The reality of Configuration space

[bohm2]

The Stoljar quote gets to an even deeper potential problem. A structural realist might hold that the structure is not the elements or their properties, but some sort of relational pattern that can be expressed with many different types of elements and properties. But Stoljar appears to make the implicit and potentially unjustified assumption that any structural realist must hold that reality is determined by its properties, even if we don't or can't know what those properties are. I would call that reductionist realism, not structural realism, because it reverses the direction of the logic. Structural realism takes the properties of successful models and projects them back onto reality, concluding that something in the model resonates with the reality in some vague but important way. Reductionist realism starts with the reality, and imagines constraints on it (properties), which must then map back into the structures of our theories. In other words, it takes a very specific (and improbable) stance to justify structural realism.

I don't think that is the central concern in Stoljar's argument. He is primarily concerned with Russell's and Eddington's "ignorance hypothesis"; the unknowable "intrinsic" properties of matter and the consequences it has on the mind-body problem. It is really the debate between the panpsychists (Seager, Strawson, Bohm) versus the emergentists (Stoljar, Chomsky) in trying to understand how the brain/matter/nonexperiential/structural (as currently conceived) can spit out experiential/mental/qualia. Here is one paper discussing this:

Suppose that Russell and Blackburn are correct, and scientific methodology will never reveal the ultimate ontological basis for observed phenomena, despite the optimism engendered by science’s continuing progress. In that case, we are not justified in generalizing from cases in which scientific methods have shown that non-manifest phenomena explain manifest nonexperiential phenomena, to the conclusion that no experiential truth is primitive. If categorical properties are beyond the reach of scientific investigation, then at most we can conclude that manifest dispositions (of experienceless objects) will be initially explained by other, non-manifest dispositions. But we have no reason to speculate about the nature of the categorical properties that ultimately explain the dispositions we observe...This may seem a hollow victory for the primitivist, since allowing that categorical properties are experiential appears to lead to panpsychism, a view rejected by most primitivists. But as Stoljar himself notes, panpsychism can be avoided...

"The Role of Ignorance in the Problem of Consciousness”. Critical notice of Daniel Stoljar
http://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/bg8y/

Strawson’s Realistic monism (Stoljar's criticism of Strawson's paper)
http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/people/Strawson.pdf

Realistic Monism (Strawson)
http://faculty.unlv.edu/beiseckd/Courses/PHIL-352/Dave%20-%20Consciousness%20PDFs/Strawson%20-%20Realistic%20Monism%20and%20Replies/Strawson%20-%20Realistic%20Monism%20Why%20Physicalism%20Entails%20Panpsychism.pdf

 

[Ken G]

Yes, I'm sure you are right that this is the correct context for Stoljar's points, I'm just surprised at how often I see the implicit assumption that behaviors are controlled by properties, and at issue is whether or not science has access to those properties. That just seems like a very confused assumption to me-- science is all about properties, it uses the concept of a property to generate models that explain outcomes. Nothing about reality has anything to do with properties, other than the lens through which science sees reality. Properties are clearly a part of science, to assume they are part of reality requires quite a leap of faith at best, and a category error at worst.

Note even the quote above seems to fall into this trap when it says "But we have no reason to speculate about the nature of the categorical properties that ultimately explain the dispositions we observe..." I would say we have plenty of reasons to speculate about the nature of properties, and we have plenty of reasons to speculate about how they explain dispositions. What we have no justification to speculate, and no payoff either, is that they are "categorical" in nature (whatever that even means), or that they "ultimately" explain anything at all-- on the simple grounds that a "categorical" or "ultimate" explanation is an incoherent concept that never had anything to do with either science or knowledge in the first place.

 

[bohm2]

This seems like a very interesting (and long) dissertation by Allori (via Tim Maudlin's direction) discussing ontology and physical theories. I'd like to print it out but I'd get beat up. I just briefly looked at it and she discusses the different interpretations of QM and does a really good job hi-liting some of the different versions of Bohmian models (configurational versus particle versions), GRW theories, etc. with respect to the possible "physical" interpretations of configuration space, wave function, particles, fields, etc. Interestingly, when discussing the ontology of the wave function and the possibility that it is a property of "particles", she seems to dismiss it:

The Role of the Wave Function

Let us now clarify one issue: If the primitive ontology of the theory are the building block of the physical world, they are the stuff in three-dimensional space physical objects are made of, what is the wave function if not a material object? One way of interpreting the wave function if it is not part of the primitive ontology is to say that the wave function is a property of the particles. Monton seems to have this view in some of his writings: "the wave function doesn’t exist on its own, but it corresponds to a property possessed by the system of all the particles in the universe".(Monton 2006)

If it is the case, then the wave function is not physical but it is instead an abstract entity. It is not really clear to me what “the wave function is a property” is supposed to mean, given that it is not clear to me what a property is supposed to be. Be that as it may, what kind of property is the wave function supposed to be? Categorical or dispositional? In my understanding, a dispositional property is a property that is what it is in virtue of the laws of physics. For example, the mass of an object can be considered a dispositional property in the sense that it expresses the resistance of the body to be accelerated by external forces. In contrast, the mass can be thought as a categorical property of the body as it specifies its own nature.

In any case, it does not seem right to consider the wave function (not even the conditional one) as a categorical property of the particles: in fact, it does not in any ways determine its nature. It might seem a little less far fetched to think to the conditional wave function as a dispositional property but actually it is difficult since it might happen not: the conditional wave function might not evolve according to Schrodinger’s equation. It would do that only in particular situations like the one in which the wave function has a particular form, the so called effective wave function. In any case, independently of whether one can make sense of the wave function being a property of the particle or one has to assume that the wave function is an holistic property, a property of the universe as a whole, I do not really see any advantage in saying that the wave function is a property, unless what one means is, at the end of the day, that it is a law.

Fundamental Physical Theories: Mathematical Structures Grounded on a Primitive Ontology
http://www.niu.edu/~vallori/thesis4.pdf

 

[bohm2]

Here's another interesting ('Quantum Mechanics Without Wavefunctions') model that just got posted today:

Regarding interpretation, we draw no definitive conclusions here. However, it is clearly of great significance that the form of Q can be expressed in terms of x and its C derivatives—implying the key idea that the interaction of nearby trajectories, rather than particles, is the source of all empirically observed quantum phenomena (suggesting a kind of “many worlds” theory, albeit one very different from Ref. 5). As such, it is locality in configuration space,rather than in the usual position space per se, that is relevant. In effect, we have a hidden variable theory that is local in configuration space, but nonlocal in position space—though the latter is hardly “spooky” in the present nonrelativistic context [even classical theory is nonlocal in this sense, depending on V (x)]. Many ramifications are anticipated for a wavefunction-free interpretation of measurement, entanglement, etc. One wonders whether Bohm would have abandoned pilot waves, had he known such a formulation was possible—or, for that matter, whether the notion of quantum trajectories might have actually appealed to Einstein.

Quantum Mechanics Without Wavefunctions
http://lanl.arxiv.org/pdf/1201.2382.pdf

 

[ThomasT]

Another nice thread bohm2. Lots of links and interesting statements regarding your consideration.

I'm curious. Can you summarize how you're thinking about this now?

My own view is in agreement with Ken G's (with my bolding):

... just because the mathematical structure works in experiments, that cannot prove that the elements exist anywhere but in that theory. Indeed, this has been seen over and over throughout history. That doesn't mean we shouldn't use the terms from the theory to apply to reality, it just means there is no requirement to take them too literally. The demonstrable physics doesn't care how literally we take those terms, so why should we?

You've asked about the relative ontological feasibility of wave functions and fields and configuration space. Well, it's known that these are mathematical constructions used for the purpose of predicting instrumental behavior. Beyond that, it's pretty much a matter of taste. Force fields correspond roughly to the notion of media. Wave functions are solutions to a general (arguably nonrealistic) wave equation. And configuration space is clearly a calculational convention ... not to be taken as a literal description of nature.

