Is 'I Think, Therefore I Am' a Valid and Obvious Philosophy?

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AI Thread Summary
Descartes' philosophy, particularly the concept of "I think, therefore I am," is revisited in the discussion, highlighting the idea that the Evil Demon could not convince a person of their non-existence because that would require the person's existence to begin with. Some participants argue that thinking alone does not prove existence, suggesting that sensory experiences and attentiveness to one's being are also crucial. The conversation explores the notion that Descartes' assertion may be myopic, as it emphasizes the mind's authority over existence while neglecting the reality of the external world. Additionally, there is a playful reinterpretation of Descartes' statement to "I drink, therefore I am," emphasizing the importance of experiential engagement. Ultimately, the discussion reflects on the interplay between thought, perception, and existence.

Was Descartes right?

  • Yes

    Votes: 25 75.8%
  • No

    Votes: 8 24.2%

  • Total voters
    33
  • #51
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:


-------Copy-Pasted from "Knowledge?", Page 4-------------------------

Every statement of the sort "I [beep] therefore I am" is erroneous when viewed with linear logic (I mean, no self-contradiction and/or loops allowed). Here's my proof:

Consider having said "I [beep]", you have to choose one of the two following statements:

P([beep]) : There need be an "I" to "[beep]."
P'([beep]) : There needn't be an "I" to "[beep]."

Since the above statements are contrary, only one of them may be yours (for we're using Aristotelian logic where a statement can be either true or false and nothing else and there's no escape from having chosen one of them).

If you choose 1, you've clearly pre-assumed that there need be an "I" to "[beep]" and you haven't done much in mentioning the consequence that "therefore I am." This is a self-referential statement giving no more information than what was known before.

If you choose 2, you've made another mistake. How could you say it isn't necessary to be an "I" to "[beep]" and then conclude that "therefore I (necessarily) am?" This is paradoxical for the statement is made up of two parts which are contradictory.

(This proof may be wrong. If so, please show my mistake(s))

This reasoning doesn't seem right to me. You said that I had to pre-suppose that there is an "I", in order for "I" to "[bleep]". Well, DUH. How can I say that "I" [bleep], unless there is an "I"?

Hint: I asked one of forum members to please take a look at this. She/he suggested it wasn't of much creditability and I agree with her/him. However, as long as "you" haven't shown its absurdity you have to take it.

Well, I'm not sure what the other member saw, but it didn't seem to have much credibility to me either.

I'm not convincing you that you don't exist, I repeat for 102th time. I'm showing how meaningless it may be to take any statement (even this well-shaped one) for granted.

Did you miss this, in my previous post...

Originally Posted By Me
Please remember, I'm not saying that you - personally - are trying to convince me of anything. I'm just saying that you couldn't, if you tried - which gives me certain amount of certainty that I do exist, because it can't be disproven .

Or did you ignore this?

Originally Posted By Manuel_Silvio
You say it "requires" that so and so, where does this "requirement" come from? You think there's a "requirement", you think a specific entity must be prior to another one, how did you come to think so? I've learned that you, like Descartes, are insisting that "I think therefore I am" is a firm ground. If everything is going to built upon this statement, the statement itself must be "proven" independently. No assumptions, no beliefs, no pre-suppositions are allowed.

Because to say that someone does something, is to imply "someone's" existence. You, yourself, have stated that when I say "I [bleep]" it implies an I. This is proof of my (and Descartes') stance.

Hint: the above paragraph suffers internal inconsistency

No kidding (no offense).

He, however, slipped once, only once. He saw it necessary for the thinker to exist prior to thinking.

He saw it necessary that the thinker exist, before the thinker thought? I ask you again: How can the thinker think, if the thinker doesn't exist?. You are contradicting yourself.

If he'd continued purifying his mind (perhaps he did but didn't find it suiting his favor) he would have seen that all "necessities", even the most basic ones, are assumptions unless that firm ground is found.

Have you ever read his "Rules on the Direction of the Mind"? You fall under the category of what was to be avoided, according to Rule #2.

Uncertainty is the principle of doubting everything, even uncertainty.

The uncertainty is the death of all progressive knowledge. Again I reference you to the second Rule of Descartes. (BTW, if you'd like, I can quote the Second Rule for you).

It's "I think therefore I am", "Cogito ergo sum", "je pons donc je suis." I thought Descartes' word would seem better in his native language.

Well it certainly sounds cooler :wink:

There is a book, "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance" by Robert M. Pirsig. I've a translation of it into my native language. It's from the 1976 print published by Corgi Books. The book is available now and, simply put, is great. I suggest you read it. It may show you many things I'm unable to show.

I'll try and find that. (Why the weird sounding name? I would have mistaken it for a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance, and dismissed it.)

Directed at Another God
Being there or not being there won't affect our thoughts/lives. We live as we live. It's the way it is. We do it as we do it.

Are you sure you don't want to retract this, for fear of being mocked mercilessly? Seriously, "Being there...won't affect our thoughts/lives"? Come on!

Nothing is prior to existence. If you say "If I'm able to [beep] then of course I exist" then you have to prove you're "able to [beep]." This is noway easier than proving you exist.

That's a different matter. You see, the fact that the Evil Demon (or you, in this case :wink:) was able to try and convince someone that they didn't exist (not saying that that's what you are doing, you "could" though, and that's the point), proves that both people (the one convincing and the one being convinced) exist.
 
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  • #52
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
... You said that I had to pre-suppose that there is an "I", in order for "I" to "[bleep]". Well, DUH. How can I say that "I" [bleep], unless there is an "I"?
There are two things here. First, that my proof relies on linear logic's vulnerability to an uncertain statement. On the first step I ask you to define the state of truth for the two contrary statements, P([beep]) and P'([beep]). Since we're viewing it using linear logic, you've no escape from giving the statements their respective truth values. You'll either have (P([beep]) = T, P'([beep] = F)) or (P([beep]) = F, P'([beep] = T)). I've shown that either of your possible choices in the framework linear logic lead to situations that are out of context, again for linear logic.

This is the nature of dilemma (only if you read that book). You have two choices both of which lead to disaster. There's no escape from that unless a third state is assumed. If a third choice is assumed then a new logic is born. The birth of a new logic means that linear (aristotelian) logic isn't unique. The very implication of its not unique gives birth to countless other systems of logical deduction with their very own rules of deduction and their very own truth values.

Second, that you ask how could you "[beep]" unless there's an "I"? May I ask in counteraction how have you come to believe that there should be an "I" to "[beep]?"

By asking this question you give a hint that it's impossible to act if one doesn't exist. I'm questioning this belief of yours. Since the proof of existence must come first of all, you can't believe in anything before you've proven your being. Since you can't believe in anything, you can't believe that "if there's a deed there's an doer."

We, in our lives, have always connected an effect with a cause, a deed with a doer. This connection isn't necessary. We just haven't observed any contradiction of this rule but this doesn't mean that this rule is never to be contradicted.

The scientific examples are the principles of conservation. Some of them were believed to be unbreakable but they were broken as their corresponding symmetries were violated; the one and only conservation principle whose breakage has never been observed is the conservation of energy. Yet this doesn't make it an unbreakable rule. Physicists are exploring every corner of the Universe to find a contradiction. Principles of conservation can't be proven. They're found empirically so their rightness can always be doubted.
Or did you ignore this?
Well, everyone makes mistakes... even me and...
Because to say that someone does something, is to imply "someone's" existence. You, yourself, have stated that when I say "I [bleep]" it implies an I. This is proof of my (and Descartes') stance.
No, I haven't said that. In my proof I offered you a statement, P([beep]), and asked you to determine its truth value. Whatever truth value you've chosen, it doesn't relate to me. I only have to show that for every truth value something obscene happens.

It's your belief you're thinking I'm implying. That you talk this over and over tells me you have a deep affection for the relation of the cause and the effect, the deed and the doer.
No kidding (no offense).
I can't get this. I wasn't kidding and really meant the hint. The paragraph I'd written above that hint really suffers internal inconsistency. I meant is as an excercise to find out if you can find where I've slipped. The hint is still there. See if you can find the weak point in that paragraph.
He saw it necessary that the thinker exist, before the thinker thought? I ask you again: How can the thinker think, if the thinker doesn't exist?. You are contradicting yourself.
I'm not contradicting myself, I'm contradicting your idea. Causality is the bond that connects the doer and the deed. It isn't a necessity. It needn't be there. The deed can be there without a doer if we ignore causality. This won't be a bad ignorance for causality is an empirical pattern; it isn't a logical obligation.
Have you ever read his "Rules on the Direction of the Mind"? You fall under the category of what was to be avoided, according to Rule #2.
No, I haven't ever read the book or caught a glimpse of it. I'd be thankful if you quote the part you're referring to.

And those rules were to direct Descartes' mind, not my mind. My mind goes where it sees suitable to go. I'm certainly someone to be avoided but I don't fall under a category. I'll go there if I'm politely asked :wink:.
The uncertainty is the death of all progressive knowledge...
Uncertainty is the death of many other things. That's what I really enjoy about it. Uncertainty is the death of confidence, righteousness, significance, preference, prudence, supremacy, ... If they're dying perhaps they don't deserve living on.

See, I'm living here with uncertainty. I'm not sure of anything but that's no problem. I've taken many steps after uncertainty and I, the precious I, haven't yet perished.

I really don't care much what Descartes has said before coming to "cogito ergo sum." Everything else is dependent on this critical point and I'll say Descartes has missed it. Anyway, I'd be thankful if you teach me these rules of mind direction.
I'll try and find that. (Why the weird sounding name? I would have mistaken it for a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance, and dismissed it.)
It's a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance. Only the motorcycle is a bit bigger, a bit more complex, a bit stranger, a bit different, just a bit. For me, it ranks among the very best among the books I've read.
Are you sure you don't want to retract this, for fear of being mocked mercilessly? Seriously, "Being there...won't affect our thoughts/lives"? Come on!
Remember what you said before, "uncertainty won't affect our lives." I'm not going to take this back.

Let's suppose someone comes and really convinces you (by magical means) that you don't exist but you go on living like before. You'll preceive everything just like before. If everything is just like before except for that you know you don't exist, would there be a problem? There's absolutely no problem. Nothing will be changed in your world if you're convinced of your non-existence unless you have a certain discomfort that leads to a suicide when you're convinced you are not.
That's a different matter. You see, the fact that the Evil Demon (or you, in this case ) was able to try and convince someone that they didn't exist (not saying that that's what you are doing, you "could" though, and that's the point), proves that both people (the one convincing and the one being convinced) exist.
First, you must know the Evil Demon scenario is a very basic one. Many other much more elaborate scenarios can be made. I'm one of those scenarios.

Second, you're still beholding the bonds of causality. Causality isn't a necessity. Causality isn't even the superior supposition. Causality isn't even the most useful supposition... There neend't be a Demon if a Demon is tricking you, you'd ask then what's tricking you? I'd say a Demon of a race of non-existent Demons. They may play hard tricks.

Do you know what the EPR experiment is? And then do you know what is Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony?
 
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  • #53
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

There are two things here. First, that my proof relies on linear logic's vulnerability to an uncertain statement. On the first step I ask you to define the state of truth for the two contrary statements, P([beep]) and P'([beep]). Since we're viewing it using linear logic, you've no escape from giving the statements their respective truth values. You'll either have (P([beep]) = T, P'([beep] = F)) or (P([beep]) = F, P'([beep] = T)). I've shown that either of your possible choices in the framework linear logic lead to situations that are out of context, again for linear logic.


You really lost me. From what I understand, your reasoning doesn't apply to something like the "I think therefore I am" philosophy. I say this because "I think therefore I am" is made up of the following propositions:

1) I exist (because I refer to myself as an entity).
2) I think.
3) Number 1 implies number 2.

This is the nature of dilemma (only if you read that book). You have two choices both of which lead to disaster. There's no escape from that unless a third state is assumed. If a third choice is assumed then a new logic is born.

Now this I understand - I've seen it applied to Euclidean Geometry before, too, and it makes sense. However, if you think that I don't have to exist in order for me to do something, you'd need a much stronger argument to convince me.

Second, that you ask how could you "[beep]" unless there's an "I"? May I ask in counteraction how have you come to believe that there should be an "I" to "[beep]?"

I come to believe this because the [bleep] on this particular occasion is substituted by "I think" - not just "think". There must be an "I" in order to [bleep], because "I" is part of the [bleep] itself.

By asking this question you give a hint that it's impossible to act if one doesn't exist. I'm questioning this belief of yours. Since the proof of existence must come first of all, you can't believe in anything before you've proven your being. Since you can't believe in anything, you can't believe that "if there's a deed there's an doer."

What do you mean "since you can't believe anything"? I can believe something, that's what proves that I exist. I rise to your challenge - because it is my opinion that there must be an "I", before "I" can do something. I hold this opinion, currently, because ther statement "I [bleep]" has an "I" in it (to put it basically).

We, in our lives, have always connected an effect with a cause, a deed with a doer.

That's because a "deed", by definition, is that which is done. And that which is done, is done by something. Also, "effect", is defined as something that is caused, otherwise it wouldn't be an "effect".

No, I haven't said that. In my proof I offered you a statement, P([beep]), and asked you to determine its truth value. Whatever truth value you've chosen, it doesn't relate to me. I only have to show that for every truth value something obscene happens.

I don't understand the relevance of this reasoning, to the topic at hand. Please explain it to me.

It's your belief you're thinking I'm implying. That you talk this over and over tells me you have a deep affection for the relation of the cause and the effect, the deed and the doer.

Well, one should have affection for that which one discusses. I have to go now, I will complete my response tomorrow...
 
  • #54


Originally posted by Mentat
So you think there is no actual objective reality, and that our minds make up our reality for us?

If so, you should perhaps see the first posts of the thread, entitled "The Hurdles to the Mind hypothesis". It is fashioned in such a way as to combat ideas set out by lifegazer, in his "Mind" hypothesis, but it appears relevant to your post, as well.

yes. i don't know about that guys post. i'll check it out when I'm free.

our minds make everything up for us. like when you see, smell, touch something, our minds tells us that it is there. therefore, that's what many people define, reality.

there is no such thing as reality.
 
  • #55
Originally posted by Mentat
So you think there is no actual objective reality, and that our minds make up our reality for us?
In a sense, you're right! But we may never know...

If so, you should perhaps see the first posts of the thread, entitled "The Hurdles to the Mind hypothesis". It is fashioned in such a way as to combat ideas set out by lifegazer, in his "Mind" hypothesis, but it appears relevant to your post, as well.

first off, see wuliheron's post.

secondly, I would like to expand on what wuliheron said. If you think that you will not, under any circumstances feel pain for example, you will feel little (as you can't stop the sensation altogether). Thoughts create our emotions, so to speak. this is yoga, reiki, zen...and other classifications. Is there like one word I could use!??

re: what am i?

well, you are who you are (oh, so very vague...and cool). IOW, I believe the question has two answers: one can be simply given through a taxonomical analysis, and another on a spiritual level. I'm sure wuliheron would be most pleased to explain this. as for me, i must go to bed.
 
  • #56
who are we?

you are your soul.
 
  • #57
Alright, I'm back. I'll finish my response now...

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
I can't get this. I wasn't kidding and really meant the hint. The paragraph I'd written above that hint really suffers internal inconsistency. I meant is as an excercise to find out if you can find where I've slipped. The hint is still there. See if you can find the weak point in that paragraph.

Well, I don't see any internal inconsistency. I'll keep looking, but maybe you should just tell me.

I'm not contradicting myself, I'm contradicting your idea. Causality is the bond that connects the doer and the deed. It isn't a necessity. It needn't be there. The deed can be there without a doer if we ignore causality. This won't be a bad ignorance for causality is an empirical pattern; it isn't a logical obligation.

Yes it is a logical obligation that all effects have causes. It would not be an "effect" otherwise.

Uncertainty is the death of many other things. That's what I really enjoy about it. Uncertainty is the death of confidence, righteousness, significance, preference, prudence, supremacy, ... If they're dying perhaps they don't deserve living on.

You see how many things uncertainty kills? And yet, kill uncertainty, and you get all the things that make human existence meaningful (IMO).

See, I'm living here with uncertainty. I'm not sure of anything but that's no problem. I've taken many steps after uncertainty and I, the precious I, haven't yet perished.

If you say that you aren't certain about anything, and don't allow for yourself to be certain of anything, then you are certain that you are not certain of anything. This is a self-contradictory statement.

I really don't care much what Descartes has said before coming to "cogito ergo sum." Everything else is dependent on this critical point and I'll say Descartes has missed it.

Wrong. The statement was dependent on the argument that he set out before, not the other way around - as you imply.

It's a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance. Only the motorcycle is a bit bigger, a bit more complex, a bit stranger, a bit different, just a bit. For me, it ranks among the very best among the books I've read.

Well, I've reserved it from the library, and hope to read it soon.

Remember what you said before, "uncertainty won't affect our lives." I'm not going to take this back.

So you won't take back this statement...

Being there or not being there won't affect our thoughts/lives. We live as we live. It's the way it is. We do it as we do it.

? Well, that's up to you, but it is obviously wrong, because of it's self-contradictory nature. You say that being there won't affect our lives. How can you even be alive, if your not "there" - IOW, if you don't exist - ?

Let's suppose someone comes and really convinces you (by magical means) that you don't exist but you go on living like before. You'll preceive everything just like before. If everything is just like before except for that you know you don't exist, would there be a problem? There's absolutely no problem. Nothing will be changed in your world if you're convinced of your non-existence unless you have a certain discomfort that leads to a suicide when you're convinced you are not.

No, nothing changes if I'm convinced that I don't exist. However, I cannot be convinced that I don't exist, until someone shows me the flaw in Descartes' reasoning.

First, you must know the Evil Demon scenario is a very basic one. Many other much more elaborate scenarios can be made. I'm one of those scenarios.

And I've already shown you that your attempt to concvince me (please note my reference to myself) of something (even if it be my own existence) proves that I exist. Otherwise, there would be no one for you to convince.

Second, you're still beholding the bonds of causality. Causality isn't a necessity. Causality isn't even the superior supposition. Causality isn't even the most useful supposition... There neend't be a Demon if a Demon is tricking you, you'd ask then what's tricking you? I'd say a Demon of a race of non-existent Demons. They may play hard tricks.

"There needn't be a Demon, if a Demon is tricking you..."? This is embarrisingly self-contradictory. I don't think I really need to comment on the inconsistency of saying that there is a demon tricking me (which is made up of the propositions: 1) There is a demon; 2) It is trying to trick me), and then saying that there is no demon.

Also, there cannot be a "Demon of a race of non-existent Demons". If the Demons are truly non-existent, then there is no demon.

Do you know what the EPR experiment is? And then do you know what is Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony?

No, I don't.

BTW, I will quote the Rules of Direction for you later, I don't have them on-hand right now, and don't really have the time to get them right now. I apologize for not being better prepared.
 
  • #58
1. For Mentat:
You really lost me...
Aha! I'll take you back :wink:. Let me re-structure my proof into a storyline:

00. You say: "Ahoy! I'm going to tell you I think therefore I am."
01. I say: "Behold! You can't say that!"
02. "Why not?"
03. "Wait a moment! Since you're the linear-logic-o-phile I may ask you anytime I wish if a statement is true or not, na?"
04. "Yep."
05. "So please tell me if P([beep]) is true or its contrary P'([beep]), P([beep]) being that there need be an I to [beep]."
06. You either say:

----a. "P([beep]) = T and P'([beep]) = F"
----b. "P([beep]) = F and P'([beep]) = T"

07. If you say (a) then I'd say: "You said there need be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement so you've pre-assumed Descartes' statement truth. Since you're informing of something you'd pre-assumed, you aren't doing much, you aren't proving. You're trapped in a loop, pre-assuming something and then debating about its truth."
08. If you say (b) then I'd say: "You said there needn't be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement. If it's so how could you say Descartes' statement is true? You'd said there's no necessary-sufficient relation between the I and the [beep] so you can no more say there's such relation."


The way out would be that you assume a third state for P([beep]), say the "suspension" state then you could say P([beep]) had to be suspended before talking about Descartes' statement.
... if you think that I don't have to exist in order for me to do something, you'd need a much stronger argument to convince me.
I needn't convince you. I'm not posing for or against, I'm posing neutral. I'm not saying you have to exist to [beep] neither do I say you have not to exist to [beep]. I say there needn't be an ontologic bond between you and [beep]. It would seem sensible to you if I said: "your being there isn't an indication of an action being done." The same way, I could say and I've said: "the action's being there isn't an indication of your being there." These two statements are complementary. That you accept the first easily but reject the second with so much effort means that you're still under Aristotle's spell.

Uncertainty doesn't need an argument. The Bill of Rights says one is innocent until proven otherwise. I say any statement is uncertain until proven otherwise. Uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement.
Well, I don't see any internal inconsistency. I'll keep looking, but maybe you should just tell me.
I'll tell you later.
Yes it is a logical obligation that all effects have causes. It would not be an "effect" otherwise.
No, it isn't. It isn't a "logical" obligation, it's an empirical pattern. For it isn't proven, it is observed. Do you consider Columb law of electric force between point charges an empirical pattern or a logical obligation?

