Proof of Reality: Electrical Impulses and The Matrix

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The discussion centers on the nature of reality, perceptions, and the validity of scientific methods in understanding existence. It begins with the assertion that all observations and feelings are merely electrical impulses interpreted by the brain, leading to questions about the objective nature of reality and whether any laws of physics truly apply. Participants explore philosophical concepts such as idealism, the Matrix hypothesis, and the problem of attributes, debating whether reality exists independently of perception or if it is merely a construct of the mind.Key points include the idea that reality cannot be perceived directly and is thus labeled as 'real' based on perceptions. Some argue that science, while effective, is limited to observable phenomena and may not encompass the full scope of reality. Others contend that the scientific method provides the best framework for understanding nature, emphasizing empirical evidence and rationality over philosophical speculation.The conversation also touches on the epistemological privilege of science, suggesting that while alternative theories may be philosophically interesting, they lack the empirical support necessary to challenge established scientific knowledge.
  • #51
LW Sleeth said:
Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological privilege in every area of human investigation.

Good thing the folks who discovered Viagra thought otherwise. Were they still looking for the source of erectile dysfunction in a person's soul, as psychologists always did, a lot of people would still be deprived of a major source of happiness, contentment, fulfillment...
 
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  • #52
LW Sleeth said:
Well heck, just when it's getting interesting I have to leave.

Not to fret: you can rely on me to disagree with you tomorrow, whatever you might say.

That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.

Well, you can perhaps see why this is too vague - especially with "experience" being such a theory-laden concept. Don't you think the Greeks sought "confirmation through experience", too?
 
  • #53
Hugo Holbling said:
Fair enough, but the same held for the Homeric gods at the time - that's the point. For these reasons, the Greek gods were as real to people as quarks are to us.

Sure, but the conclusion you want to make doesn't follow: why then eliminate Zeus and not the latter explanation? You may use an epistemological privilege but why shouldn't i grant it to Zeus? Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this privilege in a non-circular way.



I don't think we arrive somewhere if those arguments.Anyway it's hard to see how can you avoid the crackpot ad hoc hypothesis 'Homer's Gods are responsible for all we see or can discover'.Your claim,which I disagree with,was that these systems have equal privilege at least on empirical grouns just because Quine said so.I'm afraid this is not enough and I've shown you above why,maybe on short run you're right,but there is no reason to think this holds also on medium and long run.To prove/disprove convincingly that assertion we need facts and for that first you have to propose an internally coherent model for scrutiny which does not contain redundant theoretical constructs and which avoid also the ad hoc hypothesis 'Homers' Gods did everything'.As far as I know Quine agreed with this,he's still an empirist after all that,there must exist a continuity stronger in some parts,weaker (nevertheless existing) in others,between all enunciations belonging to a scientific system,in contradiction with the acceptance of redundant assumptions,totally isolated from the rest of enunciations.Thus it seems to me that he accepts the principle of sufficient reason at least within the same systems (elimination of redundant assumptions) though allowing a competition between different scientific systems.Anyway since the principle of sufficient reason is one of the first epistemological principles,'engulfed' also by the actual scientific method(s) you'd have also to provide a method of deciding what is real without allowing contradictions of how some enunciations in the system have been inferred.The mere fact that we are entitled to create whatever systems we wish by holding a certain enunciation as being true provisionally (the existence of Homer's God for example) with the expense with having to change possible large parts of the system does not prove that on long run it will still be on the same level of rationality.Finally I really doubt that Quine has ever thought seriously at this since he only wanted to discredit the logical positivist interpretation of the meaning (which he succeeded) and proposed an alternative hypothesis something like Bohm's fully causal interpretation of QM (as Bohm's witnessed he only wanted to show that non local hidden variables are still feasible in spite of von Neumann's fourth postulate).Your position is actually that of Feyerabend and as I said there is no proof that such systems can hold on long run.

So we must wait even if you propose a coherent alternative program,equally supported empirically,to settle the things in a clear way.It might even happen that during this time the assumption that Homer's God exist to be made potentially testable in a clear way (indeed why not?) enabling us to treat it in isolation from other enunciations.
 
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  • #54
Hugo Holbling

It's not clear to me,you have not proposed an alternative view to mine's,do you disagree also with the epistemological privilege of science based on logical grounds (principle of sufficient reason)?Some people here believe that you support their point of view (pure relativism).Or,not even Feyerabend say that there is no method(s),there is a clear difference between saying that all epistemological systems are equivalent and denying the existence of a metalogical,immutable,method from outside science...
 
  • #55
metacristi said:
Your claim,which I disagree with,was that these systems have equal privilege at least on empirical grouns just because Quine said so.

You'll recall that i asked you not to hopelessly mischaracterise me with a ridiculous straw man like this, but apparently that was too much to hope for. I have asked you to justify the epistemological privilege and you have singularly failed, unless you think writing at length will eventually hit on something convincing. Don't waste my time again.

To prove/disprove convincingly that assertion we need facts

No, we don't: facts are theory-laden, as you ought to know. Indeed, this is a basic logical error.

Your position is actually that of Feyerabend and as I said there is no proof that such systems can hold on long run.

Yes, you are keen to assert things but not so willing to provide any justification. If you think Feyerabend proposed a system, i suggest you think again; a remark like that would incline me to think you're not basing this on his work.

Some people here believe that you support their point of view (pure relativism).

Who are these people? Is this a spectator sport?

not even Feyerabend say that there is no method(s)

He said there is no method, and these days most philosophers of science take this as given.
 
  • #56
Hugo Holbling said:
He said there is no method, and these days most philosophers of science take this as given.
No scientific method?

In the immortal words of Arnold Drummond, Whatchoo talking about Willis?

You must have lost your gourd in order to say such silly stuff in the lion's den. Who are those philosophers of science worshipping at the altar of Feyerabend, chanting select winners from the Against Method gospel in the vain hopes of gaining hermetic knowledge? :wink:
 
  • #57
I'll not take your bait, dear Ender. :biggrin:
 
  • #58
Hugo Holbling said:
Not to fret: you can rely on me to disagree with you tomorrow, whatever you might say.

I interpret that as you joking, but I would say anyway I am not sure we disagree overall. I assume your opposition to metacristi's awarding empiricism of the title of "epistomological priviledge" is because you believe his is an absolute empirical statement. I've been trying to get him to tell me if he is limiting that privilege to physical/external inquiry, of if he believes it applies to all knowing endeavors.

I only got involved to see if you were using Homer's gods (or anything in a similar class) as a serious contender to empiricism for producing knowledge. Also, I thought if you were primarily objecting to metacristi's (alleged) absolute epistomological statement about empiricism, then I might get you to admit it does have the advantage when it comes to investigating physical apsects of reality (which doesn't meant it should granted epistomological privilege for all areas of investigation).

Hugo Holbling said:
Well, you can perhaps see why this is too vague - especially with "experience" being such a theory-laden concept. Don't you think the Greeks sought "confirmation through experience", too?