The only reality that we can appeal to is our 3D sensory apprehension, which remains the ultimate arbiter of the truth of statements about reality.

 

[bohm2]

Another nice thread bohm2. Lots of links and interesting statements regarding your consideration. I'm curious. Can you summarize how you're thinking about this now? My own view is in agreement with Ken G's (with my bolding):
You've asked about the relative ontological feasibility of wave functions and fields and configuration space. Well, it's known that these are mathematical constructions used for the purpose of predicting instrumental behavior. Beyond that, it's pretty much a matter of taste. Force fields correspond roughly to the notion of media. Wave functions are solutions to a general (arguably nonrealistic) wave equation. And configuration space is clearly a calculational convention ... not to be taken as a literal description of nature.

The only reality that we can appeal to is our 3D sensory apprehension, which remains the ultimate arbiter of the truth of statements about reality.

From the little that I've read on the topic, I'm very biased/sympathetic toward 'structural realism'. From what I understand of your/Ken G's position, it is more in line with 'constructive empiricism', I think. So I see the wave function and configuration space as something more than just a calculational device.

 

[ThomasT]

... I see the wave function and configuration space as something more than just a calculational device.

And you might be right. The question is: how can that be ascertained? Any ideas?

But maybe that's not fair. Maybe all we can hope for are reasonable, consistent arguments in favor of the ontological reality, in some sense, of wave function and configuration space representations.

So, wrt that, what's your current opinion?

 

[bohm2]

Of all the models I've linked in this thread, I think, I find Valentini's model the most appealing (maybe because it's the easiest one for me to understand-dumb reason) but Bohm's/Hiley's is interesting also, despite the strange properties of their quantum potential. I

 

[ThomasT]

Of all the models I've linked in this thread, I think, I find Valentini's model the most appealing (maybe because it's the easiest one for me to understand) but Bohm's/Hiley's is interesting also, despite the strange properties of their quantum potential.

Then I'll check out Valentini's model more closely. Thanks. As for Bohm's quantum potential ... maybe it would be informative for Demystifier to talk about this, as it seems to me to be a mathematical construction required to make dBB predictions fit with standard QM predictions that doesn't inform wrt ... reality.

 

[Ken G]

Here's another interesting ('Quantum Mechanics Without Wavefunctions') model that just got posted today:

Yes, this nicely highlights my objection to treating any of the concepts we cook up to do physics as anything but effectively, rather than actually, ontological: they are often non-unique in regard to the testable predictions they make. If reality has any attribute, should that attribute not be uniqueness? Even a "landscape" believer would presumably not hold that every interpretation of a given theory spawns a separate reality! Or, if we hold that one view is the actual reality, even though we have no evidence to distinguish it, do we not follow the path we often criticize about world religions?

 

[bohm2]

Yes, this nicely highlights my objection to treating any of the concepts we cook up to do physics as anything but effectively, rather than actually, ontological: they are often non-unique in regard to the testable predictions they make. If reality has any attribute, should that attribute not be uniqueness? Even a "landscape" believer would presumably not hold that every interpretation of a given theory spawns a separate reality! Or, if we hold that one view is the actual reality, even though we have no evidence to distinguish it, do we not follow the path we often criticize about world religions?

But we seem to progress and there seems to be some unity in science. It seems as if nature is forcing to always choose one path over another and as we do, our theories seem more unified and more encompassing and even lead to prediction of stuff we did not anticipate. Consider the unification of chemistry with physics and more recent molecular biology and chemistry. I don't know if this supports some correspondence/overlap between our cognitive structures and nature but it seems that way. Then again, we may be deceived. I have no clue. It is interesting what would happen at the limits of our understanding (assuming we reach the point)?

 

[Ken G]

It is interesting what would happen at the limits of our understanding (assuming we reach the point)?

Yes, it is a deep question whether or not science is converging toward some "ultimate truth" about reality, whether we ever get there or not. I would say that there is some convergence in science (even an amazing amount), but it is largely a convergence in the accuracy and power of our theories, not the theories themselves. Each new theory must be able to explain why some previous theory met with success (so in some sense must contain the previous theory), but the new theories don't really seem to be converging on anything. That's why I don't think it is reasonable to assume that the entire endeavor is converging uniformly-- only its accuracy and power.

 

[bohm2]

Each new theory must be able to explain why some previous theory met with success (so in some sense must contain the previous theory), but the new theories don't really seem to be converging on anything. That's why I don't think it is reasonable to assume that the entire endeavor is converging uniformly-- only its accuracy and power.

I kind of feel persuaded by this perspective, I think:

The idea instead is that our best theories latch on to the real structure to some degree; this structure will persist over theory change, because whatever element of real structure is tracked in the initial theory will be preserved within the degree to which real structure is represented within the updated theory.

“Revised Kantian Naturalism:Cognition and the Limits of Inquiry”
https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/33046/1/2011RoxburghFCPhD.pdf

I think the author offers some arguably good reasons also why structural realism may have some benefits over constructive empricism. But this stuff is very new for me, so I'm going to need to look at the arguments in more detail.

 

[Ken G]

My question: what is the "real structure", that a theory could latch onto? I'm not saying it's wrong, I'm saying it's not really saying anything.

 

[Ken G]

Let me give an example of what I mean. Shall we say that a circle and a straight line share some kind of "real structure"? We can certainly notice that within some given precision, a circle and a line tangential to it are indistinguishable over small enough scales, and only become distinguishable at larger scales. This means that for some problems, either will suffice, but for others, we'll need to choose one or the other. What more can we really say about circles and lines? I just don't see where there is a mechanism for saying "yes, they share the same real structure" or "no, they don't." But so it is with any two theories of physics that make similar predictions in one regime and different ones in another regime. It depends on the regime whether or not we will say they "share the same real structure"! So what does this expression even mean?

 

[bohm2]

My question: what is the "real structure", that a theory could latch onto? I'm not saying it's wrong, I'm saying it's not really saying anything.

Note what the author is claiming:

The claim that scientific theories track the truth about structural reality should be clearly distinguished from the claim that we know the real structure in question.

So if I'm understanding this, she is saying that while we may not literally know that "structure" (particularly given our cognitive limitations), that structure "out there" does force us to go into one direction with respect to theory formation versus another and this choice in theory inevitanly leads not only to progress but also "application of (new) scientific theories across vast sections of the universe, and even predictions of phenomena we did not anticipate" :

On the basis that the history of science shows us that scientific theories offer support to counter-factual claims, and generate (on occasion) successful novel predictions, then the course of scientific inquiry and discovery indicates that the world most likely consists of objective mind-independent modal relations. In other words:

If science tells us about objective modal relations among the phenomena (both possible and actual), then occasional novel predictive success is not miraculous but to be expected … Provision of these explanations is not a matter of satisfying philosophical intuitions, but of unifying scientific practices and theories … [W]e are [therefore] motivated … to take seriously the positive thesis that the world is structure and relations.

The author then gives arguments why ontic structural realism is a better position to take than constructive empiricism, particularly because the constructive empiricist's commitment to empirical evidence is itself not justifiable upon purely empirical grounds:

With such similarities in mind, one might wonder why it should be that ontic structural realism has anything to offer, over and above a constructive empiricist position. The debate, however, turns upon the issue of modality, or in other words, the commitment to unity (which instantiates a modal claim) on the side of the ontic structural realist, and the resistance towards modal claims (which amounts to a resistance towards the very notion of unity) on the side of the constructive empiricist. I shall spell out the argument for why constructive empiricism entails modal commitments after all.

