for sure, but we can't explain them. Here I have separated knowing from explaining. My hunch is that the ability to know is ontologically fundamental. I also suspect that nothing can be completely explained. The reason is that we can't define all the terms we use without being circular.

I take the definition of "an explanation" as the basic starting point as understanding becomes a meaningless concept in the total absense of explanation.

So I think my starting point is slightly ahead of yours. I start with knowing without being able to explain. You start with explanation and go on to derive its limitations.

There seems to be an intermediate position between knowing and explaining, and that is what MF calls "believing". I sometimes call it "thinking", as in "I think I know something but I can't necessarily explain it". If "believing" or "thinking" is not intermediate between knowing and explaining, it is at least another entity besides "knowing" which we might like to explain. That is, in addition to wanting to be able to explain what we know, we would also like to be able to explain what we believe.

Next, you mentioned 'understanding' and 'meaning'. It seems to me that you might agree that an acceptable definition of 'understanding' would be the ability to produce an explanation (of either a known fact or a belief). And, taking a cue from Wittgenstein, 'meaning' would be defined as the explanation that is commonly understood by the majority of communicants.

...I take mathematics as a unique mode of communication and not as a self evident truth. Mathematics is unique because statements in mathematics (and logic) enjoy an almost perfect definition of terms and misinterpretation is next to impossible; a quality not shared by any other human language.

Yes. And this, I think is where and why a lot of people misunderstand what you have discovered. It also is one of the sources of irritation for people like Les Sleeth. But let me give you my perspective on Mathematics and your work.

You have without a doubt based your work on traditional, standard mathematics. That is why I insist on labeling your result as a theorem. But what you have glossed over are the foundations of mathematics. I think Foundations play heavily in what we are discussing.

Mathematics has the same difficulty of circular definitions as any other language. So, in mathematics, certain terms are taken as primitive, i.e. without definition. It is a mistake to think that the primitive terms "mean something". They do not. They are only a starting point and provide an initial set of symbols which can be manipulated.

Now when you take as your starting point, a set of numbers, you have assumed the mathematical "meaning" of the term 'set' and the term 'number'. The term 'number' is rigorously defined in mathematics but the term 'set' is not (typically).

Going back to my starting point, can we say that we know what a set is even though we can't explain it? Well, yes. That's sort of the tacit position of mathematics. And that becomes the tacit position of the basis of your work, Dick.

Or, if that's unacceptable, can we say that we think we know what a set is? Or that we believe that we know what a set is? If we can just say this much, it seems that it provides enough on which all the rest of mathematics can be built. I think that's the case.

If you agree with me so far, then it seems clear that "we" must know or believe something "we" can't necessarily explain in order to have mathematics at all. But then, who exactly is this "we"? It seems to me that the existence of some kind of entity which has the ability to know, to believe, and to think, is absolutely necessary in order to have mathematics. And if mathematics is somehow involved in, or a prerequisite for, the instantiation and operation of physicality, as it sure seems to be, then it seems inescapable that consciousness must precede physicality in the development of reality.

Starting with consciousness, you can get mathematics. And with mathematics, you can get Dick's theorem. And with Dick's theorem you can get the laws of physics. And with the laws of physics, some initial numbers, and some sort of processor (like a conscious mind) you can get phenomena that appear every bit as real as the rock Boswell kicked trying to refute Berkeley. It all seems to hang together and make sense to me.

My point in all of this is that, if one is to explain "conscious awareness", that explanation must be based on fundamental elements obeying my equation: i.e., on some complex conglomerate consequences of entities which themselves are built of solutions to that equation.

For conscious awareness appearing in humans I would agree. But for that consciousness which is necessary in order to have the mathematics necessary for your starting point, it does not logically follow.

Since it is easy to show that all of known physics arises from fundamental entities which can be defined as primary solutions to that equation...

Yes but be careful. Conscious experience has not been explained by known physics and quite possibly could exist outside of physical reality. (Of course you know that I think it does.)

I would have to come down on Metzinger's side: that the self arises from the same source.

If the self you are talking about is one claimed to be inside and part of a human body, I suppose you and Metzinger could be right. But if the Buddhists are right, and there is no self in that body, then my view of reality makes more sense and is more complete. Just my humble opinions.