I think we can make it vague by including varieties of experience like delusion, for instance. Most of us know what normal experience is (whether or not anyone can precisely define it); we trust it too, which is why we prefer an experienced doctor to operate on us over an inexperienced one. I don't see how you can deny, in the case of science, what the combination of ordinary sense experience combined with intelligent hypothesizing and logical interpretation has achieved (even if you don't value what empiricism has achieved). Before the experience element was added, thinkers debated for centuries about the nature of reality leaving us mostly bogged down in rationalization. The truth is, we know little more than tautologies through rationalization alone.

As far as Greeks seeking confirmation through experience, I am sure true believers did. And I am pretty sure they didn't find it
in actuality. They might have interpreted "confirmation" was the wind blowing through their window as they made a sacrifice to the gods, but that doesn't mean it was. Besides, I thought we were talking about what produces knowledge? I cannot see a real parallel between the god stuff and investigating the nature of reality.

Maybe the Greek oracles would be a better example, but even if I believed they offered a means of acquiring knowledge, I would say they are in a different class than the empiricists and cannot be compared unless, that is, the Greek oracles were to claim they could give us knowledge of physical reality as well as science. Then I'd want to see them do it, which they nor any other knowledge discpline ever has. That is why I am perfectly willing to grant empiricism "epistomological priviledge" status if it's limited to what's physical.
 
  • #59
confutatis said:
Good thing the folks who discovered Viagra thought otherwise. Were they still looking for the source of erectile dysfunction in a person's soul, as psychologists always did, a lot of people would still be deprived of a major source of happiness, contentment, fulfillment...

True. I think we just have different ideas of what "happiness, contentment, fulfillment . . . " are. I believe science has great potential for helping to relieve suffering, particularly through correcting or aiding physical problems.

But I do not consider the absence of problems or suffering happiness, contentment, or fulfillment.
 
  • #60
LW Sleeth said:
I interpret that as you joking, but I would say anyway I am not sure we disagree overall.

I'm glad to continue this discussion because you seem genuinely interested, as opposed to avoiding the issue. You could say i was joking, but generally speaking i prefer to take the opposite point-of-view in a discussion because i feel i learn more that way, irrespective of my actual opinion.

I assume your opposition to metacristi's awarding empiricism of the title of "epistomological priviledge" is because you believe his is an absolute empirical statement.

Not really. If we want to say that science should have an epistemological priviledge, it would appear to be a claim that requires justification. If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.

Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean. Very many worldviews have been both successful and useful insofar as they have helped their users to make sense of their world and achieve whatever aims they had. That our aims may differ is not a reason for awarding an epistemological priviledge.

We can say, of course, that the obvious distinction here is that certain approaches provide knowledge of reality and that this is why we may attribute an epistemological priviledge; however, that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not. The most important matter, nevertheless, is to wonder if sentences that long are deliberate or just a result of my stupidity.

I only got involved to see if you were using Homer's gods (or anything in a similar class) as a serious contender to empiricism for producing knowledge.

Well, my arm can easily be twisted: knowledge of what?

Also, I thought if you were primarily objecting to metacristi's (alleged) absolute epistomological statement about empiricism, then I might get you to admit it does have the advantage when it comes to investigating physical apsects of reality (which doesn't meant it should granted epistomological privilege for all areas of investigation).

The serious difficulties mentioned above aside, i might be tempted to admit that, but i'd want to know how we decide when an advantage is present.

I don't see how you can deny, in the case of science, what the combination of ordinary sense experience combined with intelligent hypothesizing and logical interpretation has achieved (even if you don't value what empiricism has achieved).

A fool can deny anything. Can you deny, in like fashion, what other methodologies and worldviews have achieved? Who judges such things but those employing them on the basis of their goals?

Before the experience element was added, thinkers debated for centuries about the nature of reality leaving us mostly bogged down in rationalization.

The rise of empiricism is somewhat more complex that that, but i'll grant you the point.

And I am pretty sure they didn't find it in actuality. They might have interpreted "confirmation" was the wind blowing through their window as they made a sacrifice to the gods, but that doesn't mean it was.

Doesn't that strike you as an unfair and rather too swift dismissal of what the Greeks did with their worldview? Your certainty notwithstanding, it probably behooves us to check (particularly in the context of this discussion).

Besides, I thought we were talking about what produces knowledge? I cannot see a real parallel between the god stuff and investigating the nature of reality.

I didn't expect to see essentialist notions like "the nature of reality" on a physics board, but I'm pleasantly surprised. Concepts like this, along with knowledge in the first place, are again rather more complex. What else are people doing with their ideas, however crackpot we may suppose them to be, but investigating reality? Is everyone an instrumentalist?

Maybe the Greek oracles would be a better example, but even if I believed they offered a means of acquiring knowledge, I would say they are in a different class than the empiricists and cannot be compared unless, that is, the Greek oracles were to claim they could give us knowledge of physical reality as well as science.

I hope I've explained above why this is too quick: Quine's remark, which i presume you know of (after all, I'm just getting this stuff out of books, as I've been told already), was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and I've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods. Even if I'm talking through my hat, the matter isn't so clear-cut as at least one poster has presumed.

That is why I am perfectly willing to grant empiricism "epistomological priviledge" status if it's limited to what's physical.

That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the privilege because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.

I hope this bluster has given you something to think about (even if only for a few seconds) and attack.
 
  • #61
Holbling

We are both wasting our times in this case.But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth,I don't think you are in such as position,even if you were a professional philosopher,facts speaks and the controversies are even greater now in this field than before.Ask some scientists and you'll hardly find one who is a commited relativist,feyerabendist (though he says that there are still rules,he defended his position against the accusations of pure anarchy).I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.The quark model,though ad hoc at the time when was proposed,actually made some predictions and there is even indirect evidence for the existence of quarks (the collision electron positron at very high energies where the jets of pions obtained originate from different points showing indirectly the presence of smaller particles whose trajectories are conserved by hadrons,the variety of energies at which exist the J/psi particles which are analogous with the atomic spectres,showing indirectly the existence of two smaller components and so on).Such theoretical constructs are accepted usually even in the absence of indirect or direct evidence or at least potential testability but only if their predictions explain a wide enough range of empirical facts.Sometimes even ad hoc hypotheses are accepted if they are coherent with the body of all accepted scientific knowledge,as I said not all ad hoc hypotheses are on the same level.Even if we were to accept that a specific variant of the Greek Gods research program (when Murray Gell Mann first presented his model of quarks) as being on the same level of priority with that of science's don't you think the latter observations,I presented above, constitute a diproval of that variant of the model?Of course you can build potentially (but I'm not really sure it is an easy task) another variant,which will have the same fate on very short time,anyway this is a clear evidence that the scientific approach is superior on long run.As I said I could easily use the bayesian interpretation of probabilities for that.Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