So that,

...ontic structural realism achieves the full benefits of constructive empiricism, whilst additionally accounting for the success of novel prediction, the objectively modal structure of reality as well as the underlying notion of unity within scientific theories (for which constructive empiricism provides no account). All such features are precisely embodied in the RB (Regulative Boundary). Because of this, the better account would seem to be ontic structural realism, precisely because the latter matches the benefits of constructive empiricism along with additional important insights.

https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/33046/1/2011RoxburghFCPhD.pdf

Edit: My own personal opinion is that mind-independent reality transcends our mathematical models but those are the best cognitive tools we seem to have at our disposal for modeling it. My view of this is based on Eddington's arguments posted previously:

in regard to my one piece of insight into the background no problem of irreconcilability arises; I have no other knowledge of the background with which to reconcile it...There is nothing to prevent the assemblage of atoms constituting a brain from being of itself a thinking (conscious, experiencing) object in virtue of that nature which physics leaves undetermined and undeterminable. If we must embed our schedule of indicator readings in some kind of background, at least let us accept the only hint we have received as to the significance of the background— namely, that it has a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity

I don't think anything we can ever describe by mathematics or physics can ever do that, not because of some mysticism but because of our limitations, I think and probably for some reasons you mentioned, previously.

 

[Ken G]

So if I'm understanding this, she is saying that while we may not literally know that "structure" (particularly given our cognitive limitations), that structure "out there" does force us to go into one direction with respect to theory formation versus another and this choice in theory inevitanly leads not only to progress but also "application of (new) scientific theories across vast sections of the universe, and even predictions of phenomena we did not anticipate" :

But that's just what I'm objecting to, the idea that we are "forced to go in one direction". Where does she get that? To me, the history of physics is quite clearly a story of many directions, which overlap in some domain where they need to predict the same things (essentially, the domain of past observations), but do not overlap where they don't need to predict the same things (the new observations that require the new theory). What one direction?

As for the argument that to get novel predictions that end up being correct, we need to connect with some true structure of reality, to me that also doesn't pass to the level of an established logical argument. For one thing, we have the "winners write the history" problem. Yet how about all the novel predictions that failed? A "novel prediction" of Newton's laws is that atoms should emit light indefinitely as they pass to negative infinite potential energy, a "novel prediction" of classical blackbody thermodynamics is the "UV catastrophe" of emitting infinite energy. We knew these were wrong, but only because they were absurd, not because of any of the theory's "novelties."

Also, there is considerable question just what a "novel prediction" actually is. We consider the prediction of neutrinos and positrons, and now the Higgs, to be novel predictions, and they are indeed impressive predictions. But we don't consider it to be "novel" that if Newton's laws apply to cars and buses, that they will also apply to minivans. We have established they work in "similar" situations, so we are not surprised, but what is the difference between a "similar" situation and a "novel" one? There's no unambiguous way to make that distinction. Maybe positrons and neutrinos were just similar particles to the ones we developed our laws for, in which case their presence isn't really "novel" at all, and doesn't require the success of our theory to be viewed as prescient or hooked into some deeper truth.

Let me give you a clear example of what I mean-- Halley's comet. When Newton's laws explained Kepler's laws, we still didn't know the laws were of "universal gravity". Maybe they worked for planetary "stuff", but not cometary "stuff." Halley recognized the implications of the laws being truly universal-- and predicted the return of the comet that bears his name as a result. So what did that prove, that Newton's laws really did connect with the structure of reality, or simply that comets are "similar" to planets? We now know that Newton's "universal" gravity is wrong for light (it gets the answer wrong by a factor of 2, and that for weak gravity), so we might simply conclude that light is not "similar" to planets but comets are. What's so "novel" about that? All we can say is that nature supports a concept of similarity, which makes science possible, but that in no way tells us that we are connecting with the "true structure" of reality. I don't even see what that phrase is supposed to mean, beyond "science works by noticing nature's similarities and modeling them any way we can." The models might still have little to do with the reality, beyond successfully reflecting the similarities in the limited domains where we have noticed them. Just as Einstein's gravity has, ontologically speaking, little or nothing to do with Newton's.

Edit: My own personal opinion is that mind-independent reality transcends our mathematical models but those are the best cognitive tools we seem to have at our disposal for modeling it.

That seems reasonable to me. I'm not sure what "constructive empiricism" is, but if that's it, then I'm fine with it. In my view, physics is not something that nature does by itself, it is something that we do to try and understand nature. It's probably the best we can do, and it is amazingly successful, but not completely successful by a long shot. Above all, I see no reason to conclude that we are tapping into the "true structure" of anything, the very term seems to have no coherent meaning that could be independent of the science we do.

 

[Len M]

Edit: My own personal opinion is that mind-independent reality transcends our mathematical models but those are the best cognitive tools we seem to have at our disposal for modeling it. My view of this is based on Eddington's arguments posted previously:...


...I don't think anything we can ever describe by mathematics or physics can ever do that, not because of some mysticism but because of our limitations, I think and probably for some reasons you mentioned, previously.

I would say mind independent really transcends any notion we may have of human cognitive limitations - that very term "limitations" implies “in principle, if only we had superior mental powers we could do this or that”. You didn’t actually say “cognitive” so I may be misinterpreting you (if so apologies for that), but that’s the impression I glean. I actually think, without wishing to involve in any manner direct religious notions, the term “mystical” has relevance to the inaccessibility of mind independent reality.

I don’t see our reality as an independent mind/brain/person in one corner and an independent object in another corner separated by intrinsic space and observed in intrinsic time with the brain and senses being a kind of passive filter. That notion just seems to pander to our intuitive desires of wanting an object to be an object independently of us. Rather I see that scenario as a construct involving the “mind” in an active manner. Independently of the mind there maybe “something”, but I don’t see it as being in any kind of dualist form. For me, space and time, objects and mechanisms (whether it be the biological mechanism of the brain, the eye, a falling apple etc. etc.) within our reality “exist” separately only in terms of the “mind” – dualism is a product of our reality, it is not a structure in which we can choose to imagine to reside in or not.

From this perspective, the only reality we can ever know through science is the reality we practice the science in. It is successful because we have the notion of a separate mind and object along with intersubjective agreement. It wouldn’t matter how superior our intelligence could be thought to be in principle, we can still only operate within our reality. Within that science, I don’t know if sub atomic particles are actually a "real” part of our reality, I suspect not, rather we construct powerful models that represent the rules governing our measurements. I don’t even think that macroscopic events are “real” in the sense we give to them. Take the most simple observation that we can ever have – something moving through space and time. How on Earth does an object duplicate itself in an infinite number of different locations in space and time? It’s hard enough for me to come to terms with an object disappearing in one place and reconstructing itself (exactly) in another place, let alone accepting the fact that this has to happen an infinite number of times. To my mind the notion of a traveling object is clearly not something that exists independently of our reality, it only exists within it, and within that reality, mind is not a passive entity, it is the reality and within it the traveling object is a construct of the mind that adeheres to “rules”.

Perhaps our reality only consists of what we can "sense" in a macroscopic sense, – perhaps there are no "particles" between measurements to discover. Rather perhaps there are many ways in which we can “imagine” what could “cause” our observations, the actual underlying reality of the rules governing our observations may lie within mind independent reality, not in the sense of existing in one corner “waiting” to be acted upon by us in another corner, rather they lay outside of the very fabric of our reality. So in this sense, physics is seen not as the means of ever accessing mind independent realty (even in principle if we had greater mental powers), it is accessing our reality only and it does that by “imagining” mechanisms between measurements that in fact don’t exist as we imagine them, they are rather representations using the rules of nature as they play out in terms of macroscopic measurement.

What I do find intriguing though is the notion of mind "emerging" from mind independent reality in the form of having consistencies or “rules”. In this sense “existence” (in terms of mind independent reality) comes before knowledge (which is a logical premise within our reality), albeit in the sense that the "existence" I am talking about is not of any familiar notion, rather we may infer that from it, macroscopic rules “emerge” within our reality. This in no way implies that the "rules" emerge in any cause and effect manner, in fact there are no suitable words to describe this "emergence", such are the problems in trying to define a reality that is so disconnected to anything that we can be familiar with. So the notion that mind independent reality may be “veiled” (as Bernard d’Espagnat puts it) means that we may have some indirect connection with it, but no more than that. Going back to mysticism, d’Espagnat (in his books “Veiled Reality” and “On physics and Philosophy”) actually thinks that this access to mind independent reality may be available through the subconscious (meditation say), in other words beyond normal human perception and certainly beyond science.