It's fun talking with you, Dick,

Paul

 

[eggman]

Hello

I used to be deep into this consciousness stuff some time

ago...so I wish to add 2 cents.

1)The 'I' is generally First Person Singular Pronoun..

a verbal 'center' in which the swirl of speech revolves around.
(a talking organic computer)

2)'I' have no way to separate myself from consciousness to find out what it is...if 'it' were anything at all.

3)If I recall Knowledge is the Experience...one creates the other..
they are infinitely self referential..aka they go back and forth forever..
Consciousness like most words is a reference...it has no meaning in itself.

3a)If it did mean anything it would appear to be that 'Knowledge' and Consciousness are one and the same.

4)I did read about awareness once but it too seems to be 'knowledge' and logic simply in some sort of self-checking mode of mind...
Knowledge is aware of itself as it runs through the human brain.

5)If Consciousness were to be a 'thing' it like most things would have to be Organic therefore temporary

Thats all I have for now...just 2 cents

 

[selfAdjoint]

And I am skeptical. In order for you to know that, you must know what you mean by the term 'I', by the term 'am', and by the term 'conscious'. My skepticism comes from your use of the term 'I' without defining it. The term 'am' is a form of the verb 'to be' which is a synonym of the word 'exist'. So "to be conscious" IMHO means the same thing as "consciousness exists".

No I don't need to do all that. I know that I am conscious better than I know grammar or logic or mathematics, and have done since I was two. If you want to say awareness of being conscious is prior to all those things, which are prior to the definition game you want to play, feel free.

I am directly aware that I am conscious, but you I only have reports about.


And as for multiplying entities, AFICS you have no warrant for treating "consciousness" as a thing, so to assert that it exists is multiplying entities.

 

[octelcogopod]

Hi Dick,
If you agree with me so far, then it seems clear that "we" must know or believe something "we" can't necessarily explain in order to have mathematics at all. But then, who exactly is this "we"? It seems to me that the existence of some kind of entity which has the ability to know, to believe, and to think, is absolutely necessary in order to have mathematics. And if mathematics is somehow involved in, or a prerequisite for, the instantiation and operation of physicality, as it sure seems to be, then it seems inescapable that consciousness must precede physicality in the development of reality.

Starting with consciousness, you can get mathematics. And with mathematics, you can get Dick's theorem. And with Dick's theorem you can get the laws of physics. And with the laws of physics, some initial numbers, and some sort of processor (like a conscious mind) you can get phenomena that appear every bit as real as the rock Boswell kicked trying to refute Berkeley. It all seems to hang together and make sense to me.
For conscious awareness appearing in humans I would agree. But for that consciousness which is necessary in order to have the mathematics necessary for your starting point, it does not logically follow.
Yes but be careful. Conscious experience has not been explained by known physics and quite possibly could exist outside of physical reality. (Of course you know that I think it does.)
If the self you are talking about is one claimed to be inside and part of a human body, I suppose you and Metzinger could be right. But if the Buddhists are right, and there is no self in that body, then my view of reality makes more sense and is more complete. Just my humble opinions.

It's fun talking with you, Dick,

Paul

Thanks for a very detailed post.
I'm still a bit blurry on some issues though.
It seems to me that you are taking the easy way out, I mean, your theory doesn't bring us any closer to knowing what consciousness is.
You have explained the how but not the what, so to speak.

For instance you say consciousness is a separate thing outside of physical reality. Well jeez, I can't argue with that.
Your post makes perfect logical sense, but it doesn't really go into the specifics on how for instance the consciousness interacts with physical reality.
If something interacts with physical reality, it is automatically a part of physical reality, it's just a fundamental truth.
You can't just do a "guest visit" and then erase all traces, your presence will create "ripples in the ocean" that will spread to the far ends of the galaxy.

Also, an entity such as consciousness, for it to be "external" to physical reality, it would still need its own logical reality, for it to function in.
Anything that has any kind of form, shape, movement or change MUST have some kind of rule to how it works, and when something has a rule it is automatically defined and finite.

So imo saying that you start with consciousness still ends in infinite regress.
Where does consciousness come from?
How does consciousness work?
Why does it exist?
How could it exist?