We can never deduce knowledge from observations,we can only infer it indeed,still this does not mean all possible explanations are on the same level of rationality.Observed facts speak,having the principle of sufficient reason at base,of course once we accept the basic assumptions of science,otherwise it becomes an incoherent system.This approach does not exclude absolutely anything,since science is openly fallible,even the basic assumptions are open to revise.If it were not so then I would be fully entitled to claim that my worldview,my 'research system',based also on my own interpretation of some strange experiences,not amenable to scientific inquiry now,that a 'soul' of some sort does survive death,is on the same level with the whole research program of science.Or the Creationist science program.We need a standard of knowledge,the minimum to be accepted by all would be rational people.Of course,my 'research program' is not non rational or irrational.But it is still a mere belief,notwithstanding that rational,I am basically open to accept later that my personal experiences can be explained within the standard program of science with sufficient reasons,without the need to resort at the existence of a soul.But of course it might also happen that science will find sufficient evidence supporting my view.To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.Or at least a hypothesis which does not contain redundant assumptions,where all assumptions are valuble to the process of making new predictions,which explains facts already explained by science and makes also some new predictions.Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?Understand of rationality,it is based on all observed facts and the principle of sufficient reason (allowing some valuable theoretical constructs in science though there is no need to believe in their existence before direct or indirect experimental evidence for them).Why are they on the same level?Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?
 
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  • #62
Sleeth - But the qualitative difference in acquiring knowledge between people seeking to know by making up stories, or guessing, or divining, or purely rationalizing versus those who seek confirmation through experience is huge. That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.
I think this is a good point. Empricirical knowledge is gained through experience. This is true whether that knowledge is derived from a scientific experiment, a revelation on the road to Damascus, or a meditative experience of non-dual oneness and many-ness of Being. Science has no privilege over other systems of knowledge that are equally or more emprirical.

Also, as all knowledge derives ultimately from experience it is not always easy to distinguish which is more or less 'emprirical'.

On top of this most scientific 'knowledge' is more theoretical than empirical. Based on observation yes, but there is nothing in the way of experience to 'empiricise' much of scientific theory, and most scientific entities are no more than theoretical constructs.

Science is based more on observation than experience and as such is by definition less empirical than methods based on exploring direct experience.

Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.
 
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  • #63
metacristi said:
But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth

I'm not, and your explicit attempts to poison the well are rather pathetic. I don't think my ideas are superior to yours; instead, i think that i'll disagree to try to learn something. Alas, you have nothing but invective to offer.

I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.

Yet you seem to presume to tell me what i think, where i got it from, what my motives are and how i need to address you. Perhaps you should cease pissing in the well and ask yourself if this is the way to present your ideas in the best light?

Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

No, you haven't. All you do is write and write without actually saying anything. The privilege you want to award is epistemological, yet you refuse to address the epistemological points at issue here and declare the privilege to be justified by assuming it implictly before you even start. That, alas, is what you are plainly unable to even appreciate, let alone counter. My last post explained this, but you apparently don't follow. How can you award your privilege in a non-circular way? Try again, preferably without insulting me.

To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.

This is naive empiricism at its best (and therefore worst). "Facts" don't speak at all; they are theory-laden all the way down. The question here is what we are supposed to mean by terms like "superior" in the first place, a question you steadfastly refuse to answer.

Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?

This only serves to demonstrate your inability to charitably read my posts here and continue the mischaracterisation to make an empty point. By questioning the awarding of an epistemological privilege i do not thereby commit myself to the notion that all ideas are equally rational. This rather disappointing non sequitur makes me wonder if you have any interest in learning anything and prefer instead to just shout at me until i give up.

Why are they on the same level?

Why are you incapable of dealing with me charitably? Why should i argue against your straw men?

Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?

Are you able to stop insulting me? Others might find your insistence that i can't think for myself and am merely parroting what i read in some books to be objectionable, but not me. In the absence of any justification as to why i should waste my time on someone so insistent on poisoning the well here and telling me i can't think on my own, can you tell me the lottery numbers instead?
 
  • #64
Canute said:
Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.

What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.
 
  • #65
Hugo Holbling said:
What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.
It's impossible for me say what I mean by angry but I imagine you also have experiences of anger (especially here!) so let's say they are the same experiences.

Is your anger theory-laden, (or your hunger, pain etc)? To me they seem to be direct experiences. I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact. I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

At the moment I would say that when I perceive an orange I am theorising about the pattern of photons and the signals in my brain, however the experience of wanting to eat it (for instance) is direct and non-theoretical.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.
 
  • #66
Canute said:
I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all I'm getting elsewhere is insult.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.

I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact.

Is it? Given that I'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books I've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):

Any experience makes its apearance within the frame of our customary points of view and forms of perception.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though: what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but I'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.

What do you think?
 
  • #67
Hugo Holbling

Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning;anyway I've already (implicitly) recognized that explanations of newly observed facts might be theory laden when I said,as Popper observed once,that we cannot deduce explanations from facts,we can only infer them (as matter of fact they could be infinite).Still this does not represent an argument against some general rules,it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden,I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.Even today many scientists,the vast majority of them in fact,reject his anarchism.You might disagree with me,I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it (evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference),but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

Everything goes indeed but only if you provide also a method of establishing what is real.Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science and possible more variants of the method (though this is very controversial especially among scientists) anyway all these methods have the principle of intersubjectivity,be it only at limit,and the principle of sufficient reason incorporated (used including in the theory making process as I've explained before).The fact that there exist equally valid competing scientific hypotheses does not change too much the situation when talking about the whole of science;it (science) splits into more competing huge research programs indeed,but the above mentioned basic principles,potentially making the difference between them,are still accepted.No problem even if we accept some new assertions as being provisionally true (specific to that version of the research program),even by changing large parts of the actual accepted knowledge,if it offers a valid explanation and respects also the above mentioned basic requirements (something which I still expect from you to provide).

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths',a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.So Feyerabend might be somehow right,still keeping some rules,there is not exactly a total anarchy;as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Thus if I were to claim that my worldview is on the same level of rationality with that of science's (which I don't,at least for the moment,I still try to make it empirically progressive) I would be forced either to provide a hypothesis using the soul as a fruitful theoretical construct indispensable for the new predictions made,present indirect/direct evidence sustaining the existence of a soul whilst still accepting the actual basic requirements of the scientific method (+possible some other auxiliary assumptions) which to sustain my hypothesis,or provide a better method of establishing what's real,if I were to reject at least one of those basic requirements of the actual method.If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has even epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.If my system does not epxplain (counting as predictions) some already known but not unrelated facts,as many as possible,I cannot even claim that it has the same privilege.
 
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  • #68
metacristi said:
Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning

It's only a problem insofar as you continue the insults. I'm glad you've refrained in your goodbye speech, at least.

it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden

Instead, this is a standard remark in the philosophy of science. I know, because i found it in a book.

I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.