This of course is a philosophical position (and one that I am increasingly drawn to) and I only mention it because it often seems to me that many people take the notion of mind independent reality only as being something different to phenomenon and consider (mainly because I think it is more amenable to our intuitive sense of what reality "should be") that it must lay within a familiar framework of space, time and dualism. That may be the case of course, but there is no requirement that we should think in that way – it is a perfectly legitimate philosophical perspective (supported I think by the many strange aspects of our reality) to consider that mind, dualism, space and time, (empirical reality) emerges a temporally from mind independent reality and thus renders the actual “construction” of mind independent reality as being somewhat mystical in nature. For myself, I don’t find that a troubling issue because I don’t consider there to be any direct link between science and its tremendous ability to explore our reality and the “exploration” of mind independent reality. The latter I consider lay firmly within the realm of philosophical enquiry.

 

[bohm2]

What I do find intriguing though is the notion of mind "emerging" from mind independent reality in the form of having consistencies or “rules”.

I thought this was an interesting argument by Strawson with respect to this point:

How can consciousness be physical, given what we know about what matter is like?" If one thinks this then one is, in Russell's words, "guilty, unconsciously and in spite of explicit disavowals, of a confusion in one's imaginative picture of matter". One thinks one knows more about the nature of matter-of the non-experiential-than one does. This is the fundamental error.

So the argument is that we really don't know enough about the nature of mind-independent reality to think that there’s a major puzzle in the emergence of consciousness.

Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap
http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Strawson.html

This is particularly relevant given Russell's "intrinsic nature" argument:

Physics is mathematical, not because we know so much about the 'physical world’—and here he means the non-mental, non-experiential world—but because we know so little: it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover. For the rest, our knowledge is negative...The physical world is only known as regards certain abstract features of its space-time structure-features which, because of their abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world of mind.

Realistic Monism
http://faculty.unlv.edu/beiseckd/Courses/PHIL-352/Dave%20-%20Consciousness%20PDFs/Strawson%20-%20Realistic%20Monism%20and%20Replies/Strawson%20-%20Realistic%20Monism%20Why%20Physicalism%20Entails%20Panpsychism.pdf

 

[Ken G]

So the argument is that we really don't know enough about the nature of mind-independent reality to think that there’s a major puzzle in the emergence of consciousness.

Yet I see something that I regard as backward in Strawson and Russell's positions. They are asking, why can't mind emerge from material "stuff", if we know so little about the true nature of material stuff? The problem is, what we mean by "material stuff" is only what we know about it in the first place-- it is a model, not the actual stuff, so our efforts to understand mind via emergence must by necessity refer to the "material stuff" that we know, not some ethereal version of it about which we have no language at all. This is the real problem, and their position is not resolving it at all! Indeed, I think they are actually making the counterargument against the concept of emergence-- what point is there in "emergence" if we admit we have no idea what it is "emerging" from?

 

[bohm2]

Yet I see something that I regard as backward in Strawson and Russell's positions. They are asking, why can't mind emerge from material "stuff", if we know so little about the true nature of material stuff? The problem is, what we mean by "material stuff" is only what we know about it in the first place-- it is a model, not the actual stuff...

I don't understand how that changes anything. Everything is filtered through our minds, so sure, we can only makes models (often mathematical ones) but the models refer to something.

 

[Ken G]

My point is that there is no meaning to the question "does mind emerge from the action of material stuff" that is one iota different from the question "can we understand mind by modeling it as emerging from the action of our models of material stuff." As soon as you frame the question like that, you immediately see that Strawson's and Russell's arguments get no traction-- if they are saying "mind can emerge from stuff because we can't understand stuff", they're not saying anything useful, it doesn't tell us a thing about consciousness. Or, if they are saying "we can understand mind emerging from stuff because we don't understand stuff", then they are saying nonsense, understanding cannot be obtained by connecting to what is not understood, understanding is obtained by connecting to what is understood. The key to seeing the vacuousness in their position is recognizing that we always have to be talking about our understanding of the "emergence" of mind.

 

[bohm2]

I don't understand what you're saying. One assumes that the brain/neurons play some role in thought/experience/subjectivity but no matter what I do/measure/slice I cannot literally "see" your thoughts/experiences but I assume you have them because I have them. So the question is how does such a biological/physical system (as presently conceived) like yourself spit out consciousness. As Nagel argues:

The specific problem I want to discuss concerns consciousness, the hard nut of the mind-body problem. How is it possible for conscious states to depend upon brain states? How can technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter? What makes the bodily organ we call the brain so radically different from other bodily organs, say the kidneys-the body parts without a trace of consciousness?...The mind-body problem is the problem of understanding how the miracle is wrought, thus removing the sense of deep mystery. We want to take the magic out of the link between consciousness and the brain."

Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/conceiving.pdf

Well Russell/Strawson are claiming that on some level we don't know enough about matter/the brain to make any such claims. This seems like a perfectly reasonable argument.

Edit: This stuff may be a bit off-topic to this thread, so maybe this thread is more appropriate:

Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=523765

 

[Ken G]

Well Russell/Strawson are claiming that on some level we don't know enough about matter/the brain to make any such claims. This seems like a perfectly reasonable argument.

You're right that the other thread might be more appropriate, but to complete this point, my interpretation of Russell/Strawson is that they are arguing that despite our tendency to be incredulous that material stuff could really act so profoundly, we should not be discouraged from trying to understand consciousness as emerging from a materialistic accounting of brain function. Their point seems to stand on the grounds that we don't understand what material stuff is actually capable of, so we should suspend that incredulity. My point was that the issue is not what material stuff is capable of, it is what material stuff is, or more correctly, how we think about material stuff. I'm saying that if we need to dramatically alter how we think about material stuff to give an accounting of what consciousness is, then we have already vacated the materialistic position, it doesn't make any difference what the new description of "material" looks like. Materialism doesn't mean a committment to always reassess the meaning of "material" to uphold whatever we need it to be, it means a committment to a given and present meaning of the term.

 

[bohm2]

Then I'll check out Valentini's model more closely...As for Bohm's quantum potential...

If one isn't too concerned about ontology, I guess this stuff isn't very important/interesting but if you are, here's an interesting criticism of Valentini's interpretation:

Next, Valentini claims that his interpretation of ψ as a ‘guiding field of information’ is “free of complications”. In claiming this, he evidently does not see the irreducibly multi-dimensional character of ψ as a “complication”. This point brings out an internal tension in his guidance view. He wants to interpret ψ (via the pilot wave S) in realistic terms as representing a physically real causal entity, yet he never expressly takes a stand regarding the status of the configuration space in which ψ exists. He introduces further ambiguity by equivocating upon the real physical status of ψ itself. While in one place he takes the view that “The pilot-wave theory is much better regarded in terms of an abstract ‘guiding field’ (pilot-wave) in configuration space...” , in another he states that “The quantum mechanical wave function ψ(x, t) is interpreted as an objectively existing ‘guiding field’ (or pilot-wave wave) in configuration space...”. Is ψ a concrete entity existing in a physically real space or is it only an abstract entity existing in a mathematical space? Valentini does, though, somewhat clarify his view elsewhere by stating that “the pilot wave ψ should be interpreted as a new causal agent, more abstract than forces or ordinary fields. This causal agent is grounded in configuration space...” .

Thus, the pilot wave or ‘guiding field’, while being more abstract than forces or classical fields, in the sense of being further removed conceptually from ordinary experience-the concept of ‘guiding field’ is achieved by abstracting the notion of ‘force’ from the classical concept of ‘field’, is nonetheless an objectively existing causal entity. But, that such an entity is grounded in configuration space implies that configuration space itself must be taken to be physically real in some sense. Whereas Albert takes an unequivocal (though perhaps incoherent) stand on this, Valentini leaves us without a clear idea of in what sense configuration space is to be regarded as physically real. Is configuration space itself the only physical reality? Or are both configuration space and ordinary space physically real? And, if so, are they real in the same physical sense? These questions remain to be answered for any interpretation of Bohmian mechanics that would postulate entities in configuration space.