I'll tell you of two instances where cause-effect bond isn't as important as you may think:

a. The EPR Experiment: EPR stands for Einstein-Pudolsky-Rosen. There are four important principles of conservation: conservation of energy, of spin, of charge and of momentum. EPR experiment deals with the conservation of spin. There are ways to tie a pair of particles so that they're obliged to follow the conservation of spin (eg, in an atomic orbital a pair of electrons live who're obliged to a have total spin of zero, (+1/2) + (-1/2) = 0), this procedure is called "quantum entanglement." Consider a pair of entangled particles, and then suppose we take the two far apart. Now what will happen if we change the spin of one of the particles? The other one changs its spin in order to preserve the total spin. How long will it take for this to happen? Absolute zero. That's very strange. Waves (of all sorts) are the messengers of this Universe and the fastest messengers are em-waves who travel at c. If the second particle is informed of a spin change far away, what could have informed it? No wave could have carried the message in zero time. The EPR experiment caused a divide in the Physicist community, one group was lead by the Coppenhagen school giants (Schroedinger, Heisenberg, Bohr, et al) and the other by Einstein. The details of their ideas aren't meant here. The main point here is zero time. You know, a very strict aspect of ontologic causality is the delay between the being of the cause and the being of the effect. Cause must be chronologically prior to effect. The basis for distinguishing cause and effect is this delay; the one that comes first is the cause and the pursuer is the effect. If the spin change in both particles happens at the same time then which of the events has been the cause and which has been the effect?

b. Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony: Leibniz was a founder of Calculus. He was specially in love with the concept of "infinitely small" (the differential element). This concept appeared both in his mathematics and his philosophy. In philosophy he proposed that the Universe was made of infinitely small units called "monads." Monads are independent and aren't interacting. One may ask: "then what happens when a telephone rings and I hear it?" The answer is Pre-established Harmony. The monads of the telephone and those of the individual hearing it ringing are independent but they were synchronized (at the dawn of time, creation, or something like that) to act mutually at a certain moment. This scenario is a substitute to the cause-effect scenario and is of equal creditability.


Considering (a) and (b), these points are clear:

00. Scientific rationale has come to a point where cause-effect pair fails even though scientific methodology has never been deviated from.
01. There are many substitutes to the cause-effect theory.
02. One such substitute is that of Leibniz.
03. Cause-effect pair has been common for many years perhaps because of its practicality. Nothing more.
You see how many things uncertainty kills? And yet, kill uncertainty, and you get all the things that make human existence meaningful (IMO).
I won't kill the result of my quest in exchange for a cold comfort. Uncertainty is the essence of dynamism and change. If I was certain I'll go to hell someday I would never move a finger for escaping the hell and winning the heavens.
If you say that you aren't certain about anything, and don't allow for yourself to be certain of anything, then you are certain that you are not certain of anything. This is a self-contradictory statement.

"There needn't be a Demon, if a Demon is tricking you..."? This is embarrisingly self-contradictory. I don't think I really need to comment on the inconsistency of saying that there is a demon tricking me (which is made up of the propositions: 1) There is a demon; 2) It is trying to trick me), and then saying that there is no demon.

Also, there cannot be a "Demon of a race of non-existent Demons". If the Demons are truly non-existent, then there is no demon.
Yes! You got it. That's the heart of this debate. I'm stating self-contradictory statements but am not embarrassed. Paradox is inevitable. You see my statements like lunacy but they're there just to make you think about it. I'm giving you self-contradictory statements to show the implications of uncertainty.

There's a deed, "a Demon tricking you," and a doer, "a Demon." What relates them in your mind is causality. For me, causality isn't more creditable than anything else so I can understand "a Demon tricking" without a need for "a Demon."
Wrong. The statement was dependent on the argument that he set out before, not the other way around - as you imply.
"Cogito ergo sum" was there to prove Descartes' existence. If he hadn't yet proven his existene how could have he proven his means of proving his existence?
 
  • #59
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
1. For Mentat:

Aha! I'll take you back :wink:. Let me re-structure my proof into a storyline:

00. You say: "Ahoy! I'm going to tell you I think therefore I am."
01. I say: "Behold! You can't say that!"
02. "Why not?"
03. "Wait a moment! Since you're the linear-logic-o-phile I may ask you anytime I wish if a statement is true or not, na?"
04. "Yep."
05. "So please tell me if P([beep]) is true or its contrary P'([beep]), P([beep]) being that there need be an I to [beep]."
06. You either say:

----a. "P([beep]) = T and P'([beep]) = F"
----b. "P([beep]) = F and P'([beep]) = T"

07. If you say (a) then I'd say: "You said there need be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement so you've pre-assumed Descartes' statement truth. Since you're informing of something you'd pre-assumed, you aren't doing much, you aren't proving. You're trapped in a loop, pre-assuming something and then debating about its truth."
08. If you say (b) then I'd say: "You said there needn't be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement. If it's so how could you say Descartes' statement is true? You'd said there's no necessary-sufficient relation between the I and the [beep] so you can no more say there's such relation."

Is this reasoning really applicable to Descartes' reasoning? If the proposition is "I think", then - if this proposition is true - both parts (sub-propositions, as I mentioned before) of it must be true.

I needn't convince you. I'm not posing for or against, I'm posing neutral. I'm not saying you have to exist to [beep] neither do I say you have not to exist to [beep].

Are you sure about that? You did say this:

I'm not contradicting myself, I'm contradicting your idea. Causality is the bond that connects the doer and the deed. It isn't a necessity. It needn't be there. The deed can be there without a doer if we ignore causality. This won't be a bad ignorance for causality is an empirical pattern; it isn't a logical obligation

Besides, it doesn't matter whether you are trying to convince me of whether I exist or not, all that matters is whether Descartes' reasoning allows you to do so at all.

I say there needn't be an ontologic bond between you and [beep]. It would seem sensible to you if I said: "your being there isn't an indication of an action being done." The same way, I could say and I've said: "the action's being there isn't an indication of your being there."

Don't you see that the proposition is not "thinking is occurring"? The proposition is "I think". If this proposition holds true (as it must, in order for me to even contemplate (or think about) not existing) then I must exist.

Uncertainty doesn't need an argument. The Bill of Rights says one is innocent until proven otherwise. I say any statement is uncertain until proven otherwise. Uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement.

Even of the statement, "uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement."? If so, then your statement, itself, is also uncertain, and there is; but cannot be, because it is that very reasoning that I'm using to justify calling it uncertain; and thus, your statement - and the reasoning behind it - is paradoxical/self-contradictory.

I'll tell you later.

Oh, you will tell me later? Doesn't that statement also imply the existence of you and me? :wink:

No, it isn't. It isn't a "logical" obligation, it's an empirical pattern. For it isn't proven, it is observed. Do you consider Columb law of electric force between point charges an empirical pattern or a logical obligation?

How is that relevant? I am talking about the logical obligation of "that which was caused" having "been caused". This is a rather obvious connection, IMO - especially considering the words I've used.

I'll tell you of two instances where cause-effect bond isn't as important as you may think:

a. The EPR Experiment: EPR stands for Einstein-Pudolsky-Rosen. There are four important principles of conservation: conservation of energy, of spin, of charge and of momentum. EPR experiment deals with the conservation of spin. There are ways to tie a pair of particles so that they're obliged to follow the conservation of spin (eg, in an atomic orbital a pair of electrons live who're obliged to a have total spin of zero, (+1/2) + (-1/2) = 0), this procedure is called "quantum entanglement." Consider a pair of entangled particles, and then suppose we take the two far apart. Now what will happen if we change the spin of one of the particles? The other one changs its spin in order to preserve the total spin. How long will it take for this to happen? Absolute zero. That's very strange. Waves (of all sorts) are the messengers of this Universe and the fastest messengers are em-waves who travel at c. If the second particle is informed of a spin change far away, what could have informed it? No wave could have carried the message in zero time. The EPR experiment caused a divide in the Physicist community, one group was lead by the Coppenhagen school giants (Schroedinger, Heisenberg, Bohr, et al) and the other by Einstein. The details of their ideas aren't meant here. The main point here is zero time. You know, a very strict aspect of ontologic causality is the delay between the being of the cause and the being of the effect. Cause must be chronologically prior to effect. The basis for distinguishing cause and effect is this delay; the one that comes first is the cause and the pursuer is the effect. If the spin change in both particles happens at the same time then which of the events has been the cause and which has been the effect?

Don't you see that they are both the affect? They are both the same particle, for all practical purposes. Besides, I don't think this is very relevant to the simple reasoning that I must exist in order for a propostion, which requires me to exist, to be true.

b. Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony: Leibniz was a founder of Calculus. He was specially in love with the concept of "infinitely small" (the differential element). This concept appeared both in his mathematics and his philosophy. In philosophy he proposed that the Universe was made of infinitely small units called "monads." Monads are independent and aren't interacting. One may ask: "then what happens when a telephone rings and I hear it?" The answer is Pre-established Harmony. The monads of the telephone and those of the individual hearing it ringing are independent but they were synchronized (at the dawn of time, creation, or something like that) to act mutually at a certain moment. This scenario is a substitute to the cause-effect scenario and is of equal creditability.

How is that equally credible?

Considering (a) and (b), these points are clear:

00. Scientific rationale has come to a point where cause-effect pair fails even though scientific methodology has never been deviated from.
01. There are many substitutes to the cause-effect theory.
02. One such substitute is that of Leibniz.
03. Cause-effect pair has been common for many years perhaps because of its practicality. Nothing more.

The fact that it's so practical is evidence (IMO) that it may be true. Besides, Leibniz's idea cannot be proven. I can, however, show you that when I push something, it moves (for example). This is cause-and-effect, even if it is because of "monads". My action produced another action.

Yes! You got it. That's the heart of this debate. I'm stating self-contradictory statements but am not embarrassed. Paradox is inevitable. You see my statements like lunacy but they're there just to make you think about it. I'm giving you self-contradictory statements to show the implications of uncertainty.

Paradox is only inevitable if you choose to stick to your belief of uncertainty. It does not, however, help you to learn anything, to keep this uncertain attitude - and, since I devote myself to learning, I don't stick to irrationality (which leads to paradox, which is the death of all learning and progressive knowledge).

There's a deed, "a Demon tricking you," and a doer, "a Demon." What relates them in your mind is causality. For me, causality isn't more creditable than anything else so I can understand "a Demon tricking" without a need for "a Demon."

No you can't. Not if you fully understand the statement, "a Demon tricking", and the propositions required for such a statement to be true.

"Cogito ergo sum" was there to prove Descartes' existence. If he hadn't yet proven his existene how could have he proven his means of proving his existence?

They fulfill each other. He prove that he exists, by the fact that he can think about existing. It is obvious that he really was thinking about this, otherwise we would have nothing to discuss.
 
  • #60
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
Is this reasoning really applicable to Descartes' reasoning?...
Don't ask me. Show where the logical fault is. I described a step-by-step procedure whose steps are logical. Nothing wrong happens during the transition from one step to the other. Consequently, this can be considered a logical proof.

This reasoning is applicable to Descartes' statement for it's concerned with showing this statement's state. It shows that, with regard to an independent statement named P([beep]), the procedure of determining Descartes' statement's state leads to a dilemma.

For an understanding of this, you must be aware that P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. It's only an engineered statement that will, in association with Descartes' statement, cause this dilemma.
Are you sure about that? You did say this:
Yes, I said that. I said that about Causality. Causality has no relation to your existence. Anyway, I didn't pose pro/contra Causality. I only said "it needn't be there." Saying it "needn't" be there doesn't mean it "mustn't" be there, means it's not necessary if one's going to talk Philosophy.

Again, I'm not posing against "Causality." I'm posing against an unjustified claim, "causality is indeed there." Posing against "Causality" is a claim while posing against an unjustified claim is the regulation of dialog.
Don't you see that the proposition is not "thinking is occurring"? ...
May I ask if "thinking" is "not occurring" when you "think?" The implication of Descartes' statement is that a certain action, "thinking," when performed by the mind is a ground for the mind's existence.

Saying "I think" is equal to saying "I execute the task of thinking" which is equal to "thinking is occurring and it's occurring in my mind."
Even of the statement, "uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement."? ... your statement - and the reasoning behind it - is paradoxical/self-contradictory.
It's indeed paradoxical/self-contradictory but not at first glance.

My way of approaching the uncertainty is a step-by-step one. You take steps along a way that little by little exhausts your pre-judices and pre-suppositions. This will go on until you no more have any pre-suppositions and then comes the uncertainty. At first glance it seems like the uncertainty is a universal principle. You'll delight so much with having found a universal principle. After a while, however, you see how uncertainty plagues itself and now you learn something that's even more important than uncertainty. You learn there's a problem, a very basic problem, in human knowledge and in human ways of knowing/understanding. Where's the problem? No one knows. You won't go far with this single assumption, "there's a problem somewhere" but it gives you hints other manners of approaching the problem won't give you.

Now that you know "there's a problem somewhere," you'll be cautious, precise, clear, unbiased and always warned against whatever comes your way. For every forthcoming statement may be exactly where the problem lies and if you take the statement for granted or show bias towards it, you've fallen into the abyss, that very basic problem.

Moreover, you'll always try to look beyond and look through. Looking beyond and looking through, someday you may find that fatal crack in the Great Wall of Knowledge.

Even more, the self-contradicting principle of uncertainty doesn't prevent you from assuming whatever statement you please. You can assume the methodology of science for observing the Universe and take your chance that way. Uncertainty has only one use, that's to keep warned. When you come to say "when a ball hits a wall, the momentum will remain constant," you'll know deep inside that you may be dead wrong. Again, when you come to say "[beep] is superior to [beep]" you have your choice to assume this but you won't be imposing it on others for you know for all purposes superiority is an uncertain matter. This knowledge won't do you harm, it won't change your mind, it won't change your attitude but it will increase your acceptance for whatever thought or attitude you're offered.

Uncertainty is safeguard against supposition, prejudice and discrimination. An individual who's uncertain of her/his manners won't be imposing or preaching them. She/he also won't condemn others' attitude and beliefs, no matter how harsh it may seem to her/his common sense.
How is that relevant? I am talking about the logical obligation of "that which was caused" having "been caused". This is a rather obvious connection, IMO - especially considering the words I've used.
Don't play around with definitions, you'll get burnt! You should've known how I indulge in loops

You just made a loop. You said, "that which was caused" has "been caused." What have you said? Nothing special. Let's assume someone defined causality as the bond between the following two:

a. That causes.
b. That has been caused.

Do you think it is a subtle definition? I don't think so; (a) and (b) make a logical loop in which the meaning of causation is lost. Even if this loss is compensated (although it can't be), you won't gain much from this definition.

This definition points nowhere while Aristotle's Causality (which has been practiced for 2000 years) points at natural phenomena. It points outwards, to the Universe. Causality is a well-defined term and can't be simply played with.

Circular definitions (which are important to me) are like axioms. They can be made readily. They can be made for free and without any effort.

Let me make one such definition: temperature is that which is measured with a thermometer and thermometer is that by which temperature is measured. Do you think this definition will inform anyone of what temperature and thermometer are?
Don't you see that they are both the affect? They are both the same particle, for all practical purposes...
I don't think that's a decent way of talking about EPR Experiment. This experiment has consumed years of physicists' lives and is still a hot topic. Is that you with few lines of argument have shown how much it should be credited?

They're similar particles and if one loses track of them will no more be able to distinguish them. This, however, doesn't mean they're one entity. They may have different linear momentums and loci. They're only entangled in spin, nothing more. These two are distinct entities. When something happens between them, one "must" be the cause and the other "must" be the effect.

I don't know what you mean with "all practical purposes" and I don't want to know but it's an annoying phrase to see over and over again. For all practical purposes, you've wasted the precious heart of the EPR experiment.

It was meant to show that Causality may be a simplified form of a higher degree interconnection or may be a (hopefully) recurring pattern. If this concept is understood then it's clear that the bond between the doer and the deed (which are an exemplary cause-effect pair) is not as strong as it was assumed to be. Consequently, a deed is no more an indication of a doer, ie the thinking is no more an indication of the thinker.
The fact that it's so practical is evidence (IMO) that it may be true. Besides, Leibniz's idea cannot be proven. I can, however, show you that when I push something, it moves (for example)...
I thought I was the stubborn one. For the zillionth time, Leibniz's idea and yours can't be proven. That's why they're equally creditable. Both are uncertain like any other idea one may think of.

Who says that an object moves when you push it? Where did you come to believe this? You can't point at an object, push it, show me that it moves and then say "causality is a logical obligation." It's an empirical pattern shared by you and me.

I'm wondering if you know the difference between "a logical obligation" and "an empirical pattern." Do you know the difference?

Causality's being practical is noway an evidence. I told you of internal consistency and its implications on a post in "Knowledge?" thread. Being practical, handy, good, easy, simple, whatever is a characteristic of a system of thoughts when it's viewed from inside, ie the viewers is committed to those thoughts.
... It does not, however, help you to learn anything, to keep this uncertain attitude - and, since I devote myself to learning, I don't stick to irrationality (which leads to paradox, which is the death of all learning and progressive knowledge).
Irrationality? Who said it was irrationality? And who said rationality is the only way of learning? And who said uncertainty hasn't helped me learn more? And who said progressive knowledge was worth throwing away the inevitable? And who said I'm stuck to uncertainty? And who said the death of progressive knowledge means that it can't be used anymore?

The same principle of uncertainty let's me be uncertain of what I know and seek more knowledge. For all human history, uncertainty has been the motive to gain certainty. And for all human history, after a certain amount of knowledge was gathered uncertainty was forgotten although it still prevailed. We're living the certainty era, everyone's certain of one's life, everyone's certain of one's political/social/philosophical/[beep] stance, and that leads to blindness. Uncertainty will only motivate further thought while certainty will relieve and soothe the minds until they're too lazy and inert to move even the least bit.

In case of progressive knowledge, what dies is the blind belief in its success. For a long time now, human beings have thought they know much and they will know more with any further step. Lame! They're wrapped in the encompassing Unknown and suppose their knowledge is/will become encompassing.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #61
... continued from the previous post

Progressive knowledge can be seen more clearly in the light of uncertainty. It will become richer if it's accompanied by knowledge of its being temporal and its being uncertain.
No you can't. Not if you fully understand the statement, "a Demon tricking", and the propositions required for such a statement to be true.
It's not you who determines if I can. I can think of "a Demon tricking" without "a Demon being there" because I'm not under Aristotle's spell, or at least I'm aware of the rune that's been cast here.

P: A Demon playing nasty tricks.
Q: A Demon is there.

(P => Q) truth table for all Boolean P and Q values:

P---Q---(P => Q)

T---T---T
T---F---F
F---T---T
F---F---T

You say that if P = T then Q should be T in order for (P => Q) to be true. You're right only if you're bound to Boolean logic. Multi-value logic has been around for many decades now, and fuzzy logic is readily used in CD-ROM Drive manufacturing. Add to all these Gödel’s theorem and all the meta-mathematics stuff (don't ask me what it really is, I don't know). Now you can have countless states for a statement, eg the Demon can be 13.666 (accurate to 3 decimal places) existent or it may assume "null" state. Simply put, for every statement you can assume a logical structure in which it assumes any arbitrarily chosen state. And these are only the rationalized and/or scientific parts of this realm, the realm of uncertainty.

The philosophical parts of this realm are even more interesting. The Demon may assume states that transcend our understanding of "existence." We declare a thing either "existent" or "non-existent" and then say it to "be" existent or non-existent while it "may" (only "may" not "must," "ought to" or "should") "be" in a wholly different state, a state which "may" even transcend our understanding of a state where "being there" may be meant in some unknown implementation which may transcend our understanding of "being."

Anecdote: "Don't impose the burden of your limits unto this unknown Universe, please!"
They fulfill each other. He proves that he exists, by the fact that he can think about existing. It is obvious that he really was thinking about this, otherwise we would have nothing to discuss.
Before proving he existed he had to assume he didn't exist until he could prove his existence. Then if he didn't exist how could he believe he was thinking? He had to know and be sure that he was thinking but he couldn't be thinking if he didn't exist so his statement turns into: "I am therefore I am." What a miracle! He is therefore he is. That's why he no more "is"
 
  • #62
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Don't ask me. Show where the logical fault is. I described a step-by-step procedure whose steps are logical. Nothing wrong happens during the transition from one step to the other. Consequently, this can be considered a logical proof.

Hey, did you ignore the rest of what I said?

Originally posted by Me
Is this reasoning really applicable to Descartes' reasoning? If the proposition is "I think", then - if this proposition is true - both parts (sub-propositions, as I mentioned before) of it must be true.

You only quoted and responded to the first sentence.

Posted By Manuel
This reasoning is applicable to Descartes' statement for it's concerned with showing this statement's state. It shows that, with regard to an independent statement named P([beep]), the procedure of determining Descartes' statement's state leads to a dilemma.

No, it's not applicable. It doesn't satisfy the fact that the statement, "I think", requires two premises to be true.

May I ask if "thinking" is "not occurring" when you "think?" The implication of Descartes' statement is that a certain action, "thinking," when performed by the mind is a ground for the mind's existence.

Please tell me that you are just feigning ignorance. No offense, but how is it possible that you missed the fact that two premises are required for the statement "I think"? It is not anything like "P[bleep]". Descartes is saying that if P is [bleep]ing then P exists.[/color] (I've asked this before, but...) isn't that obvious? You cannot truthfully say that P does something, unless P exists.

Saying "I think" is equal to saying "I execute the task of thinking" which is equal to "thinking is occurring and it's occurring in my mind."

Yes, and the first [quoted] statement requires that I exist (because "I" am executing the task of thinking). The second statement requires that both "I" exists, and "my mind" exists.

My way of approaching the uncertainty is a step-by-step one. You take steps along a way that little by little exhausts your pre-judices and pre-suppositions. This will go on until you no more have any pre-suppositions and then comes the uncertainty. At first glance it seems like the uncertainty is a universal principle. You'll delight so much with having found a universal principle. After a while, however, you see how uncertainty plagues itself and now you learn something that's even more important than uncertainty. You learn there's a problem, a very basic problem, in human knowledge and in human ways of knowing/understanding. Where's the problem? No one knows. You won't go far with this single assumption, "there's a problem somewhere" but it gives you hints other manners of approaching the problem won't give you.

There is no point in my following such a path, as it destroys all need of learning/science.

Now that you know "there's a problem somewhere," you'll be cautious, precise, clear, unbiased and always warned against whatever comes your way. For every forthcoming statement may be exactly where the problem lies and if you take the statement for granted or show bias towards it, you've fallen into the abyss, that very basic problem.

I don't have time (or typing space) to discuss why uncertainty is only good, if not taken to extremes. Perhaps you should start a thread on that.

Don't play around with definitions, you'll get burnt! You should've known how I indulge in loops

Have you ever noticed how a path that loops infinitely, doesn't get you anywhere but where you started. Philosophically, scientificall, and logically this is not a good path to follow.

You just made a loop. You said, "that which was caused" has "been caused." What have you said? Nothing special. Let's assume someone defined causality as the bond between the following two:

No, it's not anything special, and yet you seem to have missed entirely when you said "and effect doesn't require a cause".