At least we agree about Lakatos. :frown:

The problem here - yet again - is that you declare things to be so without offering any justification at all; saying that the arguments proceed "rightly" cooks the books before I've even objected. Others, like Dupre, Cartwright, Galison, to name but a few, have noted what you cannot; namely, that denying the existence of a single method does not imply anarchism at all. Instead, it could be that science is far too complex to be accounted for without the plurality of methodologies that we actually see if - ironically enough, given this thread to date - we look instead of theorising.

I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it

I understand well enough, but see no reason to accept this epistemological privilege when you have used it in your arguments, smuggling it in implicitly beforehand. In any case, my objection was never that it was incoherent or inferior, so i don't know where you're getting this stuff. Either you misunderstood (perhaps my fault) or these are more straw men.

(evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference)

*shrug* You could ask for clarification before insulting me, i guess.

but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

What "point of view" am i espousing, exactly?

Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science

Here is your problem: we do not have a "single science" and the talk in the philosophy of science these days is about the disunity of science (i know, because i read it in a book). I suggest you look at Galison's collection of papers for an introduction, if you're interested.

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.

To begin with, i haven't proposed such a system and called it equally valid; instead, I've time and again asked why an epistemological privilege should be granted to your naive empiricism. The example of the Homeric gods was provided to ask why those gods stand on a different epistemological footing to quarks, to give you a chance to show why your privilege should allow me to choose quarks instead of gods for some reason or other.

In the second place, it isn't at all obvious that anyone interested in this question should allow you to smuggle in an epistemological privilege a priori, as you have here: why should we privilege the scientific method, so-called, when the issue here is precisely to ask why this privilege should be granted to start with? Even if i were to fit your mischaracterisation and declare an alternative epistemology equally valid, we judge the two by some means of comparison - not by assuming the one to be priviledged and asking the other to match up to it. You are assuming the result beforehand in order to justify it, which isn't cricket.

I won't attack the sniff of parsimony i smell here for now...

The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths'

Nonsense. How do we decide what "superiority" means in this context? It won't do to say that the scientific method, so-called, has empirical support because that again assumes what is to be proven; namely, that it gets at reality while other methodologies do not.

a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.

If you had read any philosophy of science, you'd know that Bayesian analysis is subject to severe skepticism.

as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Why don't you read his own works instead of mischaracterising them? I promise i won't insult you for getting information out of a book, even though i was fair game on that charge.

If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.

Wrong again. You cannot grant an epistemological privilege on the basis of scientific method or the demarcation criteria you offer here without first explaining why we should accept their epistemological priviledge. That is what you still have failed to do.

Whatever the case, i thank you for an interesting discussion. I hope you will refrain from insult next time, as i sincerely hope we'll cross paths again.
 
  • #69
You solve nothing by not allowing empirical facts as the criterion of making the difference between theories on rational grounds (or even different branch of scientific programmes,I mean the whole of science here) at least on long run.You cannot simply say 'concepts are theory ladden therefore you cannot make an empirical difference between alternative theories or programmes',this is on the same foot with saying 'subjective experiences are private therefore science will never be able to accommodate them'.My point is that there is a strong ground for this,even history of science does support this view,I will present later an example;there is an evolution of science,the point of Lakatos.There is absolutely no proof that such a programme where large chuncks of science,not coherent at limit with at least some (many) of old enunciations,is possible practically,though I agree that it is equally valid on short run.You must first prove that such a programme is possible and we can continue the discussion.It seems to me that if I try to retroactively create such a programme (assuming that I do this in 1870 for example but taking in account the later development of science) it would not have stand in a more or less stable form in time.If I understood well,sorry if I mischaracterise again,never inteneded by the way,but you haven't explained too much of your views,you do not support this approach.While such alternative programmes are viable on purely empirical grouns on short run I don't think they resist on long run.Empirical grounds still prove crucial to make the difference.

Some concepts might be theory ladden indeed still we can make the difference using common concepts accepted by competing programmes,at a more basic level.There might exist cases when crucial experiments do not exist indeed,still this does not prove that there are not cases when even instant disproval is possibile,not to mention diproval of specific variants of a programme.As a matter of fact on long run history proves that we can make a difference.Even Kaufmann's experiment is a good exmaple here,though it seems to vindicate Kuhn first.Einstein's theory seemed diproved because it was used a model of Kaufmann's experimental dispositive which was specific for Abraham's model (specific to that theory).Not even Planck,though using another model for Einstein's theory,was able to settle things in 1906.Still in later reviews Bucherer using the results of other experiments (acceptable by both programmes Abraham's and Einstein's) measuring the value of e/m0 settled the things in the favor of Einstein's theory by proving that in Kaufmann's experiments that value is almost constant for SR theory,varying in a significant way for the data of Abraham's model.By 1915 this problem has been completely resolved using empirical grounds entirely.Finally some concepts might be embedded in all those programmes,at a very basic level,like was the atomic theory,thus allowing empirical difference between programmes on long run at least.
 
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  • #70
Apparently the several times you've said this discussion is over were not enough. I don't think i can help you here since you still fail to appreciate that you simply cannot use an "epistemological priviledge" to justify an "epistemological priviledge". I already explained the circularity inherent in your approach and left you with plenty of questions and hidden presuppositions in your account to consider; what's clear is that you may not smuggle in your conclusion as a premise as you continue to do, and i think this is plain enough for everyone else that I'm content to leave it for now. Perhaps there is a communication problem here, but my post above stands as it is.

Edit: no need to apologise. Let me know how i can make this clearer, if i can.
 
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  • #71
What to explain?i don't think that the accepted knowedge of an alien culture on the other part of the galaxy,situated at roghly our level of development,is too different...I think finding one would settle things clearer.
 
  • #72
Hugo Holbling said:
I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all I'm getting elsewhere is insult.
Yes, I've never understood why M thinks science has 'e-priviledge'. I've asked on a few threads with no answer yet.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.
I was considering two things. Firstly that all knowledge begins in experience, and secondly that certain knowledge lies in a unity of knower and known (as per Aristotle and Popper and other notables). If all experiences are theory-laden then neither of these two things would be true, knowledge would begin in theory and certain knowledge would be impossible. Also introspection suggests to me that if not all then most experiences are direct and 'pure'.

I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Is it? Given that I'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books I've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.
I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid. However you raise a good point here, namely that experience and subject are denied by some.

I cannot see how to deny experience. However I would agree that ultimately 'self' is an epiphenomenon which can be transcended. In this state experiences occur, but those experiences are un-owned, there is no 'self' having them. This is precisely the knower and known becoming one. But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):
Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view. because of this he missed the fact that meditative practitioners assert that 'points of view' and 'forms of perception' are exactly what are to be avoided in pursuing knowledge through experience.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though:
Is it? It seems exactly the point to me.

what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but I'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.
Good points. I don't think the views of Churchland or Bohr are correct, partly for the reasons you give. There's a chicken and egg problem (as there is with all scientific explanations).