And I don't think a satisfactory answer would be that it is fundamental and therefore those questions don't arise.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi octelcogopod,

It seems to me that you are taking the easy way out, I mean, your theory doesn't bring us any closer to knowing what consciousness is.
You have explained the how but not the what, so to speak.

It might seem easy, but there are a lot of people who seem to be having a hard time accepting it. I think that once people start accepting the possibility, then some reasonable theories might start coming out.

As for what consciousness is, I think it is fundamentally the ability to know. This, to me, is the same sort of idea that energy is the ability to do work. Now energy comes in many different forms that at first seem to be quite different things. But science has now demonstrated that electric energy, gravitational potential energy, heat energy, nuclear energy, and even matter itself are all forms of energy, and they are comfortable in considering, quantifying, and measuring energy as it transforms from one form to another.

I think the same sort of thing might be worked out for the ability to know. We may know that something exists, how something happens, how to do some act, why some things occur, what something is, where something is, when something happened, what something is like, etc. These are all forms of knowing, and I would say that together they make up consciousness just as all the forms of energy make up the total energy.

It seems to me that knowing is the acquisition of information by consciousness. And I suspect that there might be some sort of conservation law or an extension to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics that says something like knowledge never decreases. Since the law of conservation of mass had to be extended to become the conservation of energy, which included all forms of energy including mass, it seems to me like we might need to extend it once again to include information and knowledge. Those are only idle speculations, but they suggest that a theory of consciousness might bring us closer to an understanding of the deeper mysteries of the physical world. Who knows?

Your post makes perfect logical sense, but it doesn't really go into the specifics on how for instance the consciousness interacts with physical reality.

I have speculated on these specifics in other posts (and gotten into a little trouble for it). Basically I think consciousness interacts with physical reality in both directions.

In the direction of perception, where information from physical reality becomes known to consciousness, I say that the biological nervous system receives information from sense organs and then transmits it to consciousness somehow. Since consciousness is outside the physical universe, this transmission method must either be something we don't yet know about, or it is something we do know about but which also produces effects in the other "world" which can carry the information.

In the other direction, that of causing willful action in the physical world, I think the information triggering or directing the action presents itself in the physical world as quantum effects that are below the threshold of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. From the standpoint of our measurements, these effects look like they are random. But in a carefully constructed apparatus, like the setup for the Schroedinger's Cat experiment, or like a living brain, quantum effects that are below the HUP radar can be amplified to the point where they can cause intended macro effects. I think neurons with their microtubules can receive and amplify these signals and cause a cascade of physical effects eventually resulting in muscle action which in turn can result in bulldozer action which in turn can cause significant changes in the world.

Also, an entity such as consciousness, for it to be "external" to physical reality, it would still need its own logical reality, for it to function in.
Anything that has any kind of form, shape, movement or change MUST have some kind of rule to how it works, and when something has a rule it is automatically defined and finite.

I agree. I especially agree that consciousness, along with everything else in reality, is finite. Moreover, the rule you say MUST exist has been deduced by Dr. Dick. The rule says that any consistent explanation of what consciousness or reality might be doing must obey the laws of physics. That is its logical reality.

So imo saying that you start with consciousness still ends in infinite regress.

How so? I don't agree with that at all. If you start with a primordial consciousness which is extremely limited, maybe only knowing a single bit, and then that primordial consciousness evolves by imagining, experimenting, and learning, building virtual physical realities as it goes, it will at all times remain finite. There is no more infinite regress in that kind of development than there is in the evolutionary development of biological organisms here on earth. What infinite regress do you see?

Where does consciousness come from?

The rich consciousness that we experience as humans came from a long long evolutionary path beginning with the primordial consciousness long before the Big Bang, and culminating with what there is "now", whatever all that includes. But where did that primordial consciousness come from? That part of it remains a mystery and probably always will.

How does consciousness work?

I think it works within a structure described by Gregg Rosenberg in his "A Place for Consciousness". This is a hierarchical structure of what he calls "natural individuals". The characteristic of a natural individual is that it has at once a receptive principle and an effective principle. To me the receptive principle is the ability to know and the effective principle is the ability to cause effects. These are communication actions that flow among natural individuals both across the hierarchy and up and down the hierarchy. I think human (and other animal) brains are elements of the lowest level of this hierarchy of natural individuals. Unlike Rosenberg, however, I claim that no natural individual experiences consciousness except the one at the very top of the hierarchy. Each of the others presents an illusion to the one at the top making it seem that while the lower individual is active, it seems that consciousness inheres in it, when in fact it is only vicarious. If that's not clear, I apologize. It's the best I could do in one paragraph.