Do you think it is a subtle definition? I don't think so

Then why was it so easy for you to miss it?

Circular definitions (which are important to me) are like axioms. They can be made readily. They can be made for free and without any effort.

My definition is not circular. I was saying that that which has been caused has been caused. It is obvious, and seems unnecessary to actually say, but you were the one who said that an "effect" doesn't always require a "cause".

I don't think that's a decent way of talking about EPR Experiment. This experiment has consumed years of physicists' lives and is still a hot topic. Is that you with few lines of argument have shown how much it should be credited?

Well, I'm sorry, if I offended you or anyone else in my indifference to what seemed to me to be obviously wrong.

They're similar particles and if one loses track of them will no more be able to distinguish them. This, however, doesn't mean they're one entity. They may have different linear momentums and loci. They're only entangled in spin, nothing more. These two are distinct entities. When something happens between them, one "must" be the cause and the other "must" be the effect.

If they are Quantum Mechanically bound, they are one entity.

I don't know what you mean with "all practical purposes" and I don't want to know but it's an annoying phrase to see over and over again. For all practical purposes, you've wasted the precious heart of the EPR experiment.

:frown:

Please forgive my sarcasm, but it really doesn't matter to me that I have defied that which you held sacred, because it doesn't appear right that you should hold it so, in the first place.

It was meant to show that Causality may be a simplified form of a higher degree interconnection or may be a (hopefully) recurring pattern. If this concept is understood then it's clear that the bond between the doer and the deed (which are an exemplary cause-effect pair) is not as strong as it was assumed to be. Consequently, a deed is no more an indication of a doer, ie the thinking is no more an indication of the thinker.

It has no such application. If I connect the fact that both of the particles changed in spin, to a cause (the physicist which made the "observation") then I still have a simple cause-and-effect relationship.

I thought I was the stubborn one. For the zillionth time, Leibniz's idea and yours can't be proven. That's why they're equally creditable. Both are uncertain like any other idea one may think of.

Leibniz's idea is also one of cause-and-effect. Just because he describes what is happening differently than I do, doesn't change the fact that he acknowledges there being a person who caused the effect.

Who says that an object moves when you push it? Where did you come to believe this? You can't point at an object, push it, show me that it moves and then say "causality is a logical obligation." It's an empirical pattern shared by you and me.

Well, I could show you this, if you were physically in my presence. But I can't now, if that's what you mean.

I'm wondering if you know the difference between "a logical obligation" and "an empirical pattern." Do you know the difference?

Not really. A logical obligation should be readily demonstrable, as should an empirical pattern. However, if you think that it is relevant to the thread, please explain the difference between the two.

Irrationality? Who said it was irrationality? And who said rationality is the only way of learning? And who said uncertainty hasn't helped me learn more? And who said progressive knowledge was worth throwing away the inevitable? And who said I'm stuck to uncertainty? And who said the death of progressive knowledge means that it can't be used anymore?

You are talking in stupified and irrational contradictions. I see no point in replying to the above.

continued on the next post...

As is my reply...
 
  • #63
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
It's not you who determines if I can. I can think of "a Demon tricking" without "a Demon being there" because I'm not under Aristotle's spell, or at least I'm aware of the rune that's been cast here.

The statement "a Demon tricking" has two premises (at least). One is that there is a Demon. That is why I said that you cannot believe in one without the other.

P: A Demon playing nasty tricks.
Q: A Demon is there.

(P => Q) truth table for all Boolean P and Q values:

P---Q---(P => Q)

T---T---T
T---F---F
F---T---T
F---F---T

You say that if P = T then Q should be T in order for (P => Q) to be true. You're right only if you're bound to Boolean logic. Multi-value logic has been around for many decades now, and fuzzy logic is readily used in CD-ROM Drive manufacturing. Add to all these Gödel’s theorem and all the meta-mathematics stuff (don't ask me what it really is, I don't know). Now you can have countless states for a statement, eg the Demon can be 13.666 (accurate to 3 decimal places) existent or it may assume "null" state. Simply put, for every statement you can assume a logical structure in which it assumes any arbitrarily chosen state. And these are only the rationalized and/or scientific parts of this realm, the realm of uncertainty.

I don't see how any of this applies. Please explain it to me. As far as I can tell, this only applies to a set of separate propositions, that are bound to each other, possibly by the cause-and-effect reasoning. However, I was not talking about two different propositions. I was talking about one proposition - "A Demon tricking" - which has a sub-proposition (or a proposition that helps make it up) - "there is a Demon".

The philosophical parts of this realm are even more interesting. The Demon may assume states that transcend our understanding of "existence." We declare a thing either "existent" or "non-existent" and then say it to "be" existent or non-existent while it "may" (only "may" not "must," "ought to" or "should") "be" in a wholly different state, a state which "may" even transcend our understanding of a state where "being there" may be meant in some unknown implementation which may transcend our understanding of "being."

May I ask that you stick to that which we currently understand as logically obligatory, instead of wandering of into dreams of uncertainty?

Before proving he existed he had to assume he didn't exist until he could prove his existence.

Not true. In fact, before proving that he existed, he had to exist.

Then if he didn't exist how could he believe he was thinking?

Exactly. That's why Descartes would never assume that he didn't exist, and the Evil Demon could never convince him.
 
  • #64
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
Hey, did you ignore the rest of what I said?...
I didn't. You only repeated what you'd written many times before, so I wrote nothing in response. I asked you to show me the logical fault in my proof. If there isn't a logical fault in my proof and it leads to a dilemma while studying Descartes' statement then the statement must be erroneous. This is simple; if a logical procedure leads to an illogical result, there should have been problems in either the procedure or its subject of study.
No, it's not applicable. It doesn't satisfy the fact that the statement, "I think", requires two premises to be true.
The proof has nothing to do directly with "I think." That P([beep]) statement in the proof is not (how many times have I said this?) related to Descartes' statement. It's a statement I made and asked you (in the course of that storyline) to determine its value as you liked. Since we're talking in a framework of Aristotelian logic you had to choose either T or F as the value for the P([beep]) I offered. P([beep]) can assume no states other than T and F, and you had to choose one. Then I showed that (whatever your choice has been) Descartes' statement, with regard to your choice about P([beep)'s value, leads to a dilemma.

This proof has absolutely nothing to do with the premises for "I think" for it isn't directly touching this phrase. You say for "I think" to be true one has to "exist," so for a statement like "I think therefore I am" the critique must satisfy the premise for "I think" and that is "existence." This is right but is irrelevant to this proof. This proof isn't studying "I think," it doesn't even care if it is "I think" or "I eat" that have obviously different premises. That's why I use [beep] in place of "think" or any other word, [beep] means any word that makes sense in that place, it can be "think," "eat," "drink," "walk," "fly," "understand," whatever. You see, the proof is independent of whatever specific word is replaced by [beep]. Its flow is simply so general that every literally sensible word can be in place of [beep].
... how is it possible that you missed the fact that two premises are required for the statement "I think"? It is not anything like "P[bleep]". Descartes is saying that if P is [bleep]ing then P exists. (I've asked this before, but...) isn't that obvious?...
The "fact?" Do you mean "fact" as you defined it? That sort of fact has no place in Philosophy. What I'm struggling over with you for such a long time is this "fact." You say it is necessary, it is a "fact," that one exists in order for one to think. I asked it over and over how you can be sure of this necessity. You said it was simple Causality (or so I understood) and I'm showing how trivial Causality is.

Your way of talking my proof shows you haven't understood it. Read it over and over until you understand it. How many times have I repeated that P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but an engineered statement by me? Once again, P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but a statement that leads to dilemma along with Descartes' statement. It's the core to this proof and its misunderstanding (like in your case) means that the entire proof is lost.

If you show a fault in that proof, I'll accept and take a chance with my other ways of talking this over. Until now you haven't stated anything worth noting other than your initial stance.
There is no point in my following such a path, as it destroys all need of learning/science.

Please forgive my sarcasm, but it really doesn't matter to me that I have defied that which you held sacred, because it doesn't appear right that you should hold it so, in the first place.
I don't hold the EPR Experiment sacred but I think it's very interesting, nor do I hold sacred its results. I would have a hard time with uncertainty if I wanted to hold something sacred. What I don't like so much is ignorance and careless conclusions.

It seems you're the one who holds something sacred. You say you won't follow that way for it will destroy all need of learning/science. Let's suppose this really happens. If the way you follow has merit (for you, at least) you won't have lost much.

I think I described how uncertainty is a motive for learning and for gathering knowledge, including science. I told you how uncertainty is a drive towards certainty (hence, a drive towards more knowledge if not absolute knowledge) while certainty is a narcotic for the minds. Your worries about losing interest in science/knowledge/[beep] because of uncertainty are out of place. What you should worry for is the Mare Constans of certainty. Uncertainty is a manifestation of change and dynamism while certainty is the last station. Why should you take the next step if you're sure of whatever you know, whatever you want, whatever you have to do and whatever you are?

By the way, learning and science aren't synonyms, what you can learn is not always science and science is not the only thing you can learn.
Have you ever noticed how a path that loops infinitely, doesn't get you anywhere but where you started. Philosophically, scientificall, and logically this is not a good path to follow.
It isn't that I've chosen a path that loops infinitely; it is that all known human paths are infinite loops. Loops are all you can see. Our knowledge is self-referenced. It doesn't include what "is" (if "being" in the sense we understand is sensible to the Universe) but what "is represented." There's a chasm of Unknown between what "is" and what "is represented."
No, it's not anything special, and yet you seem to have missed entirely when you said "and effect doesn't require a cause".
Did I write this sentence? Or this is what you understood of what I wrote? There's a big difference between these two.

I never said "effect doesn't require a cause" (I'm not sure but I couldn't find such sentence). For cause and effect by their definition are bound to Causality and saying that would be a big mistake. I said this definition may be non-informative, irrelevant and even misleading. First you make a definition, say Causality, then you map it into the Universe by saying "the telephone" is an instance of a cause and "the individual hearing the ring" is an instance of an effect. What I've been denying is this process of mapping. You're free to make as many definitions, circular and non-circular, as you like but aren't free to map them into the Universe and expect compliance. I told you of another definition, the Pre-established Harmony, which worked and was compliant just like Causality. You relate a pair of phenomena with Causality while this bond needn't be "out" there. It's "in" here. It's an optimization method become prominent (too prominent, in fact).
My definition is not circular. I was saying that that which has been caused has been caused. It is obvious, and seems unnecessary to actually say, but you were the one who said that an "effect" doesn't always require a "cause".
It is circular. "That has been caused has been caused" lacks the meaning of causation. You say "that has been caused," so you're expected to say "what causation is" independent of "that has been caused." Then you say "has been caused" implying that "causation" is the event happening to "that has been caused." The first part "that has been caused" promises to define "causation" in its following part while the following part points back at the firs part.

This is a circular definition for it makes perfect sense while it's absolute nonsense. This is the indication of loops. A circular definition somehow (sometimes subtly) points at itself; hence, the main task of a definition (that is, defining) remains undone while the definition makes sense for it's confirmed by itself.
If they are Quantum Mechanically bound, they are one entity.
I'm not a Physicist but I'm wondering what you're thinking of Quantum Mechanics. It isn't sorcery, it's science. Being "quantum mechanically" bound doesn't means anything more than being bound. Protons and Neutrons in an atom nucleus are "quantum mechanically" bound to each other by strong nuclear force. They aren't one entity; they're one group of distinct entities. The same way, a pair of entangled particles isn’t one entity; they're simply a pair gathered into one group under a certain rule of conduct.

One entity, here, refers to a single particle of fermion family (which have odd half-integral spin like 1/2 or 3/2) as designated by being made up of either 2 (in mesons) or 3 (in baryons) quarks and anti-quarks (together hadrons) or being a lepton. I don't know if bosons are also subject to EPR experiment.

If you name every group of more than one members "one" entity and refrain from analyzing its members then the entire Universe is one entity and it shouldn't be divided in order to be analyzed. Do you agree with that?
It has no such application. If I connect the fact that both of the particles changed in spin, to a cause (the physicist which made the "observation") then I still have a simple cause-and-effect relationship.
How could the Physicist (the cause) cover the delay between two far-off events? A Physicist is usually located at one place and can affect (act as the cause to) things in a radius of a few meters and there's always a delay between what she/he does (as the cause) and what happens (as the effect). In this case you can consider the Physicist the cause to the spin change but then how can you explain absolute zero delay between her/his action and the spin change in the remote particle? Nothing changes here, whatever the cause may be, the zero delay can't be explained with a Causality bond that takes the chronological order as a basis to the distinction of the cause and the effect.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #65
... continued from the previous post
Leibniz's idea is also one of cause-and-effect. Just because he describes what is happening differently than I do, doesn't change the fact that he acknowledges there being a person who caused the effect.
Don't use this word, "fact," this much. As long as we're debating uncertainty and existence, fact is out of context and using it is premature for if uncertainty is shown to prevail, no such thing as fact can be called for. You can't talk of some "fact" as a certain piece of knowledge before you've shown certainty has any chance here.

Leibniz's idea was exactly meant as a rival to Causality. Pre-established Harmony hasn't been caused by a person/thing. Saying that something hasn't been "caused" is clearly insane viewed from a view point committed to Causality. However, it is equally creditable when viewed from an unbiased point of view. It maps a certain mental pattern to the flow of events in the Universe (an empirical pattern), so does Causality. For such mental pattern to be creditable, its characteristics must be shown to be compliant to those of the empirical pattern it corresponds to. Causality, a mental pattern imposed on an empirical pattern, is creditable for it describes and predicts the flow of events in the Universe, so does Pre-established Harmony. In order to make use of Causality one studies those things considered the cause to certain events and tries to invoke the cause to achieve the effect. In order to make use of Pre-established Harmony one studies the harmony of phenomena in order to act to the beat of that harmony and achieve the desirable target (some fugue, perhaps ).
Well, I could show you this, if you were physically in my presence. But I can't now, if that's what you mean.
Even if I was in your physical presence you couldn't point at something. We talked about this before on "Knowledge?" thread where I described that before being certain of your existence, your audience's existence, your qualia, your audience's qualia and a big bunch of other things, you can't "point at" or "show" something. We're discussing certainty and uncertainty so we ought not to be bound to either point of view and/or use their suppositions/obligations.

You didn't disagree with me, also didn't agree with me, you posted nothing about that. Now it's up for discussion.
Not really. A logical obligation should be readily demonstrable, as should an empirical pattern. However, if you think that it is relevant to the thread, please explain the difference between the two.
A logical obligation is the outcome of deduction from the axioms of a logical system. As long as the participants of the dialog are bound to that logical system, these logical obligations must be held inviolate. Let's see this example in Boolean algebra:

Boolean algebra truth table for "AND" operator:

^ : AND operator

A-----B-----A ^ B
T-----T-----T
T-----F-----F
F-----T-----F
F-----F-----F

The above truth table is a premise for Boolean logic so it should never be violated. So if we have A = T and B = F, a logical obligation of Boolean logic is that A ^ B should be evaluated as F.

An empirical pattern, on the other hand, is the outcome of observation. It isn't necessary to be true in any logical system. Science has used Boolean logic for so many years while the outcome of its observation has been always changing in those years. Causality is an empirical pattern (better said, a mental pattern imposed on an empirical pattern) for it's been observed.

Suppose you throw a stone and you watch it break some glass, if you do this many times and observe the repeated pattern of the glass being broken you'll make a mental pattern that is imposed on that empirical pattern. This mental pattern says "a rightly directed stone thrown at glass will break it" and is meant as an optimization so that you won't be re-observing a thrown stone every time you want to see if it breaks the glass. This mental pattern is the bond of Causality between two phenomena.

Two things must always be kept in mind about a mental pattern. First, it isn't an obligation for the corresponding empirical pattern may change and the mental pattern may become invalid. Second, the mental pattern may impose itself on some phenomenon so that the phenomenon is re-shaped to correspond to that mental pattern. Examples of such false imposition are optical illusions. Human visual system wants to impose a certain mental pattern that corresponds to a continuously-observed empirical pattern on a new empirical pattern, hence, the empirical pattern is perceived other than what its representation would be if that mental pattern didn't exist. And optical illusions are only low-level examples of mental patterns. These patterns appear at all levels of abstraction. They sometimes show up as prejudice, eg you're scared at the sight of a tame and shy dog because you have a mental pattern saying "all dogs bite and do harm" which was formed as a result of your unlucky encounters with dogs.

Descartes first noticed optical illusions and based his manner of doubting on them, but he didn't extend this concept to higher levels of abstraction. Causality, which seems to be necessary for your version of Descartes' statement, is a mental pattern at a not-so-high level of abstraction.

Every mental pattern may and has been shown to be possibly invalid. At lower levels of abstraction mental patterns can be broken easily and new ones can be made to avoid mistakes, like what happens with optical illusions, eg after a while you adapt to the illusion and figure out much about its shape. At higher abstraction levels, mental patterns become exceedingly difficult to break; like that you seem never to accept that Causality may simply be a long-enduring mental pattern which has many substitutes to be replaced with.
You are talking in stupified and irrational contradictions. I see no point in replying to the above.
I only asked a few questions. You could show me if there was a problem with them. Don't you think avoiding the answers to possibly "stupefied and irrational" questions is even more "stupefied and irrational?"
The statement "a Demon tricking" has two premises (at least). One is that there is a Demon. That is why I said that you cannot believe in one without the other.
Isn't that there are those certain premises to this statement, another premise? Where does this premise of yours take it validity from?
... As far as I can tell, this only applies to a set of separate propositions, that are bound to each other, possibly by the cause-and-effect reasoning. However, I was not talking about two different propositions. I was talking about one proposition - "A Demon tricking" - which has a sub-proposition (or a proposition that helps make it up) - "there is a Demon".
You told me the Demon may be either "existent" or "non-existent" and that this statement, "a Demon tricking," implies that a Demon exists. What I wrote in response was that the Demon may assume many states other than "existent" and "non-existent." And that for your deduction (a Demon must be there if a Demon is playing tricks) to be creditable it was necessary that we're bound to Boolean logic, where the statement "a Demon is there" (one of your sub-propositions) may only be either T or F.

Your claim here is made of two parts, "a Demon is playing tricks" and "so the Demon exists." These two parts are related to each other in a conditional statement: "if a Demon is playing tricks then there is a Demon." I wrote and shown that even if this statement is considered true (Causality bond is taken serious), your deduction on the truth values for the necessary condition, "a Demon is playing tricks," and the sufficient condition, "there is a Demon," is limited to Boolean logic which is rivaled by many other equally creditable logical systems in which your deduction becomes invalid (sometimes even senseless).
May I ask that you stick to that which we currently understand as logically obligatory, instead of wandering of into dreams of uncertainty?
I wasn't wandering in dreams of uncertainty (although it's much fun to do); I was showing you the vista of uncertainty and the vast realm beyond Aristotle.
Not true. In fact, before proving that he existed, he had to exist.

Exactly. That's why Descartes would never assume that he didn't exist, and the Evil Demon could never convince him.
Let's go the other way. If Descartes "had" to exist in order to think then why do you bother "proving" his "cogito ergo sum?"

Proving means to show a statement's truth using other statements that have been shown or assumed to be true along with the rules of deduction. If "thinking" is the corollary of "being" then why should you prove "I think therefore I am?"

Saying that "thinking" is the corollary of "being" you've already admitted that "I think therefore I am" is a self-referenced statement. With your assumption (one "has" to be if one thinks), "I think therefore I am" can be replaced with "I am therefore I am." This statement, "sum ergo sum," is clearly self-referenced for it assumes its own truth. Aside from being self-referenced, it is non-informative for if you knew "I am" why should you deduce "I am?"
 
  • #66
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

I didn't. You only repeated what you'd written many times before, so I wrote nothing in response. I asked you to show me the logical fault in my proof. If there isn't a logical fault in my proof and it leads to a dilemma while studying Descartes' statement then the statement must be erroneous. This is simple; if a logical procedure leads to an illogical result, there should have been problems in either the procedure or its subject of study.

I repeated what I said before, because you don't seem to get it. I am telling you that your reasoning does not apply, when there is only a proposition and it's sub-proposition being considered.

The proof has nothing to do directly with "I think." That P([beep]) statement in the proof is not (how many times have I said this?) related to Descartes' statement. It's a statement I made and asked you (in the course of that storyline) to determine its value as you liked. Since we're talking in a framework of Aristotelian logic you had to choose either T or F as the value for the P([beep]) I offered. P([beep]) can assume no states other than T and F, and you had to choose one. Then I showed that (whatever your choice has been) Descartes' statement, with regard to your choice about P([beep)'s value, leads to a dilemma.

I did choose. I said that you must believe that "I think" is true, because - in the illustration - the Evil Demon has tried to convince me that I don't. And, since I contemplated existence/non-existence, I am thinking. Now, my whole reasoning is (how many times have I said this?) that in order for it to be said that P does in fact [bleep], there must exist an entity "P".

This proof has absolutely nothing to do with the premises for "I think" for it isn't directly touching this phrase. You say for "I think" to be true one has to "exist," so for a statement like "I think therefore I am" the critique must satisfy the premise for "I think" and that is "existence." This is right but is irrelevant to this proof. This proof isn't studying "I think," it doesn't even care if it is "I think" or "I eat" that have obviously different premises. That's why I use [beep] in place of "think" or any other word, [beep] means any word that makes sense in that place, it can be "think," "eat," "drink," "walk," "fly," "understand," whatever. You see, the proof is independent of whatever specific word is replaced by [beep]. Its flow is simply so general that every literally sensible word can be in place of [beep].

No, this is my point. It doesn't matter what you substitute [bleep] with, one of the premises will be that there is an entity "P".

The "fact?" Do you mean "fact" as you defined it? That sort of fact has no place in Philosophy. What I'm struggling over with you for such a long time is this "fact." You say it is necessary, it is a "fact," that one exists in order for one to think. I asked it over and over how you can be sure of this necessity. You said it was simple Causality (or so I understood) and I'm showing how trivial Causality is.

You haven't showed that yet. You may be intending to, but your examples coincide with my reasoning.