Formalism, Ontology and Methodology in Bohmian Mechanics
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foda/2003/00000008/00000002/05119217

With respect to the quantum potential (Q) one of the main advantages is the following:

Regarding the causal view, though, we should consider one further argument for retaining the quantum potential over the objections of the guidance view. Besides playing a key role in explanation, the quantum potential is also crucial for formulating the classical limit in Bohmian mechanics. One of the chief advantages of Bohmian mechanics over standard quantum mechanics is that the former can formulate the classical limit in a mathematically precise and coherent way. Thus, in deciding the very meaning of Bohmian mechanics itself, one should take the classical limit into account.

So it's argued that Bohm's/Hiley's/Holland's version (e.g. with the quantum potention-Q) does not require one to draw some arbitrary distinction between the micro/macro-domain, since the classical limit is attained quite naturally: when Q/V <<<1, (where Q is quantum potential and V is classical potential) the quantum dynamical equation becomes the classical equation of motion so that "conceptually, a continuous passage from the microdomain to the macroworld is possible." Here's a graph of some of the different Bohmian interpretations and characteristics according to this author (Darren Belousek):

In the following table we summarize the five interpretations of Bohmian mechanics that we have considered, where each is appraised with respect to our desiderata of
(i) all postulated entities sould exist in 3-dimensional physical space;
(ii) the quantum state ψ should, in some way, be interpreted in physical (and not merely statistical) terms; and
(iii) the physical interpretation of ψ should adequately underwrite explanation of quantum phenomena

 

[bohm2]

I still think the heart of the problem with QM is related to this point, as Einstein, deBroglie, etc. argued. I can't see how both configuration space and ordinary 3-dimensional space are "equally physically real". Having said that I also don't understand what this configuration space represents but it can't be of the same nature as 3-dimensional space. But in many ways it kind of reminds me of the mind-body problem (e.g. how does one substance "spit out" or "act" on the other).

There are two related problems that immediately arise here. First, if both multi-dimensional configuration space and ordinary 3-dimensional space are to be equally physically real, then unless one spells out the physical relation between them, one will have divided the quantum world into two disparate realms. Second, if the quantum field (in whatever sense it is to be understood) exists in configuration space and particles move in ordinary 3-dimensional space, how is the quantum field to act causally upon the particles in order to guide their trajectories? Solving the second problem depends, of course, upon solving the first. One might reply to the first problem that ordinary 3-dimensional space can be regarded simply as a sub-space projection of the multi-dimensional configuration space.

But, for an N-particle system described by a 3N-dimensional configuration space, there are mutually orthogonal sub-space projections. Do we then have multiple disjoint ordinary spaces for each many-particle system, one for each particle? The significance of this situation can be brought out by considering the case of an N-particle system in a factorizable quantum state– ψ(q1, . . . , qN) = ψ1(q1) . . .ψN(qN). In contrast to the general case of a non-factorizable quantum state, in this case one can represent the system in terms of N ‘waves’, where ψi(qi) depends upon only the coordinates of the ith particle so that each ‘wave’ can be associated with a separate particle. But, the sub-spaces of the 3N-dimensional configuration space to which the respective ψi(qi)’s belong are all mutually orthogonal so that the N ‘waves’ and particles do not all exist in one and the same 3-dimensional space (unless one were to equivocate on the meaning of the qi ).

Thus, even in this case, one cannot simply regard the total quantum system as existing in ordinary 3-dimensional space, but rather must still regard it as existing irreducibly in configuration space, with each part existing in a ‘separate’ sub-space. And that would undercut any sense of a single system existing in one and the same physical space, which is surely requisite for a coherent physical theory.

Formalism, Ontology and Methodology in Bohmian Mechanics
http://www.springerlink.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/content/v73r718212357885/fulltext.pdf

 

[Ken G]

Here's the statement from that which I just don't think has a lot of scientific meaning: "how is the quantum field to act causally upon the particles in order to guide their trajectories?" What is it about quantum mechanics that makes people think questions like this should have an answer? It's almost like, quantum mechanics is so bizarre that it makes us forget the kinds of questions that physics ever has any way to answer, such that we start expecting more from our bizarre theories than we expect from our more common-sense theories.

There was nothing in classical mechanics in ordinary 3-space that ever answered questions like how do particles collide with each other, or how do fields act on particles, or why do fields obey field equations, and so on. Dumping all these particles into 3-space never answered any of these questions, the sole reason for doing it is that is the way our brains naturally organize our perceptions, which appears to have something to do with degrees of freedom and how that connects with geometry. But what does that have to do with how a quantum or electric field alike "act causally on particles"? That's backward, we have the fields because we can interpret them as acting causally, we didn't discover the fields in some acausal way and then say "hey, fields like this ought to act causally on particles." It's almost like these people think that if we dump the particles in 3-space, suddenly it makes perfect sense that they interact this way, so we need an interpretation of reality that is consistent with this common-sense understanding of how and why things "interact causally." But it doesn't make perfect sense, we still have no idea why they interact this way.

All we get from 3-space thinking is a closer connection to how we organize our sensory perceptions, such that we are familiar with the fact that they interact this way, and the interactions are consistent with the degrees of freedom we have taught ourselves to perceive. Don't get me wrong, familiarity is a crucial stage of understanding, so it's all well and good to make connections with what we are familiar with. But where does this idea that what we are familiar with should be "more real" than what we aren't? What is their definition of "more real" anyway, that which connects more closely with whatever we are already familiar? That sounds like a lexicon, not a reality, unless one sides with the close connection between those two-- which kind of puts "reality" into its proper place, but not the place it is often held up to.

 

[bohm2]

I think the assumption of "contact mechanics" was brought down by Newton's theory of gravity. But Einstein brought it back to a very significant degree with Relativity and the "field" concept and this seems to be at odds with QM. So we seem to be back to the same debate, I think. So I don't think the debates on this issue are unimportant. Here's some interesting historical quotes/insights from Newton's time:

Leibniz argued that Newton was reintroducing occult ideas similar to the sympathies and antipathies of the much-ridiculed scholastic science, and was offering no physical explanations for phenomena of the material world...Newton largely agreed with his scientific contemporaries. He wrote that the notion of action at a distance is “inconceivable.” It is “so great an Absurdity, that I believe no Man who has in philosophical matters a competent Faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it.” By invoking it, we concede that we do not understand the phenomena of the material world. As McMullin observes, “By ‘understand’ Newton still meant what his critics meant: ‘understand in mechanical terms of contact action’.”

“It was 40 years before Newtonian physics firmly supplanted Cartesian physics, even in British universities,” and some of the ablest physicists of the eighteenth century continued to seek a mechanical-corpuscular explanation of gravity—that is, what they took to be a physical explanation—as Newton did himself. In later years positivists reproached all sides of the debates “for their foolishness in clothing the mathematical formalism [of physical theory] with the ‘gay garment’ of a physical interpretation,” a concept that had lost substantive meaning.

Newton’s famous phrase “I frame no hypotheses” appears in this context: recognizing that he had been unable to discover the physical cause of gravity, he left the question open. He adds that “to us it is enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws
which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.” But while agreeing that his proposals were so absurd that no serious scientist could accept them, he defended himself from the charge that he was reverting to the mysticism of the Aristotelians. His principles, he argued, were not occult: “their causes only are occult”; or, he hoped, were yet to be discovered in physical terms, meaning mechanical terms.