Why does it exist?

In the sense of "how come?" it is because it has always existed. In the sense of "what for?" it is to discover novel things to know and novel ways of knowing. Those are just my guesses.

How could it exist?

Good question. We only know that it does exist so there must be a way. Chris Langan has done a lot of thinking about how it could exist. You might want to check with him at http://ctmu.org/

And I don't think a satisfactory answer would be that it is fundamental and therefore those questions don't arise.

Me either.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

No I don't need to do all that. I know that I am conscious better than I know grammar or logic or mathematics, and have done since I was two. If you want to say awareness of being conscious is prior to all those things, which are prior to the definition game you want to play, feel free.

I am directly aware that I am conscious, but you I only have reports about.


And as for multiplying entities, AFICS you have no warrant for treating "consciousness" as a thing, so to assert that it exists is multiplying entities.

So you know you are conscious yet you say consciousness doesn't exist. Is there no such thing as consciousness? Should we expunge the word from our language? Would you agree to define 'consciousness' as the thing --- whoops! I mean that which you experience when you know you are conscious?

What is 'AFICS' and what is your definition of 'thing'?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

First I must apologize, you said "accept the rational explanation" not "truth."

(I guessed that was the case, but didn’t want to presume, so asked the question)

so you do agree that qualia exists, but you do not have an explanatin for consciousness?

I believe qualia are “virtual” entities, just like the conscious self is a virtual entity. Neither qualia nor the conscious self “exist’ in the sense of having any kind of existence outside of the conscious processing which is creating these virtual entities.

There is in fact a very credible explanation for consciousness – consciousness is simply a particular form of information processing (by an agent) which produces (as part of that processing) the entities of virtual “qualia” and virtual “self”. This (imho) is all that consciousness is, and thus is an explanation for consciousness. The details are in Metzinger’s paper.

You say that conscious experience and detection are not the same.

Can you remind me where I say that?

Then you explain how the brain sees red in the consciousness, but we are no closer to knowing what consciousness IS.
What IS conscious experience?

Consciousness is simply a particular form of information processing (by an agent) which produces (as part of that processing) the entities of virtual “qualia” (the experience) and virtual “self” (the experiencer). This (imho) is all that consciousness is, and thus is an explanation for consciousness. The details are in Metzinger’s paper. What more is there to know?

It's quite a baffling post you made though, I never thought about it like this before.
I think your point is that a quale and conscious experience are not the same things.

I agree the notion I am trying to put forward may seem baffling at first, because it goes against deep-seated intuitions of “how the world works”. But human intuitions evolved to help humans survive in the macroscopic everyday world, they did not evolve to give humans accurate insights into the microscopic world, or the world inside the mind.

A “quale” is supposed to be an element of conscious experience – assuming that we can “reduce” consciousness and dissect it up. In the same way, the “self” is supposed to be the thing doing the experiencing.

The issue here is that one cannot have “an experience” in the absence of “something doing the experiencing”, and one cannot have “something experiencing” in the absence of “an experience”. The notion that we can dissect consciousness down and isolate the “quale” and the “self’ as separate entities is nonsensical, irrational. The reason why people (like Chalmers) try to do this separation is because we have a deep-seated intuition that all subjects and objects can be both logically and physically separated from each other (this is what we do all the time in everyday life for example). But this naïve intuition does not hold when we apply it to consciousness. The “conscious experience” is a whole, an irreducible entity, a unity, which cannot be physically separated into subject and object parts.

Would you care to elaborate a little bit or should I go read metzingers writings?

Reading Metzinger would give you some more insight.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

Moving finger, a concept like “inside” or “outside” a box is a mental idea.

I agree it's an "idea". I'm not sure why you say it is necessarily a mental idea.

And a mental idea consists of sensations that are processed in the right way so that the idea (the concept) is presented to itself (or for those who believe in dualism, to homunculus). Either way, a concept is secondary, whilst the nature of sensations itself is the unexplained substance we seek to understand when we (at least some of us) speek of qualia.