What do you think?
Ah, my favourite question. :smile: I think that exclusive use of the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge produces a horribly warped idea of reality. According to science consciousness, the thing that allows us to know anything in the first place, cannot be shown to exist, cannot be causally or reductively explained, has no reason for existing, has no purpose or function, did not evolve, cannot be studied except in the third-person (even though third-persons cannot be shown to be conscious) and consists of no more than matter self-referencing. To me Heidegger was spot on, science confuses Being with beings.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical privilege over all other forms of enquiry into truth. Science denies the possibility of certain knowledge so can only come in second at best. Combining them seems the best way forward, not dismissing either but accepting each for what they can tell us and what they can't.

To waffle on - if we want to understand the world it must be inevitable that we combine science, metaphysics and what we know from personal experience. Whatever we call this combination it is not science, ergo the practice of science alone isn't ever going to give us a true understanding of the world. The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.
 
  • #73
i confess that i haven't read all the posts on this thread, however, i wonder why bother?

if you do not accept that you exist then nothing can be discussed or 'proved'. to me, this shows a complete lack of selfconfidence.

in order to move forward, we MUST believe that we are our own individual authority( not egotistically but confidently).

once i have faith in self, i am free to accept experience and determine it's value.

it seems a fruitless waste of time debating whether or not there is a reality. all i know is that i am experiencing something and i want to understand it by discussing and/or sharing what has been learned. perhaps, the real problem is that we all experience reality in a slightly different way.

when i experience pain i have pain, same for pleasure, etc, etc --let's not debate whether it's an illusion or photons or a dream. let's discuss what is learned and how to apply the lesson for a better society, etc.

it all begins with self awareness. that's my reality.

love and peace,
 
  • #74
Canute said:
I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).

I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper I'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.

But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.

Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view.

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical privilege over all other forms of enquiry into truth.

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?

The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?
 
  • #75
Hugo Holbling said:
Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).
I can't see a way of denying that, on the other hand I can't see how it can be demonstrated either. All I can do is go back to the chicken and egg problem here. Even if we do interpret experiences before having them it would seem odd to argue that in an evolutionary or a 'morphogenical' sense we develop the means of interpreting experiences before we develop the means of having them.

I'm convinced that we have experiences directly when we focus on what they are). However perhaps it's true that much of the time we do not focus on what they are, and thus 'colour' them with our discriminations, preferences and habitual reactions. Underneath these, however, is the original experience, the one we had which led to their subsequent processing.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper I'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.
I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.
Ok

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.
I suppose I meant 'the scientific way of thinking', rather than meaning to imply Bohr didn't think for himself. (I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

I do respect Bohr as a thinker, particularly for his explorations of what the findings of QM research might mean. However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa). Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object? (I'm no physicist but complementarity and the C-interpretation appear to be on their way out. Not that this is in any way a criticism of him).

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?
That's very even-handed of you. In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain. All other forms of it are not. Hence, for instance, idealism is unfalsifiable and always will be however much scientific research we do. All knowledge gained through proofs or through our sensory apparatus is uncertain, relative, dependent on assumptions or premises, and as such has limits.

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued. To add some weight I'll also cite Spinoza as saying that "nothing exists external to God, and certainly not man's understanding of him". I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?
All the undecidable questions of metaphysics, plus Zeno's paradoxes of motion, Russell's paradox, Goedel's proofs, the impossibility of certain proof, the problem of infinities and infinitessimals, the undetectability of consciousness, wavicles, the 'something-nothing' problem entailed by materialism, etc. These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways. (BTW I'd say the same of religion for similar reasons - in case you think I'm arguing for God).
 
  • #76
Canute said:
I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:

... no cognitive activity takes place save as the input vectors pass through that speculative configuration of synaptic connections, that theory. Theory-ladenness thus emerges not as an unwelcome and accidental blight on what would otherwise be a neutral cognitive achievement, but rather as that which makes processing activity genuinely cognitive in the first place.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken into be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.

(I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

You didn't; i brought it up to counter your remarks on Bohr.

However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa).

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.

Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object?

Bohr thought that it was impossible to maintain a sharp separation of observer and observed. He talked often in metaphors and i recall a story in which the observer peered closer and closer at reality until he finally saw himself peering back, but i can't remember where at the moment; it may be a paraphrasing of one of his parables. Maybe i'll remember in the morning?

In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?

I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?

These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways.

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?
 
  • #77
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/10/05/out_of_the_matrix?mode=PF

Davidson would reply that Cartesian skeptics are misusing the expression "really real." It makes sense to say that the people I encounter in my dreams, or the things I see after taking hallucinogens, are not really real. For denying them reality is just a way of saying that we cannot make beliefs about these people or things cohere with the rest of our beliefs -- specifically, with our beliefs about other people and things. The expression "not really real" is, in such contexts, given its meaning by contrasting cases in which we are prepared to say that those other people or things are really real.

Davidson's point is that retail skepticism makes sense, but wholesale skepticism does not. We have to know a great deal about what is real before we can call something an illusion, just as we have to have a great many true beliefs before we can have any false ones. The proper reply to the suggestion that beavers might be illusory is this: Illusory by comparison to what?

Even a mind-bending movie like "The Matrix" supports this insight. If you see the film after having read Davidson, you will be struck by the fact that the hero has mostly the same beliefs after he is ripped out of his artificial environment as he did before. He still believes millions of the same commonplaces -- the commonplaces that make it possible for him to use the same language outside the Matrix that he used inside it. He had been fooled about what was going on around him, but had never been fooled about what sorts of things the world contains, what is good and what evil, the color of the sky, the warmth of the sun, or the salient features of beavers.
 
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  • #78
Hugo Holbling said:
Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:
The trouble is that all the Churchlands' theorising is based on the same presumption, what Gold & Stoljar call the 'neuron hypothesis', which states that all reference to mental events are simply 'folk-psychological' and that all such events will eventually be reduced to neuroscience or 'psychopharmacology'. I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken into be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.
It seems fair enough to say that all experiences derived from sensory data are theory-laden, (if one calls a set of connections in the brain a 'theory' as seems do be done in your quoted extract).

However we know this already from philosphers (Plato again). The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose, which suggests that certain knowledge is impossible and that mind is an illusion reducible to brain computation and 'connectionism', begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.
I wasn't drifting off into Kuhn country, but was using 'paradigm' in its everyday sense, in which as individuals we all have one. My impression is that Bohr stuck with looking at the issue from the 'western' 'third-person' point of view (unlike Shroedinger for instance). However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?
I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?
I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?
Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known. Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us.

“Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.”
(Critique of Pure Reason) Hawking also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place -

“What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?
Ok - same difference.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this? (Just so I know where we are likely to agree and disagree).
 
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  • #79
Canute said:
I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?

The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose ... begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?

However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.

I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.

However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

No problem. I don't mind ad hoc or quotes, in any case.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this?

