learningphysics said:
I think we get to the crux of the issue here. Why exactly is killing a human for personal gain (when utilitarian principles don't forbid it) wrong, whereas killing a cow for personal gain (when utilitarian principles don't forbid it) alright?
You are quite right. The moral question is
exactly the crux of the issue. Thank you for spotlighting this.
This will be my last post in this thread - I'm putting
way too much time into this - so all of my correspondents are granted the luxury of getting the last word against me. Make it a good one! "Shoot straight... and don't make a mess of it!"
The hidden part of this discussion all along has had to do with
defining morality with regard to diet - and so, defining morality at all. I'll get to that question in a minute, after recapitulating a few problems with the animal rights position.
Problems with the Animal Rights position
The ethical vegetarian/animal rights position accords animals the same "right to be free from inflicted pain" as humans (supposedly) have. (Some people like to complain that I am not representing the ethical vegetarian/animal rights position correctly. In order to disarm this complaint, I quoted the above statement from the words of an ethical vegetarian/animal rights advocate on the board - Dissident Dan, if I recall correctly, but maybe cogito - and which most AV/ER people on the thread endorsed.)
As far as I can tell, no ethical vegetarian/animal rights person has yet ponied up and gone on record to answer the question: "Do non-human animals have the right to be free from pain inflicted
by other, non-human animals?" - or the consequent question, "Should humans
intervene to stop non-human animals from inflicting pain on other, non-human animals?". So I will have to deal with both sides of
that question.
Case A: Non-human animals have the right to be free from human-inflicted pain, but
do not have the right to be free from pain inflicted by other, non-human animals.
1) Non-human animals have the same rights as humans.
2a) Non-human animals have the right to inflict pain on each other, but
2b) Humans do not have the right to inflict pain on non-human animals.
3) Therefore, non-human animals have inherently more rights than humans.
(Which explicitly disagrees with A1, but we pass this over as a refinement of position rather than an actual contradiction.)
Case 1B: Non-human animals have the right to be free from human-inflicted pain, and
do have the right to be free from pain inflicted by other animals, but humans
should not interfere in non-human relationships.
1) Non-human animals have the same rights as humans.
2a) Non-human animals should not be stopped from inflicting pain on each other.
2b) Humans should be stopped from inflicting pain on each other.
2c) Humans should be stopped from inflicting pain on non-human animals.
3) Therefore, practically speaking, the right of others to be free from inflicted pain restricts only humans - and therefore, again, non-human animals have greater rights than humans.
Case 2B: Non-human animals have the right to be free from human-inflicted pain,
and have the right to be free from pain inflicted by other animals, and humans
should intervene to prevent non-human animals from inflicting pain on other, non-human animals.
1) Animals have the same rights as humans.
2a) Animals don't share the human value system - do not concern themselves about inflicting pain on others.
2b) Animals do not have the right to enforce their value system (their expressed right to inflict pain) on humans or other, non-human animals.
2c) Humans have the right to enforce their value system (the right to be free from inflicted pain) on non-human animals.
3) Therefore, humans have more rights than non-human animals.
(Which
cannot be called anything
but a contradiction of 2B1 - and speciesist - since the aim of this series of considerations was to elevate non-human animal rights to the status of human rights, so intending to controvert the "speciesist" tendency to subordinate non-human animal rights to human rights.)
So, as we see, there is no equation of human and (non-human) animal rights which actually ends up with a parity of rights between humans and non-humans. In two cases, humans end up with fewer rights than non-human animals; in the third, humans end up with more.
(I apologize about inserting "non-human" in front of "animals" throughout, but there are a few people in this thread whose niggling complaints have made it necessary.)
(And finally, the above consideration will not benefit those who cannot recognize or process logical considerations of a position. Sorry. No help, there.)
The Moral Question
But what is really at stake here is
the basis of moral evaluation. It may sound all righteous and good to say, "Animals have the same right to be free of inflicted pain as humans do," but the obvious question is, "Why?", "Who says?" On what grounds can one make such a statement? If this is an overarching moral truth, what makes it so? Why are not other moral statements valid? For example, why cannot I say, "Humans may kill and eat non-human animals, but may not torture them for pleasure"? Or why is it wrong to say, "Anything which I may morally do to a tree, I may morally do to a (non-human) animal"?
What is actually going on here - pretty much unremarked - is a
clash of moral systems. Meat eaters believe that they are well within their rights to eat meat - and, based on their moral system, they are right. Ethical vegetarians may well believe that "Meat is Murder" (as Morrissey sings) - and within their value system,
they are right.
So the real question is,
Which value system (if any) is right?
This question has really been at the foundation of the disagreement here - and without facing and resolving this question, there can be no resolution on the matter. Or, put another way, unless the ethical vegetarian or animal rights activist is able to show that
my value system is wrong and theirs is right, they have no business condemning me for eating meat - they are
wrong to do so.
But
that, it turns out, is probably the subject of another thread. At least.