Your way of talking my proof shows you haven't understood it. Read it over and over until you understand it. How many times have I repeated that P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but an engineered statement by me? Once again, P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but a statement that leads to dilemma along with Descartes' statement. It's the core to this proof and its misunderstanding (like in your case) means that the entire proof is lost.

Well, this is something that I tried to tell you long ago: the subject is Descartes' philosophy. The subject is not the proof of any other statement, of the form P[bleep] or any other form.

If you show a fault in that proof, I'll accept and take a chance with my other ways of talking this over. Until now you haven't stated anything worth noting other than your initial stance.

Which you haven't countered satisfactorily yet.

I don't hold the EPR Experiment sacred but I think it's very interesting, nor do I hold sacred its results. I would have a hard time with uncertainty if I wanted to hold something sacred. What I don't like so much is ignorance and careless conclusions.

You do, however, seem to hold uncertainty itself as the only certainty (which is a sickening paradox, as we've already talked about, and I don't want to talk about on this thread).

It seems you're the one who holds something sacred. You say you won't follow that way for it will destroy all need of learning/science. Let's suppose this really happens. If the way you follow has merit (for you, at least) you won't have lost much.

Science, learning, progressive knowledge... these things have merit for me. Thus, that which attempts to kill them has very little merit. It reduces what would have been rational human beings, to babbling/speculating fools (I don't include you in that, because you haven't abandoned science, you just entertain this uncertainty because you don't mix it with your progressive learning).

I think I described how uncertainty is a motive for learning and for gathering knowledge, including science. I told you how uncertainty is a drive towards certainty (hence, a drive towards more knowledge if not absolute knowledge) while certainty is a narcotic for the minds.

Uncertainty doesn't progress towards certainties. This is utterly wrong. Uncertainty doesn't even allow for any certainties.

Your worries about losing interest in science/knowledge/[beep] because of uncertainty are out of place. What you should worry for is the Mare Constans of certainty. Uncertainty is a manifestation of change and dynamism while certainty is the last station. Why should you take the next step if you're sure of whatever you know, whatever you want, whatever you have to do and whatever you are?

I told you, a certain amount of uncertainty is required (and so I partially take back what I said above), however the kind of uncertainty you are talking about doesn't allow for any progress, and is thus unhealthy to progressive knowledge.

By the way, learning and science aren't synonyms, what you can learn is not always science and science is not the only thing you can learn.

I know that. I mentioned that in your "Knowledge" thread.

It isn't that I've chosen a path that loops infinitely; it is that all known human paths are infinite loops. Loops are all you can see. Our knowledge is self-referenced. It doesn't include what "is" (if "being" in the sense we understand is sensible to the Universe) but what "is represented." There's a chasm of Unknown between what "is" and what "is represented."

And that chasm cannot be crossed by turning around and doubting the few things that do have an amount of certainty to them.

I never said "effect doesn't require a cause" (I'm not sure but I couldn't find such sentence). For cause and effect by their definition are bound to Causality and saying that would be a big mistake. I said this definition may be non-informative, irrelevant and even misleading. First you make a definition, say Causality, then you map it into the Universe by saying "the telephone" is an instance of a cause and "the individual hearing the ring" is an instance of an effect. What I've been denying is this process of mapping. You're free to make as many definitions, circular and non-circular, as you like but aren't free to map them into the Universe and expect compliance. I told you of another definition, the Pre-established Harmony, which worked and was compliant just like Causality. You relate a pair of phenomena with Causality while this bond needn't be "out" there. It's "in" here. It's an optimization method become prominent (too prominent, in fact).

And yet there was a cause to this perceived effect, wasn't there? If so, Causality appears to only be validated in the Pre-established Harmony idea.

How could the Physicist (the cause) cover the delay between two far-off events? A Physicist is usually located at one place and can affect (act as the cause to) things in a radius of a few meters and there's always a delay between what she/he does (as the cause) and what happens (as the effect). In this case you can consider the Physicist the cause to the spin change but then how can you explain absolute zero delay between her/his action and the spin change in the remote particle? Nothing changes here, whatever the cause may be, the zero delay can't be explained with a Causality bond that takes the chronological order as a basis to the distinction of the cause and the effect.

Ah, then you've missed the point of a "neighborhood" universe. You say that the physicist is "here" or "there", and this is true. But the two particles are bound such that they are not far apart from each other at all, in spite of appearing to be so.

Please, Manuel, let's drop the discussion of Causality and Uncertainty, in this thread, unless you can make all of the arguments directly relevant to Descartes' philosophy. We can discuss those other things in other threads.
 
  • #67
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
I only asked a few questions. You could show me if there was a problem with them. Don't you think avoiding the answers to possibly "stupefied and irrational" questions is even more "stupefied and irrational?"

Please forgive the hostility in the afore-quoted post. I just don't like how you keep asking such baiting questions. I wouldn't mind them, if they were in a thread dedicated to such reasoning, but this thread is solely about Descartes' philosophy.

Isn't that there are those certain premises to this statement, another premise? Where does this premise of yours take it validity from?

Observation. Besides, while it can be considered it's own proposition, if you were to actually take this proposition (a demon tricking) apart, you would find the same two propositions that I speak of.

You told me the Demon may be either "existent" or "non-existent" and that this statement, "a Demon tricking," implies that a Demon exists. What I wrote in response was that the Demon may assume many states other than "existent" and "non-existent." And that for your deduction (a Demon must be there if a Demon is playing tricks) to be creditable it was necessary that we're bound to Boolean logic, where the statement "a Demon is there" (one of your sub-propositions) may only be either T or F.

But if the sub-proposition is false, then the actual proposition must also be false, musn't it?

Your claim here is made of two parts, "a Demon is playing tricks" and "so the Demon exists." These two parts are related to each other in a conditional statement: "if a Demon is playing tricks then there is a Demon." I wrote and shown that even if this statement is considered true (Causality bond is taken serious), your deduction on the truth values for the necessary condition, "a Demon is playing tricks," and the sufficient condition, "there is a Demon," is limited to Boolean logic which is rivaled by many other equally creditable logical systems in which your deduction becomes invalid (sometimes even senseless).

Well, if Boolean Logic has been used by Science and philosophy for so long (as you mentioned earlier) then I like it.

I wasn't wandering in dreams of uncertainty (although it's much fun to do); I was showing you the vista of uncertainty and the vast realm beyond Aristotle.

I don't know any of Aristotle's philosophy. I may agree with some of what he postulated, but not on purpose :wink:.

Let's go the other way. If Descartes "had" to exist in order to think then why do you bother "proving" his "cogito ergo sum?"

I'm not proving it, I'm saying you can't disprove it. It is the proof, within itself, as I've shown.

Saying that "thinking" is the corollary of "being" you've already admitted that "I think therefore I am" is a self-referenced statement. With your assumption (one "has" to be if one thinks), "I think therefore I am" can be replaced with "I am therefore I am." This statement, "sum ergo sum," is clearly self-referenced for it assumes its own truth. Aside from being self-referenced, it is non-informative for if you knew "I am" why should you deduce "I am?"

You are almost right. The difference between "I think therefore I am" and "I am therefore I am" is (obviously) that there is a different verb involved (and the verb is "thinking", which is required when something tries to prove that I don't exist). Does that make sense?
 
  • #68
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

First of all, there's one thing I'd like to draw your attention to: I put my words in the place I seem suitable for them so the way my words are is an expression of my opinion, I'm not humming dial tone I'm talking so please don't ignore the words.
... I am telling you that your reasoning does not apply, when there is only a proposition and it's sub-proposition being considered.

... Now, my whole reasoning is (how many times have I said this?) that in order for it to be said that P does in fact [bleep], there must exist an entity "P" ...

No, this is my point. It doesn't matter what you substitute [bleep] with, one of the premises will be that there is an entity "P".
And I'm telling you it does apply. The problem here is your misunderstanding of the notation I used.

See, you do understand the concept of function f(x), don't you? Like you've learned in Mathematics, the function f(x) takes x from its domain and maps it into f(x) value from its range. Now consider P([beep]), P is a function that takes the action [beep] as the input and outputs a statement "there need be an I to [beep]." Function P works like a juicer, it takes apples (the action [beep], where you can place any action in place of [beep]) then it gives back apple juice (it gives you a statement, "there need be an I to [beep]").

This notation, P([beep]), doesn't mean "P [beep]s therefore P is." P doesn't substitute the entity being studied, it is the notation of a function. P is used only as a generalization. P is only a word substitution function; it maps words (anything like [beep]) from its domain (all sensible words for [beep]) into its range (all possible sentences of the form "there need be an I to [beep]").

Now, if you understand what I'm talking about, it will be clear that P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement, it is a "helper" device for this proof. P([beep]) is independent from and irrelevant to Descartes' statement. In the course of the proof you're asked to determine its state (T or F). It's your choice and is irrelevant to that you're defending Descartes' statement. For P([beep]) is just another statement, see, "another" statement.

Please read that storyline again. I guess you're way far from having understood the proof, and you can't criticize what you haven't understood yet.
Well, this is something that I tried to tell you long ago: the subject is Descartes' philosophy. The subject is not the proof of any other statement, of the form P[bleep] or any other form.
This thread is named "I think therefore I am" and I'm trying to show this statements and all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" lead to undesirable situations when viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic. I came to this thread because we had a debate on another thread where I claimed the Uncertainty applies to all human knowledge and you opposed saying there are certain parts of human knowledge one can be sure of.

My job here is to show this certain piece of knowledge, existence of the self, is absurd enough to be counted along with other uncertain things.

P([beep]) is a word substitution function, like I said above. It's used as a generalization and a helper device in a specific proof that shows Descartes' statement, "cogito ergo sum," will result in confusion if it's viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic, which is the sort of logic used in these discussions.
Which you haven't countered satisfactorily yet.
It'd be helpful to know that your stance could be modified to comply with Uncertainty. I'm opposing you because you see Descartes' statement as a proof of existence. I think this statement can't be held as a proof but as a between-the-lines hint. This between-the-lines hint doesn't prove or guarantee but it intrigues.

The intonation and strength by which you say "I think therefore I am" is vital to the distinction made between a statement and a hint. You seem to like to shout it loud like there's something important, there's a victory. If you whispered it, like having found some tiny thing you liked then I wouldn't have opposed. For I would've understood that you hold "I think therefore I am" for your pleasure. Your tendency to shout the thing out makes this hint absurd and displays your stance as an aggressive attempt for certainty. Such attempt is, well, only heading for the wall. I suggest there would be a hit then, but then do you think this would happen if you quietly went around the wall?
You do, however, seem to hold uncertainty itself as the only certainty (which is a sickening paradox, as we've already talked about, and I don't want to talk about on this thread).
I don't hold the Uncertainty sacred. For me, it's just a between-the-lines hint, nothing more. And yes, we've talked about the paradox but we haven't reached a compromise.

Like I told you (and you ignored), I approach Uncertainty in steps whose order makes sense out of nonsense. The first step is the discovery of Uncertainty. The next step is to see how Uncertainty plagues itself. Having passed these stages in order, Uncertainty is washed along with itself as the last of all universal principles (for Uncertainty is the most general universal principle) but there remains a residue. That residue is an understanding that can't be found if Uncertainty is either ignored or held sacred. Ignoring Uncertainty is ignoring the common point of all human knowledge. Holding Uncertainty sacred, as that wouldn't contradict itself and remain a universal principle that doesn't apply to itself, will deprive one from that residual understanding. I won't attempt to describe what and how this understanding is but I'll say it's the only thing that remains after having doubted everything and anything; it's the last residue of philosophical thought. I guess you don't oppose the principle of skepticism in the face of what one knows (and what one doesn't know) for that's the foundation of Philosophy. You must ask "why?" in the face of what is seen as apparent by others and what seems apparent to yourself.
Science, learning, progressive knowledge... these things have merit for me. Thus, that which attempts to kill them has very little merit. It reduces what would have been rational human beings, to babbling/speculating fools (I don't include you in that, because you haven't abandoned science, you just entertain this uncertainty because you don't mix it with your progressive learning).
After having understood what Uncertainty is, how it works, what its results are and how it is inevitable and paradoxical, you're left on your own to choose what has merit for you. That's why I emphasize Uncertainty this much. No certainty can bring those degrees of freedom, even though there're still boundaries, that Uncertainty brings. Uncertainty is the most general point of view for it simply allows everything.

You're committed to Science and that's your choice. Uncertainty won't lower, honor or change that but it gives you the freedom to see countless other options. I, too, have to some extents chosen my way of life, for now. Uncertainty gives me the freedom to see how worthless may be all that I hold dear. I, too, am interested in Science (you see, I'm a student of Physics) and will learn whatever comes my way. This, however, doesn't prevent me from seeing how trivial all Science may be, and what complexities may be beyond what I see, and that I may be dead wrong with all this.

Anecdote (derived from a Kundera quote): "Things are more complex than what you think." (it'd be great if you read his "Testaments Betrayed").

It isn't easy to call irrational human beings "babbling/speculating fools." You aren't the one who determines what is babbling and who are fools. No human being can see what is right/wrong, what good/evil is, what is wise/foolish and what is better/worse. Your opinion is meaningful only in your own domain. You, passionate for Science, see irrationality as absolute mishmash. Matter of fact irrationality has very often its own rationale. That you can't see the complexity beyond what you understand doesn't mean it won't someday strike you hard from ambush.
Uncertainty doesn't progress towards certainties. This is utterly wrong. Uncertainty doesn't even allow for any certainties.
Uncertainty needn't allow certainties but again it's a drive towards them. A Physicist is uncertain of her/his findings so she/he will try to gather more about her/his subject of study. This is the Uncertainty drive although it's aimed at certainty. And then why do you like certainty this much? You like to be certain that you are, that you are the way you see yourself in the mirror, that the Universe be the way you currently perceive. Isn't this liking a bit too simplistically oriented? What do you want out of certainty?

Certainty is clearly the end to research. When you know something and know it for sure, will you do research activities? Isn't Uncertainty about your subject a better station to start from?

You're misinterpreting Uncertainty. It simply doubts everything and this doubt has proven to be worth noting.
I told you, a certain amount of uncertainty is required (and so I partially take back what I said above), however the kind of uncertainty you are talking about doesn't allow for any progress, and is thus unhealthy to progressive knowledge.
Where does your passion for progress come from? Who says progress in its current form is better than stability? All your reasoning is based on your suppositions (suppositions like, "science is good," "learning is good," "progress is necessary") that don't seem to be more valid to me.

continued on the next post...
 
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  • #69
... continued from the previous post
But if the sub-proposition is false, then the actual proposition must also be false, musn't it?
That's another rule from Boolean logic. Another system of logic may even assign other states to a statement, no true or false.
Well, if Boolean Logic has been used by Science and philosophy for so long (as you mentioned earlier) then I like it.
Sorry for the roughness of the analogy but your saying deserves some hard opposition. There was once a horse that loved her blinders for she had them on for so long.
I don't know any of Aristotle's philosophy. I may agree with some of what he postulated, but not on purpose.
Aristotelian way of thinking is woven into our everyday lives. It's endured 2000 years and will endure much longer for it's easy (not quite easy but much easier than a sincere study of our knowledge) and frees one from the burden of thinking further into the complexity.

Aristotle was a genius and his ideas have originality but in his own context and his own time. His way wouldn't gain this much publicity if it was introduced somewhere other than ancient Greece.

The horse said she couldn't see any blinders and what was all this story about blinders.
 
  • #70
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

First of all, there's one thing I'd like to draw your attention to: I put my words in the place I seem suitable for them so the way my words are is an expression of my opinion, I'm not humming dial tone I'm talking so please don't ignore the words.


There is something that I'd like to bring to your attention as well. I don't ignore anything you say. I read all of it. I reply to that which I question, provided it appears relevant to the discussion at hand (namely: I think therefore I am).

And I'm telling you it does apply. The problem here is your misunderstanding of the notation I used.

See, you do understand the concept of function f(x), don't you? Like you've learned in Mathematics, the function f(x) takes x from its domain and maps it into f(x) value from its range. Now consider P([beep]), P is a function that takes the action [beep] as the input and outputs a statement "there need be an I to [beep]." Function P works like a juicer, it takes apples (the action [beep], where you can place any action in place of [beep]) then it gives back apple juice (it gives you a statement, "there need be an I to [beep]").

Either you are still missing the point, or I am. You still keep implying that I'm saying "there need be an I to [bleep]". I am not saying that. I am saying that there need be an "I" for "I" to [bleep].

This notation, P([beep]), doesn't mean "P [beep]s therefore P is." P doesn't substitute the entity being studied, it is the notation of a function. P is used only as a generalization.

Which is why the "P[bleep]" reasoning doesn't apply to Descartes' philosophy. You must substitute an entity for "P" in order for it to be at all relevant to Descartes' philosophy.

Now, if you understand what I'm talking about, it will be clear that P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement, it is a "helper" device for this proof. P([beep]) is independent from and irrelevant to Descartes' statement.

Then how can it possibly be relevant to this discussion?

This thread is named "I think therefore I am" and I'm trying to show this statements and all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" lead to undesirable situations when viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic.

But you haven't showed that. You have showed that all statements of the form "P[bleep]" (the function notation) lead to undesirable results. And yet, you yourself have said that this reasoning (P[bleep] reasoning) is irrelevant to Descartes' philosophy.

P([beep]) is a word substitution function, like I said above. It's used as a generalization and a helper device in a specific proof that shows Descartes' statement, "cogito ergo sum," will result in confusion if it's viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic, which is the sort of logic used in these discussions.

Is it really a "helper device" if it is entirely separate from and irrelevant to Descartes' type of reasoning (as shown above)?

The intonation and strength by which you say "I think therefore I am" is vital to the distinction made between a statement and a hint. You seem to like to shout it loud like there's something important, there's a victory. If you whispered it, like having found some tiny thing you liked then I wouldn't have opposed. For I would've understood that you hold "I think therefore I am" for your pleasure. Your tendency to shout the thing out makes this hint absurd and displays your stance as an aggressive attempt for certainty. Such attempt is, well, only heading for the wall. I suggest there would be a hit then, but then do you think this would happen if you quietly went around the wall?

I don't think that Descartes' philosophy is a victory over uncertainty. I know that there is debate to be had (about that particular philosophy, not just statements of the same kind), that's why I started this thread. However, I do think that it is an interesting/meritable philosophy, and that it has not been disproven yet (on this thread).

Like I told you (and you ignored), I approach Uncertainty in steps whose order makes sense out of nonsense. The first step is the discovery of Uncertainty. The next step is to see how Uncertainty plagues itself.

Which should lead you to discard Uncertainty. If Uncertainty plagues itself (because of it's paradoxical and self-contradictory nature), then it isn't useful, it's plagued. Why would you stay with something that was plagued, when you could continue with non-paradoxical studies, such as Science/Philosophy?

Having passed these stages in order, Uncertainty is washed along with itself as the last of all universal principles (for Uncertainty is the most general universal principle) but there remains a residue. That residue is an understanding that can't be found if Uncertainty is either ignored or held sacred. Ignoring Uncertainty is ignoring the common point of all human knowledge. Holding Uncertainty sacred, as that wouldn't contradict itself and remain a universal principle that doesn't apply to itself, will deprive one from that residual understanding. I won't attempt to describe what and how this understanding is but I'll say it's the only thing that remains after having doubted everything and anything; it's the last residue of philosophical thought. I guess you don't oppose the principle of skepticism in the face of what one knows (and what one doesn't know) for that's the foundation of Philosophy. You must ask "why?" in the face of what is seen as apparent by others and what seems apparent to yourself.

I do question that which is apparent. However, I do so through the use of logic and progressive knowledge. I build off of foundations, instead of reinventing the wheel at every point. I will question the foundation later, but if you question everything at once, you start all over again, every time.

After having understood what Uncertainty is, how it works, what its results are and how it is inevitable and paradoxical, you're left on your own to choose what has merit for you.

It is not inevitable. It is a choice, that you already seem certain of.

That's why I emphasize Uncertainty this much. No certainty can bring those degrees of freedom, even though there're still boundaries, that Uncertainty brings. Uncertainty is the most general point of view for it simply allows everything.

If one is Uncertain about all things, then there can be no boundary. However, this creates a paradox similar to that of the paradox of limitlessness, which I have discussed on numerous threads. This means that Uncertainty itself, when applied to all things, is paradoxical. Not just plagued/dirty/difficult, but paradoxical, and paradox is the dead-end of progressive knowledge, as I see it.

You're committed to Science and that's your choice. Uncertainty won't lower, honor or change that but it gives you the freedom to see countless other options. I, too, have to some extents chosen my way of life, for now. Uncertainty gives me the freedom to see how worthless may be all that I hold dear. I, too, am interested in Science (you see, I'm a student of Physics) and will learn whatever comes my way. This, however, doesn't prevent me from seeing how trivial all Science may be, and what complexities may be beyond what I see, and that I may be dead wrong with all this.

Well, sure, I should be able to see other options. But, in doing so, I have to be able to look beyond Uncertainty itself. The only thing other than Uncertainty is Certainty, and since there isn't supposed to be anything certain, I shouldn't be able to look beyond Uncertainty. Thus, Uncertainty is a dead-end, isn't it?

You, passionate for Science, see irrationality as absolute mishmash. Matter of fact irrationality has very often its own rationale. That you can't see the complexity beyond what you understand doesn't mean it won't someday strike you hard from ambush.

Irrationality is mere "mishmash". That's the point of the irrational. If you say that there is something rational about irrationality, then you have another paradox on your hands. How many paradoxes must one run into, before abandoning a certain line of reasoning?

Uncertainty needn't allow certainties but again it's a drive towards them.

And thus, you use Uncertainty to get certainty. And yet, Uncertainty dictates that there are no certainties. How can a line of reasoning lead to something, when it (the line of reasoning) is based on teh premise that that "something" doesn't exist?

What do you want out of certainty?

A foundation, from which to question that which I am not certain about. There's not enough time in life to question everything. I'm only 14 and I know that.

Certainty is clearly the end to research. When you know something and know it for sure, will you do research activities? Isn't Uncertainty about your subject a better station to start from?

I told you, a degree of uncertainty is good - necessar in fact. I only object to being uncertain about everything (I don't even think you can be, but that's a subject for another thread).