Newton not only joined the great scientists of his day in regarding “the now prevailing theory of actio in distans … simply as absurd, [but] also felt himself obliged, in the year 1717, in the preface to the second edition of his ‘Optics,’ to protest expressly against [the] view” of his followers who “went so far as to declare gravity to be a fundamental force of matter,” requiring no “further mechanical explanation from the collision of imponderable particles.” Lange concludes that “the course of history has eliminated this unknown material cause [that so troubled Newton], and has placed the mathematical law itself in the rank of physical causes.” Hence “What Newton held to be so great an absurdity that no philosophic thinker could light upon it, is prized by posterity as Newton’s great discovery of the harmony of the universe!”

Thy Mysteries of Nature: How Deeply hidden?
http://www.journalofphilosophy.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/articles/issues/106/4/1.pdf

The problem is also nobody seems to know the meaning of this larger space (3-N dimensions)where the wave function lives. But it is at clearly at odds with the local classical field as Einstein notes:

It is further characteristic of these physical objects that they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated in different parts of space’. Unless one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the existence (the ‘being-thus’) of objects which are far apart from one another in space—which stems in the first place from everyday thinking— physical thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is also hard to see any way of formulating and testing the laws of physics unless one makes a clear distinction of this kind. This principle has been carried to extremes in the field theory by localizing the elementary objects on which it is based and which exist independently of each other, as well as the elementary laws which have been postulated for it, in the infinitely small (four-dimensional) elements of space.

Thus,

Einstein notes that in classical field theory all of the beables are local, and local in the strongest sense: the entire physical situation is nothing but the sum of the physical situations in the infinitely small regions of space-time.

 

[Ken G]

What all that says to me is that the glue that holds space and time into something we tend to view as "physically real" is causality. I can agree that causality plays a crucial role in physics, but notice the problem here-- if all that makes spacetime "real" is causality, then what makes causality real? I contend that even causality is nothing but an organizational tool used in our minds, quite similar to space and time (indeed they are largely the same). There is nothing "more real" and "less occult" about causality than action at a distance-- they are simply two models, one which has proven more reliable, and the other which has proven less so. So in the end we have what we started with: the "reality" of a model is never anything beyond its reliability, and when reliability is coupled with being close to how we organize perceptions, we annoint the concept with the title "realness." But it never means anything more than that, and is no less proviisional to tomorrow's experiments than any other present law of physics.

 

[Len M]

That’s why I think it perfectly legitimate to (philosophically) say that space and time does not exist within mind independent reality. Of course whether there actually is such a thing as “mind independent reality” is a philosophical question between realism and idealism, so perhaps it better to make a more general statement that space and time does not have to exist outside of the means by which we "experience" it. The means by which we "experience" space and time is also the means by which we do physics along with everything else within our reality. I haven’t thought of causality being similar to space and time before, but I can see your point.

 

[bohm2]

I think this issue of "causality" is interesting because one can think of some situations where it seems to break down. One is the "birth" of our universe. Then, there's the problem of conscious intention, choice, decision (e.g. mental "causation"). But even in so-called "causal" interpretations of QM like Bohmian mechanics there is a kind of non-causal part. For instance:

The quantum potential acts on the quantum particles in determining their trajectory, but the quantum particles are causally inert: they do not in turn act on the quantum potential. But this fact constitutes a serious objection to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics. One can with good reason follow Bell in acknowledging the need for local beables. It is, however, questionable whether one respects the spirit of Bell’s demand in posing local beables that are hidden variables and that are causally inert, not manifesting themselves in any way.

Causal realism
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8545/1/CausalReal2011.pdf

I'm not sure why but this "inertness" never bothered me. Same with the breakdown of spatio-temporality either. In fact, some argue that to make sense of consciousness requires it; as per Mcginn's "spatial problem for mind" argument:

How do conscious events cause physical changes in the body? Not by proximate contact, apparently, on pain of over-spatialising consciousness, and presumably not by action-at-a-distance either. Recent philosophy has become accustomed to the idea of mental causation, but this is actually much more mysterious than is generally appreciated, once the non-spatial character of consciousness is acknowledged. To put it differently, we understand mental causation only if we deny the intuition of non-spatiality. The standard analogy with physical unobservables simply dodges these hard questions, lulling us into a false sense of intelligibility...

Conscious phenomena are not located and extended in the usual way; but then again they are surely not somehow 'outside' of space, adjacent perhaps to the abstract realm. Rather, they bear an opaque and anomalous relation to space, as space is currently conceived. They seem neither quite 'in' it nor quite 'out' of it. Presumably, however, this is merely an epistemological fact, not an ontological one. It is just that we lack the theory with which to make sense of the relation in question. In themselves consciousness and space must be related in some intelligible naturalistic fashion, though they may have to be conceived very differently from the way they now are for this to become apparent. My conjecture is that it is in this nexus that the solution to the space problem lies. Consciousness is the next big anomaly to call for a revision in how we conceive space-just as other revisions were called for by earlier anomalies. And the revision is likely to be large-scale, despite the confinement of consciousness to certain small pockets of the natural world. This is because space is such a fundamental feature of things that anything that produces disturbances in our conception of it must cut pretty deeply into our world-view...That is the region in which our ignorance is focused: not in the details of neurophysiological activity but, more fundamentally, in how space is structured or constituted. That which we refer to when we use the word 'space' has a nature that is quite different from how we standardly conceive it to be; so different, indeed, that it is capable of 'containing' the non-spatial (as we now conceive it) phenomenon of consciousness

Consciousness and Space
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/ConsciousnessSpace.html

 

[Ken G]

It won't surprise you that I view the resolution of this kind of question to lie in the recognition that neither consciousness, nor any other more clearly physical phenomenon, "exists in" either real space or configuration space. Rather, the connection is the other way around-- the action of our intelligence, related to consciousness in some still mysterious way, is to take our sensory inputs and our efforts to organize and predict them, and insert them into conceptual frameworks we call real space and configuration space. That much is demonstrably true, it is very clear that we do exactly that, the question is can we correctly imagine that there is some other more fundamental meaning to these versions of space? I can't see any reason to think so, I can't see how the description I just gave is missing anything that could ever be established to be true by any scientific or even philosphical argument. To expect space to mean anything else is to mistake an effective ontology for a real one, but the latter concept is just a fantasy or pipe dream.

 

[bohm2]

It won't surprise you that I view the resolution of this kind of question to lie in the recognition that neither consciousness, nor any other more clearly physical phenomenon, "exists in" either real space or configuration space. Rather, the connection is the other way around-- the action of our intelligence, related to consciousness in some still mysterious way, is to take our sensory inputs and our efforts to organize and predict them, and insert them into conceptual frameworks we call real space and configuration space. That much is demonstrably true, it is very clear that we do exactly that, the question is can we correctly imagine that there is some other more fundamental meaning to these versions of space? I can't see any reason to think so, I can't see how the description I just gave is missing anything that could ever be established to be true by any scientific or even philosphical argument. To expect space to mean anything else is to mistake an effective ontology for a real one, but the latter concept is just a fantasy or pipe dream.

Your position seems consistent but let's assume your model/description is accurate/true. I'm not a philosopher, but I have across arguments like this:

Wouldn't your own model preclude you from making any such claims (e.g. demonstrably true)? In some sense, you are arguing that we can't project 'a priori' categories of mind unto unknowable 'things-in-themselves'. Whether such things really exist we are not in a position to say. But, doesn't that very model/position you are advocating for preclude you from making any such claims? I mean, you are arguing about how things "really" are, aren't you? Or is this argument flawed?