I genuinely don't understand what it is that you think is left unexplained.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

Our views seem to be equally magical (or rational) by these criteria.

The fundamental problem with your suggested solution is that, if you are suggesting that “consciousness gives rise to physicality”, you need to derive the exact reverse of Metzinger’s paper. Instead of constructing a plausible and rational mechanism which shows how we can start with the physical world and this gives rise to and explains everything we know empirically about consciousness, you instead need to construct a plausible and rational mechanism which shows how consciousness gives rise to and explains everything we know empirically about the physical world. Can you do this? If not, your notion is explanatorily very weak.

My X is an observed phenomenon, not new at all (we each experience consciousness beginning in childhood), and it is as directly observed as anything can be -- more directly, in fact, than anything physical can be observed.

I disagree. Your X is not observed in the scientific sense of objectively observed. Your X is “subjectively experienced”. A subjective experience for which we have a very rational objective physical explanation.

How does your assumption that the “subjective experience of consciousness is fundamental, and is the explanation for the physical world” actually explain the physical world? Where is the model?

My X is an integral part of at least my explanation of human conscious experience, which is the most in-your-face existing phenomenon there is.

It’s a purely subjective phenomenon.

I think my view is more parsimonious than yours since I posit nothing new; we know consciousness exists and we are pretty sure physicality exists.

You need to provide a coherent and rational model for how your subjective consciousness generates everything we know about the physical world. Without this model your notion is not an explanation.

Yours still needs the elusive X' and it brings along The Hard Problem of how consciousness can arise from physicality.

There is no Hard Problem – read Metzinger again.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

for MF I have one question; what are your proposed ways of solving the hard problem?

I am often asked this, and my reply is always the same: What Hard Problem? The ideas elaborated by Metzinger explain how information processing gives rise to a virtual self as well as to virtual qualia. I don't see any problem unanswered. Perhaps you could explain just what you think the Hard Problem is?

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

Hi Paul

Your ideas are interesting, but for the most part (as you admit yourself) mainly speculative.

With respect, I think you should not be surprised that few people take your ideas seriously, unless and until such time as you can work out a rational, coherent and “explanatorily adequate” model based on these ideas. It seems that you’re a long way from this.

As for what consciousness is, I think it is fundamentally the ability to know.

If one accepts the definition that knowledge is “justified true belief”, then any agent with an ability to form beliefs about the world has an ability to possesses knowledge. This has nothing necessarily to do with consciousness (I can envisage a complex information processing machine which could form beliefs, ie speculative propositions which it deems to be true, about the world but without that machine necessarily possessing consciousness).

This, to me, is the same sort of idea that energy is the ability to do work. Now energy comes in many different forms that at first seem to be quite different things. But science has now demonstrated that electric energy, gravitational potential energy, heat energy, nuclear energy, and even matter itself are all forms of energy, and they are comfortable in considering, quantifying, and measuring energy as it transforms from one form to another.

Energy is simply a property of the physical world, just as mass and lengths are a proprties of the physical world. It does not exist in its own right (one cannot isolate a kilogram of pure energy). The intuition that “energy transforms from one form to another” is a misleading way to think of it – it’s like saying that “lengths transform from one form to another” when a piece of paper is folded up. All we do when we are measuring “energy” is we are measuring certain properties of the physical world.

I think the same sort of thing might be worked out for the ability to know. We may know that something exists, how something happens, how to do some act, why some things occur, what something is, where something is, when something happened, what something is like, etc. These are all forms of knowing, and I would say that together they make up consciousness just as all the forms of energy make up the total energy.

As pointed out above, a sufficiently complex non-conscious machine could claim to possesses this kind of knowledge. The conflation of knowledge with consciousness may seem naively intuitively correct (after all, I am conscious, and I know things – therefore the two must be intimately related, no?), but consciousness and knowledge are strictly (both scientifically and philosophically) quite different things. Intuitions are often misleading.

It seems to me that knowing is the acquisition of information by consciousness.

How do you arrive at this conclusion? Simply because you are conscious and you acquire knowledge? Are you saying therefore that a non-conscious agent cannot possesses knowledge?

And I suspect that there might be some sort of conservation law or an extension to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics that says something like knowledge never decreases.

