Sherlock said:
But to adopt MWI requires that one take quantum theory as a complete description of an underlying reality --- and there's no particular reason to believe that it is.
The viewpoint that quantum theory doesn't completely define an underlying reality is why there is a measurement problem in the first place. So, while solving the measurement problem by assuming that quantum theory is a complete description might seem economical, it isn't necessarily the most reasonable approach to take.
Yes, but that's about the only argument. It doesn't seem "reasonable" ; it is "just too crazy". As I repeated zillions of times, quantum theory is no better than any other scientific theory, and can, as such, be falsified. When that happens, all what goes with it as "picture of the world" can of course go down the drain, and it is up to the new queen in town to say what's now the new picture. This ephemere nature of things is inherent in any scientific endeveour. So if you ask me if quantum theory "really" describes the world, as with all scientific knowledge, I put this caveat. However, quantum theory is NO LESS a scientific theory than any other. Given its empirical success, I don't see why it should be a LESSER theory than any other scientific theory. I don't see why quantum theory should receive that dubious stature of "complete description of outcome of experiment" together with "it is of course NOT a DESCRIPTION of an underlying reality". Why not ? What's so terrible about quantum theory as a scientific theory, that others don't have ? Why should we take the 4-dim space-time manifold of GR somehow as a "description of underlying physical reality" but the wavefunction of quantum theory not - apart from the usual caveat about scientific theories, namely that one day, they can be falsified ? Isn't this similar to accepting natural evolution for animals, and even as an empirically complete theory for humans, except of course that it is "not reasonable" to say that our far ancestors were apes ?
Thus, Bohmian Mechanics for example is a more reasonable approach to the measurement problem because it is a hidden variable theory of underlying processes, which MWI (as well as quantum theory according to the standard interpretation) isn't.
There are serious conceptual problems with Bohmian mechanics too, because of the mixture between epistemological and ontological concepts. In essence the "quantum equilibrium condition" - the requirement that our INITIAL KNOWLEDGE of the state of the system, as a probability distribution, corresponds to |psi|^2 of the ONTOLOGICAL state (the wavefunction, with all its parallel worlds, is as much part of the ontology of Bohmian mechanics as it is in MWI - the only thing we have extra is a "token" (the particle positions) which indicate which branch we're supposed to collectively experience). So if you say that, in Bohmian mechanics, the subjective experience is only derived from the particle positions, and not from the wavefunction (both are part of the "state of the world"), then there's no way of requiring that our knowledge of the particle positions of our body should not be more precise than what's allowed by the HUP and the wavefunction (and if you do that, Bohmian mechanics breaks down). It is only in the particular case when our subjective knowledge of our own bodystate corresponds to particle positions with a probability distribution given by the wavefunction, that Bohmian mechanics can save the HUP. But this means that the particle positions, by themselves are NOT the thing that determines (as in classical physics), our subjective perception: the wavefunction is just as much part of it. And in Bohmian mechanics, the wavefunction is exactly the same one as in MWI (no collapse) - with all its parallel branches and all that.
So the relationship between subjective experience, knowledge, particle positions and wavefunctions is just as involved in Bohmian mechanics as it is in MWI. On top of that, Bohmian mechanics is not compatible with the minkowski spacetime view of SR. So I'd say that Bohmian mechanics has its own interpretational issues, and is not as clear as Newtonian mechanics in any case.
In saying that it's all, at least for now, a matter of taste and opinion, you've hit upon the most economical viewpoint which is that all of the alternative formulations-interpretations of quantum theory are models, ie. fictions, and there really is no physical basis for choosing one over the other --- which brings you right back to conventional quantum theory (at least until there is some compelling reason to adopt a different formulation).
This is not entirely true. Ether theory also works for special relativity. Does that mean that special relativity has no ontology ?
Then there's Bell's (vis ttn) two-part argument for nonlocality. If this argument is indeed sound, then relativity's prohibition on superluminal causation is just wrong and the ONLY approach that then makes sense is something along the lines of Bohmian Mechanics.
I would like to point out that ttn agrees that the *other* way out is MWI - but considers it "just too crazy".
But under no formulation is there any physical meaning to the notion that a tennis ball can tunnel through, say, a brick wall.
I think it is of the same order as the physical meaning of all life on Earth dying, because all air molecules suddenly end up in a big lump on top of Antarctica.
My impression of the entire interpretational debate of quantum theory is that we've been inventing all of this "empirically complete but ontologically meaningless" positivist babble because we simply refuse to make the mental step which the quantum formalism cries out, and that is: the wavefunction describes reality - with the usual scientific caveat of the possibility of being falsified one day. Just as one could refuse the mental step that his great great great old dad was something close to a chimp, or that the sun doesn't turn around the earth, or that the Earth isn't flat, or that organic chemistry is like any chemistry... I agree that the mental shock is greater. The entire speculation, and the "matter of opinion" resides in fact in speculation of how quantum theory will be falsified.
For instance, according to Bohr, quantum theory does NOT describe macroscopic objects, but classical physics does. This means that certain quantum interference experiments, with large enough objects, will *falsify* quantum theory.
But this is an odd way of thinking! Never before, in the interpretation of a new theory, we started by speculating on how it was going to FAIL ! Newton didn't say that his theory of matter points in Euclidean space was probably just an approximation to a field theory ! Einstein never said that the 4-dim spacetime manifold was probably an erroneous concept which gave good empirical results, but which was probably going to be shown to be wrong ! So this is what I don't understand: people thinking about quantum theory seem to START with the assumption that it must be somehow fundamentally flawed, and base their view of things on that. Strange...