There's been a bunch of threads about Einstein's postulates before. This is a summary of what I've been saying in some of the more recent threads:
1. Einstein's "postulates" aren't well-defined enough to be the axioms of a mathematical theory. The biggest problem with them is that they use the concept "inertial frame" without a definition.
2. Any definition of "inertial frame" that's appropriate for special relativity will actually include both of Einstein's postulates in some form.
3. This means that Einstein's postulates are useless both as a definition of special relativity and as a starting point of rigorous derivations of theorems.
4. The postulates are just a list of properties that Einstein thought that a good theory of space and time should have. He wanted to find a new theory and at the time he was only willing to consider theories that had those specific properties.
5. This means that there's nothing wrong with using very non-rigorous methods when you're trying to derive something from Einstein's postulates. (In fact it wouldn't make any sense at all to try to do things rigorously). For example, if you can't prove that Lorentz transformations must be linear maps, then don't. Just guess that they are and move on.
6. When you do the sort of things I'm talking about in 5, you will end up with something that looks a lot like Minkowski space. This suggests that you can take Minkowski space to be the mathematical model of space and time in the new theory.
7. Minkowski space is mathematically well-defined, and therefore an excellent starting point for derivations of mathematical theorems about the properties of space and time. It also includes a version of the second postulate explicitly and suggests a very natural way to include the first postulate. (It also includes the additional postulates that Ich mentioned).
8. No mathematical model can make predictions about the outcome of any experiment all by itself. We also need to make some identifications between things in the model and things in the real world. (I recently started
this thread about that, but it didn't really go anywhere). Those identifications can't be derived from anything else, so they must be postulated.
9. What I'm saying in 8 is that we need to specify what sort of gizmos in the real world we think will be able to measure real-world quantities that correspond to things in the mathematical model. Every such specification is a
postulate of the theory. For example, this is a statement that (unlike Einstein's postulates) deserves to be called a postulate of both special and general relativity: "What a clock measures corresponds to the proper time along the curve in Minkowski space that represents the clock's motion".
It seems to me that what Zonde is going for in #1 is another example of an identification between something in the real world and something in the model. It's necessary to specify in some way what sort of thing in the model corresponds to "what we measure with a meter stick" in the real world. So I agree with Zonde that it's definitely necessary to postulate something like that, although I might do it a bit differently.