 

[bohm2]

I haven't read the piece closely, but this seems like an interesting summary/argument (by Esfeld et al.) for the dispositional interpretation of Bohmian mechanics ('ψ as Property'):

The spatial configuration of a universe of N particles at time t is represented by a vector Q(t) ∈ IR^3N. This vector can be regarded as a point in configuration space, but represents the actual configuration of the particles in three-dimensional physical space. The 3N-dimensional configuration space is usually understood as the mathematical representation of all possible configurations of N particles existing in three-dimensional physical space. Regarding the universal wave-function as a complex-valued function Ψ(x), the variable x then ranges over all possible spatial configurations of the universe. A tension now arises when this function is supposed to represent a physical field, existing as a concrete entity in the actual physical world. Then, one either has to argue that the space of possible configurations somehow supervenes on the actual configuration of the particles in physical space, or grant it an independent reality in addition to three-dimensional physical space. The dispositionalist, by contrast, has no such troubles. In being located in a certain manner in three-dimensional physical space, the particles have the disposition to move in a certain way...In short, there is a disposition for a certain form of motion as a property of the particles instead of a field or a pilot-wave external to the particles that is supposed to move them. Nonetheless, it may seem that the dualism of entities has simply been replaced with a dualism of properties...There is no problem of connection of the various properties admitted in the ontology, if all elements of the ontology are located in physical space and, moreover, if all properties are properties of the particles. In other words, even if there is a dualism of properties, it does not give rise to the objections that hit the dualistic ontology of particles in physical space and a field on configuration space.

The ontology of Bohmian mechanics
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9381/1/Bohm-ont1012.pdf

I still don't see this view as being very clear or it is clear and I don't understand it fully. With respect to the pilot-wave interpretations, I still find the arguments presented by Valentini and Bohm/Hiley more plausible: an ontological interpretation of the wave-function where the wave-function represents an element of physical reality but not falling under any of the familiar categories we are used to (e.g. particles, fields).

 

[Quantumental]

I find this paper by Wallace and Timpson interesting: http://arxiv.org/abs/0907.5294
In it they argue against configuration space wf realism and for what they call space time state realism.

 

[bohm2]

I find this paper by Wallace and Timpson interesting: http://arxiv.org/abs/0907.5294
In it they argue against configuration space wf realism and for what they call space time state realism.

I read that article before and had trouble understanding it but they seem to be arguing for the claim that three-dimensional objects exist emergently, given the 3N-dimensional ontology. They write:

While the wave-function realist will deny that 3-dimensional objects and spatial structures find a place in the fundamental ontology, this is not to say that the 3-dimensional objects surrounding us, with which we constantly interact, and which we perceive, think and talk about, do not exist, that there are not truths about them. It is just to maintain that they are emergent objects, rather than fundamental ones. But an emergent object is no less real for being emergent...It is also worth keeping in mind that many workers in quantum gravity have long taken seriously the possibility that our 4-dimensional spacetime will turn out to be emergent from some underlying reality that is either higher-dimensional (as in the case of string theory) or not spatio-temporal at all (as in the case of loop quantum gravity). In neither case is it suggested that ordinary spacetime is non-existent, just that it is emergent.

And I'm guessing emergence would occur via decoherence? But as I understand it, decoherence cannot do that. Monton has also criticized Wallace's/Timpton's arguments for other reasons. He writes:

But it’s not clear from Wallace and Timpson’s discussion what’s meant to ground the claim that three-dimensional objects exist emergent...Maybe Wallace and Timpson hold that there’s something special about the structure of the wave function in 3N-dimensional space that gives rise to three-dimensional objects, even in a world where there’s no experience at all. I have two responses. First, I’d need to see the argument. Second, I don’t think one could provide a sound argument for this, because reality doesn’t work that way. It’s simply not the case that one can have a 3N-dimensional space with a field evolving in it, such that when the field has a certain configuration three-dimensional objects come into existence. Granted, this isn’t logically impossible–there could be laws of physics that specify the conditions under which three-dimensional objects come into existence–but for them to come into existence emergently, without this happening in accordance with certain novel laws of physics, is not the way a world where quantum mechanics is true works.

Against 3-N Dimensional space
http://spot.colorado.edu/~monton/BradleyMonton/Articles.html

I'm guessing here that Monton is just presenting the same argument presented by jostpuur in this thread?

In the end, there is no precise way of telling if this should be a one particle in a 3N-dimensional space, N particles in a 3-dimensional space, or 3N particles in one dimension.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=285019

 

[bohm2]

Edit: So basically Monton is arguing that there is no particular reason why the wave function's space should lead to an emergent 3-D space versus some other space; that is, there is no intrinsic structure in the wave function's space marking out a preferred grouping of axes into 3's. I'm not sure if this is related in any way to Ilja's or Maudlin's argument.

 

[Quantumental]

And I'm guessing emergence would occur via decoherence? But as I understand it, decoherence cannot do that.

But why not? I know that Tim Maudlin objects to it, but I've seen very few others with the exception of Amit Hagar's recent paper: http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/370/1975/4594.full.pdf

Monton makes some good points, but I don't see any technical objections in his paper.

Jostpuur seems to conclude the opposite in that thread.

I know that Wallace and Timpson reject configuration space wavefunction realism, but I don't see why emergence cannot work out in space time state realism.
Obviously this would still not solve Born Rule, but if we ignore that for now and focus on ontology, I am still on the fence

 

[bohm2]

But why not? I know that Tim Maudlin objects to it, but I've seen very few others with the exception of Amit Hagar's recent paper: http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/370/1975/4594.full.pdf

Thanks for the link. He does reference (see reference 55) Maudlin's article we discussed. But I know you didn't find that argument convincing.

With respect to decoherence, and from my understanding, decoherence on it's own cannot explain the emergence of 3 dimensions. It needs to be supplemented with an ontology. Am I mistaken?

Edit: I posted this before and I'm still trying to understand how this all fits into the criticisms offered by Maudlin and Ilja:

In simplified terms: the Everett worlds splitting (branching) is not allowed for the realistic Everett worlds. Thus, we conclude: Unless there is a privileged, spatial structure (decomposition into subsystems) of the model-universe, Everett Interpretation appears either to be not correct or the Everett-worlds (the Everett ”branches”) are not physically real. The interpretational consequences as well as some ramifications of our findings are yet to be explored.

Quantum Structures of a Model-Universe: Questioning the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1109.6424.pdf

 

[bohm2]

Even though I don't find her functionalist argument persuasive, this is a very interesting paper discussing whether we can recover 3-space from configuration space and if we can't what it means:

There are now several, realist versions of quantum mechanics on offer. On their most straightforward, ontological interpretation, these theories require the existence of an object, the wavefunction, which inhabits an extremely high-dimensional space known as configuration space. This raises the question of how the ordinary three-dimensional space of our acquaintance fits into the ontology of quantum mechanics. Recently, two strategies to address this question have emerged. First, Tim Maudlin, Valia Allori, and her collaborators argue that what I have just called the ‘most straightforward’ interpretation of quantum mechanics is not the correct one. Rather, the correct interpretation of realist quantum mechanics has it describing the world as containing objects that inhabit the ordinary three-dimensional space of our manifest image. By contrast, David Albert and Barry Loewer maintain the straightforward, wavefunction ontology of quantum mechanics, but attempt to show how ordinary, three-dimensional space may in a sense be contained within the high-dimensional configuration space the wavefunction inhabits. This paper critically examines these attempts to locate the ordinary, three-dimensional space of our manifest image “within” the ontology of quantum mechanics. I argue that we can recover most of our manifest image, even if we cannot recover our familiar three-dimensional space.

The Status of our Ordinary Three Dimensions in a Quantum Universe
http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/alyssaney/research/papers/Ney_3DQM.pdf

 

[Quantumental]

Even though I don't find her functionalist argument persuasive, this is a very interesting paper discussing whether we can recover 3-space from configuration space and if we can't what it means:

The Status of our Ordinary Three Dimensions in a Quantum Universe
http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/alyssaney/research/papers/Ney_3DQM.pdf

I don't see any functionalist argument here, all she does is mention that "if through functionalism it works, then it might be enough to describe our experiences"".

Personally I am a dedicated functionalist, but I'm not sure whether that is enough to get emergent structure out of a wavefunction.

I'd love to hear Ilja's thoughts aswell

 

[bohm2]

I don't see any functionalist argument here, all she does is mention that "if through functionalism it works, then it might be enough to describe our experiences"".

