zenith8 said:
So you're a fundamentalist instrumentalist (far too many syllables for a job description).

It has a nice ring to it, however I believe in and like to speculate about the deeper reality underlying instrumental behavior. While science is limited to the sensory realm, instrumental behavior provides the basis for many good assumptions about deeper reality which might then become the basis for more realistic theories.
zenith8 said:
... I fail to see why you are using the instrumentalist Orthodox interpretation of QM to make sweeping statements about the physical reality of 'action at a distance', and to justify writing 'Incorrect. Incorrect.' next to perfectly correct statements of fact in my original post #36.
The assumption of nonlocality in nature isn't warranted vis standard qm -- and the passage from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (concerning standard qm) that you quoted supports this.
Note that in post #77 of this thread I retracted my statement that quantum nonlocality is acausal. It's causal, but nonlocality isn't part of or implied by standard qm.
Here's the argument against the assumption of nonlocality:
Statistical dependence of the separate data sets is what causes violation of Bell inequalities. The statistical dependence has a local causal explanation vis experimental design and execution.
Hence, as I outlined in post #77, violation of Bell inequalities does not require superluminal causal connections, nor does it require superluminal info transmission.
Where does this leave us wrt nonlocality? It's an open question, of sorts. But there's no 'nonlocality problem' because there's no good reason to assume that nonlocality is a realistic possibility.
I agree with you that physics can benefit from exploring inferences about the deeper reality. However, I don't think that the existence of a deeper wave and particle reality implies nonlocality. Our universe might be local or nonlocal. I think it's, presently, more reasonable to suppose that there's a propagational speed limit equivalent to the speed of light.
zenith8 said:
The main difference of opinion seems to be that you think that 'realistic' means 'engaging in speculative metaphysics' rather than 'objectively existing' ...
There are levels of reality. Our mode of existence is somewhat limiting. We all agree that there's a deeper reality. When we offer qualitative descriptions of that deeper reality, then we're engaging in speculative metaphysics because there's no way to completely objectify the descriptions themselves. The only things that are amenable to objectification are the instrumental behaviors predicted by the quantitative theory.
zenith8 said:
... and that 'metaphysics' appears to be some sort of term of abuse.
It is, somewhat. Speculative physics involves formulating testable hypotheses. Metaphysical speculations are, by definition, nontestable -- though they can still be evaluated as more or less reasonable.
Anyway, it seems that a certain amount of metaphysical speculation will always be part of theoretical physics -- and both despite and because of this, physics will continue to progress.
zenith8 said:
We cannot accept, as a legitimate argument form, inferences from the unobservability of a distinction to the unreality of the distinction.
FAPP we can. If the level of reality wrt which objective distinctions are made (instrumental predictions) produces no distinction, then as far as the science is concerned there's no distinction.
It's mostly just a matter of taste as to which of several competing nonverifiable descriptions of deep reality is adopted. I say mostly, because some metaphysical speculations are more reasonable than others.
Given what we know, the assumption that our universe is local is the more reasonable alternative.