What possible empirical evidence or theoretical justification would one have for such an outrageous and irrational assertion (apart from mystical wishful thinking)? If one accepts the JTB definition of knowledge, then knowledge is in direct proportion to the number of agents with justified true beliefs. If the planet Earth were to be destroyed in a holocaust tomorrow, there would be a sudden drop in knowledge (at least in this part of the universe). The 2nd Law is based on sound, rational argument using both the theory of statistical mechanics and the obsservations of countless experiments. Please don’t sully the name of the 2nd Law by trying to associate it with some fantasy guesswork about the possible metaphysical properties of knowledge.

Those are only idle speculations, but they suggest that a theory of consciousness might bring us closer to an understanding of the deeper mysteries of the physical world.

I’m glad you say these are “idle speculations”. Don’t fool yourself into thinking that you have a coherent and rational theory which would rival the physicalist account unless and until you work these things out rigorously.

There is nothing wrong with idle speculation. Mankind has speculated idly, and wildly, about many things, such as angels pushing the planets around, but it is important not to confuse such idle speculation with rational, coherent models of how the world works. We can all make idle speculations, but (with all due respect) nobody intelligent should consider an idle speculation, unsupported by any proper coherent rational theory or empirical data, to be a serious rival for well-established models which are based on and supported by mountains of theory and data.

Since consciousness is outside the physical universe, this transmission method must either be something we don't yet know about, or it is something we do know about but which also produces effects in the other "world" which can carry the information.

More idle speculation? What evidence do you have for your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”? Your model offers no explanation for how this information is transmitted, it simply seems “magical”, please don’t try to suggest this is a rival for a physicalist account.

In the other direction, that of causing willful action in the physical world, I think the information triggering or directing the action presents itself in the physical world as quantum effects that are below the threshold of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. From the standpoint of our measurements, these effects look like they are random.

Quantum behaviour is in fact not random, it is (epistemically) stochastic. Are you suggesting that consciousness can directly interfere with or control this stochastic behaviour? In which case, in well controlled experiments, we should be able to observe this “conscious influence” on quantum behaviour? What mechanism do you propose for this mysterious influence, or perhaps it is magical again?

I think neurons with their microtubules can receive and amplify these signals and cause a cascade of physical effects eventually resulting in muscle action which in turn can result in bulldozer action which in turn can cause significant changes in the world.

You’ve been reading that misguided mathematician called Roger Penrose haven’t you
Let’s explore this speculation. In this magical influence upon the quantum realm, is your consciousness itself operating deterministically? In other words how does it decide what it wants to do – does it (a) choose quantum results quite randomly with no regard for “what it wants to happen”, or does it (b) make targetted and intentioned deterministic choices based on “what it wants to happen”? Which way would you prefer to jump, (a) or (b)?

Anything that has any kind of form, shape, movement or change MUST have some kind of rule to how it works, and when something has a rule it is automatically defined and finite.

I agree. I especially agree that consciousness, along with everything else in reality, is finite. Moreover, the rule you say MUST exist has been deduced by Dr. Dick. The rule says that any consistent explanation of what consciousness or reality might be doing must obey the laws of physics.

What comes first, the rule or the behaviour? Rules may be descriptive rather than prescriptive. By your own account, consciousness it seems can magically interfere with quantum stochastic behaviour, which would mean that the “rules” would in fact be made up as we go along? Or are you suggesting that consciousness follows rules as well?

If you start with a primordial consciousness which is extremely limited, maybe only knowing a single bit, and then that primordial consciousness evolves by imagining, experimenting, and learning, building virtual physical realities as it goes, it will at all times remain finite.

“Evolves”? How does it evolve, what is the mechanism for this evolution? Evolution by natural selection is based upon competition for finite resources which eliminates weaker or less competitive genes. What mechanism would you propsoe for your evolution of primordial consciousness?

The rich consciousness that we experience as humans came from a long long evolutionary path beginning with the primordial consciousness long before the Big Bang, and culminating with what there is "now", whatever all that includes.

So this “primordial consciousness” was around for 13 billion years before conscious human beings came on the scene? It also existed before the Big Bang?

In the sense of "what for?" it is to discover novel things to know and novel ways of knowing.

Are you suggesting a teleological reason for consciousness? That there is an ultimate “purpose” which this consciousness is working towards?

Best Regards

MF