Where does your passion for progress come from? Who says progress in its current form is better than stability? All your reasoning is based on your suppositions (suppositions like, "science is good," "learning is good," "progress is necessary") that don't seem to be more valid to me.

Well, it's my outlook on life. How is "nothing is certain" better than "progressive knowledge is necessary"?
 
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  • #71
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
Either you are still missing the point, or I am. You still keep implying that I'm saying "there need be an I to [bleep]". I am not saying that. I am saying that there need be an "I" for "I" to [bleep].
No, no, no! I'm not implying anything. Only if you got the catch of that proof! Suppose there are two independent statements, one is Descartes' statement and the other is my P([beep]). We want to see if Descartes' statement is true or not, but before we do this I ask of you of the state you associate with P([beep]). See, P([beep]) is just a helper. Then you say that P([beep]) is true or false. The true/false state of P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. After you've given P([beep]) its state, we come to study Descartes' statement. Then I turn to you and show that Descartes' statement will lead to undesirable situations, "with regard to P([beep])." And I show that this happens for all states P([beep]) can assume.

This means there's an incompatibility between all the states P([beep]) may assume and Descartes' statement. Now, with asking for P([beep]) state and assigning a state to it, I haven't done anything illogical and I've also let you choose its state as you wish. There must be something wrong with the view point from which the problem is viewed. Simply put, Descartes' statement is incompatible with this viewpoint.
Which is why the "P[bleep]" reasoning doesn't apply to Descartes' philosophy. You must substitute an entity for "P" in order for it to be at all relevant to Descartes' philosophy.
I designed the proof and then you tell me what to do? I wanted to design it the way it is. P is a function, can you understand this? It has an input and an output, nothing more. P isn't part of the statement, it's the function that maps [beep] into the statement I wanted.

Let me see, do you know what f(x) means in Mathematics?
Then how can it possibly be relevant to this discussion?
I told you many times before. P is a helper device. In that proof P isn't being studied, P is "being used." P "is used" to study Descartes' statement. A tin-opener is not a can but it's used to open a can. When you open cans, you don't say "how can a tin-opener be relevant here?" The tin-opener and the can are different but they're both involved in the mutual task of opening a can.
But you haven't showed that. You have showed that all statements of the form "P[bleep]" (the function notation) lead to undesirable results. And yet, you yourself have said that this reasoning (P[bleep] reasoning) is irrelevant to Descartes' philosophy.
I've shown, you didn't get it. P([beep]) leads to undesirable results, that's right but how then? In association with Descartes' statement.

I didn't say P([beep]) reasoning is irrelevant to Descartes' statement, I said P([beep]) is distinct and irrelevant to that statement. A tin-opener's action isn't irrelevant to the can being opened but the tin-opener itself is irrelevant to and distinct from the can.
Is it really a "helper device" if it is entirely separate from and irrelevant to Descartes' type of reasoning (as shown above)?
Yes! You see how it works if you understand what is going on in that proof.
Which should lead you to discard Uncertainty. If Uncertainty plagues itself (because of it's paradoxical and self-contradictory nature), then it isn't useful, it's plagued. Why would you stay with something that was plagued, when you could continue with non-paradoxical studies, such as Science/Philosophy?
Once again, this isn't the way I've chosen. This is the way it is. Science is a disguise and Philosophy is not what you call Philosophy.
It is not inevitable. It is a choice, that you already seem certain of.
It is inevitable for it is the most general. How can you avoid the most general while you're concerned with its particulars?
If one is Uncertain about all things, then there can be no boundary. However, this creates a paradox similar to that of the paradox of limitlessness, which I have discussed on numerous threads. This means that Uncertainty itself, when applied to all things, is paradoxical. Not just plagued/dirty/difficult, but paradoxical, and paradox is the dead-end of progressive knowledge, as I see it.
How did you conclude that? That I'm uncertain of everything (you're right, I can't be but I pretend to) doesn't have any implication but that I'm uncertain of everything. It won't give me power over something so it won't break any hard boundaries. Broken are the boundaries of my mind, those chains that needn't be there.

And I have no problem with paradoxes and paradoxical speech. Your paradoxes are merely lexical ambiguities but those paradoxes I'm concerned with are those relying not on ambiguity in literary expressions but on the nature of human knowledge.
Well, sure, I should be able to see other options. But, in doing so, I have to be able to look beyond Uncertainty itself. The only thing other than Uncertainty is Certainty, and since there isn't supposed to be anything certain, I shouldn't be able to look beyond Uncertainty. Thus, Uncertainty is a dead-end, isn't it?
Yes, you have to look beyond Uncertainty, too. That's when that residual understanding I wrote of comes in.

Suppose Uncertainty is a dead-end, what then? Just tell me what then? Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to sincerely study human knowledge or human being and you've encountered a dead-end. Wouldn't that be much more honorable than making an excuse, named Certainty, to intoxicate your mind and shield it against what is forthcoming? Certainty is a narcotic, I told you before. Narcotics aren't all bad, you need them sometimes to relieve but take it too much and you'll never get out of it.
I do question that which is apparent. However, I do so through the use of logic and progressive knowledge. I build off of foundations, instead of reinventing the wheel at every point. I will question the foundation later, but if you question everything at once, you start all over again, every time.
One such apparent thing would be "the use of logic and progressive knowledge." Don't you mind questioning this one?

Those foundations you're talking of are for others. They had their own and you should have your own, if you're really interested in having them. I told you before, this isn't re-inventing the same wheel all the time, it's inventing your "own" "all-new" wheel which's "unlike" any wheel that's come before and that'll come after.
Irrationality is mere "mishmash". That's the point of the irrational. If you say that there is something rational about irrationality, then you have another paradox on your hands. How many paradoxes must one run into, before abandoning a certain line of reasoning?
Irrationality has its own rationale like I said. That "rationale" is an extended version of the "rationale" you understand.

You think of irrationality and imagine picturesque scenes of humans fighting to death for nothing. That's one sort of irrationality. There are other kinds of it. Think of so many hermits with all sorts of odd faith, and even no faith, who've lived peaceful lives without your rationality. They had their own way of ordering things and that was their rationale. The order of things was different for them but it wasn't mishmash. Think of all peoples of ancient times who've lived their lives in so many ways that would seem absurd to the people of these days. Yet they were righteous over what they did.


Once again, if you insist that's a paradox, well, that's a paradox, what then?
And thus, you use Uncertainty to get certainty. And yet, Uncertainty dictates that there are no certainties. How can a line of reasoning lead to something, when it (the line of reasoning) is based on teh premise that that "something" doesn't exist?
I don't use Uncertainty to "get" Certainty. I use it to "approach" Certainty. That's the twist. A Physicist will never be certain of the physical Universe but she/he will, led by the Uncertainty drive, approach Certainty day by day step by step.
A foundation, from which to question that which I am not certain about. There's not enough time in life to question everything. I'm only 14 and I know that.
You can take any foundation you like but I think, being uncertain is much more honorable that being certain of something that holds no certainty.

I understand what you mean. The life is short, you're right and I agree with you but then couldn't we be wrong? Couldn't we be dying for we think we must die someday? This isn't ridicule, think about it.
Well, it's my outlook on life. How is "nothing is certain" better than "progressive knowledge is necessary"?
Now that's a brilliant question. My answer is "noway." Suppositions of any sort are equally creditable but they can be more or less general. "Nothing is certain" leaves a way open for any new idea to come in while "progressive knowledge is necessary" is like condemning a whole bunch of new ideas that have equal creditability to those ideas enhanced and promoted by the supposition, "progressive knowledge is necessary."

"Nothing is uncertain" is so general that it can incorporate the other supposition but the other supposition isn't that general.

You may ask why I prefer more general suppositions. I'd say that's a matter of taste. If you agree to Uncertainty, everything and every choice will become a matter of taste. I don't know if you like this.
 
  • #72
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

No, no, no! I'm not implying anything. Only if you got the catch of that proof! Suppose there are two independent statements, one is Descartes' statement and the other is my P([beep]). We want to see if Descartes' statement is true or not, but before we do this I ask of you of the state you associate with P([beep]). See, P([beep]) is just a helper. Then you say that P([beep]) is true or false. The true/false state of P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. After you've given P([beep]) its state, we come to study Descartes' statement. Then I turn to you and show that Descartes' statement will lead to undesirable situations, "with regard to P([beep])." And I show that this happens for all states P([beep]) can assume.

This means there's an incompatibility between all the states P([beep]) may assume and Descartes' statement. Now, with asking for P([beep]) state and assigning a state to it, I haven't done anything illogical and I've also let you choose its state as you wish. There must be something wrong with the view point from which the problem is viewed. Simply put, Descartes' statement is incompatible with this viewpoint.


But, Descartes' statement is not of the form "P([bleep])". That's what I've been trying to say. I understand functions in Algebra, but I don't think that Descartes' statement is using "I" as a function. Hence, I don't think that any reasoning on the problems of statements of the form "P([bleep])" is relevant to Descartes' philosophy.

I designed the proof and then you tell me what to do? I wanted to design it the way it is. P is a function, can you understand this? It has an input and an output, nothing more. P isn't part of the statement, it's the function that maps [beep] into the statement I wanted.

Yes, "P" is a function. But "I" in Descartes' statement is not. It doesn't work the same way. I didn't mean to tell you what to do, when discussing a "P([bleep])" philosophy, I was telling you that - if you wanted to use a variable in the place of the word "I" in Descartes' statement - you had to replace "I" with some other entity.

I told you many times before. P is a helper device. In that proof P isn't being studied, P is "being used." P "is used" to study Descartes' statement. A tin-opener is not a can but it's used to open a can. When you open cans, you don't say "how can a tin-opener be relevant here?" The tin-opener and the can are different but they're both involved in the mutual task of opening a can.

But, as I've been trying to tell you, P is a helper device for other philosophies - not this philosophy of Descartes' (for the above reasons).

I've shown, you didn't get it. P([beep]) leads to undesirable results, that's right but how then? In association with Descartes' statement.

I didn't say P([beep]) reasoning is irrelevant to Descartes' statement, I said P([beep]) is distinct and irrelevant to that statement. A tin-opener's action isn't irrelevant to the can being opened but the tin-opener itself is irrelevant to and distinct from the can.

Yes, I know what you said. However, a tin-opener is useful for a can, while the P[bleep]-type philosophy that you are examining is not useful for understanding Descartes' statement.

Yes! You see how it works if you understand what is going on in that proof.

Once again, this isn't the way I've chosen. This is the way it is. Science is a disguise and Philosophy is not what you call Philosophy.

It is inevitable for it is the most general. How can you avoid the most general while you're concerned with its particulars?
How did you conclude that? That I'm uncertain of everything (you're right, I can't be but I pretend to) doesn't have any implication but that I'm uncertain of everything. It won't give me power over something so it won't break any hard boundaries. Broken are the boundaries of my mind, those chains that needn't be there.

And yet, in "breaking" those "chains", you enslave yourself to irrationality and paradox, and this is no better than being enslaved to progressive understanding.

And I have no problem with paradoxes and paradoxical speech. Your paradoxes are merely lexical ambiguities but those paradoxes I'm concerned with are those relying not on ambiguity in literary expressions but on the nature of human knowledge.
Yes, you have to look beyond Uncertainty, too. That's when that residual understanding I wrote of comes in.

You can't look beyond Uncertainty, if Uncertainty is your premise. That is the nature of absolute Uncertainty. It doesn't allow you to use it (or anything else, for that matter) as a foundation, because nothing is certain, and foundations must be at least partially certain.

Suppose Uncertainty is a dead-end, what then? Just tell me what then? Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to sincerely study human knowledge or human being and you've encountered a dead-end. Wouldn't that be much more honorable than making an excuse, named Certainty, to intoxicate your mind and shield it against what is forthcoming? Certainty is a narcotic, I told you before. Narcotics aren't all bad, you need them sometimes to relieve but take it too much and you'll never get out of it.

And I have (repeatedly) told you that I like uncertainty, and I recognize it's necessity. I just know that too much of it is also bad. I'm certain of very few things, and leave most things uncertain. However, this is all - as I've said before - the subject for another thread.

One such apparent thing would be "the use of logic and progressive knowledge." Don't you mind questioning this one?

Not when the argument that I'm currently on requires this as a premise. As a matter of form, I cannot question all foundations at the same time. It's not just paradoxical, but it also doesn't allow me to ever answer the question that I started out trying to answer.

Those foundations you're talking of are for others. They had their own and you should have your own, if you're really interested in having them. I told you before, this isn't re-inventing the same wheel all the time, it's inventing your "own" "all-new" wheel which's "unlike" any wheel that's come before and that'll come after.

Yes, but your still inventing a wheel, when the problem your really trying to resolve has to do with the combustion engine of a Dodge Viper (please try to understand my illustration, I don't think I have enough space left, on this post, to explain it).

Irrationality has its own rationale like I said. That "rationale" is an extended version of the "rationale" you understand.

Irrationality, by definition and common use, cannot have a rationale of any kind.

You think of irrationality and imagine picturesque scenes of humans fighting to death for nothing. That's one sort of irrationality. There are other kinds of it. Think of so many hermits with all sorts of odd faith, and even no faith, who've lived peaceful lives without your rationality. They had their own way of ordering things and that was their rationale.

Yes, they didn't have my rationale, but they had one. That's the point. If they were truly irrational, they would have no rationale, whatsoever.

The order of things was different for them but it wasn't mishmash. Think of all peoples of ancient times who've lived their lives in so many ways that would seem absurd to the people of these days. Yet they were righteous over what they did.

Again, they were still rational, just in a different way than the typical person of today.

Once again, if you insist that's a paradox, well, that's a paradox,
what then?

You shouldn't speak of paradox as though it were just another logical approach. Or just another consequence. A paradox is the dead-end of reasoning on anyone idea. Resulting in paradox usually leads people to discard that idea and try another.

A Physicist will never be certain of the physical Universe but she/he will, led by the Uncertainty drive, approach Certainty day by day step by step.
You can take any foundation you like but I think, being uncertain is much more honorable that being certain of something that holds no certainty.

Uncertainty doesn't hold any certainty either.

Couldn't we be dying for we think we must die someday? This isn't ridicule, think about it.

Well, if we're dying because we think we will die, then discussing it is making us all the more likely to die :wink:.

"Nothing is certain" leaves a way open for any new idea to come in while "progressive knowledge is necessary" is like condemning a whole bunch of new ideas that have equal creditability to those ideas enhanced and promoted by the supposition, "progressive knowledge is necessary."

Well, actually, if your premise is "progressive knowledge is necessary", then those "other ideas" don't really have "equal creditability".

"Nothing is uncertain" is so general that it can incorporate the other supposition but the other supposition isn't that general.

"Nothing is uncertain" is not the premise that we were talking about. "Nothing is uncertain" is the opposite of your Uncertainty, and is equally wrong, IMO.

You may ask why I prefer more general suppositions. I'd say that's a matter of taste. If you agree to Uncertainty, everything and every choice will become a matter of taste. I don't know if you like this.

No, I don't. I think that moderation is important. Thus, whether to behave in a civilised manner on every occasion (for example) will not be a matter of taste, but a matter of form.
 
  • #73
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
But, Descartes' statement is not of the form "P([bleep])"...

... But "I" in Descartes' statement is not. It doesn't work the same way. I didn't mean to tell you what to do, when discussing a "P([bleep])" philosophy ...
That's right. The P([beep]) statement is not the statement category ("I think therefore I am" and similar) proven absurd in that proof. You're just stating the reason I wrote that P([beep]) was "irrelevant to" and "independent from" Descartes' statement, that it was just a helper device.

I've times described how this helper device works. It's irrelevant to Descartes' statement but it's engineered so that it causes trouble when the study of Descartes' statement is seen in association with P([beep]) state.

There may be faults in that proof. It may be wrong but what you're pointing out is "your" misconception. I've wrote so many times that the subject of study in that proof is Descartes' statement and P([beep]) is only a "helper device," so you can't tell me that since my P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement the proof isn't studying that statement. Back to the tin-opener analogy, you can't tell me that since a tin-opener isn't a can, its task can't be opening cans.

I've done the best I could to describe it for you. Understanding that proof and criticizing it in its own context is your job. I think it'd be beneficial if you invite some PF member to take a look at it and explain it some other way so that you can understand.
And yet, in "breaking" those "chains", you enslave yourself to irrationality and paradox, ...
At every given time, one is chained to a specific system of thoughts. What matters is the fairness and sincerity of that system of thoughts. Another thing that matters is the awareness of the chained mind of its chains.

So far that I've learnt, Uncertainty (if you like, Paradox and Irrationality) is the most sincere way to study something. Uncertainty implies absence of bias and prejudice.

Obviously enough, Uncertainty isn't a practical way. This isn't because of Uncertainty being useless, it's because of what we mean with "practice" and "practicality." We see practicality in terms of what satisfies our desires (the roots of these desires I don't know) and the more of satisfaction is the more of practicality. Uncertainty is for known and unknown reasons dissatisfying for it robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness. These aspects of human life that fade away when Uncertainty comes in, are necessary for leading a normal life. Without them we could never be choosing our next moments' actions. These aspects are so important that they simply can't be taken away. Resultant is a milder version of Uncertainty that won't hurt these aspects much.

There's a fair way to avoid the loss of these aspects while avoiding being unfair with ignoring Uncertainty. That's the way of simultaneous acceptance and denial (another paradox, spot it, get it right there, get it up against "The Wall" ). One will be aware and cautious of Uncertainty while one acts as if nothing's happened.

In order not to waste the fairness of this way, one should be warned against any unnecessary certainties. One such "unnecessary" certainty is the existence (lest you see me, I know :wink:). It really won't change much of one's perspective if one's informed of her/his existence/non-existence if this information doesn't change any aspect of her/his life.

I have to admit you wrote of "mild" Uncertainty before and were right with that but I didn't like the way you talked of it; it sounded to me like you were saying "well, we have this here and that there, I like this you like that, but if you insist I'll take a bit of that, too."
... As a matter of form, I cannot question all foundations at the same time. It's not just paradoxical, ...
Let me see, you question a part of the foundation, make it up with it and go to the next. Seems pretty procedural task! Yet it's problematic. Whilst you question a certain part of the foundation you'll be assuming other parts true, won't you? And if the foundation is a coherent structure the validity of every part of it will be enough to prove other parts valid. Now "you" have a dead-end at hand, if you only question one part of the foundation, which is a coherent structure, every time you'll simply prove that part valid because you've assumed the other parts of the foundation.

The foundation, as a coherent structure, must be removed, thoroughly examined and then put back where it belongs. No part of the foundation can be allowed as a premise for studying the same foundation.
Yes, but your still inventing a wheel, when the problem your really trying to resolve has to do with the combustion engine...
I understand what you wrote as "you are trying to modify the whole while you're asked to modify only the particulars."

This doesn't seem right to me. Making one's own system of thoughts involves the re-thinking of all one has as thoughts and then thinking new thoughts. This task must be done bottom-to-top and in order of complexity. The most basic intuition seems to be an intuition of existence (one that you're trying to change into a solid statement) so the first thing to be re-thought is the meaning, validity and works of existence. For this re-thinking one can't rely on any other thoughts for they are yet-to-come thoughts that haven't been revised.

Re-thinking isn't a work on particulars, it's ought to alter the whole. Consqeuently, it's equal to re-inventing a "new" wheel, not a mistake between the rudimentary conecpt of a wheel and the much higher level concept of a combustion engine peculiar to a specific car. Systems of thoughts are peculiar to their owners, the thinkers, so every system of thoughts must be built from the bottom to the top and without referencing other systems for the validity of other systems is, in the best case, limited to their owner. External references can only be used as helpers in explaining common or similar concepts, ie you can't point out Kant's idea on something and take that for a part of your system of thoughts but you may point at his idea and say "see, it's these points in common." It's obvious that similarities between two systems of thoughts one of which has gained public credit can't be held as an advantage for either of the systems.
Irrationality, by definition and common use, cannot have a rationale of any kind.

Yes, they didn't have my rationale, but they had one. That's the point. If they were truly irrational, they would have no rationale, whatsoever.
Let's have your word. The consequence: there's never been such thing as irrationality for there's never been actions without some sort of rationale behind them. And there's never been systems of thoughts without a supportive skeleton of "rationale," one way or the other.

You claim that Uncertainty leads to irrationality but then you claim that every order in the things can be considered a rationale and isn't included in irrationals list. Now, Uncertainty has its own order of things. This order may be comlicated or even too complicated to comprehend but it is there. To conclude, Uncertainty isn't irrationality or irrational.

If you like it that way I can say that Uncertainty isn't irrational but has it's own not-so-much-publicized rationale. Does that work?
You shouldn't speak of paradox as though it were just another logical approach...
I don't speak of paradox as another logical approach. I speak of it as the end to a "specific" form of logic. That which is a paradox in one logical system can be worked out simply in another system. The sight of a paradox isn't a dead-end. It's a call to change and a call to a new system. A paradox indicates that a logical system isn't even self-sufficient, let alone sufficient. A paradox is the rise of countless possibilities that were oppressed by the materialization of a certain possibility which hasn't "necessarily" been superior to those countless possibilities.

And what "people" do isn't the measure of what we do.
Uncertainty doesn't hold any certainty either.
That's true but it gives you a perspective of countless options, at least. I didn't say it held certainty. I said it was more honorable than the "usual" excuse, certainty.
Well, if we're dying because we think we will die, then discussing it is making us all the more likely to die.
You see the dark side of it. The same discussion may make us re-think the concept of death and, who knows, perhaps discard it.
Well, actually, if your premise is "progressive knowledge is necessary", then those "other ideas" don't really have "equal creditability".
That's it. If you want to be fair in judging suppositions, first you have to be independent of them. In the court of fair judgment all suppositions are equally creditable for the judge isn't initially committed to any of them. It's after the judgment that premises come. Premises are the outcome of judgment and a choice of suppositions that've seemed the best to the court of fair judgment.
"Nothing is uncertain" is not the premise that we were talking about...
Shame on me! I've played this certain-uncertain thing so much that I mix them all up. I beg your pardon. I meant "nothing is certain."
No, I don't. I think that moderation is important...
You mean you tend to choose certain behavior and "officially" declare them "superior in form" and then present them as the "right" behavior?