No.
 
  • #80
Hugo Holbling said:
Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?
The same as the writers mentioned, the 'hard' problem and all that. I fail to see how science can explain something it cannot prove to exist.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?
What consciousness is, how (or if) it is caused, and how we can know (experience) anything.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.
Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?
They are distinct categories of knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be certain for reasons given earlier. By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.
If you're not sure then I'll stick to my opinion, which I still think is correct. :smile: I don't believe that what I said was contentious.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?
Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?) I don't have a quick answer on 'truth', but briefly I take a truth to be what is the case. It's a bit more complicated because if we are to know that something is the truth then it must be the sort of thing we can know. (E.g. 2+2=4 we can know is the case because it's a tautology. The existence of self-awareness we can know, because we know directly).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).
 
  • #81
Thanks for your additional remarks.

Canute said:
Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.

By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?

Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?)

Ah, well. You can find it here (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).

You can post quotes if you like but I've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.
 
  • #82
Hugo Holbling said:
Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.
Sorry - I didn't mean he wasn't interesting - I just couldn't remember how he connected with the topic.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?
Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

Ah, well. You can find it here (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).
I wasn't saying I couldn't be bothered. I have quite a few threads here and elsewhere on the go and get confused which is which sometimes. My apologies.

You can post quotes if you like but I've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.
Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers. I'll stick to 'glib and not very rigorous' for now.

Edit: Aha - just read some of your essay on truth. (I thought it was very good). It illustrates what I meant earlier by saying that I took a naive approach to truth. I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute. This gives me just four kinds of truth, or equivalently four kinds of knowledge. (Bear with me, I'm having to figure out what I think as I go).

These are relative truths that I do or do not know, and absolute truths that I do or do not know. I exclude all truths or true knowledge that I cannot know from this system, since it can't possibly ever be true as far as I'm concerned. This is a sort of mixed subjective/objective way of coming at it, and it seems functional (even if rather folk-epistemilogical).

This has the strange consequence that a certain truth is one which I am certain is true. But then what else can a certain truth be? One has to trust ones own rationality somewhere along the line and if one doesn't know a truth is certain then it isn't, if you see what I mean.
 
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  • #83
Hugo Holbling said:
If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.
. . . . Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean
. . . . that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not.
. . . Quine's remark . . . was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and I've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods.
. . . . That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the privilege because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.

I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view (hey, you told me to attack . . . just kidding! :biggrin:). However, I am serious when I say I believe the reason for all your objections above are not because of a problem with experience, but they are inherent to the epistemological approach of rationalization. I define rationalization for this little critique as the attempt to justify, prove, or formulate statements of “verisimilitude” (to rely on Popper) without reference to experience.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to. Recently I had to revisit his thinking to figure out what Ragesk8 meant when he referred to himself as a “holist,” so my interpretation of your point might be influenced by that.

I do see a way to interpret Quine’s idea of a man-made “fabric of knowledge and belief” as you suggest. In this holist view, he suggests there is no statement which can be considered completely immune to revision. Quoting from his Two Dogmas of Empiricism he says, “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. . . . A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth-values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. . . . . Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. . . . Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.”

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended. I say it is because rationalization cannot be anything but circular. That’s why I quoted the statements you made above. Every statement can be said to be self-justifying, and every premise can be questioned with “how do we know what __________ [fill in the blank] is.”

The rationalists had a couple of millennia to show us they could get out of their endless circular traps, and they never could. It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt) and everyone else into rationalizing were/are nonetheless dinosaurs, still trying to figure out too much in their heads. It’s amazing what a little experience adds to any subject being thought about. Talk about a major adjustment to one’s thinking!

Do you want to argue if a wall is there? We’ll never decide because how do we define what a wall is? How do we know if the eyes accurately convey the image of a real wall? Just the very statement, “is there a wall,” assumes we can know (or not) and so is circular. So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain. Of course, no doubt (if you are a die-hard rationalist) you can say “how do I know if what just flattened my face was a wall, or if I am just imagining it?” Me, looking at another bloody face, accepts that the wall is there (until new evidence suggests otherwise) and can see no more need for discussion about that issue.
 
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  • #84
LW Sleeth said:
I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view

It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to.

I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended.

Alternatively, he could be pointing out the necessity of boundary conditions for methodologies.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt)

I'm afraid i do doubt and am quite surprised by the reverence shown to Popper by several members here.

So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain.

Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

EXPERIENCE AND KNOW! (although that's your decision since I am also an individualist)

Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience and your remarks do no better, other than to give me pause and wonder if i am wasting my time here. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to be more charitable than you; thus:

It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

How does this process work?
 
  • #85
Canute said:
Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.

Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers.

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether I'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).

I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.
 
  • #86
Bunghole philosophy has infected the physicsforums...

I've been following this thread since i registered for this board. Being a philosophisticator myself, i couldn't help but zero on your musings of a philosophical nature.

Canute said:
I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd. This is manifestly false, because first of all it would be a sweeping generalization that marginalizes the difference under a mischaracterization. Anaximander pushed a dualist view while Heraclitus was comfortable with a non-essentialist take of Being as Becoming, a ceaseless fluctuation, constantly changing state of affairs. Parmenides dealt a deathblow to material monism with his privileging of the intelligible over the sensible, and his philosophy in turn spawned a school of puralists: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Leucippus and Democritus intended to replace monism with their atomism. The only true monist among the Greeks would be Xenophanes, who thought that God was identical with the entire universe.

Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century. And even then, empiricism bloomed only in England, where Bishop George Berkeley and David Hume took the principles of empiricism to new heights. However, thanks to Hume the philosophy of empiricism found itself at a dead end, stuck in the abyss of skepticism. The logical positivists exhumed Hume and resurrected his Fork of Knowledge (a posteriori and a priori), but they didn't last beyond the first half of the 20th century. Wittgenstein instigated a linguistic revolution in the mid 20th century and after Wilfred Sellars published his book on empiricism, it's safe to say that empiricism is no longer in vogue. :)

Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us. “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.” (Critique of Pure Reason)

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.

Hawkings also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').
Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place - “What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.
 
  • #87
Theothanatologist said:
Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd.
Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century.
I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did? I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.
I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.

Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?
I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.
I know.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.
Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.
 
  • #88
Hugo Holbling said:
That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.
I wasn't saying it was satisfactory, just that there is no other way forward. Are you saying that you know how we know?

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether I'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).
Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.
But of course not everyone agrees. This is the problem, and why one has to make ones own mind up based on pragmatic considerations (or remain forever on the spot trapped in philosophical debate). 'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case). That doesn't mean throwing philosophical considerations out of the window, just acknowledging that they are not a final guide to what is true.