Her major argument is a functionalist one. Although she doesn’t seem to commit herself to Wallace’s or Albert’s version. She writes:

How does this work? We begin by being functionalists about the material objects of our manifest image–all that is required for there to be a chair is for there to be something that can play the functional role of a chair. For there to be a person, there just must be something that can play the functional role of a person. Albert suggests that any physics that is going to have a chance at describing our world as we experience it is going to have to describe a wavefunction that evolves in such a way that it is able to play the functional role of a universe with tables and chairs and people in it (1996, pp. 279-280)...

The idea is this. Accept the straightforward, ontological reading of these realist versions of quantum mechanics. In other words, accept that all there is fundamentally is a wavefunction in configuration space. Then the claim is that in the actual world, the behavior of the wavefunction over time is such that it is able to play the functional role we ordinarily associate with material objects in a three-dimensional...

I am claiming that while functionally-enacted chairs are chairs, and functionally enacted people are people, for a substantivalist, functionally-enacted space is nothing more than a simulation...We can allow that the fundamental space of quantum mechanics is the high-dimensional configuration space, but also claim that there is a derivative, functionally-enacted three-dimensional space occupied by tables, chairs, and people.

But I still don’t buy her argument for some of the same reasons mentioned by Monton and others. I don’t, however, agree with Monton that the wave function/configuration space is just some sort of illusion. I think both spaces and ontologies (wave function and particles) do represent something that exists in the world but not in the minimalist way argued by Maudlin/DGZ where the wave function is treated as a law.

 

[bohm2]

Can't say I fully understand Wayne Myrvold's argument so I guess I'll have to wait for his paper but here's a recent talk/video where he argues the following:

The fact that the quantum wavefunction of a many-particle system is a function on a high-dimensional configuration space, rather than on spacetime, has led some to suggest that any realist understanding of quantum mechanics must regard configuration space as more fundamental than spacetime. Worse, it seems that a wavefunction monist ontology cannot help itself to talk of "configuration space" at all, without particles for the configurations to be configurations of. The wavefunction, it might seem, threatens to become a function defined on a high-dimensional space whose relation to spacetime is obscure. I will argue that such worries are misplaced.

What is a wavefunction?
http://www.perimeterinstitute.ca/videos/what-wavefunction

 

[Quantumental]

Interesting, but I still think that there are stronger arguments against WF realism in config space.

Even David Wallace has abandoned that view and now try to make a many worlds interpetation in a view he calls space time state realism, but even there the preferred basis problem (which that paper we discussed the other day highlights) and the born rule still shows it can't be done

 

[bohm2]

I thought this interpretation (see below) of Bohm’s/Hiley’s quantum potential/active information scheme by Seager was an interesting one and actually makes more sense to me than the one proposed by Bohm/Hiley. First, consider the problem with the pilot-wave dualist ontology as acknowledged by Bohm:

Finally, our model in which wave and particle are regarded as basically different entities, which interact in a way that is not essential to their modes of being, does not seem very plausible. The fact that wave and particle are never found separately suggests instead that they are both different aspects of some fundamentally new kind of entity which is likely to be quite different from a simple wave or a simple particle, but which leads to these two limiting manifestations as approximations that are valid under appropriate conditions.

There’s also the problem of how an "informational field" can guide/interact with the particle, particularly because it can't be by any "mechanical" interaction (non-local). Moreover, the field acts on the particles but the particle doesn't act on the field. This goes against Einstein's action-reaction principle (Newton’s third law). Lee Smolin also criticizes this dualistic ontology on similar grounds:

This dependence is awkward because of a principle, which we can call the principle of explanatory closure: anything that is asserted to influence the behavior of a real system in the world must itself be a real system in the universe. It should not be necessary to postulate anything outside the universe to explain the physics within the one universe where we live. This means that the wavefunction must correspond to something real in the world. In the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation this is satisfied by asserting that the wavefunction is itself a beable. This results in a dual ontology-both the particle and the wavefunction are real. But this violates another principle, which is that nowhere in Nature should there be an unreciprocated action. This means that there should not be two entities, the first of which acts on the second, while being in no way influenced by it. But this is exactly what the double ontology of deBroglie-Bohm implies, because the wavefunction acts on the particles, but the positions of the particles play no role in the Schroedinger equation which determines the evolution of the wavefunction.

So, is there a way to circumvent these problems? Seager suggests a Russellian/Eddington-type solution. Recall first, that Russell (and Eddington) argued that:

Physics is mathematical, not because we know so much about the 'physical world' but because we know so little: it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover. For the rest, our knowledge is negative...The physical world is only known as regards certain abstract features of its space-time structure — features which, because of their abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world of mind.

So basically physics can only tell us only about the relational/extrinsic properties of matter but has little to say about the intrinsic ground of such objects. Seager then suggests that perhaps Bohm’s model does give us a glimpse of the "intrinsic" properties of matter:

Hiley frequently expresses the distinction between active information and Shannon information as the latter being ‘information for us’ whereas the former is ‘objective information’ . Shannon information is ‘for us’ in the sense that we must always interpret the information structures or ‘signals’ in terms of some meaning we interpretively impose on some physical process. But at some level, interpretation must give out. That is, Shannon information requires some intrinsic grounding. Active information can thus be seen as playing the role of the intrinsic ground for the purely structural features of Shannon information. What exactly active information is remains somewhat mysterious. The quantum potential is the direct structural reflection of it in our world but that—of course—says little about its intrinsic nature. It is tempting to link active information with consciousness if only for the reason that conscious states seem to carry meaning intrinsically (as intentional content), and nothing else we know of does so. Such a view is at odds with the claim that the implicate order is neither mental nor physical however.

So the core of Seager’s argument is that we know with absolute certainty that some macroscopic phenomena of the world are intrinsically mental even though we don't literally "see"/measure such phenomena. So if one cannot fathom how mental stuff can emerge from stuff currently described by physics, it is tempting to speculate that the intrinsic nature of the basic constituents of the world must have some vestiges of some property that allows for the possibility of emergence of mind at the macroscopic level:

It is indeed the case that mind cannot emerge from scientifically described extrinsic properties like mass, charge, and spin, but do we know that mind could not emerge from the intrinsic properties that underlie these scientifically observable properties? It might be argued that since we know absolutely nothing about the intrinsic nature of mass, charge, and spin, we simply cannot tell whether they could be something non-mental and still constitute mentality when organised properly. It might well be that mentality is like liquidity: the intrinsic nature of mass, charge and spin might not be mental itself, just like individual H2O-molecules are not liquid themselves, but could nevertheless constitute mentality when organised properly, just like H2O-molecules can constitute liquidity when organised properly (this would be a variation of neutral monism). In short, the problem is that we just do not know enough about the intrinsic nature of the fundamental level of reality that we could say almost anything about it. Finally, despite there is no ontological difference between the micro and macro levels of reality either on the intrinsic or extrinsic level, there is still vast difference in complexity. The difference in complexity between human mentality and mentality on the fundamental level is in one-to-one correspondence to the scientific difference in complexity between the brain and the basic particles. Thus, even if the intrinsic nature of electrons and other fundamental particles is in fact mental, this does not mean that it should be anything like human mentality—rather, we can only say that the ontological category their intrinsic nature belongs to is the same as the one our phenomenal realm belongs to. This category in the most general sense is perhaps best titled ‘ideal’.

So whereas Bohm/Hiley have an interaction problem of how the wave function which lives in configuration space can interact with the particle evolving in 3-space, Seager treats the wave function as the intrinsic part a single entity.

Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order
http://www.springerlink.com/content/0253782470826522/fulltext.pdf?MUD=MP

From the Heisenberg Picture to Bohm: a New Perspective on Active Information and its relation to Shannon Information
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/tpru/BasilHiley/Vexjo2001W.pdf

Mind as an Intrinsic Property of Matter
http://users.utu.fi/jusjyl/MIPM.pdf