Every choice is a matter of the chooser's taste. You may like to behave in a civilized manner on every ocassion while this me likes better not to do it that way every once in a while.

Do you give up chooser's choice for the groundless superiority assigned by the society?
 
  • #74
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
1. For Mentat:
That's right. The P([beep]) statement is not the statement category ("I think therefore I am" and similar) proven absurd in that proof. You're just stating the reason I wrote that P([beep]) was "irrelevant to" and "independent from" Descartes' statement, that it was just a helper device.

Ok, for the millionth time. P([bleep]) reasoning is a helper device for other philosophies. It cannot be applied to Descartes' philosophy, unless you have some argument that you haven't yet presented. A tin-opener can be fitted to a can, thus it can be useful. However, I'm telling you that P([bleep]) reasoning doesn't "fit" with Descartes' statement. It cannot be made to fit, as far as I've seen - and you have not made any effort to "fit" them, taking it as obvious that this kind of reasoning (P([bleep])) is helpful.

I've times described how this helper device works. It's irrelevant to Descartes' statement but it's engineered so that it causes trouble when the study of Descartes' statement is seen in association with P([beep]) state.

There is no association. P([bleep]) requires that P is a function of whatever [bleep] stands for. Descartes' statement requires that P is an entity, that acts out [bleep].

There may be faults in that proof. It may be wrong but what you're pointing out is "your" misconception. I've wrote so many times that the subject of study in that proof is Descartes' statement and P([beep]) is only a "helper device," so you can't tell me that since my P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement the proof isn't studying that statement. Back to the tin-opener analogy, you can't tell me that since a tin-opener isn't a can, its task can't be opening cans.

The proof isn't studying the statement, but not because they are different. It's because they are unrelated, the don't "fit" (see above).

At every given time, one is chained to a specific system of thoughts. What matters is the fairness and sincerity of that system of thoughts.

And yet, to ascertain the "fairness and sincerity" of that system, you need to look at it from outside that system. In doing so, you must make use of another system, whose "fairness and sincerity" you haven't determined.

Obviously enough, Uncertainty isn't a practical way. This isn't because of Uncertainty being useless, it's because of what we mean with "practice" and "practicality." We see practicality in terms of what satisfies our desires (the roots of these desires I don't know) and the more of satisfaction is the more of practicality.

I'll tell you the root of these desires: survival. Humans would not have survived this long, if they hadn't used "practicality" and "progressive knowledge". Now, they are safe enough to question, but the "roots" are now deeply engrained.

Uncertainty is for known and unknown reasons dissatisfying for it robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness.

This sounds like wuliheron's reasoning, and I only partially agree. I think that some uncertainty can accomplish this purpose, but full Uncertainty just robs you of any progressive knowledge, and thus you get "stuck".

There's a fair way to avoid the loss of these aspects while avoiding being unfair with ignoring Uncertainty. That's the way of simultaneous acceptance and denial (another paradox, spot it, get it right there, get it up against "The Wall" ). One will be aware and cautious of Uncertainty while one acts as if nothing's happened.

I don't get this. You are saying, "I have an answer", then you say "My answer is paradoxical". What is supposed to incline me toward listening to this "answer"?

It really won't change much of one's perspective if one's informed of her/his non-existence

But, this "information" (of his/her non-existence) cannot be true, otherwise who would you be "informing" (Descartes' reasoning again)?

I have to admit you wrote of "mild" Uncertainty before and were right with that but I didn't like the way you talked of it; it sounded to me like you were saying "well, we have this here and that there, I like this you like that, but if you insist I'll take a bit of that, too."

That wasn't the way I intended you to take it. I meant that it's good to have some uncertainty, and that everything can be questioned, but in turns. You must take some things for granted while questioning others, and then later question the things that you previously took for granted, while taking the previous uncertainties as now certain. You just shouldn't be uncertain of all things at once. Can't be, IMHO.

Whilst you question a certain part of the foundation you'll be assuming other parts true, won't you? And if the foundation is a coherent structure the validity of every part of it will be enough to prove other parts valid. Now "you" have a dead-end at hand, if you only question one part of the foundation, which is a coherent structure, every time you'll simply prove that part valid because you've assumed the other parts of the foundation.

This reasoning isn't just for questioning foundations, but for questioning new assumptions/speculations, as well.

I'll finish my response in the next post...
 
  • #75
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
The foundation, as a coherent structure, must be removed, thoroughly examined and then put back where it belongs. No part of the foundation can be allowed as a premise for studying the same foundation.
I understand what you wrote as "you are trying to modify the whole while you're asked to modify only the particulars."

What you are missing is that it is impossible to question all foundations at once. I've tried to reason on it, and I can't, it's just not possible to do it. Let me explain: If it tried to question all foundations, then my foundation would become "question all previous foundations". However, since this is a foundation in itself, you are not questioning all foundations.

This doesn't seem right to me. Making one's own system of thoughts involves the re-thinking of all one has as thoughts and then thinking new thoughts. This task must be done bottom-to-top and in order of complexity. The most basic intuition seems to be an intuition of existence (one that you're trying to change into a solid statement) so the first thing to be re-thought is the meaning, validity and works of existence. For this re-thinking one can't rely on any other thoughts for they are yet-to-come thoughts that haven't been revised.

Exactly, and it is thus impossible to disprove existence! If re-thinking relies on other thoughts (which it obviously does) and you can't have had other thoughts without existing (as you've pointed out, in so many words), then you cannot really re-think your existence.

Re-thinking isn't a work on particulars, it's ought to alter the whole. Consqeuently, it's equal to re-inventing a "new" wheel, not a mistake between the rudimentary conecpt of a wheel and the much higher level concept of a combustion engine peculiar to a specific car.

That's what I've been saying you are not supposed to do. If you keep reinventing the wheel, then you'll never get to a car. Also, if you cannot work on any particular problem, without having to start form scratch, you will never solve any problem.

External references can only be used as helpers in explaining common or similar concepts, ie you can't point out Kant's idea on something and take that for a part of your system of thoughts but you may point at his idea and say "see, it's these points in common." It's obvious that similarities between two systems of thoughts one of which has gained public credit can't be held as an advantage for either of the systems.

I don't understand this. Do you mean that I can't use someone else's opinion to help create my own?

Let's have your word. The consequence: there's never been such thing as irrationality for there's never been actions without some sort of rationale behind them. And there's never been systems of thoughts without a supportive skeleton of "rationale," one way or the other.

You claim that Uncertainty leads to irrationality but then you claim that every order in the things can be considered a rationale and isn't included in irrationals list.

Yes, that's why Uncertainty (btw, I capitalize the first letter of "uncertainty" when I want it to mean "uncertainty of all things at once") is unusable, IMO.

Now, Uncertainty has its own order of things. This order may be comlicated or even too complicated to comprehend but it is there. To conclude, Uncertainty isn't irrationality or irrational.

Uncertainty does not have an order of things. If your uncertainty has an order to it, then it is not true Uncertainty.

If you like it that way I can say that Uncertainty isn't irrational but has it's own not-so-much-publicized rationale. Does that work?

No. It is, demonstrably, irrational and paradoxical (we've already shown this in previous posts).

I don't speak of paradox as another logical approach. I speak of it as the end to a "specific" form of logic. That which is a paradox in one logical system can be worked out simply in another system. The sight of a paradox isn't a dead-end. It's a call to change and a call to a new system. A paradox indicates that a logical system isn't even self-sufficient, let alone sufficient.

Which means that Uncertainty isn't sufficient, because it leads to paradox, right?

That's it. If you want to be fair in judging suppositions, first you have to be independent of them.

That, in itself, is a supposition. I have to get off-line now, but I hope you think about what I've written.

Until next time...
 
  • #76
Originally posted by RageSk8
I like "I think therefore I know"




-Stolen from Nagel in his characterization of Davidson.
yeah.this one is good.

by the way I'm means a lots of other things not just thinking.
let me put it this way:
i have 36 oC therefore i'm.
 
  • #77
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

I won’t discuss the proof anymore. You’re in harsh misunderstanding of it and I’ve done my best to clarify but have failed. I re-shape and re-explain the proof one more time, but I won’t discuss it until you show you’ve understood what I mean. I don’t mean for you to agree with it, I just want you to understand it and then say whatever you like. For one time only put aside all you think of the proof and read these lines, forget what we wrote before:

Take the statement “I think therefore I am” and call it Descartes’ statement and show it with Q. Now put this in the back of your mind. Put it away for later study. Don’t think about it for a moment.

Take the statement “There need be an I to think” and show it with P.

Since this proof is meant to be understood in Boolean logic framework, P may only assume one of these two states, T or F. I ask of you: “What state do you assign to P?” You may choose either T or F.

Now we come to study Q. We know nothing of its state because this is what we’re going to find out.

For P you have chosen either T or F.

If you’ve chosen P to be T, then you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q. P is independent of Q and you’ve chosen P to be true before we come to study Q, so you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q because Q is a corollary of P. In pre-assuming truth for Q and coming to study it after this pre-assumption you’ve made a circular deduction. You’ve first assumed Q is true then come to study it and then concluded, again, that Q is true. Circular deduction is non-informative and isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

If you’ve chosen P to be F, then you’ve contradicted this pre-assumption with asserting that Q is true. If P is false then Q can’t be true so Q must be false, too. P being F and Q being T is a paradox and this isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

Questions that may be asked concerning the proof:

00. How are P and Q related?
01. Why should I assign any state to P?
02. What if I want to study Q before assigning a state to P?
03. What does this whole mean?
04. Could this proof be applied to other statements?

Answers:

00. P and Q are semantically equal but logically independent. In the course of proof, they’re studied independently but then the results are synthesized and shown to be incompatible in a specific logical framework, namely Boolean logic.

01. For in a logical framework where only two states, true (T) or false (F), can be assigned to a statement, the state of any statement should be definitively determinable at any given time. Other logical frameworks, too, have this characteristic but they may incorporate additional/totally different states that make them more flexible and less vulnerable.

02. You can’t because even if you don’t assign a state to P it must have some state which is either T or F. No matter what the state for P is, it’s shown in the proof that either way will cause trouble.

03. Anyone can generate countless statements. These statements may be studied in countless logical systems, one of which is Boolean logic. The best logical system is the most consistent one, one that doesn’t contain any internal inconsistency. For this purpose the logical system must be able to synthesize and analyze all of the countless statements that can be generated without contradicting its own axioms. Out of countless statements two are chosen, P and Q. If a logical system is minimally consistent it must be, at least, able to synthesize these two statements. Boolean logic assumes an axiom that prohibits the collocation of contraries (which we call paradox) and the study of axioms or rather pre-assumed statements (which we call a loop, a circle or a self-referenced statement). In this proof it’s shown that Boolean logic is unable to synthesize these two statements although these two are valid statements (validity is not equal to truth, it means they’re really statements that can be assigned states).

04. Many other statements may be proven to be incompatible in the framework of Boolean logic.
And yet, to ascertain the "fairness and sincerity" of that system, you need to look at it from outside that system. In doing so, you must make use of another system, whose "fairness and sincerity" you haven't determined.
That’s right. Isn’t that another plus for Uncertainty? Since no system of thoughts can be shown fair and sincere without being committed to another or the same system of thoughts, one must always be aware of distortions in the judgment. Wouldn’t it be the fairest to be uncertain of everything? Being uncertain is just another way of thinking, the most general one.
I'll tell you the root of these desires: survival. Humans would not have survived this long, if they hadn't used "practicality" and "progressive knowledge". Now, they are safe enough to question, but the "roots" are now deeply engrained.
Survival exists in the scientific Universe, it needn’t exist anywhere else. The struggle for survival has been scientifically observed in the nature. To say the root of desires is survival is equal to saying that there’s the nature, that it can be observed, that these observations can be concluded from and that the certain conclusion is the struggle for survival. This doesn’t seem to be much of Philosophy.

You can’t make any scientific claim in a realm beyond and over Science. Philosophy may study Science but Science may not get involved in Philosophy. Philosophy is meant as the study of anything and everything using all possible tools while Science is the study of a certain realm of knowledge with specific methodic tools.
This sounds like wuliheron's reasoning, and I only partially agree. I think that some uncertainty can accomplish this purpose, but full Uncertainty just robs you of any progressive knowledge, and thus you get "stuck".
You tend to mention that “progressive knowledge,” too much. Perhaps I like it, too, but it won’t prevent me from seeing clearly that sticking to “progressive knowledge” may be as bad as “getting stuck.”

Let’s have your word and “suppose,” only “suppose,” that one will “get stuck” in Uncertainty. I just don’t see the problem with that. You may hate “getting stuck” but that’s your emotional state of mind, it may not enter this discussion.
I don't get this. You are saying, "I have an answer", then you say "My answer is paradoxical". What is supposed to incline me toward listening to this "answer"?
Nothing. Absolutely nothing can incline you, or anyone else, towards listening to anything. One’s inclinations lie deep in the dark labyrinth of one’s mind. There’s as much rationale behind your preference of “progressive knowledge” to “Uncertainty,” as there’s behind your preference of, say, McDonald’s fast food to fish and chips.

You may be inclined towards inquisitiveness and like to see other options. One such option that you’re offered is Uncertainty. You aren’t obliged to accept it, you aren’t even invited to take a look at it but you’ve come to, at least, flash past it once. What makes you choose something over the other is unknown to me, and I guess it’s unknown to you as well. I, too, have no idea what drives me towards choosing something.

A solid mountain of logic or an ocean of emotion or a blinding lightning of power, when applied from outside of you won’t change your mind. However, the slightest breeze of logic, emotion or power blowing “in” your mind may become a critical point to your life.
But, this "information" (of his/her non-existence) cannot be true, otherwise who would you be "informing" (Descartes' reasoning again)?
I’d be informing the “non-existing one.” Your system of thoughts doesn’t allow such thing, mine does. It’s up to you to fairly decide if a change is necessary somewhere.
… and that everything can be questioned, but in turns. You must take some things for granted while questioning others, and then later question the things that you previously took for granted, while taking the previous uncertainties as now certain. You just shouldn't be uncertain of all things at once…
I want to emphasize these words of yours. You say I “must” do this, you say I “should” do that, where do you take these from? These “must” and “should” of yours aren’t of our points of agreement in this discussion.

Once again, if my knowledge is a coherent structure the truth of every part of it will directly result in the truth of other parts of it. Now if I question things in turn, I’ll always be taking something for granted. That something will be part of this coherent structure so it will always prove other parts true. Nothing will change if I do that. Is that all with fair questioning? I question but go back to where I was? My saying “everything happens in loops” is much similar to this. Isn’t it?

Even worse (from you point of view), is that every part of my knowledge is an assertion of other parts. Now if I take some part for granted, I’ll be asserting the truth of other parts and then getting into showing their truth. Isn’t that self-reference come back again?
This reasoning isn't just for questioning foundations, but for questioning new assumptions/speculations, as well.

What you are missing is that it is impossible to question all foundations at once. I've tried to reason on it, and I can't, it's just not possible to do it...
I understand this but I don’t view it like you do. You’re assessing these situations according to your own priorities. You say paradoxes, self-reference, dead-ends and “getting stuck” are the results of being as fair as one can (that “fairness” is Uncertainty), and then insist one would better be a bit less fair but gain something worth that much effort put into many years of thinking.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #78
... continued from the previous post

You have your choice but then I’m also interested in Certainty just as much as I’m interested in Uncertainty. In spite of this interest I don’t assess those situations, assessed by you as “must-be-avoided,” as “must-be-avoided” but as “must-be-thought-of.”

Those situations are inevitable whenever one’s trying to use an encompassing logical system (see Gödel’s Theorem, I’m not much into it but I know a bit about it). Think about them and think why you think they must be avoided.
Exactly, and it is thus impossible to disprove existence! If re-thinking relies on other thoughts (which it obviously does) and you can't have had other thoughts without existing (as you've pointed out, in so many words), then you cannot really re-think your existence.
I didn’t mean you have to exist to think. I “only” said that re-thinking “existence” as “the most basic intuition” when done in a “bottom-to-top” manner must occur independent of any other thoughts. One such thought is “there should be an entity if an entity is thinking.”

However, there’s something good with your words. I’ve never said it is possible to disprove existence, I only said it is impossible to prove it. These two are complementary sides of one thing, that one thing being Uncertainty. If one’s uncertain of one’s existence, one wouldn’t be thinking one exists, one wouldn’t also be thinking one doesn’t exist.
That's what I've been saying you are not supposed to do. If you keep reinventing the wheel, then you'll never get to a car. Also, if you cannot work on any particular problem, without having to start form scratch, you will never solve any problem.
You like it the practical way. I won’t give up fairness for practicality. I haven’t come to solve a problem. I haven’t come to help the human species. I haven’t come to take something out of this. I want to build my own way of thought and for that purpose I’ll be scrutinizing every bit of every bit.

I’m doing it from scratch for I want to have it cleansed. Others seem to have introduced a hell of a lot of their own obsessions and absolute rubbish into the field. Even though there’ve surely been a few whose speech deserves reverence.
I don't understand this. Do you mean that I can't use someone else's opinion to help create my own?
You can but you can’t take their validity and/or truth for granted. You have to question them and take them apart to see if they’re valid and/or true in the context for/in which you’re going to use them.
Uncertainty does not have an order of things. If your uncertainty has an order to it, then it is not true Uncertainty.
The order of things in Uncertainty is their being uncertain and their being equally creditable.
No. It is, demonstrably, irrational and paradoxical (we've already shown this in previous posts).
Paradox and irrationality aren’t synonyms. Paradoxes are the brinks of rationality; they’re as much rational as they’re irrational.
… I have to get off-line now, but I hope you think about what I've written.
I seem to have thought about them :wink:.
 
  • #79
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

I won’t discuss the proof anymore. You’re in harsh misunderstanding of it and I’ve done my best to clarify but have failed. I re-shape and re-explain the proof one more time, but I won’t discuss it until you show you’ve understood what I mean. I don’t mean for you to agree with it, I just want you to understand it and then say whatever you like.


I had a pretty good understanding of what you were trying to say. My problem was that I couldn't make it "fit" the statement, "I think therefore I am".

Oh well, I don't think it was applicable anyway, so I'm glad enough to move on without it.

For one time only put aside all you think of the proof and read these lines, forget what we wrote before:

Take the statement “I think therefore I am” and call it Descartes’ statement and show it with Q. Now put this in the back of your mind. Put it away for later study. Don’t think about it for a moment.

Take the statement “There need be an I to think” and show it with P.

Just so long as you don't think that I ever implied proposition P. I never did. I said (and this is important): There need be an I for 'I' to think". The distinction being, obviously, the reference to the entity doing the thinking.

Since this proof is meant to be understood in Boolean logic framework, P may only assume one of these two states, T or F. I ask of you: “What state do you assign to P?” You may choose either T or F.

Rephrased as "There need be an I, for 'I' to think" - I say it is true.

Now we come to study Q. We know nothing of its state because this is what we’re going to find out.

For P you have chosen either T or F.

If you’ve chosen P to be T, then you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q. P is independent of Q and you’ve chosen P to be true before we come to study Q, so you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q because Q is a corollary of P. In pre-assuming truth for Q and coming to study it after this pre-assumption you’ve made a circular deduction. You’ve first assumed Q is true then come to study it and then concluded, again, that Q is true. Circular deduction is non-informative and isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

Wait a minute now. I said "P" was true, not "Q". Yes, I may be implying it, but that's just because Q inevitably follows P (as you've said). I was not even considering Q, because you told me not to.

If you’ve chosen P to be F, then you’ve contradicted this pre-assumption with asserting that Q is true. If P is false then Q can’t be true so Q must be false, too. P being F and Q being T is a paradox and this isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

Questions that may be asked concerning the proof:

00. How are P and Q related?
01. Why should I assign any state to P?
02. What if I want to study Q before assigning a state to P?
03. What does this whole mean?
04. Could this proof be applied to other statements?

Answers:

00. P and Q are semantically equal but logically independent. In the course of proof, they’re studied independently but then the results are synthesized and shown to be incompatible in a specific logical framework, namely Boolean logic.

You didn't show them incompatible. You just showed that if P is true, then Q must be, what's wrong with that?

Besides, your proposition "P" is not the same as any of the propositions that I have made (as I've shown above, it (P) requires some adjustment before it becomes one of my postulates). I don't agree with: "There need be an I to think", but I do agree with: "There need be an I, for 'I' to think".

02. You can’t because even if you don’t assign a state to P it must have some state which is either T or F. No matter what the state for P is, it’s shown in the proof that either way will cause trouble.

No, you just showed that calling it false could be problematic, and I tend to agree.

04. Many other statements may be proven to be incompatible in the framework of Boolean logic.
That’s right. Isn’t that another plus for Uncertainty? Since no system of thoughts can be shown fair and sincere without being committed to another or the same system of thoughts, one must always be aware of distortions in the judgment. Wouldn’t it be the fairest to be uncertain of everything? Being uncertain is just another way of thinking, the most general one.

Has the paradox of trying to be completely Uncertain gone over your head, or are you just ignoring it?

Survival exists in the scientific Universe, it needn’t exist anywhere else. The struggle for survival has been scientifically observed in the nature. To say the root of desires is survival is equal to saying that there’s the nature, that it can be observed, that these observations can be concluded from and that the certain conclusion is the struggle for survival. This doesn’t seem to be much of Philosophy.

You forget, Science is a branch of Philosophy. Thus, any Scientific claims that I make, can be considered Philosophical.

You can’t make any scientific claim in a realm beyond and over Science. Philosophy may study Science but Science may not get involved in Philosophy. Philosophy is meant as the study of anything and everything using all possible tools while Science is the study of a certain realm of knowledge with specific methodic tools.

Science is one of the tools that Philosophy uses.

You tend to mention that “progressive knowledge,” too much. Perhaps I like it, too, but it won’t prevent me from seeing clearly that sticking to “progressive knowledge” may be as bad as “getting stuck.”

It may be, but the human race (and other animal races) seem to have a greater chance of surviving, if they progress in knowledge and understanding.