"There is one great question," he writes in 1911. "Can human beings know anything, and if so, what and how? This question is really the most essentially philosophical of all questions." (Bertrand Russell in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell 1911,)

Analytic philosophers have not yet answered this question. I don't intend to wait through another two millenia of philosophical anlaysis before deciding what I think is the best way to know what is true. I haven't got time. If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

BTW when I said my approach was 'naive' I didn't mean simpleminded. It might be wrong of course, but you'll have to show that. It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

To be clear - I think it is possible to know certain truths, but not by the senses or by reason alone. There are a few reasons for this, some of which you give in your essay. I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.
 
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  • #89
Do not misunderestimate my powers of misunderstanding misrepresentations!

Canute said:
Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.
You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?

I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did?

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.

I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.
I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.
I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.
I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known. The faculty of reason does encourage the intellect to posit objects without a corresponding form of intuition, which lies outside of experience, but this is not a "certain knowledge" by any stretch of the imagination.

I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.
Passing the buck... :biggrin:

Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.
C'est la vie. :wink:
 
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  • #90
Theothanatologist said:
You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?
Non-dual means literally 'not-two', it does not mean 'one'. If I could explain what it means I'd be cleverer than Chuang-Tsu. Roughly it's the view that all dualisms are ultimately false, in the sense that ultimate reality and ultimate states of consciousness (roughly same thing in this view) are non-dual, beyond truth/falsity, one/many etc. Mathematically speaking it's the view from the meta-system.

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.
I'll change it to 'most philosophers who conclude that certain knowledge is possible agree that it is only achievable by a 'oneness' of knower and known'. (I suppose a Christian mystic or gnostic would say becoming one with God, but personally I don't hold with God). Others (like Popper) do not take this final step but conclude certain knowledge is impossible. I take this conclusion as consistent with the first, but less well considered.

I have problems with the word 'empiricism' because people take it to mean various different things. For that reason I'm not arguing for it.

I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.
Ok - see above for my amendment assertion. Who is it that disagrees?

I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known.
Quite agree. I didn't suggest otherwise.

Passing the buck... :biggrin:
It's you that's passing it. Try typing 'Hawking End of Phsyics' into your search engine. Or do want me to do it? Have I offended you in some way?
 
  • #91
Canute said:
Are you saying that you know how we know?

No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?

Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.

But of course not everyone agrees.

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.

If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.

It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.

I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.

Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.
 
  • #92
Hugo Holbling said:
No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?
Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.
Do you read what I write?

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.
It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.
So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.
I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.


Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.
I think I agree. If you doubt something then you can conceive of it being false. However if you cannot conceive of it being false it is not necessarily true.
 
  • #93
Hugo Holbling said:
It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism. . . . wonder if i am wasting my time here.


Hugo, I really don't think your view is "wrong." I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack." I was in a playful mood last night, and that accounts for some of my comments. I've been enjoying your comments so far. I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

My comments below mix up the order of your post, I hope you don't mind.

Hugo Holbling said:
I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

That's what I was took my interpretation from. His point about experience infringing only on the edges of any system of thought, and that within any system of thought we can revise components to still get the answer we want I think is pretty good. If that is what you are referring to, then I don't think Quine is saying there cannot be an epistomological privilege established in some area of investigation, but rather he demonstrates what believing something a priori can do to one's objectivity.


Hugo Holbling said:
Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.


Hugo Holbling said:
Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience . . .

I haven't purposely mischaracterized you, but obviously I might have done so anyway (purposefully or not). I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism. But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made? Of course, that doesn't excuse me from making my case, so here is what I was referring to.

I chose a number of your quotes of which I claim two types characterize the overly-rationalistic debate. For example, you said, ". . . we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way." You also said, ". . . it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what 'successful' or 'useful' are supposed to mean." And then a combination of both! "That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place?"

What I find to be a problem with those types of arguments is that there is no way to propose anything without first stating assumptions (premises), and also unless we accept (even if temporarily) certain definitions. I realize either can be used improperly, and in fact often are. But the problem, I claim, is that even if one is perfectly logical there is no way to state anything and prove the truthfulness of it with pure reason alone (other than tautologies). So when you say we cannot state what is real can be tested because we've already assumed what's to be proven, what is the way out of that dilemma? I say there is no logical way out, we are stuck going in circles unless . . .


Les said: It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

Hugo said: How does this process work?

I remember when I first started reading philosophy I was hoping it would make me wise. Several years later I decided that it had made me dizzy because nothing was ever decided until, that is, empiricism came along. With that lots of stuff got decided. Why? The only reason I can see is the addition of experience to reason. That is what did it.

Now, in case you think I believe empiricism is the answer for everything . . . I don't. I've simply stated that experience proved its epistomological advantage very well there. But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological privilege to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

That has been my point to you all along. I can see how relative epistomological privilege might be allowed.
 
  • #94
Canute said:
Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.

Do you read what I write?

For my sins, i do indeed.

It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur. If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another. Thus, when you say:

'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case).

... it makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuff.

So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think I'm being difficult for the sake of it.

I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?
 
  • #95
LW Sleeth said:
I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack."

You can tease all you like, but principled objection doesn't appear to be welcome here. Oh well.

I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

*shrug* I don't take this stuff personally but I'm not interested in the behaviour I've had directed at me so far, in this thread.

That's what I was took my interpretation from.

Read on a little further. Quine remarks thus:

For my part i do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and i consider it to be a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.

Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistemological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.

Fair enough, but my falling wouldn't prove that.

I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism.

In fact, you do me a great honour: usually my name is mentioned in the same breath as irrationalist (along with "jackass" and some others i won't repeat).

But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made?

You can suggest i walk on all fours if you like; it seems to be the fashion here already.

But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological privilege to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

I'm afraid I'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). I also don't believe you that "empiricism relies only on sense experience", not least because sense-datum accounts of knowledge are long-dead.

That has been my point to you all along.

Fair enough, but countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.
 
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  • #96
Hugo Holbling said:
I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.
I'm not trying to fit you into a box. I can't think what gave you that idea. The question I asked was purposely a non sequitur, that why I asked it. You asked me what 'knowing' was. I was illustrating that there couldn't be an answer to it because The question is a non sequitur. (I haven't characterised you yet, so I can't have mischaracterised you).

For my sins, i do indeed.
I feel that you're reading things into what I'm writing that aren't there. That could be my fault of course.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur.
In what way? It doesn't seem one to me.

[If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another.
I agree, but this is the whole problem with the discussion. My view is that 'truth' can only be known from direct experience. (A view I'd call empiricism if the term didn't seem to be usually interpreted as related only to sensory experience).

In this case how can I define what truth is, since experiences are incommensurable? I'd have the same trouble explaining what I think 'pain' is. I could attempt to define truth it in relative terms, (systems of proof and so on), but much better philosophers than I have done that already. I don't need to do this, since I do not take systematic proofs or even the evidence of my senses as bringing complete certainty so I can bypass all the stuff about correspondence theories and so on. I suspect I'm roughly in agreement with Sleeth on this one.

makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuf.
Usually I'd completely agree with you. But discussions that relate to consciousness (knowing etc) are a bit different. They always have this defintion problem at their heart. As you'll know it crops up all the time in consciousness studies. It leads to strange situations - for instance Francis Crick, in papers claiming to explain consciousness, argues at the same time that we shouldn't try to define it.

