There are a lot of questions accumulating in this thread. I will start with a few big-picture remarks.
Field theory and string theory have a mathematical aspect and a physical aspect. The mathematical aspect usually includes some procedure of calculation. The physical aspect involves physics concepts like matter, force, space, time... Discussing the physical aspect of quantum theories brings well-known problems because of concepts specific to quantum mechanics, like superposition, complementarity, and the emphasis on "observables" rather than "physical facts".
In #14,
@asimov42 asked about the ontological status of virtual objects in string theory. This is hard to address without knowing what approach to quantum ontology in general is being assumed. For example, are we to assume that observables are the only real things? Or are we being asked to say something about reality between "observations"? Or is it really a question about what string theorists think, what their attitude to virtual objects is?
Strict adherence to the positivism of the original Copenhagen interpretation offers one kind of clarity. There are quantum states, there are observables, and all there is to say ontologically about a quantum state, is what it implies for observables.
An alternative kind of clarity is offered by a reconstruction of quantum mechanics into a theory in which reality is described by a collection of objective physical facts, in which observation, measurement, etc., play no fundamental role. Bohm offered such a theory, Everett tried to, so do various other schools of thought.
Perhaps the majority of discussion about quantum mechanics takes place between these poles of clarity. But if we really are going to discuss the ontological status of virtual quantum objects, it would help if the participants explicitly indicated whether they speak as Copenhagen subjectivists (example: Lubos Motl) or as quantum crypto-realists (example: Brian Greene), or otherwise said something about their place on the spectrum.
Now to some specifics. It was said in #6 that "there is no time-energy uncertainty principle". Well, it's not as straightforward as the uncertainty relations arising from the usual complementary observables, but time-energy uncertainty relations can be derived, e.g. by considering time-of-flight of a particle in an energy eigenstate that is tunneling through a barrier.
I tried to find the origin of the idea that time-energy uncertainty is to be expressed (or even explained) in terms of "borrowing energy" for a limited time. Via Peter Holland's Bohmian text, "The Quantum Theory of Motion", section 5.3, I found a 1974 paper by
Hirschfelder et al which does actually defend this interpretation (end of part III). Holland criticizes it; I have not tried to analyze the original argument or Holland's criticism.
Neumaier and others have emphasized that "quantum fluctuations" do not refer to something changing in time, but rather to an observable with a range of possible values. These statements seem to come from the Copenhagen end of the "axis of interpretation" that I described. The closest thing to an ontological argument that I see, is the remark that virtual particles only exist in perturbative methods of calculation; obviously they can't be objectively existing objects, because objective existence can't depend on a method of calculation.
For someone at the other pole of interpretation, someone who is seeking a characterization of objective reality, that argument might be salient but not decisive. So long as no definite ontological picture is presented, a person can still think, nonetheless maybe that is how it is. For example, what if we could keep our virtual objects "on shell"? Would that make them candidates for objective existence after all? Or, what if energy is borrowed from, and then returned to, a realm of subquantum thermal fluctuations? Could we implement energy-time complementarity, in a form where the energy really is borrowed from somewhere?
So, as difficult as it is to have that sort of discussion
and the more mathematical discussion at the same time, I think there can be no real clarity until people at least indicate where on the axis of interpretation they're talking from.