Also, you seem to like Philosophy. In case you haven't heard this before, Philosophy is the love and pursuit of Wisdom. Wisdom is applied Knowledge. Thus you cannot Philosophize without taking in knowledge, can you?

Let’s have your word and “suppose,” only “suppose,” that one will “get stuck” in Uncertainty. I just don’t see the problem with that. You may hate “getting stuck” but that’s your emotional state of mind, it may not enter this discussion.

No, it's not that I have a problem with getting stuck, it's that Uncertainty is not just "sticky", it's unusable. With paradox at it's very heart, it's impossible to use it in any way. In fact, it can be (and has been, by me) argued that it is impossible to completely Uncertain.

Nothing. Absolutely nothing can incline you, or anyone else, towards listening to anything. One’s inclinations lie deep in the dark labyrinth of one’s mind. There’s as much rationale behind your preference of “progressive knowledge” to “Uncertainty,” as there’s behind your preference of, say, McDonald’s fast food to fish and chips.

Didn't I already show that Uncertainty is inherently irrational? If so, then isn't it obvious that there can be no "rationale" to Uncertainty, while there is some to "progressive knowledge"? If so, then my choice is rather a bit more justified then my choice of Pizza Hut (one of my personal favorite restaurants), to Little Ceasers (who also makes good pizza, but not as good IMO :smile:).

You may be inclined towards inquisitiveness and like to see other options. One such option that you’re offered is Uncertainty. You aren’t obliged to accept it, you aren’t even invited to take a look at it but you’ve come to, at least, flash past it once. What makes you choose something over the other is unknown to me, and I guess it’s unknown to you as well. I, too, have no idea what drives me towards choosing something.

I don't know either. You know, It's interesting enough to point out that the fact that you can settle on Uncertainty, means that you aren't truly Uncertain.

I’d be informing the “non-existing one.” Your system of thoughts doesn’t allow such thing, mine does.

Then why do you still refer to "it" as "the non-existing one?

Once again, if my knowledge is a coherent structure the truth of every part of it will directly result in the truth of other parts of it. Now if I question things in turn, I’ll always be taking something for granted. That something will be part of this coherent structure so it will always prove other parts true. Nothing will change if I do that. Is that all with fair questioning? I question but go back to where I was? My saying “everything happens in loops” is much similar to this. Isn’t it?

And yet this reasoning only applies to questioning your foundations.

Even worse (from you point of view), is that every part of my knowledge is an assertion of other parts. Now if I take some part for granted, I’ll be asserting the truth of other parts and then getting into showing their truth. Isn’t that self-reference come back again?
I understand this but I don’t view it like you do. You’re assessing these situations according to your own priorities. You say paradoxes, self-reference, dead-ends and “getting stuck” are the results of being as fair as one can (that “fairness” is Uncertainty), and then insist one would better be a bit less fair but gain something worth that much effort put into many years of thinking.

Fairness and Uncertainty (please notice the capitalized "U") are not the same thing. Uncertainty requires a bias also. (Of course, that bias is just the bias of trying to be unbiased...which is a paradoxical concept of the same type as the Paradox of Limitlessness).
 
  • #80
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Those situations are inevitable whenever one’s trying to use an encompassing logical system (see Gödel’s Theorem, I’m not much into it but I know a bit about it). Think about them and think why you think they must be avoided.
I didn’t mean you have to exist to think. I “only” said that re-thinking “existence” as “the most basic intuition” when done in a “bottom-to-top” manner must occur independent of any other thoughts. One such thought is “there should be an entity if an entity is thinking.”

But who is doing the reasoning then? The thought that there should be an entity if an entity is thinking, can be taken apart into it's two parts ("there should be an entity", and "an entity is thinking"), the second of which is composed of two propositions, one of which is "there is an entity". Oh well, I've already said this same thing before, and I still haven't gotten a good response, on this particular point.

However, there’s something good with your words. I’ve never said it is possible to disprove existence, I only said it is impossible to prove it. These two are complementary sides of one thing, that one thing being Uncertainty. If one’s uncertain of one’s existence, one wouldn’t be thinking one exists, one wouldn’t also be thinking one doesn’t exist.
You like it the practical way. I won’t give up fairness for practicality. I haven’t come to solve a problem. I haven’t come to help the human species. I haven’t come to take something out of this. I want to build my own way of thought and for that purpose I’ll be scrutinizing every bit of every bit.

I’m doing it from scratch for I want to have it cleansed. Others seem to have introduced a hell of a lot of their own obsessions and absolute rubbish into the field. Even though there’ve surely been a few whose speech deserves reverence.
You can but you can’t take their validity and/or truth for granted. You have to question them and take them apart to see if they’re valid and/or true in the context for/in which you’re going to use them.
The order of things in Uncertainty is their being uncertain and their being equally creditable.
Paradox and irrationality aren’t synonyms. Paradoxes are the brinks of rationality; they’re as much rational as they’re irrational.

I would respond to this whole quote, but I don't have time. I think you make some excellent points, and some that I don't agree with, especially to do with Uncertainty. However, let me draw your attention to your last sentence. You see, I believe you are wrong about Paradox. They may be the brinks of rationality, but that means that they are still in "irrational" territory. Besides, I don't see them as the brinks of rationality, so much as they are the end of one line of reasoning, and thus - when pursued - can easily lead one to irrationality.
 
  • #81
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
I had a pretty good understanding of what you were trying to say. My problem was that I couldn't make it "fit" the statement, "I think therefore I am".

Oh well, I don't think it was applicable anyway, so I'm glad enough to move on without it.
No, unfortunately you don't seem to have a phantom of a shadow of having understood this proof. Your following sentences show this. And it's me who must be assured that you've understood the proof for you yourself are always sure you've understood the whole thing.

Please don't be glad. I'm not moving on without it, I only suspend it until you get the point. If you don't the entire discussion has been pointless. Here are my last words on this proof.
Just so long as you don't think that I ever implied proposition P. I never did. I said (and this is important): There need be an I for 'I' to think". The distinction being, obviously, the reference to the entity doing the thinking.
I didn't say you implied it. I proposed it. The proof doesn't care who's proposed this statement.
Rephrased as "There need be an I, for 'I' to think" - I say it is true.
You may not rephrase it. It’s my statement. I propose a specific statement and ask of you of its state. I'm not interested in any statements you may think are equal to that statement.
Wait a minute now. I said "P" was true, not "Q". Yes, I may be implying it, but that's just because Q inevitably follows P (as you've said). I was not even considering Q, because you told me not to.
This is logic. P and Q are independent but I may derive Q's state from the state you assigned to Q. I asked you not to consider Q in order to take care of this independence but the logical system can be used at any time to derive and conclude. That's why I say P and Q show inconsistency in Boolean logic. I use the rules and never break them but I arrive at a forbidden point.
You didn't show them incompatible. You just showed that if P is true, then Q must be, what's wrong with that?
I showed. That P's truth will result in Q's truth is taken from your premise that "for an entity to think there must be an entity," it doesn't relate to this proof. The proof shows that whatever state has been chosen for P, either T or F, P and Q together lead into either a loop or a paradox.
Besides, your proposition "P" is not the same as any of the propositions that I have made ... I don't agree with: "There need be an I to think", but I do agree with: "There need be an I, for 'I' to think".
See, it isn't important which state your choose for P. You may agree or disagree with it. The point in this proof is that no matter you agree or disagree with P, it will cause trouble. And for Boolean logic you must either agree or disagree with P, you can't postpone or suspend judgment. This is the vulnerability I'm talking of. P can't be suspended to be judged after Q has been judged. They must be judged at one time and this coincidence causes trouble.

P needn't be one of your premises. It's only a statement and for every given statement you have to be able to definitely determine its state, if you claim consistency in Boolean logic.
No, you just showed that calling it false could be problematic, and I tend to agree.
I also showed calling it true will be problematic. How then you ask? If you call it true you've slipped into pre-assuming an assertion of what you're just going to prove, the other statement, Q.
Has the paradox of trying to be completely Uncertain gone over your head, or are you just ignoring it?
Being uncertain isn't absolutely fair but it's relatively fairer than any other stance. This relative fairness in comparison to other stances is what I call a plus for Uncertainty.

Being uncertain requires no assumption but "nothing is certain."
You forget, Science is a branch of Philosophy. Thus, any Scientific claims that I make, can be considered Philosophical.

Science is one of the tools that Philosophy uses.

It may be, but the human race (and other animal races) seem to have a greater chance of surviving, if they progress in knowledge and understanding.

Also, you seem to like Philosophy. In case you haven't heard this before, Philosophy is the love and pursuit of Wisdom. Wisdom is applied Knowledge. Thus you cannot Philosophize without taking in knowledge, can you?
If Science is a branch of Philosophy, it can be seen as Philosophy's subset. A subset has all its members contained in its superset but it doesn't contain all of the superset's members. Hence Philosophy may embrace non-scientific or even anti-scientific claims, which means scientific claims don't qualify for assessing philosophical claims. Philosophy is simply "over" Science.

Philosophy may study Science and scientific tools but it may not use Science as a tool. Using Science as a tool to assess/evaluate/judge will result in all scientific claims being approved and all non-scientific ones disapproved. It also limits the borders of Philosophy to Science.

And I don't like your way of talking the words, Philosophy, Wisdom and applied Wisdom. "Survival" is a piece of knowledge from scientific Universe; it may not be mixed with philosophical thought.

Philosophy is the study of human situation in all of its aspects. Philosophy must use tools independent of specific viewpoints, Science for example, in order to avoid confirming those viewpoints with their own tools. It's obvious that Science will seem consistent viewed by its own tools and premises. Philosophy must study Science and other ways of viewing the Universe from their outside.
No, it's not that I have a problem with getting stuck, it's that Uncertainty is not just "sticky", it's unusable...
Let's suppose, only suppose, that Uncertainty is unusable. What's the problem with that? Suppose we've tried to study human situation and we've come to this unusable concept, is there a problem with that?

You may argue that total Uncertainty is impossible and I may "perhaps" accept that. In which logical framework has this happened? Boolean logic. Aren't there any other logical systems? There are. You must prove this for all logical systems and now this is impossible.
Didn't I already show that Uncertainty is inherently irrational? If so, then isn't it obvious that there can be no "rationale" to Uncertainty, while there is some to "progressive knowledge"?...
You didn't show for I wrote of the order of things in Uncertainty and you accepted that every order may be considered rationale.

Even if we suppose, only suppose, Uncertainty is irrational, nothing is more "justified." Why do you think rationalization can distinguish one idea among others, that a rational idea is "better" than an irrational one?
You know, It's interesting enough to point out that the fact that you can settle on Uncertainty, means that you aren't truly Uncertain.
For me, Uncertainty is only one step in a way. I don't settle on it. I take this step and then come new understandings. You view my stance as an aggressive attempt to Certainty about Uncertainty while it actually isn't that way. My way is another between-the-lines hint. Try to see the hint, between the lines, don't struggle to break the lines up, they aren't worth the effort.
Then why do you still refer to "it" as "the non-existing one?
"It" may include and refer to the "non-existing" ones as well as the "existing" ones.
And yet this reasoning only applies to questioning your foundations.
Accept it for the foundations. Extend it to all knowledge for every piece of knowledge may be taken as an equally creditable foundation.
... Uncertainty requires a bias also...
Yes, it is. Yet it's the fairest bias.
But who is doing the reasoning then? The thought that there should be an entity if an entity is thinking, can be taken apart into it's two parts ... the second of which is composed of two propositions, one of which is "there is an entity"...
The non-existing one. See, I understand what you mean. You say "thinking" is so firmly in correspondence with "existing" (by the bond of Causality, that there must be a doer for a deed to be) that any form of "thinking" (eg, thinking about non-existence) can be an undeniable indication of "existing." I doubted that bond of Causality and talked of it being broken and its substitutes. Did you take this into account? If you avoid relying on Causality then a deed will no more be an undeniable indication of a doer, be the deed reasoning, thinking, eating, whatever.

Once again, I suggest you take a look at Gödel’s Theorem. Many things will be clear then.
... They may be the brinks of rationality, but that means that they are still in "irrational" territory. Besides, I don't see them as the brinks of rationality, so much as they are the end of one line of reasoning, and thus - when pursued - can easily lead one to irrationality.
Let's see how you come to a paradox. A paradox is reached when you start out with valid premises, use valid rules of deduction but you end with an invalid result (the collocation of contraries). Everything in here is rational. It's rationalization come to a brink for only rationality may have brinks. Irrationality may even be "limitless" for it's irrational, where your argument of "limitlessness" no more works.

Paradox lies on the border of rationality and irrationality. You come to a paradox after some lines of reasoning and then you "may" bypass it into irrationality. You stop at the sight of a paradox, that's what you do. You won't go on after a paradox and that's exactly why it's the brink of rationality. You reach the border and you don't want to step into irrationality so you'll take aback for a while and then try to find another way.
 
  • #82
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
No, unfortunately you don't seem to have a phantom of a shadow of having understood this proof. Your following sentences show this. And it's me who must be assured that you've understood the proof for you yourself are always sure you've understood the whole thing.

Truth be told, I haven't made all that much effort to understand the proof, as you have yet to show me how it "fits" Descartes' statement. It still doesn't appear to.

Please don't be glad. I'm not moving on without it, I only suspend it until you get the point. If you don't the entire discussion has been pointless.

Only because you have placed so much emphasis on a proof that doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' statement. If you would argue the statement itself, I would not declare anything you said to be irrelevant.

I didn't say you implied it. I proposed it. The proof doesn't care who's proposed this statement.

No, I know, but then this statement would just be a random statement, designed for proving that Boolean Logic was inconsistent, but not designed to attack the statement in any way.

It now becomes apparent (please correct me if I'm wrong) that that's what you've been doing this entire time. You've just been trying to prove that Boolean Logic is inconsistent, while still claiming ultimate Uncertainty. This is obviously also contradictory, as you've said that Uncertainty is fair to all systems.

This is logic. P and Q are independent but I may derive Q's state from the state you assigned to Q. I asked you not to consider Q in order to take care of this independence but the logical system can be used at any time to derive and conclude. That's why I say P and Q show inconsistency in Boolean logic. I use the rules and never break them but I arrive at a forbidden point.

I'm sorry, I really do not see it. Maybe there's something wrong with me, but I can't see anything wrong with one proposition's implying another.

I showed. That P's truth will result in Q's truth is taken from your premise that "for an entity to think there must be an entity," it doesn't relate to this proof. The proof shows that whatever state has been chosen for P, either T or F, P and Q together lead into either a loop or a paradox.

Where is the paradox?

See, it isn't important which state your choose for P. You may agree or disagree with it. The point in this proof is that no matter you agree or disagree with P, it will cause trouble. And for Boolean logic you must either agree or disagree with P, you can't postpone or suspend judgment. This is the vulnerability I'm talking of. P can't be suspended to be judged after Q has been judged. They must be judged at one time and this coincidence causes trouble.

Why? There coincidence means that they are inter-related. So? What's wrong with that? Is there some proposition of Boolean Logic that states that there can be no two inter-related propositions?

P needn't be one of your premises. It's only a statement and for every given statement you have to be able to definitely determine its state, if you claim consistency in Boolean logic.

I understand. Please forgive my past attempts to show that it didn't apply to Descartes' statement. It's obvious that you didn't care about Descartes' statement, but were trying to show an inconsistency with Boolean Logic as a whole. That's what the P([bleep]) analogy was for too, wasn't it? While I still don't see the inconsistency caused by these proofs, I do see that that's all you were trying to show (inconsistency in Boolean Logic).

I also showed calling it true will be problematic. How then you ask? If you call it true you've slipped into pre-assuming an assertion of what you're just going to prove, the other statement, Q.

So? In deciding that P is true, I pre-suppose that another (very related) statement is also true. So what?

For example, if I say "I'm alive" = proposition P. Then I say that propostion Q = "I exist". Taking "P" to be true necessitates that I pre-suppose the truth of "Q" - but what's wrong with that?

Being uncertain requires no assumption but "nothing is certain."

Yes, and that would be an assumption, wouldn't it? If that is an assumption, then Uncertainty is not entirely free of assumptions, is it? However, if the one assumption that it has is "there are no assumptions", then it must both have and not have any assumptions...this is a paradox/self-contradictory idea, just like limitlessness.

Philosophy may study Science and scientific tools but it may not use Science as a tool. Using Science as a tool to assess/evaluate/judge will result in all scientific claims being approved and all non-scientific ones disapproved. It also limits the borders of Philosophy to Science.

Not necessarily. Let's say that Philosophy makes use of both religious philosophy, and nihilism. So what if they contradict each other? They are still both important Philosophies. Neither of them limit Philosophy, they simply provide structures - within the realm of Philosophy - for different kinds of people to form their opinions in.

Let's suppose, only suppose, that Uncertainty is unusable. What's the problem with that? Suppose we've tried to study human situation and we've come to this unusable concept, is there a problem with that?

You have called Uncertainty "fair", "more reliable then certainty", "better conclusion", etc... . If Uncertainty is unusable, then none of these terms apply to it.

You may argue that total Uncertainty is impossible and I may "perhaps" accept that. In which logical framework has this happened? Boolean logic. Aren't there any other logical systems? There are. You must prove this for all logical systems and now this is impossible.

Why do you ask me to do something that you know very well is impossible? Different logic systems often contradict each other directly. That means that no one can use all of them to prove something, at the same time.

You didn't show for I wrote of the order of things in Uncertainty and you accepted that every order may be considered rationale.

There is no order of things in true Uncertainty. You have shown the rationale (by my definition) of uncertainty, but not of Uncertainty.

Even if we suppose, only suppose, Uncertainty is irrational, nothing is more "justified." Why do you think rationalization can distinguish one idea among others, that a rational idea is "better" than an irrational one?

You think so too, otherwise you wouldn't have tried to assign a rationale to Uncertainty.

"It" may include and refer to the "non-existing" ones as well as the "existing" ones.

"It" may not include "non-existing" ones. In speaking of specific "ones" you imply their existence, at least in a conceptual manner.

Yes, it is. Yet it's the fairest bias.

No it's not, because it denies all other biases. At least Science allows for some of the things that it finds/theorizes to be wrong. Uncertainty has only one premise, and that is that there can be no premises (which doesn't allow for any of the other fields of study to be correct). How is that fair?

The non-existing one. See, I understand what you mean. You say "thinking" is so firmly in correspondence with "existing" (by the bond of Causality, that there must be a doer for a deed to be) that any form of "thinking" (eg, thinking about non-existence) can be an undeniable indication of "existing." I doubted that bond of Causality and talked of it being broken and its substitutes. Did you take this into account? If you avoid relying on Causality then a deed will no more be an undeniable indication of a doer, be the deed reasoning, thinking, eating, whatever.

I took your "substitutions" into account. As it turns out, they all rely on Causality anyway. Or at least it appears that way to me. For example, the inter-relationship between two "Quantum-bound electrons"; the reaction is instantaneous, and thus neither of the two can be considered the "cause". However, the "observer" can be considered the "cause", and without him/her, there would be no effect (the change of spin of the two electrons).

Let's see how you come to a paradox. A paradox is reached when you start out with valid premises, use valid rules of deduction but you end with an invalid result (the collocation of contraries). Everything in here is rational. It's rationalization come to a brink for only rationality may have brinks. Irrationality may even be "limitless" for it's irrational, where your argument of "limitlessness" no more works.

Paradox lies on the border of rationality and irrationality. You come to a paradox after some lines of reasoning and then you "may" bypass it into irrationality. You stop at the sight of a paradox, that's what you do. You won't go on after a paradox and that's exactly why it's the brink of rationality. You reach the border and you don't want to step into irrationality so you'll take aback for a while and then try to find another way.

Yes, and that's what so many logicians/philosophers/scientists/mathematicians/etc... have done in the past. When they come to a paradox, they realize that there must be some flaw in the particular line of reasoning that they've been following, and they abandon it in search of a better one.
 
  • #83
As I see it, 'thinking' is how existence is assertained - along with 'sensation-of-awareness'. Thus thinking is the source of knowing that 'existence is'.
Therefore, it can definitely be claimed that 'thought' is evidence of existence. Since it is.
Therefore, since am-ness equates to existence, we can definitely say that I think, therefore I am.
Descartes was correct I think, about this. The only talking-point is the meaning of 'I'. "Who exactly am I?", is the only thing left to ponder.
 
  • #84
Originally posted by Lifegazer
As I see it, 'thinking' is how existence is assertained - along with 'sensation-of-awareness'. Thus thinking is the source of knowing that 'existence is'.
Therefore, it can definitely be claimed that 'thought' is evidence of existence. Since it is.
Therefore, since am-ness equates to existence, we can definitely say that I think, therefore I am.
Descartes was correct I think, about this. The only talking-point is the meaning of 'I'. "Who exactly am I?", is the only thing left to ponder.

So Descartes' reasoning applies, whether there is anything other than the Mind's thoughts, or not, right?

Good point, lifegazer.
 
  • #85
Originally posted by Mentat
So Descartes' reasoning applies, whether there is anything other than the Mind's thoughts, or not, right?
I claim to be a rationalist too. I don't know a lot about Descartes, though I understand that his statement "I think, therefore I am." is rationally correct. Though like I say, the question of "Who am I?" is left untouched. By Descartes, anyway.:wink:
 
  • #86
Originally posted by Lifegazer
I claim to be a rationalist too. I don't know a lot about Descartes, though I understand that his statement "I think, therefore I am." is rationally correct. Though like I say, the question of "Who am I?" is left untouched. By Descartes, anyway.:wink:

That's very true, at least as far as I've read from his Philosophies.
 
  • #87
Originally posted by Mentat
That's very true, at least as far as I've read from his Philosophies.
You surprise me. Do you realize that Descartes' axiom puts you within touching-distance of my own personal mind-hypothesis? I'm not asking you to discuss my hypothesis - I'm just 'shocked' (pardon the exaggeration) at your responses here.
 
  • #88
Originally posted by Lifegazer
You surprise me. Do you realize that Descartes' axiom puts you within touching-distance of my own personal mind-hypothesis? I'm not asking you to discuss my hypothesis - I'm just 'shocked' (pardon the exaggeration) at your responses here.