The issue of 'knowing' raises all these issues and they can't be avoided. I cannot tell you what 'knowing' is, any more than you can tell me. All we can do is assume that we have the same sort of experiences and are talking about the same thing. We are only having the same discussion as researchers have about whether consciousness should be defined as 'what it is like' or more intra-subjectively. (Perhaps 'knowing' can be defined as 'what it is like to know).

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think I'm being difficult for the sake of it.
Charitable is certainly not how I'd characterise it, but I expect I don't come across as I think I do either. You sigh and shrug as if it's as if you are bored in the company of mortals.

I have no idea why you called this comment a non sequitur. I pointed out that I'm not changing my opinions just because you think I should, and before you have shown what is wrong with them. What makes that a non-sequitur?

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?
Of course, but this is why I was trying to figure out your angle, there are lots of ways of coming at it. But I'll give up on that since you misinterpret my motives.

In the end I'd go with this from the Kuan Tsu.

"What all people desire to know is that (meaning the external world).

But our means of knowing that is by this" (our self, our mind).

How can we know that?" (the external world)?

Only by perfecting this."

Thus I'd say that (certain) truth lies on the inside not the outside, for while 'truth' implies a fact, something that is the case (let's say) 'certainty' implies knowing, and knowing is the task of consciousness, which is not on the outside, not 'lo there or lo here' to quote the apocryphal Jesus.
 
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  • #97
Hugo Holbling said:
Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistomological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No one, I think, is disputing the potential utility to people to employ myths or superstition, or any other device that helps them cope psychologoically. But I thought metacristi's initial point concerning epistomological privilege was about what helps us find proof of reality. In other words, what best contributes to knowing.

That is the problem, how can we "know that we know," as William James put it. We can believe in gods, no problem, but how will the gods help us acquire information about the nature of reality? For that matter, how can we even find the gods to ask them (or however one gets knowledge from god belief) about reality?

So the point never has been awarding epistomological privilege to physical objects over gods, except in the sense of what we actually can study and get to know. Physical reality just happens to be available to experience, gods so far have not been found.


Les said: . . . I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

Hugo responded: I'm afraid I'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). . . . countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.

I do not see how we can leave "utility" out of what we value epistomologically. I want some reassurance that my methods of knowing are actually giving me knowledge. How do I achieve that?

Well, trying to figure out how reality works by ideas, reason and imagination alone left us perpetually undecided. There were no reassurances to be found in purely rationalistic endeavors. We can say there are gods, but anyone can say "how do you know?". We can say we know because our belief in gods makes us feel better, but then anyone can say "maybe, but you've assumed what we're asking you to demonstrate." Thus, these arguments keep reason alone from ever being able to decide for sure about knowing.

So we add a test, and the test is what "works." Now, the rationalist can also demand justification for why what "works" should be assigned any particular epistomological priviledge. We cannot justify it rationally, just like we cannot justify anything with pure rationality. What we've done, essentially, is decided rationality needs something more to work epistomologically, and so we added two entirely different components to rationality: experience, and, less formally, utility.

The current epistomological paradigm seems to be that we rely on rationality to consider if something is true, we try to observe what we propose, and then (when possible) we try to use what we've observed in some practical application. The feedback particularly from something "working" indicates reality has been perceived correctly. Can we doubt it? Yes, but only with radical skepticism. The evidence is mounted before our eyes.

Of course, just being able to manipulate physical reality doesn't mean we've understood all there is to understand about what exists. I catch thinkers here at PF assuming all the time that because of the successes of empiricism at producing knowledge, that empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge; and that because empiricism only produces physical knowledge, physicalism has been all but proven. But those assumption overlook a huge possibility which is, that the only reason physical aspects are being discovered through empiricism is because physical aspects are all empiricism is capable of revealing!

The interior world of consciousness, though under attack by the physicalist hopefuls:wink:, still holds itself aloof from their reductionist efforts. I still think experience is what we need to study the nature of consciousness, just not sense experience.
 
  • #98
Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's. Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.
 
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  • #99
Les: your comments are worth a second read.

may I add that we all have annecdotal evidence of how our belief system has been a tool in gaining knowledge and manipulating physical reality. unfortunately, this does not satisfy or lend itself to scientific measurement.

that is why all truths are subjective. even empericism. they create a view based on their inner belief. as they look outward, that is all they observe.

love and peace,
olde drunk
 
  • #100
Canute said:
Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's.

It doesn't really matter to my point if it's anthropomorphic . . . dodo's found what worked for them too. I'll explain more of what I mean as I answer your post. I am going to mix up the order of your statements a bit to help me keep from repeating myself.

Canute said:
Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data. Meditation is experience, but what one learns from it is not via sense experience. I think you know I am an advocate for the value of that "inner" experience, so I hope you don't think I am discounting it. I am just granting empiricism the standards of its own definition.


Canute said:
Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

I made a mistake when I accepted Hugo's term "utility" without explaining what I meant. I assumed everyone was familiar with philosophical pragmatism, which I can now see was a bit egocentric . . . more below.


Canute said:
Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.

My perspective on "utility" or "usefulness" is pragmatic in the sense that Pierce, James, et al, developed the pragmatic concept. This uniquely American philosophy truly reflects our down-to-earth attitude (later hair splitting disputes notwithstanding). I can't express how much I love it as an unpretentious standard for evaluating if one has accurately perceived or understood reality. However, to use it one cannot evaluate superficially; one must have the wisdom to realize that what first shows up in a situation very often isn't all there is to it.

Let's start with a simple example. If I propose humans will be most likely to survive if they cooperate, I can test that by figuring out how to get people to cooperate, and then seeing how that "works." If we really do thrive when we cooperate, then a principle may have been validated. I emphasize "may" because the cooperative experiment will almost certainly develop aspects down the road that didn't show up in the beginning. So a second part of the test is to do cooperativeness over time.

Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. :cool: But has it really worked?

They have not correctly understood what it is that leads to crop decimation, and so they likely will not focus enough on figuring out how to prepare for the idiosyncrasies of nature. Also, like a child who is beaten while growing up, their brutality desensitizes people, and encourages them to accept that as the norm. Violence as a standard has proven not to be socially beneficial. So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.

Along comes the scientist, and he says, "let's not just speculate, let's look at what we can do to prepare for hard times." We study climate and weather patterns, we do statistical studies on past frequencies of conditions, we calculate how much people need to survive desperate times . . . When we have accurately portrayed the way reality is, then our plans should "work." When we haven't, then we get wiped out.

A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, say, in a solar cell. The model predicts that resident electrons in a semiconductor material will be forced out by sunlight, and then other electrons migrating into vacated positions through an external circuit will create a current. When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.

But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.
 
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