I've always agreed with some of the points of your idea. I just don't agree with the premise/conclusion (there really should be a word for a premise that is also a conclusion). You are probably correct that we can't get information without the use of the "senses". And perhaps even correct that we can thus never prove the existence of an external reality. I just don't agree with your alternative.

Besides, even if I fully agreed with you, I would probably still present an argument against you :wink:. That's just the kind of person I am: The true Devil's Advocate .
 
  • #89
Originally posted by Mentat
I've always agreed with some of the points of your idea. I just don't agree with the premise/conclusion (there really should be a word for a premise that is also a conclusion).
My premise builds upon sensation & thought. The conclusion about God is not the same as the opening-premise.
Besides, even if I fully agreed with you, I would probably still present an argument against you :wink:. That's just the kind of person I am: The true Devil's Advocate .
There's nothing wrong with that. But you should apply the same challenges to your own philosophies. Never close your mind to anything that you cannot disprove.
 
  • #90
Originally posted by Lifegazer
There's nothing wrong with that. But you should apply the same challenges to your own philosophies. Never close your mind to anything that you cannot disprove.

Good point. I do try to apply my Devil's Advocate mentality to my own philosophies. I don't, however, type my contradictions to my own philosophy on the Forums (unless other people aren't making any worthy attempt to contradict it, in which case I decide to give them something to work off of, but this is rare).
 
  • #91
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Apologies for the delay.
Truth be told, I haven't made all that much effort to understand the proof, as you have yet to show me how it "fits" Descartes' statement. It still doesn't appear to.
How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?

I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?
Only because you have placed so much emphasis on a proof that doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' statement. If you would argue the statement itself, I would not declare anything you said to be irrelevant.
It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.
... but then this statement would just be a random statement, designed for proving that Boolean Logic was inconsistent, but not designed to attack the statement in any way.

... You've just been trying to prove that Boolean Logic is inconsistent, while still claiming ultimate Uncertainty. This is obviously also contradictory, as you've said that Uncertainty is fair to all systems.

... It's obvious that you didn't care about Descartes' statement, but were trying to show an inconsistency with Boolean Logic as a whole. That's what the P([bleep]) analogy was for too, wasn't it?...
First, you're right. I've been trying to show the inconsistency but there's a specific place where the inconsistency occurs and that's when statements like "I think therefore I am" are studied. This shows an incompatibility between this statement and the viewpoint from which it's meant to be seen.

My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.

Like I wrote before, Descartes' statement isn't intrinsically problematic. Problems rise when this statement is viewed in a specific logical framework.

Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it let's one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted. To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It let's one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair. It's worth noting that Uncertainty won't give an evaluation system by which to rank knowledge bodies, it only shows (or is meant to show) their status quo, show them as they are not as they're seen from inside. Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other but it enables its user to see that one idea is consistent while the other one isn't. It should be clear that inconsistency is only an attribute of a knowledge body, not a means of preference or else.
I'm sorry, I really do not see it. Maybe there's something wrong with me, but I can't see anything wrong with one proposition's implying another.
It isn't a simple implication; it's pre-assumption. This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).

You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.
Where is the paradox?
If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.

One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.
Why? There coincidence means that they are inter-related. So? What's wrong with that? Is there some proposition of Boolean Logic that states that there can be no two inter-related propositions?
No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.

P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.
For example, if I say "I'm alive" = proposition P. Then I say that propostion Q = "I exist". Taking "P" to be true necessitates that I pre-suppose the truth of "Q" - but what's wrong with that?
If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.

You surely know of Vienna Circle and their "verifiability criterion." In analogy to that "verifiability criterion" (ie, "that which can't be verified may not be claimed"), one can say "that which can't be proven wrong may be claimed but is non-informative."
Yes, and that would be an assumption, wouldn't it? If that is an assumption, then Uncertainty is not entirely free of assumptions, is it? However, if the one assumption that it has is "there are no assumptions", then it must both have and not have any assumptions...this is a paradox/self-contradictory idea, just like limitlessness.
Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).

And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.
Not necessarily. Let's say that Philosophy makes use of both religious philosophy, and nihilism. So what if they contradict each other? They are still both important Philosophies...
Philosophy doesn't "make use" of these viewpoints. Its main task is to "study" and "compare" them and in order to remain fair it must remain neutral to them. After having "studied" and "compared" them, they "may" be evaluated and ordered based on some criteria. Resultant is the choice of a viewpoint that would be one's stance on the subject. This stance is also called "one's Philosophy" but this is merely a lexical ambiguity. Philosophy happens before the selection, manipulation and implementation of a viewpoint.

Viewpoints may contradict each other while Philosophy, as the means of study, remains intact. Philosophy only needs to reflect these contradictions as comparative reports but need not and should not get involved in them. One such viewpoint is Science, another is Christianity, yet another is Logical Positivism and so on. Philosophy's task is to study these one by one and then comparatively. That a scientist thinks this planet has been around for some 4.5 billion years while biblical words say that the Creation happened some thousands of years ago, is something worth noting for Philosophy but nothing worth getting involved in.
You have called Uncertainty "fair", "more reliable then certainty", "better conclusion", etc... . If Uncertainty is unusable, then none of these terms apply to it.
"You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."

By the way, I couldn't find out where I'd claimed Uncertainty to be "reliable." I said what we think we know is unreliable. This doesn't mean that doubting our knowledge is more reliable. I clearly said that Uncertainty (quoting myself) "robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness."
Why do you ask me to do something that you know very well is impossible? Different logic systems often contradict each other directly. That means that no one can use all of them to prove something, at the same time.
Because, as a result of this impossibility, one can't claim one's reasoning inbound some logical system is encompassing. You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).

Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #92
... continued from the previous post
There is no order of things in true Uncertainty. You have shown the rationale (by my definition) of uncertainty, but not of Uncertainty.
Let's see what "order" means. The books in the Library of Congress are "ordered." What does this mean? I guess it means there's a well-defined well-rounded rule set that assigns them to their respective places. This rule set has been chosen based on an analysis of the premises assumed for building a library (eg, accessibility, exactness, clarity, whatever). Notice that this rule set doesn't give significance or distinction to some books. It only orders them but doesn't rank them. There is an "order" but it isn't an order of "significance" or "preference."

So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.

Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."
You think so too, otherwise you wouldn't have tried to assign a rationale to Uncertainty.
I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.

By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.
"It" may not include "non-existing" ones. In speaking of specific "ones" you imply their existence, at least in a conceptual manner.
This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say ).
No it's not, because it denies all other biases. At least Science allows for some of the things that it finds/theorizes to be wrong. Uncertainty has only one premise, and that is that there can be no premises (which doesn't allow for any of the other fields of study to be correct). How is that fair?
Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.

That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way. It means condition, diversity, value, significance and outcome of every choice are wrapped in Uncertainty. One can risk choosing or even risk not choosing.

Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go? You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications. Practicality can be defined either as "what Science is concerned with" or as anything else. The first definition is intra-scientific so it doesn't qualify to evaluate anything but Science. If the second definition, anything else, is allowed then there would be countless other definitions. If one of the countless definitions can be chosen at will one may choose one that corresponds with what Uncertainty concerned with. Now, with this new definition, Uncertainty is "practical."
I took your "substitutions" into account. As it turns out, they all rely on Causality anyway. Or at least it appears that way to me. For example, the inter-relationship between two "Quantum-bound electrons"; the reaction is instantaneous, and thus neither of the two can be considered the "cause". However, the "observer" can be considered the "cause", and without him/her, there would be no effect (the change of spin of the two electrons).
I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.

Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.

What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.

As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs. Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.
Yes, and that's what so many logicians/philosophers/scientists/mathematicians/etc... have done in the past. When they come to a paradox, they realize that there must be some flaw in the particular line of reasoning that they've been following, and they abandon it in search of a better one.
Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.

Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?

Not all Philosophers/Scientists have given up at the sight of paradox. There've been some to think of its nature and why it's faced everywhere. The great example is Kurt Gödel. Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.

There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.

Hint: I told you Uncertainty is a double-edged sword. See if you can use the other edge.
 
  • #93
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Apologies for the delay.
How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?

I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?
It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.

I also apologize for the delay, your post was simply too long for me to respond to, with the time I had left, yesterday.

You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement. You showed the problems with your proof. You also showed that a "helper device" need not be of the same form as the proposition that they are trying to resolve/explain. However, you didn't show how your particular proof "fit" Descartes' philosophy.

My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.

How does it "suit" Descartes' statement? Your statement only examines the inconsistency found when trying to analyze a proof of the form "P([bleep]), doesn't it? Descartes' statement isn't of the form "P([bleep])".

Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it let's one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted.

But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.

To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It let's one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair.

I agree with you, provided you are talking about limited uncertainty. I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well. Of course, you only have to doubt the Uncertainty premise if you accept it (because it is that premise which states that you must doubt all premises). Do you see why this is paradoxical?

Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other...

Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.

This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).

This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.

You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.

Yes, it is non-informative. However (briefly returning to the point of the thread), if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know, it just doesn't allow them to try to disprove that which they knew (that I exist) without contradicting themselves.

If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.

It (assuming that P is T and that Q is T) is not so much circular as it is non-productive. However, the Evil Demon is assuming that P is T (otherwise, who is he trying to convince?), and then trying to prove that Q is F at the same time. Thus the paradox, and thus the conviction that trying to prove my non-existence is futile (according to Descartes).

One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.
No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.

I've already said that there is no need of studying it. It is the Evil Demon that has the problem of trying to prove that Q is F, while pre-assuming that P is T.

Also, isn't it just as "circular" (non-productive) to assume that P is F, and then to assume that Q is also F?

P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.

But it is also unnecessary. We are assuming the truth of both statements at the same time. What's wrong with that?

If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.

Tell that to the Evil Demon.

Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.

Wrong. Uncertainty's one assumption makes it paradoxical and self-contradictory, not "fair".

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?

And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.

Uncertainty shouldn't be viewed as a "step in a way" (IMO). It should be viewed as a road-block, because it's paradoxical.

Besides, if it leads to Certainty (which would the absolute form of "certainty") then it's not much good anyway. I don't want "Certainty". I want a healthy amount of uncertainty. If one can keep these things (certainty and uncertainty) in balance, then one doesn't run into the paradoxes of either extreme. This is the "fair" way (or so it seems to me).

"You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."

As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk a lot about it's being more "fair".

You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).

You yourself have said (posted but un-quoted - ran out of room) that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?

Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.

Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty (couldn't resist :wink:).

continued on the next post...

As is my response...
 
  • #94
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
... continued from the previous post
So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.

OK.

Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."

But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.

I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.

Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).

By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.

It doesn't matter. Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.

This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say ).

Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?

Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.

Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.

That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way.

No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".

Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go?

It's not the only way I go.

You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications.

Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.

I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.

I don't understand the question (was it a question?). I was saying that Pre-established Harmony also necessitates a form of Cause-and-effect relationship, and is thus not an alternative to Causality, but merely one of the forms of it.

Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.

No, the limit is not between them, as it would under "usual" Causal reasoning. But that doesn't mean that there is no cause at all. I really don't remember what Pre-established harmony is. I thought it had to do with the Quantum binding of two particles, and that there states change instaneously/simultaneouly. It is in this particular case that I still see a cause (the "observer").

What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.

Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occurring.

As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs.

I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?

Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?

Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.

But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.

Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.

But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction".

Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?

It seems resolved. See the thread, "Zeno's Paradoxes".

Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.

No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.

There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.

It means everything here. It is the reason why I don't use Uncertainty.
 
  • #95
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement...
I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?

The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?

To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:

00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).
But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.
Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."

You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest." Relatively more fairness when seen in comparison to other stances doesn't mean absolute fairness. It's only "the fairest" and not "absolutely fair."
... I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well...
I see why it's paradoxical but I don't run away at the sight of paradox. You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.

You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body? And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?

The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.

Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?

So if one's to study Science or Religion fairly one has to stay outside both of them and whatever other knowledge body that may interfere in fair judgment by the means of its premises. The same is valid for any study of any other knowledge body.

Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty. One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?
Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.
First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.

Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?
This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.
This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.

For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.

I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.

Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.

Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular. One can't oppose a statement that is made of itself and that's why one can't oppose "I am therefore I am." Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.
... if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know...
And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."

There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.
Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?
One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.

Any knowledge body, in order to remain consistent, must somewhere assert its own premises. Many times though, this is done with much subtlety.

Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.

Furthermore, Uncertainty needn't care for explaining the "phenomenal" Universe. The "phenomenal" Universe is the "sensible" one and "senses" and "relying on the input from the senses" are all from the "scientific" Universe. Philosophy comes before one chooses to submit to the scientific Universe.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #96
... continued from the previous post

The balance you talk about is achieved after both extremes are experienced. That balance, I guess, is somehow like that "residual understanding" I wrote of. One experiences Certainty (in the form of scientific and/or religious and/or whatever belief) then one experiences Uncertainty and then comes the residual understanding, or as you call it "the balance." If you're in balance then you won't be sure that you're absolutely right but you also won't be sure that you're wrong. You have a good amount of hope in that that your thoughts may work as you wish and choose and think on the basis of that hope. Am I correct here? If yes, then I think you already have experienced with Uncertainty and Certainty.
As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk a lot about it's being more "fair".
I never said it's "better." I said it's a "fairer" substitute. And again "you" interpret the "fairness" I talk about as "practicality." I don't put any value on Uncertainty for it's worthless but it's "fair" and "sincere" to that which is called Philosophy.
You yourself have said ... that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?
Don't prove and don't claim your argument "encompassing" and "ever-true." Your arguments are good inside a framework of Boolean logic, beyond that isn't in your, or anyone else's, power.

We can discuss the thing in some framework and get results for that framework and we can be satisfied with those results in their respective framework. However, there's no warranty, even limited, for outside of that framework. And clearly there's much more to outside than to inside.
Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty...
Seriously, do you have some grounds for that claim? If yes, do you know that if your grounds are creditable you would have overcome one of the most compelling challenges humanity has faced?

Claiming that some logical systems are "less creditable" makes a basis for choosing among logical systems. Do you know what this means? This means some forms of attitude can be preferred to other forms. This means some individuals have been "right" while some others have been "wrong." This means there's always been "absolute rightness" and "absolute wrongness." Do you know of what order of magnitude is such a claim?
But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.
No, the rule is "there's no distinction between any two places, put them wherever and they'll be equal." Things are "put into place" but all into "one place" and that's the "place of equality."
Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).
I can't prove what I haven't even claimed. I never claimed that Uncertainty is useful; I said it shouldn't be assessed by practicality criterion. I never claimed its existence, I said it's paradoxical and can't be given a definite state.
... Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.
Why? And how? "Nothing is uncertain" doesn't seem to me like opposing "any" order. It surely opposes "many" orders but not "any" order. I wrote of an order that is well suited to this premise, the order that places everything in one place, the place of equality.
Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?
For I don't run away from loops and paradoxes. I like to see how they work and why they appear all around.
Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.

No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".
Again, this is "your" interpretation (or rather "misinterpretation"). Uncertainty asks for caution, clarity and hesitation in the face of anything and everything; not a bit less, not a bit more. Uncertainty is of paradoxical nature that means it's nothing more than a between-the-lines hint. One may choose one's premises at will while one's uncertain of their truth.

One's choice for one's life isn't associated with one's stance on one's choice. Uncertainty provides a ground for always being cautious of what one chooses but doesn't prevent a choice from being made. Being cautious of one's choice one will always be ready to change it if one finds out that choice has been erroneous. This readiness is a basis for a dynamic system of thoughts that can change with new packets of knowledge (even though uncertain they are). Instead of taking "progression" as a premise (like with Science) one will be experiencing "change" as a consequence of a fairer, more general, less demanding and more open premise.
It's not the only way I go.
You seem to.
Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.
Practicality does have meaning in many knowledge bodies but doesn't have the same meaning all over these places. Practicality can be defined even for a Religion, as "conformance to God's commandments" for example. This practicality is apparently different from the other one discussed in words of Science.

Science has to do with its own definition of this term which is an intra-scientific concept confined to a scientific understanding of scientific Universe. I don't think "practicality" in this sense is even an outcome of observing the scientific Universe. One can study the scientific Universe with scientific method but nowhere around this Universe it's written "survival, longevity, prosperity is our motto." We know that living beings, being living beings by scientific definition in the scientific Universe, want to live, live longer, produce more of their instances and get more energy/matter for their lives. Anyway, that's no necessity, it's not an obligation. We know there's this desire but we can't say it's an aim. That we want to "live, live long and prosper" doesn't make this desire a logical obligation. Nowhere in any description of the scientific method is stated that we have to reach for this target by the means of that method. This aim isn't intrinsic even to Science; it's intrinsic to scientifically-defined living beings, when they're viewed scientifically.
Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occurring.

I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?

Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?
Causality bond is explained for scientifically through the declaration of forces. The four forces are the source of all interaction including that you smack someone. Forces are elements from the scientific Universe. They're of fundamentals of Science. Let's think of them for a moment. What's a force? An obscure concept that explains for a coincidence that is later called an "interaction."

How do you know they're hurt when you smack them? You see them getting hurt but do you see them? You see a consistent representation in your mind that goes through a transition but what's the nature of this representation? No one knows and is that what "really" (supposing there's some "real" thing around) happening? No one knows.

I meant EPR Experiment and Pre-established Harmony as two separate lines of discussion. Here comes my re-explanation of Pre-established Harmony:

You ask if there isn't a bond between two coinciding events and that's the central question to Causality and its substitutes. All of them try to explain for coincidences that are observed over and over.

Pre-established Harmony explains these coincidences as parts of the Harmony that governs the events of this Universe. The coincidence of two events is a part of the Harmony but not a necessity of Universe's structure which is supposed to be made of abstract Monads that are isolated from each other. While one part of the Harmony may force a coincidence and a seemingly relation between some of the Monads (of the two coinciding phenomena), a repetition is noway guaranteed. Monads are totally isolated and play their own roles in the Harmony but these roles may or may not be synchronized to mimic some relation.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #97
... continued from the previous post
But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.
How do you know they're observing something? Isn't that you have a picture of an observing Physicist to compare them to? The alien Physicist may not comply with this picture so you'll never know it's been observing but you'll see the change.

Moreover, this doesn't solve the problem with zero time. Some "cause" (say, a Physicist or a particle) "causes" some "effect" but there's no time delay between them. How could you say which one is the cause and which one is the effect without previously knowing one of them (eg, the Physicist) has an intention for a change?
But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction".
"The wrong direction" for that system but maybe "the right direction" for another totally unnoticed one which can bring you extension to the horizons of your thought.
No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.
Kurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.

Not "all" of them for sure. Eastern thinkers (that you seem not to count in "all") didn't do as you say, they even didn't go the way of "progression."
 
  • #98
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
[BKurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.
[/B]

The wording I know of for the theorem of Godel reads that any formal, axiomatic system is either incomplete or inconsistent (or both).

incomplete:
the system has not the capacity to produce all the truths. there are truths that can not be produced by the axiomatix rules of the system

inconsistent:
the system has some internal problem of consistently defining the truth value of statements based on the axiomatic rules
 
  • #99
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?

I repeat, I am not criticizing the proof, I am waiting for you to show me it's applicability, otherwise it's not important to the discussion.

The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?

It may seem clear to you, but perhaps you are witholding something from me, because it doesn't make any sense - to me - to say that one proposition's implying another proposition's truth leads to a paradox/loop.

To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:

00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).

I perfectly agree with point 03. Q won't lead to paradox, and I haven't agreed to anything of the kind.

Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."

No, it's telling you "I'm unreliable, and self-contradictory". If something cannot even be self-consistent, how can it be consistent with any other system?

You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest."

It's not that it's not "entirely fair". It's that it cannot exist. It's supposed "fairness" just contradicts it's premise, and thus leads to unusability.

You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.

No, Uncertainty doesn't give a perspective for anything, because it's unusable/paradoxical/self-contradictory - and thus self/defeating.

You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body?

Yeah.

And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?

Yes.

The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.

How is it paradoxical, without the use of "Uncertainty"?

Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?

First off, there are many (rather intelligent) people, that I know of, that can study science with the Bible as their premise, and they have no problem. I think your problem here is that you are saying "stand inside X, to judge Y". This is not what I was talking about. I'm saying "take X for granted (as part of the foundation/premise), to judge Y".

Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.

But saying that something necessitates Uncertainty is also contradictory to the premise of Uncertainty, can you see why?

One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?
First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.

You are totally missing the point (IMO). You are saying "it will do this" and "it will do that". This implies it's practicality, when in fact such a thing (as practicality) cannot exist in an Uncertain world, nor can it exist along with paradox.

Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?

It's not more flexible, when will you get this? It's unusable, that's not the same thing as "flexible".

answer continued on next post...
 
  • #100
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.

For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.

I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.

I understand this. That still doesn't show any inconsistency the logic. Yes, assuming the proof of one of these things assumes the proof of the other. So what? What is wrong with my saying "I'm fifteen", and then saying "I was born fifteen years ago"? In fact, I could just omit one, and it wouldn't matter, because these things don't prove each other, they just assume the same thing.

Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.

Yes, you are right, they can. Also, why is it that it matters to you that it is "non-informative", when you were previously trying to show the folly of sticking to that which leads to progressive understanding/knowledge?

Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular.

I know. The point of all of Descartes' reasoning was not so much to prove that he existed (pay attention, please, this is important), it was to prove that the fact that he could contemplate not existing proved his existence - thus any attempt to prove his non-existence further validated his existence.

Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.

Again, and this is important, it is not so much circular, as restating the same thing twice. Pay attention to this, please, Boolean Logic doesn't say that it is wrong to postulate the same thing twice (does it?), so "I am therefore I am" shouldn't be forbidden.

(Just to make sure you get this): The point of the statement is not to be found in the statement, it is found in the context. As I've said before, the point is that, the more one tries to prove that I don't exist, the more proof I have of my existence.

And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."

There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.
One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.

See above, for why it's not a loop; why Uncertainty is not an answer; and why the statement ought not be studied outside of it's context (the story about the Evil Demon).

Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.

However, Science is a perfectly sound branch of Philosophy, and thus there is nothing wrong with my using it to prove something's practicality (which, btw, is not just a scientific tool, it is a tool of practically all of the different reasoning systems that I've ever been introduced to).
 
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